


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





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THE
HISTORY OF CANADA.

BY
WILLIAM KINGSFORD, LL.D., F.R.S. [CANADA].

VOL. VI.
[1776-1779.]
[WITH MAPS.]



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THE HISTORY OF CANADA

FROM THE EARLIEST DATE OF FRENCH RULE.

CHAPTER I.

The advanced season of the year when Montgomery descended the Saint Lawrence, with the conviction that the possession of Quebec was an immediate certainty, forcibly suggested that no time should be lost in carrying out his purpose. He believed that he had only to shew himself before the walls, for the gates to be thrown open to him to enter and dictate his own terms. The most effective portion of the troops in Canada had surrendered at Saint John's; the few regulars in the garrison were young soldiers; the sailors taken from mercantile vessels were without discipline; the "Royal Emigrants" was a regiment lately raised. There were the few blue jackets from the war vessels who commanded a certain respect, for they were under disciplined officers: but it was a service different from that in which they were ordinarily engaged, while the duty would be doubly trying, owing to many of them, for the first time, being subjected to the severity of a Quebec winter. This limited, ill-assorted garrison had in addition only some hundreds of volunteers taken from the British and French Canadian population. It was on the want of endurance and want of discipline of this portion of the force that Montgomery to some extent relied. He believed that they would never submit to the privations of the siege, or to the strain upon their powers; not only from the suffering which it would entail, but from the feeling that the active sympathies of the majority were

entirely on his side, and that they only sought the opportunity to declare themselves openly in his favour.

Montgomery's illusions on this point were rapidly dispelled. One of the first items of intelligence he must have received was that the active sympathisers, on whom he most counted, had been ordered outside the walls ; while those who were his spies must have made known to him the active and willing participation of all present in the common defence, and that the strictest discipline prevailed. He must have felt great anxiety on finding the situation so different from what he had expected and hoped. The capitulation of Montreal ; the surrender of Preston at Lavaltrie ; Three Rivers placed under his authority, while he was sitting in his quarters in Montreal, had led Montgomery to believe that the spirit of resistance in Canada was dead, and that his one difficulty would be to agree upon the terms on which the ancient fortress would surrender. Such expectations at once passed away. The garrison under a renowned soldier, with lieutenants accustomed to war, whose reputation he well knew, the citizens, with arms in their hands, devoted to the mother country, furnished a different spectacle from that imagined by the "whisperings of fancy." He was entering upon a season when the cold is often intense, when movement in the field is difficult, having under his command troops gathered hastily together within the last few months, without discipline, officered by men without knowledge, all of whom could not but be affected by the disappointed hopes which, in common with their leader, they had encouraged. Montgomery must clearly have felt the magnitude of the task he had undertaken. His whole force amounted to between 1,500 and 2,000 men, with a detachment of some hundred French Canadians who had joined him in thorough confidence of his success, on whom he could place reliance only so long as his good fortune attended him. He had, with the main force, landed on the 5th of December at Saint Foy, his artillery having been disembarked at Cap Rouge.* Arnold here joined him, and was despatched to

* [Carleton to Howe, 12 Jan., 1776, *Can. Arch.*, Q. 12, p. 11.]

occupy the suburb of Saint Roch in a separate command. Two batteries were constructed against the walls, one on the heights opposite Saint John's gate, within seven hundred yards; a second at Saint Roch, at the same distance. Montgomery was no sooner established in his position than he addressed a letter to Carleton, written in the worst possible taste. It painfully suggests his own sense of the desperate crisis in which he was placed. The treatment which Arnold's letter of the previous month had received should have led him to believe, that any communication from himself would meet no better fate.* Arnold's first letter, in which he demanded the surrender of the city, had been delivered, but remaining unacknowledged, he wrote a second letter complaining that his flag of truce had been fired upon, which likewise obtained no notice. With this experience Montgomery formed the opinion that any communication sent in military form would be refused; he accordingly adopted the unusual course of engaging an old woman to be the bearer of his letters. One was addressed to Carleton, the second to "his friends and fellow-subjects"; both were dated the 6th of December, and, consequently, must have been written the day after his arrival. The old woman succeeded in obtaining admission and in delivering the letters, but she was arrested, imprisoned for a few hours, and then drummed out of the city.

Montgomery's letter could only have been written under strong feelings of excitement. Addressed to one of Carleton's character, it is difficult to conceive anything more unwise or more unlikely to reach the purpose it was designed to attain. It professed the desire to save Carleton from destruction: in offensive language it depreciated the character of the garrison and its powers of resistance; and held before the defenders the threat of famine, with the hopelessness of relief. At the same time, Montgomery dwelt upon the excellence of his own force and its previous successes in the campaign, and he added that he had difficulty in exercising restraint to

* Vide Vol. V., p. 483.

stay his men, in their anger, from immediately storming the ramparts. One can conceive the grim smile of contempt with which this bombast was read by Carleton; more especially the concluding threat, that if the stores were destroyed no mercy would be shewn.

The letter to the inhabitants expressed Montgomery's sorrow that he would have to overwhelm them with distress. He threatened them, should resistance be offered, with both "carnage and plunder." These letters detract from Montgomery's character and shew the weak side of his nature, how ill-fitted he was to cope with difficulty and disaster. Hitherto he had been favoured in an extraordinary degree by circumstances. His success had arisen from the great mass of the Canadian people having taken sides with him and from the weakness of the opposition he had experienced. A small body of French Canadians had accompanied him in his present enterprise. However he affected to despise the force which he had to overcome before entering the city, he could not but feel that it was formidable, so long as it remained united: that the defenders were led by a soldier of experience and high courage, devoted to the cause in which he was engaged, and that under him were many determined officers who would hold the fortress so long as defence was possible.*

* That the reader may form his own view of Montgomery's letters, I append them in full :—

² "Holland House, 6 Dec. [no year].

"SIR,—Notwithstanding the personal ill-treatment I have received at your hands, and notwithstanding your cruelty to the unhappy Prisoners you have taken, the feelings of humanity induce me to have recourse to this expedient to save you from the Destruction which hangs over you. Give me leave Sir, to assure you, I am well acquainted with your situation. A great extent of Works in their nature incapable of defence, manned with a motley crew of Sailors, the greatest part our friends, of citizens who wish to see us within their Walls, & a few of the worst troops who ever stiled themselves Soldiers. The impossibility of relief & the certain prospect of wanting every necessary of life, should your opponents confine their operations to a simple Blockade, point out the absurdity of resistance. Such is your situation! I am at the head of Troops accustomed to Success, confident of the righteousness of the cause they are engaged in, inured to danger & so highly incensed at your inhumanity, illiberal abuse, and the ungenerous means

Montgomery did not abandon the hope that the city still numbered many secretly on his side, and that he would be able to introduce disunion and disaffection among those who were regarded as its defenders. No explanation can otherwise be given for his again endeavouring to open communication with Carleton. The latter, during the siege at Saint John's, had refused to reply to Montgomery's letters and would not hold intercourse of any character with him. There could have been no other view, than that Montgomery looked employed to prejudice them in the minds of the Canadians; that it is with difficulty I restrain them till my Batteries are ready, from insulting your Works, which would afford them the fair opportunity of an ample vengeance and just retaliation.

"Firing upon a Flag of truce, hitherto unprecedented even among Savages, prevents my taking the ordinary mode of communicating my sentiments. However, I will at any rate acquit my conscience; should you persist in an unwarrantable defence, the consequences be on your own Head.

"Beware of destroying Stores of any Kind, Public or Private, as you have done in Montreal & in the River; if you do, By Heavens there will be no mercy shewn.

"RICH^d. MONTGOMERY,

"Brig^d. General,

"Continental Army, G.C."

The second letter, dated the 6th, was sent into Quebec by an old woman on the 7th December.

"My friends and Fellow Subjects,—The unhappy necessity which subsists of dislodging the Ministerial Troops obliges me to carry on Hostilities against your city, which they now occupy. 'Tis with the utmost compunction, I find myself reduced to Measures which may overwhelm you with Distress! The City in Flames at this severe Season! A general attack on wretched Works defended by a more wretched garrison. The Confusion, Carnage & Plunder, which must be the consequence of such an attack fill me with horror. Let me entreat you to use your endeavours to procure my peaceable admission. You cannot surely believe the ungenerous Falsehoods propagated to our Disadvantage by Ministerial Hirelings. The Continental Arms have never been sullied by any Act of Inhumanity or Violence. We came with the professed Intention of eradicating Tyranny and giving Liberty and Security to this oppressed Province. Private Property having ever by us been deemed sacred.

"I have enclosed you my Letter to General Carleton, because he has industriously avoided giving you any Information which might tend to shew you your true Interest. If he persists, and you permit him to involve you in that Ruin, which, perhaps, he courts to hide his Shame, I have not the Reproach to make my own conscience, that I have not warned you of your Danger.

"RICHARD MONTGOMERY."

forward to his propositions becoming known, and that a large number of the defenders would shew their disapproval of any refusal to enter into terms of accommodation, by ceasing to take further part in the defence. Arnold on that occasion was the bearer of a flag of truce with a second proposition, but its character remains unknown, for "he was sternly refused admittance, and ordered to carry back the letter."*

The difficulties of Montgomery's position must have powerfully forced themselves upon his mind. However boastfully he may have described the force under his own command, he knew that it was so composed as to be entirely unfit for the trying duty of storming the walls of the city. Its service before Saint John's and Chambly had been a simple cannonade, and towards the close of the siege the men had suffered from exposure to the severity of the climate. The garrison of Saint John's had capitulated from the prospect of starvation, and from the certainty that no help could be given them in their emergency. The progress of Montgomery's force, from the banks of the Richelieu to its position before Quebec, had been little more than a military promenade. The duty entailed upon it was now of a different character, under altered circumstances. Montgomery knew well that if the garrison could keep him at bay for some four months, reinforcements would arrive with the spring ships, and that in a few days he would be driven from the province. His one chance was to possess himself of Quebec as rapidly as he was able, before the defenders had become inured to the fatigues of the siege and discipline had become developed to a system. One great source of the weakness which was paralyzing the operations of Montgomery was the expulsion from the city of the leading sympathisers with the cause of Congress.† It deprived him of a reliable source of communication with the garrison and destroyed the influence, which he looked forward to exercise, to create a strong party in his favour. The example had a deterrent effect upon all who were hesitating

* These are Carleton's words in his letter to Howe. *Can. Arch.*, Q. 12, p. 11.

† Vide Vol. IV., p. 487.

as to the side they would take. The positive consequence was that their removal weakened the cause of congress, to the extent that it remained without leaders.

Montgomery was sufficiently provided with food ; part purchased in the neighbourhood, part gathered by force, part furnished by the sympathisers with his cause, and part from belief in his ultimate success. The clothing necessary to protect the men against the severity of a Quebec winter was a matter of greater difficulty ; no regular provision had been made to supply it, and recourse was had to many expedients to guard against the cold. The duty soon became burdensome, exacting endurance and causing privation. Desertions were frequent, especially with the Canadians who had joined him. Montgomery's strength was about 1,500 men, and many were sick. The Canadians were under the command of major Duggan, whose previous experience as a barber in the city enabled him to give correct information about the place. On Montgomery's arrival he was sent to take possession of Saint Roch, then a small suburb, with orders to disarm the inhabitants. Montgomery's design was soon made apparent to the defenders ; to cannonade and bombard the town for some days, and at a certain time attempt its assault. Shells were thrown into the city on the 10th from the battery constructed at Saint Roch, but they effected little damage. The same day the battery opposite Saint John's gate was unmasked. The garrison burned the houses in the neighbourhood of the gate which interfered with the attack brought to bear upon it. In the meantime, the riflemen from Saint Roch constantly fired upon the sentries whenever they were seen. On one occasion, one of the besiegers treacherously approached a sentry under the pretence of being desirous of surrendering as a deserter ; seeking his opportunity, he shot the sentry dead. Some of the attacking troops had established themselves on the cupola of the Intendant's palace, from which they fired on any exposed person. They were dislodged by cannon shot. It was owing to this building having been selected as the spot from which Montgomery's force

pursued this barbarous system of warfare, that cannon were brought to bear upon it, by which it was destroyed. It has never been rebuilt, and remains to this day a ruin.

The weather became exceedingly severe. There was a heavy fall of snow on the 8th of December, succeeded by a severe frost, so that by the 11th the streets of the city were covered with ice. The besiegers' fire was continued each day and shells were thrown within the walls. They did no damage and the citizens soon gave little heed to them. Those only were wounded whom the sharp-shooters, firing on every chance that offered, were able to injure.

It was well understood by the defenders that all this firing was to be followed by an assault at an early date. The report reached the city that Montgomery had informed his troops that on Christmas day he would certainly dine in Quebec.* Quebec was at this period defended by about sixteen hundred men in arms,† all that were available to guard the entire circuit of the walls. The danger lay in the surprise of a given point by the total force of the enemy, the general attention of the defenders being dissipated by false attacks in other directions. There was no danger from any attack by water, for the floating ice, passing up and down with the tide, made all effort in that direction impossible, owing to the danger attending it. There was generally a good store of ammunition and provisions, but a scarcity of firewood, hay and oats. After Arnold's appearance, the *habitants* in the neighbourhood discontinued bringing provisions into the city and, according to

* Caldwell, p. 9 [Hist. Soc. Quebec Coll.]. Finlay, in his journal under date of the 20th December, gives another version. He writes: "It was reported that Montgomery told his men he would dine in Quebec or in Hell on Christmas day. He may, perhaps, in the latter place, if he attempts to become our guest." Both these writers were within the walls during the progress of the siege. The journals are published by the Historical Society of Quebec. The one which bears internal evidence as being written by Colonel Caldwell, who had served under Wolfe as quartermaster-general, is in the form of a letter giving a narrative of the siege, supposed to be addressed by him to Major-General Murray, dated 15th June, 1776. The second is the MS. journal attributed to Mr. Hugh Finlay, day by day recording the events from Nov. 14th to the 7th May, 1776, as they occurred.

† We have the state of the troops in garrison at Quebec performing duty on

Finlay, prevented those at some distance from doing so. The severity of the weather gave some encouragement to the defenders, that during its continuance no attack would be attempted, but news of such design was brought by every deserter. What particularly established this belief was the reappearance of one Joshua Wolf, clerk to colonel Caldwell. He had been taken prisoner when attempting to save some property of the latter, owner of a farm known by the name of *Sans Bruit*, some few miles to the west of the city. It had been occupied by Arnold, together with the adjoining house belonging to de La Gorgendière. Caldwell's house was burned down a few days after Arnold's departure for Point aux Trembles, and de La Gorgendière's destroyed to obtain firewood.

On the 22nd Wolf made his appearance with a deserter with whom he had made his escape. He reported that Montgomery intended to storm the city, but experienced difficulty when addressing his men as to the attempt, in obtaining from them a willing obedience. As an incentive, he had promised them the plunder of the place. There were several men of European birth in Montgomery's force, who

the 1st May. The losses were so inconsiderable that it may be accepted as the strength of the force which bore the brunt of the siege :

	Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers, Rank and File.
Royal Fusiliers	7	76
Royal Emigrants	21	207
Corps of Seamen ..	31	377
Marines	3	34
Artificers	—	77
British Militia	30	296
Canadian "	43	531
Company of Invalids	4	59
	<hr/> 139	<hr/> 1,657

To the above must be added—

2 officers, 8 rank and file,

Royal Artillery.

19 of the civil branch of the ordnance.

2 officers, general's staff.

4 " garrison.

Of this number, many during the siege were non-effective. On the 1st of January 1762 are reported on the sick list, 100 of whom belonged to the militia. [Can. Arch., Q. 12, p. 35.]

asked that the native Americans should first mount the walls ; but the latter expressed themselves willing to concede this post of honour to those who had their birth in the mother country. Every precaution was now exercised to prevent surprise. Two days later a deserter came in, relating that the attack had been deferred owing to Wolf's escape, but it was designed to make the attempt that night.

The duty of defence was carried on actively and cheerfully. Every able-bodied man took part in standing sentry and in picket duty. Carleton was the centre whence all orders came. The British militia were under the command of Caldwell, who was everywhere present. There was at first some suspicion of the fidelity of many of the "old subjects," but their conduct during the siege entirely removed this feeling of uncertainty. The French Canadians, under colonel Voyer, performed their duty equally well, and the two corps formed half the number of defenders. There was one continuous call for their service. The militia, not on duty on the ramparts or on picket, slept in their clothes at the upper town, in the recollet convent. Those in the lower town acted with equal alacrity. The soldiers and sailors in the barracks adopted precautions so that they would be immediately prepared to act against surprise.

On the 30th a deserter came in ; he described Montgomery's force as being between two and three thousand in strength, well provided ; that the Canadians present with them were paid in specie. He related that they were assembled some nights back, and that Montgomery harangued them, and when he dismissed them, positively asserted that the attack would be made on the first dark and stormy night.*

* The promise of Montgomery to give the city of Quebec over to plunder, in order to encourage his troops to the attack, can only be too well established. The following is the general order issued by him :

" Headquarters, Holland House, near Quebec,

" 15th December, 1775.

" Parole ' Connecticut,' countersign ' Adams.'

" The General having in vain offered the most favourable Terms of accommodation to the Governor, and having taken every possible step to prevail on the

The defenders of the city were thus kept in constant expectation of attack. There was but one fear that it would take the form of surprise in a quarter imperfectly guarded, and every precaution was adopted to prevent its success. Vigilance was unrelaxed; the activity on all sides indefatigable, so that the point threatened could immediately be reached and the whole strength of the small garrison made available there.

The succeeding nights were passed in feverish anxiety, for the conviction was general that the assault would not long be delayed. Shells were still thrown into the city, but without effect. They were, however, replied to from the walls. There was not a long truce given to the continuance of this strained expectation, for in the night of the last day of the year Montgomery determined to make his contemplated attempt.

Montgomery's plan of attack was simple in the extreme, and it was the only one by which he could hope for success. He was deficient in artillery to break the walls, and he was without faith in the composition of his force to justify an escalade. His friends within the city had informed him of

Inhabitants to desist from seconding him in his wild scheme of Defence, nothing remains but to pursue vigorous measures for the speedy Reduction of the only Hold possessed by the Ministerial Troops in this Province. The Troops flushed with continual success, confident of the Justice of their cause, and relying on that Providence which has uniformly protected them, will advance with alacrity to the attack of Works incapable of being defended by the wretched Garrison posted behind them, consisting of Sailors, unacquainted with the use of arms, of Citizens incapable of the Soldier's duty and a few miserable Emigrants. The General is confident a vigorous and spirited attack must be attended with Success. *The Troops shall have the effects of the Governor, Garrison and of such as have been acting in misleading the Inhabitants and distressing the friends of Liberty to be equally divided among them, each to have the one hundredth share out of the whole, which shall be at the disposal of the General and given to such soldiers as distinguish themselves by their Activity and Bravery, and sold at Public Auction. The whole to be conducted as soon as the City is in our hands and the inhabitants disarmed."*

Some details as to guards follow.

"The General at Headquarters.

"FRED. WEISENFELS,

"Major of Brigade."

[Can. Arch., Q. 12, p. 20.]

The details which follow with regard to the guards establish the genuineness of the order. The fact is alluded to both by Caldwell and Finlay.

the constant watchfulness exercised, and the desertions from his force warned him that his designs were known and guarded against. The lower town of Quebec, at that date, did not present the same features as at present; it is important to understand its extent and character, in order to follow the movements of Montgomery's force.

As at present, the street Sous-le-fort ran at right angles from Champlain street to the line of Saint Peter street, which passes to the east. At its foot was an open space on which the battery known in the French *régime* as "la batterie royale" was constructed. On the west side of Sous-le-fort street, the rear of the houses which fronted on it extended to the water; the water line here takes a trend northwards for some hundred feet, then it again turns westwardly.

Champlain street, as to-day, was approached by steps from Mountain street, the ascent to the upper town. It ran westwardly for some distance with houses built on either side, the termination of them being known as "Près-de-ville"; a spot described as the further side of the king's wharf past the old king's forges.* The street had a roadway passable for vehicles to this spot, which here ceased. Beyond this distance a way had been traced round the cape westward. In summer it was narrow and rough, but in winter it was cumbered with the season's snow, which lay as it fell, and by the ice formed on the water line by the rise and fall of the tide. It was narrow, and would admit the passage of three or four men only, and in some spots had to be passed with great caution.

A barrier had been constructed at the end of the roadway where the last house stood; it was mounted with four cannon and a four-pounder. On the night of the 31st of December the guns were under the command of captain Barnsfore, a merchant captain, with a sergeant of artillery, Hugh McQuarters, placed under his orders. The guard consisted of about thirty men, quartered in the house belonging to Mr. Simon Frazer known as the "pot-ash."† A picket was thrown out

* Caldwell, p. 8.

† Finlay.

in advance to give notice of the approach of the enemy.* Such was the defence on the west of the lower town.

On the east, the city, since that date, has become much extended and changed. A large area, now covered with buildings, was then, at high tides, under water, and at the extreme ebb, with a surface of mud. The present Saint Paul street, skirting the Saint Charles river, was only imperfectly traced out. The point of rock known as the Sault-au-Matlot, which to this day retains its name, extending so far back that the tradition suggesting it has been lost, projected to the water's edge,† and its base was washed by the tide. The lower town in this direction was closed by this projection approximately where the present Quebec Bank in Saint Peter street has been constructed, and here the street terminated; the back line of the properties fronting on this street extended to the water line. The only connection between the suburb of Saint Roch direct to the lower town was over this spur, across the end of Sault-au-Matlot street, which, commencing west of the spur, occupied its present site at the foot of the rock. It was at the eastern extremity of Sault-au-Matlot street that the main barrier was constructed; a second barrier was formed at the western end of the street, at its junction with the present des Sœurs street, at which the ascent to the upper town, by Mountain street, was commenced.

It was the spot selected by Montgomery at which the assault on the upper town should be made. He counted upon success from the weakness of its garrison, made less formidable, in his view, by the belief that it was leavened by disloyalty. He had full news of the condition of Quebec, and a knowledge of its situation, and the route he should follow. When in the

* The number of the picket at the post has been variously stated. Caldwell describes the "guard as under the command of a Canadian officer of militia, the men Canadians and British mixed." Finlay mentions the guard as being of about thirty. Caldwell and Finlay were at Quebec during the event. Sanguinet places the number at forty-five. The latter, who was in Montreal, evidently wrote from hearsay, his narrative on many points is in disaccord with established facts, and cannot be accepted as authoritative.

† Le Petit Atlas. Bellin., 1764, map No. 9.

17th regiment, he had been quartered in the city ; his second in command, Campbell, had also been in the British service, and was well acquainted with the interior of the place.* Duggan, now a major, as has been said, had carried on his business at Quebec. It has been stated that Arnold had also paid several visits there, but the fact is not substantiated. What was essential in this plan was to sweep away all opposition, so that when a junction of the two columns had taken place, at the foot of Mountain street, an ascent could be made to the upper town without fear of attack from the rear.

Montgomery had accordingly determined that he, with his division, should descend to the *Anse de Foulon* on the west and follow the line of communication described towards Champ plain street, and after mastering the barricade and making prisoners of the guard, should push through the lower town to the point of assembly. At the same time Arnold was to advance from Saint Roch, where he had been established, and, skirting the rock, force the barricade in Sault-au-Matelot street and effect a junction with Montgomery. While this movement was proceeding, a false attack was to be made, under major Brown, upon the heights.

In accordance with this plan, the attention of the garrison was diverted by the report of musketry west of the ramparts. Caldwell, on hearing the alarm, examined into its cause. Finding that the fire was being delivered at some distance, he correctly judged that no serious attack was intended, and after making the necessary dispositions, in the event of its assuming a more formidable character, he left the spot.

Simultaneously the guns from the batteries were opened out, while at Saint Roch the Canadians who had joined Arnold's ranks, under colonel Livingston, appeared under arms. The design of these feints was to separate the force of the defenders, so as to reduce the number opposed to the onslaught of the column of the true attack.

* Caldwell thus describes him in his letter to Murray : " Your old acquaintance and friend, Colonel Donald Campbell, quartermaster general, arrived at Holland's house (now the rebel headquarters)." p. 7.

The night was dark, there was a drizzling snow, and it was precisely the weather to suggest an attempt at a surprise. The garrison for some days had looked upon an assault as constantly imminent, therefore even more than the ordinary vigilance had been exercised. Every preparation had been made in expectation of some hostile movement. Those not on duty, as had lately been the custom, were sleeping in their clothes, with their arms within reach ; and it is left on record that this trying demand on strength and personal effort was unflinchingly responded to without a murmur.

On the night of Sunday the 31st of December, captain Malcolm Frazer, of the "Emigrants," was in command of the main guard. Shortly after four on the morning of the 1st of January, 1776, he perceived two rockets thrown up from beyond Cape Diamond ; he at once understood that it was a signal for some purpose, and to his mind was so threatening that it could not be allowed to pass without notice. He immediately ordered the guards to turn out, calling the alarm as he passed through Saint Louis street. The general and the pickets in the recollet convent assembled under arms ; the alarm bells were rung ; the drums of the guards beat the assembly, and the troops took the several posts which had been assigned to them. The weather was still stormy, the snow continuing to fall, so that the alarm was not in all cases heard ; but the attention of the garrison was unfailingly awakened by the continual report of the musketry and guns of the attacks apparently directed against the ramparts and Saint John's gate.

The rockets seen by Frazer were those sent up by Montgomery as a signal for Arnold to advance from Saint Roch to the east of the city, and for the simulated attacks to be made. Montgomery himself was well on his way towards "Près-de-Ville," where his career in a few hours was so summarily and disastrously to close. Some hours previously he had descended from his camp on the heights to the *Anse de Foulon* and had commenced his march.

A picket had been thrown out from the main barricade

near the "pot-ash," at the end of Champlain street. All we can learn with regard to it is that Montgomery was not impeded by it. Doubtless his march was noiselessly conducted; no man who took part in it but could understand its desperate character. The probability is, the picket had returned to report that all was quiet. The advance was now silently continued towards the main barricade, defended, as has been said, by four cannon. We are told that every night at watch-setting these guns were examined and pointed, the great importance of the post being fully known, for on its maintenance the safety of the city no little depended. The men on duty had been called upon to be unrelaxing in their charge; they were thus, on this night, keenly alive to the danger of an attack. The storm still raged, but above its tumult the sound of the footsteps of the advancing column was heard. No sign, however, was made from the barricade, as Montgomery, attended by his aides-de-camp, at the head of his men, proceeded towards it.

There can be little doubt, that for the moment, Montgomery believed that he had surprised the post. All was quiet within, and there was nothing to suggest that the handful of men who were defending it were watchful at their duty. Montgomery was allowed to approach within thirty yards, when in an instant there was a general discharge of cannon and musketry. The report was followed by groans of distress, for by that discharge Montgomery, his aide-de-camp, his secretary, and captain Cheeseman, with nine others, making a total of thirteen, were killed. So unexpected was the discharge that the attacking column was completely disorganized. The guns were again loaded and fired, but the congress troops had rapidly retreated: there was no attempt to reform them. The probability is that they were so bewildered by terror and the losses they had suffered, as to make any offensive movement impossible.

A block-house had been constructed at Cape Diamond over the height at Drummond's wharf. Caldwell remarks that had the officer of the Canadian militia who commanded

there done his duty, great havoc might have been made upon the retreating column exposed to its attack; but not a shot was fired.

Before turning to the attack from the east it must be said that this small detachment which had behaved so well was suddenly struck with panic. Some old woman came in with an account that the other division of the enemy had surprised the post at the Sault-au-Matelot, and was in possession of the lower town. Some of the detachment commenced to conceal their arms, others to offer to throw them in the river. Such fear was shown that a Mr. Coffin, who had taken refuge in the house adjoining the barricade, with his wife and twelve children, drew his bayonet and declared he would put to death the first man who laid by his arms or attempted to abandon the post. With the assistance of the seamen two guns were pointed in the direction of the city, in case they should be assailed in that direction, but, as Caldwell relates, Arnold's force was at that time surrendering as prisoners of war.

I now return to Arnold's force, which consisted of seven hundred men. Henry* relates in his narrative that at two o'clock they began their march; the storm was violently raging and the wind most biting. As they reached the foot of the ascent to Palace gate, they were exposed to a heavy discharge of musketry from the ramparts, and all the bells of the city were loudly ringing; as Henry naïvely writes, "they are very numerous, of all sizes." It could not have been by any means a welcome sound, for it betokened that their movement was known and the garrison prepared to receive them. There was, however, no alternative but to proceed; Montgomery's signals proclaimed that his division had commenced its march, and the failure of Arnold's column to have appeared would have subjected the former to be withstood by the whole force of the garrison. Henry describes Arnold as leading the forlorn hope of one hundred men before the main

* *Siege of Quebec, 1775, 1776, etc., etc.*, by John Joseph Henry; , Lancaster, 1812.

body. Morgan's, Smith's and Steele's companies followed. Hendrick, in command of the eastern men, brought up the rear. As they passed under the ramparts, they received a continual volley from the troops in position there.

Arnold's column, having followed the base of the rock, finally reached the projecting spur of the Sault-au-Matelot. Crossing the point, which then extended to the water, they arrived at the first barricade erected at the eastern end of Sault-au-Matelot street, now forming the corner of Saint James street. The barricade was vigorously attacked by Arnold. He states in his letter to Wooster that he approached the two gun battery without being discovered; this fact is entirely at variance with Henry's narrative. Arnold describes the battery as having been defended for an hour and finally stormed. He himself, being shot through the leg, had to be carried from the field. This letter, asking for assistance, was written on his reaching the hospital. He had then heard of Montgomery's death and the likelihood of his column being attacked in the rear. Unable to act from his wound, he had given over the command to colonel Campbell. He reported that before leaving the ground about thirty had been killed and wounded.

It is evident that Arnold miscalculated the length of time of the attack of the first barricade, for all was over by eight o'clock. Henry relates that when Arnold was carried wounded past the column great depression was felt, the men crying out "we are sold." He describes Arnold as having been wounded on the outset; the contest, he tells us, lasted but a few minutes, and was so severe that the embrasures were entered as the enemy were discharging their guns. Of the British picket which consisted of thirty men, part fled and part were taken prisoners. The congress troops, finding that their own muskets were useless from having become damp in the march, took what they could find of the arms which the British had abandoned.

On Arnold leaving the field, the command of the detachment devolved upon Morgan. He was a man of courage

and determination, and no one could have behaved better in his difficult position. The first barricade being carried, Morgan entered the narrow street of Sault-au-Matelot, and proceeded along the few hundred yards of its length, when he was stopped at the second barrier at the western end, at the corner of des Sœurs street, leading to the ascent to the upper town. The barricade was strongly closed, and Morgan soon learned that a strong force was on the western side to prevent his further advance.

When the alarm had been given by the appearance of the rockets, McLean, second in command, had ordered Caldwell to Cape Diamond with a force to aid in its defence. Finding that there was no call for any extra precautions, Caldwell returned to Saint Louis gate. He there met an extra picket, composed of the best men of the 7th and the "Emigrants," and he ordered this picket to proceed to the quarters of the general for further orders. Passing by the esplanade he reached Saint John's gate; there he heard that the first barricade at Sault-au-Matelot had been surprised, and that the congress troops had forced their way into the lower town. Caldwell was in command of the British militia, a position which conferred authority. Finding that there was no real attack in the direction of Saint John's gate, he ordered the detachment on the ramparts to proceed to the head-quarters of the general and place itself at his disposal; and he increased his own party by some of the fusiliers. As he reached Palace gate he came upon captain Laws, who, in pursuance of his orders, with seventy men was passing out of the gate to gain the level of the base of the rock, which he was to follow in order to attack Arnold's party in the rear. Caldwell, strengthening his own party by a subaltern and thirty men, with captain Nairne, hastily went forward to the lower town. On his arrival, he found the force under a Canadian officer, colonel Voyer. They were "shy of advancing towards the barrier," Voyer doing his best to encourage his men. The appearance of Caldwell with Nairne and his party, and a lieutenant with fifty seamen, gave fresh spirit to the men, and they were

placed with the fusiliers, posted with fixed bayonets to prevent any passage by the barrier.

The congress troops had brought ladders, which they had placed on their side of the barricade, and had succeeded in landing one on the opposite side by which they could descend. Caldwell now took command and occupied some houses described by him as the one where Levy, the jew, formerly lived and that of Lymburner. From the back windows they fired upon the congress troops in Sault-au-Matelot street. The ladder also came into service. Caldwell ordered it to be removed and placed against the gable end of the house fronting on Sault-au-Matelot street, upon which a party under the command of Nairne and Dambourges, an officer of McLean's corps, entered by the window as the congress troops were coming in by the front door. Nairne's party drove them out by the bayonet, and they did not attempt a second entry. They had kept up a brisk fire from the houses on Sault-au-Matelot street, until a 9-pounder was brought to bear on them, by which one man was killed and another wounded. This subdued their fire.

Nairne's party was followed by a reinforcement under the command of captain Campbell, of the "Emigrants," and lieutenant Layard, of the fusiliers. They attacked the congress troops with the bayonet and obtained command of the narrow street. In the meantime, Laws with his party had pushed forward, supported by a second detachment under Macdougall, of the "Emigrants." A third party under captain Alexander followed. As it was plain that the main attack was confined to the lower town, captain Hamilton, of the "Lizard," with a force of blue jackets, was likewise sent forward.

The congress troops, seeing that they were in a *cul-de-sac*, hopelessly outnumbered, surrendered; they amounted to 431 prisoners. Many of the congress troops escaped by crossing the ice on the Saint Charles river. The prisoners taken, as a distinguishing mark, had papers pinned in their caps with the written words, "Liberty or death."

The loss on the part of the British was captain Anderson

of the seamen, one French Canadian, four of the seamen and British militia. The latter included Mr. Frazer, a master ship-builder.

As the congress troops in the first instance surrendered, they entered the corner house and descended by the ladder to the other side of the barrier. But as their number increased, the barrier was opened and they were taken in charge by the force assembled. Some other straggling prisoners were also taken and sent in by the Palace gate.*

The prisoners were marched to the parade ground to await Carleton's orders. Caldwell was in hopes that a sortie in force would have been ordered and the congress troops attacked in position. But Carleton was too wise to run any useless risk. The night's operations had been in every respect successful, more even than could have been hoped. With the handful of men at his command, insufficient in number to

* The following is the official report of the losses of the whole attacking force. [Can. Arch., Q. 12, p. 37] :—

Return of the Rebels killed and wounded brought into the town, and of those taken prisoners, on the 31st December, 1775.

	Brigadier General.	Lieut. Colonels Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Volunteers.	Drummers.	Sergeants and Rank and File.	Total.
Killed.	1	0	0	3	3	0	0	23	30
Wounded	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	38	42
Prisoners.	0	1	2	8	17	4	2	355	389
Total	1	1	2	13	22	4	2	416	461

McLean, in a letter dated 28th of May to some unknown person [Can. Arch., Q. 12, p. 69], states that twenty more dead were discovered in spring under the snow. We have likewise a statement by Henry of the losses of Arnold's column. "Many of the men, aware of the consequences, and all our Indians and Canadians (except Natanes and another), escaped across the ice which covered the bay of Saint Charles, before the arrival of Captain Laws. This was a dangerous and desperate adventure, but worth the undertaking in avoidance of our subsequent sufferings. Its desperateness consisted in running two miles across shoal ice, thrown up by the high tides of this latitude, and its danger in meeting with air-holes deceptively covered by the bed of snow. Speaking circumspectively, yet, it must be admitted, conjecturally, it seems that in the whole of the attack we had six officers killed and five wounded, and of non-commissioned officers and privates, at least one hundred and fifty killed and fifty or sixty wounded." [Henry's narrative.]

defend the walls of the city against a powerful force, it would have been little short of madness to attempt offensive operations. A reverse would have proved ruinous. Carleton, however, did not remain perfectly inactive. A force was sent to Saint Roch to destroy the battery which had been established near the house of a Mr. Grant. They brought in several mortars placed in position there, and a field-piece. The houses in which the congress troops had taken position and had fired upon the garrison were burned. The first duty of Carleton was to provide for the safety of the town; he resolved, therefore, to await the certain arrival of the reinforcements in spring before aggressive operations would be undertaken.

No discomfiture could be greater than that received by the congress troops. It was the one attempt made to obtain possession of the city. All that was subsequently done was to blockade it from the outer world. All fear for the future passed from its defenders. The garrison had felt its strength and understood that safety lay in watchfulness. All its defenders had a common confidence in the governor and themselves. The success of the defence, from the spirit it instilled, was equal to a reinforcement of five hundred men. The courage of the garrison became more self-reliant and the prospect of a second attack was not an unwelcome expectation. None of those who had experience in war believed that an attack would again be made: nevertheless discipline was fully maintained and every precaution continued to prevent surprise.

Some modern writers have placed the date of the assault of Quebec on the night of the 30th and the morning of the 31st. I cannot agree with this view. The date as given in the text, the night of the 31st, is sustained by the following evidence :

Finlay in his journal thus writes : " 31st December, Wind N.E., very stormy and dark. As Capt. Malcolm Fraser of the Emigrants, who that night commanded the main-guard," etc., etc.

Caldwell writes : " They (the congress troops) remained quiet until the 31st of December. About five o'clock in the morning we were alarmed at our picket by Captain Fraser, who was captain of the main guard," etc., etc.

Mr. James Thompson, who as engineer carried on the work of increasing the fortifications and lived to be 96, dying on the 30th of August, 1830, describes " the assault of Quebec as taking place on the night of the 31st of December, 1775, or rather the morning of the 1st of January, 1776."

Carleton, in a letter to Howe, Quebec, 12th January, 1776, relates the attack as being made on the 31st of December.

Henry, the United States writer I have quoted as present in Arnold's column, gives the date as the 31st of December, and specially mentions the morning of the 1st of January as the time when Arnold's force approached Palace gate. [p. 113.]

Badeau [Verreault, p. 182] gives the same date. " Enfin ne trouvant aucun moyen pour entrer dans la ville, il forma l'escalade le 1er jour de l'année 1776, à 4 h. du matin."

I have felt it necessary to establish this point as clearly as it is possible to do, owing to the mistaken date having to some extent been accepted without proper examination.

The error apparently has arisen from Sanguinet having described the event as taking place " le trente un de Decembre, 1775, à cinq heures du matin." Sanguinet was, however, at the time at Montreal, and whatever the expression may mean, he cannot be accepted as an authority for what took place during the siege.

CHAPTER II. .

On the 2nd of January, the dead lying outside the barrier of "Près-de-ville" were brought to the city. The corpse of Montgomery was at once recognized and he was buried on the same day with every mark of respect: the remaining twelve were placed side by side in one grave. The prisoners were taken into the lower town, allowed to send for their clothes, and major Meigs went out on parole to obtain their kits, with what other private property was possessed by them. Among those who surrendered were several Canadians, who were immediately released by Carleton, and two or three Indians. On the 4th, the few defenders of the city who had fallen in Arnold's attack were buried with the honours of war.

The month of January passed without any extraordinary event. The weather was severe and the defeat of the congress troops entirely paralyzed further active operations. They remained, however, in their position, blockading the city, cutting it off from connection with the surrounding country and preventing the delivery of supplies of fresh provisions and the arrival of intelligence. Caldwell estimates their number during the month as never exceeding 1,400 men.* Many in the city felt that an attempt at their annihilation might have succeeded. The total number of the garrison, of all ranks, was 1,800; those under arms, owing to the prevailing sickness, were far fewer.

Even conceding that the congress troops might have been entirely routed, no good result could have been attained. Quebec could not have been left without a force sufficient for its defence. The city was still exposed to a winter expedition by the Kennebec, now the route was known; moreover, any aggressive movement on the part of Carleton would

* [Caldwell, page 15.]

have been the commencement of a winter campaign with a few hundred men, without supplies and with no power of obtaining them, with the mass of the population unfriendly, and with the congress troops in occupation of the western portion of the province. These considerations shew the impracticability, even the madness, of such an undertaking. Carleton, moreover, felt that he could not afford, gratuitously, to risk the loss of a single man in a garrison so burdened with duty and effort, in which the life of its defenders had merged into one constant act of watchfulness and devotion to the preservation of the fortress. It was not possible to make additional demands upon strength so sorely taxed. Carleton's refusal to listen to those who desired more active operations proved the soundness of his judgment. No policy was ever more thoroughly vindicated by the facts which guided it and by the events which followed.

The death of Montgomery and Arnold's wound led to a change in the command of the besieging force. Wooster arrived from Montreal to take charge of the siege. Arnold remained at Quebec until the beginning of April, until his recovery, when he was transferred in command to Montreal, where he remained until the congress troops were driven out of the province. The besiegers suffered greatly from sickness during the siege, especially from small-pox. Of the prisoners taken, two hundred were cured from its attack. It is related that upwards of five hundred men lost their lives during the winter before Quebec, from this and other severe diseases.

Among the prisoners were about one hundred old countrymen, the majority from Ireland, most of whom agreed to enlist into McLean's corps. They were enrolled to the number of ninety-four, and performed duty regularly until the 5th of February, when three of them posted as sentries deserted, taking with them their arms. Early in February there was a severe snow storm. In some parts of the ramparts the snow had drifted to nine feet in depth. The whole garrison was employed during the next few days clearing the space round the guns and a passage for the pickets ; whether this labour

occasioned discontent with the newly enlisted men, or whatever the cause, three more of them deserted on the 31st, and five on the 15th of March. Consequently the uniforms and arms were taken from the rest of the men, and they were placed as prisoners on board the ships in the harbour.

The lull in active operations on the part of the besiegers justified Carleton in sending a strong party to the Intendant's palace, where the archives were stored in a vault. The documents were obtained and placed in safety in the city. Some of the inhabitants, covered by a detachment, likewise went to the Saint John's suburbs and brought in the ruins of the wooden houses for fuel. Provisions were still fairly plentiful. The militia received one shilling a day as pay and rations for themselves and their families, so they were well cared for. Generally speaking, those able to do so had laid in a stock of supplies, which in the winter months of Canada is practicable, from the frost assuring its safe keeping. Food, however, began to grow dear; in the middle of January beef was 12½ cents per lb., a month later 15 cents, while fresh pork cost 25 cents. As provisions became more scarce, strong parties were sent out from the Saint John's gate to obtain what supplies were procurable, remaining absent the whole night. From time to time wood for fuel was brought into the city from the same direction.

So February and March passed away. There were constant reports of threatened attack and the vigilance of the garrison remained unrelaxed. Some reinforcements had been sent to the besiegers, but nothing was attempted by them. Shots were repeatedly fired into the city and signals were seen from time to time. One, that of a red flag at Saint Charles ferry, attracted attention. It was supposed to be in commemoration of the "Boston massacre," so called, and was kept flying some days. If it had any significance, it was a prelude to no event. Some looked upon it as a "bloody flag," intended as a threat; others thought it might be a signal to the prisoners. On one or two occasions an alarm was given, when the whole force turned out with alacrity. Another flag

of truce was sent, to meet the rebuff which those at the commencement of the siege had received. The only novelty in the operations was the construction of a battery at Point Levis, directed against the shipping in Quebec.

By the 1st of April, the battery was completed ; shot had constantly been fired from Quebec in the attempt to destroy it during construction. On the 3rd of April it was opened with twenty-four 12 and 9-pounders, but it proved to be of no material effect. Indeed, the only deaths it caused were those of one man and a young boy ;* three of the inhabitants were wounded.

Owing to the continual fall of snow the narrow streets were in many parts impassable, and the approach to the walls had to be made on snow-shoes. Signals from the besiegers constantly attracted attention, and in order to confound them, on their appearance, rockets were sent up from the city. Wood was still obtained through the Saint John's gate, and as deserters gave notice of the arrival of reinforcements, and that on some dark night the attack would be repeated, every means was taken to guard against it. The fortifications had been considerably strengthened, 140 pieces of cannon were at this date in position in different parts of the city ramparts, and the ditches were kept freed from snow,† "every man without distinction taking a shovel on that occasion." The lower town defences had been greatly strengthened, provisions became more plentiful, and the garrison was in excellent health and in the best of spirits.

Independently of the batteries constructed by the congress force at Point Levis, a 3-gun battery had been thrown up on the river Saint Charles ; another battery had been begun on the heights, on a site between the two gates of Saint Louis and Saint John. Deserters who came in gave the information

* Finlay's Journal [p. 20, April 8th.] "In the evening a cannon ball from Point Levy unluckily killed a boy of ten year old, son to Mr. Melvin, Merchant." The tradition remains, that the family were assembled round the table for a meal when this casualty took place.

† Caldwell.

that it was to be opened on the 8th of May. It was its fate never to fire a gun.

The prisoners during this time were treated with much forbearance and allowed their liberty to an extent commensurate with the safety of the place. On the fact becoming known that some of the officers had endeavoured to bribe the sentries, they were placed in irons. On the 31st of March, the prisoners made an attempt to escape. They were confined in the Dauphin barracks, the guard having been taken from the company of "Invalids," which had been organized, to relieve, in some respects, the pressure of duty; at this date their sole charge was to furnish this guard. They were generally men advanced in years, many not enjoying good health. The plot was to kill these old men and rush to the Saint John's gate, and, bayoneting the guard, take possession of and hold it, so that the prisoners might regain their liberty or admit their friends into the city, as might be expedient. A few days previously, one of the prisoners had managed to escape, and he gave intelligence of the design. The plot was fortunately discovered, and as a consequence they were removed from the barracks and placed in confinement on the ships.

In the middle of March a canoe reached the city from Beaumont, on the south shore, opposite the island of Orleans, about six miles from its western point. It had been sent by Fraser,* who gave a favourable account of the people in the lower parishes who had expressed readiness to aid the garrison in any feasible enterprise. Carleton, by the same channel, sent instructions to the effect that it was desirable, could the attempt be made, to surprise the Point Levis battery and destroy it.

In consequence, de Beaujeu, then living in retirement at île-aux-Grues, and de Gaspé, both Canadian officers, set to work to complete the organization to undertake the duty. They were aided by Messire Baillie, a priest and a "zealous

* Finlay [15th March, p. 17] mentions him by the name of Hugh Fraser as a well known person.

royalist," and one William Ross, who had served in the 78th. About one hundred men were brought together. The whole population, however, did not entertain these views. Many of the Canadians of the neighbourhood held the opposite opinions and communicated the design to the commandant at Point Levis. The consequence was that measures were taken to suppress the movement. About one hundred congress troops, accompanied by a body of Canadians, surprised the small party of royalists. Four or five were killed, several wounded ; among the latter, Messire Baillie, who was seriously hurt. The design accordingly failed.

Deserters were constantly coming into the city ; on the 9th of April one Chaucer, whose name has been preserved, appears to have been so plausible a person, that he was looked upon as a spy. He gave important information nevertheless, most of which was subsequently confirmed. He described the force of the besiegers as 1,800, many suffering from sickness, and gave accurate information of the battery opposite the walls, between Saint John and Saint Louis gates. Arnold, he stated, was on the morrow to leave for Montreal. He represented the Canadians with the congress troops as dissatisfied, owing to being paid in paper. His most important piece of intelligence was that a fire ship was being prepared to be piloted among the shipping in the harbour for its destruction. A few days later it became known that the Gaspé schooner, which had been taken the last autumn and had remained at the island of Orleans, was the vessel selected and was being prepared for the purpose. The congress commandant had offered 20,000 *livres* to any one who would pilot her among the shipping and at the right moment set her on fire ; the design was to attack the town during the confusion which would arise. The snow, however, outside the walls was so deep that no assault could be made from the heights. It was generally felt within the city that another crisis was to arrive and the same watchfulness was continued. On all sides strict discipline was maintained, to meet the threatened danger.

It was now May, and the inhabitants of the city anxiously

looked forward to the arrival of the reinforcements, which they felt satisfied had left England and were to free the city from its beleaguerment. Cut off from communication with the rest of the world, this was the hope which had sustained them in their efforts. As the last days of April were passing away the ships had been anxiously looked for, and it was the confident feeling that only a few hours could elapse before the arrival of the war ships, which would make active offensive operations possible.

From time to time sorties were made to obtain firewood, which constantly required to be replenished. On one occasion the party came upon some scaling ladders ; being both heavy and short, they were left behind, in the hope that if an attack were made they might be used. Every day the eastern water approaches towards Quebec, as the haven whence relief should come, were anxiously scanned, with the anxiety springing from hope deferred.

On the evening of the 3rd of May, about nine o'clock, a vessel was seen turning Point Levis. It was looked upon as the first arrival of the spring fleet. No enemy was expected from that direction, the belief being entertained that the threatened fire ship would descend from above. There was for a time great joy, as if expectation would at last be satisfied, and salutes of welcome were fired. The vessel continued to approach the wharves without interference ; at length, as no signal was made by her and the salutes remained unacknowledged, a heavy gun was fired from the grand battery. It must have taken some effect, for those on board directing the vessel were seized with panic, set fire to her, and abandoned her to her course, with the sails all set. In a few minutes she was wrapped in flames. The wind was north-east, but the tide was an hour on the ebb ; as the flames seized the sails she lost headway and drifted down the river clear of the shipping and the lower town. Caldwell relates that had she continued her course for a hundred yards further she might have caused great mischief, for there were many ships in the harbour, including a 28-gun frigate, a king's sloop, and thirty merchantmen and transports.

It was the last effort of the congress troops. They had been reinforced, but they felt their own impotence for further effort; they knew that at this time the "Isis" frigate was in the river and was forcing her upward passage through the ice as rapidly as possible. Two days passed without any event, but early on the morning of the 6th of May some unusual activity was visible among the besiegers. It was soon explained by the appearance of the "Surprise" frigate. For a short time she seemed to hesitate whether or not she should approach. A boat, however, was sent to give her the information required, and she came as near to the city as possible, while keeping out of range of the Point Levis battery. Shortly afterwards the frigate "Isis" and a sloop-of-war arrived.

Two companies of the 29th, with some marines, in all, two hundred men, were immediately landed. About noon a sortie was made with 1,000 men from the two gates, Saint Louis and Saint John, more with the desire of learning the position of the congress troops than with the design of attacking them. Captain Nairne with the advance guard pushed rapidly forward and mastered the two batteries lately thrown up. Some straggling shots were fired, but there was no resistance. The force was formed in line, with four field-pieces. As the heights were gained, the flight of the congress troops became general. So rapidly was the retreat made that no engagement was possible.*

The besieging force fled in the greatest confusion, abandoning their artillery, ammunition, and provisions. The very dinners of some of the force were left ready to be eaten. There was no attempt at pursuit by the land forces; it sufficed for the time to drive the besiegers from before the walls. In the

* "When we got a full view of the Enemy, it was then found that they ran away so fast that it was impossible to bring them to any Engagement, their two Generals were amongst the first fugitives, and after a Retreat was ordered my Regiment Eat the Dinner of the two Generals found upon the table in good order, we took all their Cannon, Ammunition, Artillery Stores, Provisions, Baggage and all their papers, there never was a more compleat Victory without the loss of a man. We took a good many Prisoners, many of them sick." Colonel McLean to an unknown correspondent, 25th May, 1776. [Can. Arch., Q. 12, p. 69.]

afternoon the two frigates ascended the river, and, shelling a force navigating some *bateaux*, compelled those on board to abandon the vessels, and the craft were taken. The congress troops continued their flight to Three Rivers; abandoning that place, they reached Sorel, where the resolution was formed of making a stand behind intrenchments.

It was the end of the siege: the end unceasingly foreseen by Carleton, who correctly judged that a few weeks would bring the attack to an end, and wisely refused to risk the loss of a man to defeat an enterprise which, with the snow of winter, would of itself melt to nothingness. To the besiegers themselves the continuance of the siege had long been a hopeless undertaking. The one chance of gaining possession of the city had passed away in the failure of Montgomery's attempt. That unfortunate officer had been early made to feel the desperate nature of the duty he had so confidently assumed with the certainty of success. His death exercised the most depressing influence in every quarter, so that no second project of attack was ever conceived. Although the blockade of the city was in a measure continued, each hour the defence was prolonged caused it to grow in strength and gave increased assurance that the time of delivery was drawing nearer. There could have been but one object in continuing these operations, and on the part of the political leaders it was purely political. Canada had already been represented as a conquered province, and the abandonment of the siege would have been the admission of failure everywhere to create general

"Return of Ordnance and Ordnance Stores collected from the different Batteries, etc., occupied by the enemy after their retreat of the 6th of May:

Guns—Brass [24, 12, 6, 3-pdr.], 7.

" Iron [18, 14, 12, 9, 8, 6, 4, 3½-pdr.], 36.

Mortars—Brass [5½, 4½ in.], (5), 8 in. Howitzers (2): Iron 7 in., (3): 7 in. Howitzer (1), Gun carriages, 28 serviceable; 8 unserviceable.

Powder, 25 bbls. of 60 lbs., 29 doz. of port fires, 7,000 fuzes, 484 shells, 6,003 empty shells, 178 hand grenades, round shot 5,372, from 36 lbs. to 3 lbs., with grape and other shot, with wad hooks, sponges, ladles: Blocks for guns 417: Cartridges: guns 721, for muskets, 3,200, Flints 25,000: and a whole mass of Tools and Implements."

[Can. Arch., Q. 12, pp. 75-79] [given in full detail]. *

depression. The operations were continued to support the revolutionary cause in Boston and Philadelphia. The partisans of congress, to the last, expressed the most confident anticipations that the city was doomed. The remaining extent of Canada was under the domination of their troops, and it appeared a safe promise to vociferate that the king's soldiers would soon be driven from the northern British territory. It was a safe assertion for the Adams and Hancocks to make from their places of repose, where their agitation could be continued; but those bearing the brunt of the duty, whatever good face they put upon the attempt, must long have felt that the capture of Quebec was beyond every effort they could make with the means at their disposal and that their own fate was certain discomfiture. Accordingly at the first indication of active operations against them, no attempt at resistance was made. The flight of the force was immediate, to escape the disaster of defeat. If for the time their discomfiture had been delayed, its certainty had not the less been foreseen, and when the hour for its accomplishment arrived it was accepted as inevitable.

The events which took place in Three Rivers during this interval have come down to us by the record of Badeaux. Livingston, who was colonel of the French Canadian contingent, had been placed in command. From time to time until the end of December, detachments of the congress troops marched through the burg on their way to Quebec, and at the end of January they are spoken of as being a brigade. The liberty announced in the public proclamations of congress, the establishment of which was declared to be the cause of the invasion of Canada, was shewn by an ordinance of general Wooster, read at the church door on the 14th of January, in which it was forbidden to speak against congress, and it was threatened that all contravening this proclamation would be sent out of the province.

Three recollects who arrived shortly afterwards having stated, in reply to the queries made of them, that the inhabitants of Quebec were in no way short of provisions, but somewhat

straitened for wood, were, in the view of Mr. Price, guilty of treason to the principles of the liberty he represented; so they were arrested and sent prisoners to Montreal.

Early in February, a captain Goforth with a detachment occupied the barracks. Within two days he called upon the militia officers having British commissions to resign them, and all retail vendors of liquor were forbidden to continue the sale without a license from Wooster. De Tonnancour not giving in his commission, Goforth sent his lieutenant to demand it: de Tonnancour claimed that the commission was his private property, secured to him by the terms of the capitulation granted by Montgomery, and that he did not desire to part with that, which he held it was an honour to possess. An appeal was made to Goforth, who, however, insisted upon its surrender, and finally gave de Tonnancour twenty-four hours to obey or to take the consequences. There was no course open but compliance.

The commandant now called for the election of new officers. The affair took place after grand-mass. Badeaux was sent for as an interpreter. Mr. Laframboise was re-elected for the city by general desire. When the election of the suburbs was considered, the sieur Saint Pierre, who had long served, declined to act on account of his age and asked that someone else should be named.*

Badeaux has given an account of a dinner which the commandant gave on the occasion. The conversation was not interesting, and in spite of the Bastonnois they drank to the health of general Carleton. The commandant offered to bet that before long they would be in Quebec. The Canadians replied that they did not believe they would get in at all. One Leproust, who was present, offered to bet two dozen of wine, that on the 5th of May vessels would have arrived at

* "Le Sr. St. Pierre qui l'avoit toujours été, dit qu'il n'étoit plus d'âge à servir en cette qualité, qu'on pouvoit remettre cette charge à un autre. M. Baby prit la parole et luy dit: 'Comment! vous avez servi le Roy de France, le Roy d'Angleterre et vous refusez de servir le congrès! Ne vaut-il pas autant comme eux?' Une pareille sottise n'eut pas grande approbation, car personne ne souffla; il se trouva contraint de s'applaudir lui-même." [Badeaux, p. 185.]

Quebec with reinforcements. The commandant accepted the bet. "We are therefore sure," adds Badeaux, "to have twenty-four bottles of wine drunk on the 5th. Pray heaven it may be the wine which the vessels have brought."

The election of officers was made in all the adjoining parishes, but by no means unanimously, for there were many who were in no way identified with the extreme partisans of congress. Some of the latter from time to time made accusations against their opponents as disloyal to the American cause. The commandant, however, proved himself a man of sense and discretion and discountenanced such reports and, when possible, silenced them. On an objection being made to one chosen as a militia officer that he had *le cœur Anglais* and had received a commission from Carleton, the commandant replied, if holding a royal commission he had served the king, that would not prevent him from being a good subject of congress.

During this whole period great activity was displayed in furnishing the force before Quebec with reinforcements and material of war. The executive officers of congress were unceasing in their efforts to supply the means of continuing the siege, a proof of the political value attached to the capture of Quebec and of the belief entertained that the resistance of the defenders could not be indefinitely prolonged.* During January 530 men passed through Three Rivers, and in February and March the same energy was displayed in the

* This feeling is strongly shewn in some intercepted letters of one Bendfield, a member of a British Canadian firm which had embraced the cause of congress on the ground that it was the winning side and that money could be made by adhering to its fortunes. In a letter to their correspondents at Bristol, 4th February, 1776, after alluding to Montgomery's defeat, this person proceeds to say, "This miscarriage has greatly alarmed the Americans, who are now coming down with a force that will make Resistance vain, even a Folly; in short, Mr. Carleton has most inhumanly subjected the citizens of Quebec to sustain a siege at the Risk of their Lives and Properties, without any Prospect of Securing other Advantages than in some measure to retrieve his personal Credit by this petty effort. To him and to his Instructions may be attributed the Loss of Canada to Britain, and all the private Losses by their most unexampled Misconduct." These letters were intercepted on their way to England from New York, and sent by Germain to Carleton. [Can. Arch., Q. 12, p. 100, 22nd August, 1776.]

despatch of men and necessaries. There was, however, difficulty with the congress troops in Montreal, many of whom unwillingly left their quarters in the city for the privations of the siege. Badeaux mentions the report of a mutiny; on an order being given for a detachment to proceed to Quebec, several refused to march, on the ground that they had been sent to Canada to garrison the towns, not to fight. Six of the ringleaders were seized, but their comrades forced the prison gates and released them. The firmness of the general quelled the tumult, but he had to take the extreme measure of flogging six of the most prominent mutineers, before he could obtain obedience to his orders.*

The great difficulty during the occupation of Canada by the revolutionary troops was their want of silver money. The Canadians had by no means forgotten the melancholy experience of Bigot's ordinances; but even the paper currency was not forthcoming. Badeaux waited upon the commandant on the part of the *religieuses* of the hospital, who had for upwards of three months attended the sick soldiers of congress without having received payment or other acknowledgment. Badeaux earnestly represented their case and the impossibility of continuing this assistance, finding food and surgical care without remuneration. All that the commandant could reply was that no money had been sent to him. Again Badeaux pointed out the impossibility of incurring further expense without means being furnished to meet it. The commandant answered that the nuns must have patience. Upon which Badeaux replied that he must tell the *religieuses* that they had to nourish the sick with patience. The commandant took the remark kindly and engaged to send money as soon as he could obtain it.†

* I repeat this story as I find it in Verreault. Badeaux likewise tells that it was reported in Three Rivers that some of the inhabitants of Quebec made a wooden horse and placed it on the ramparts with some hay before it, with the remark, "When this horse shall have eaten the bundle of hay, we will surrender." [Verreault, pp. 189-190,]

† "Eh bien, lui ai-je répondu, je vais dire à ces Dames qu'elles nourrissent vos soldats avec de la *patience*, l'on verra comme ils seront bien gras." Il se met à rire et me dit que sous peu il y auroit de l'argent." [Verreault, p. 196.]

Three Rivers witnessed the spectacle of the arrival of the prisoners taken in the defeat of de Beaujeu's small force, twenty-one in number, marched in under a guard of their countrymen. The escort performed the duty with un concealed satisfaction. Those composing it had taken the side of congress, and many of this class were extremely demonstrative in its advocacy. Such of the people of Three Rivers as were royalist in feeling were indignant at their conduct, but they were in the minority and could only bide their time. Some of the prisoners were short of money ; in this respect they were aided by de Tonnancour.

The most contradictory reports ran through the town of the alternate success and failure of the operations before Quebec. They are registered by Badeaux day by day ; when anything painful to record fell to his lot, he adds he cannot believe it. One absurd rumour was that colonel McLean had three times attempted to desert. When news came of any failure on the part of the besiegers, the royalists rendered thanks to God. The ursulines obtained Messire Saint Onge, the grand vicar, to perform the ceremonies of Easter, to demand the blessing of God upon the royal arms, and each day the ancient hymn was sung, "*Domine salvum fac regem*";* not, it may be said, a matter of great danger, from the act of devotion being generally understood. On the 12th of April Badeaux enters a solemn prayer for delivery from their enemies.

Arnold arrived at Three Rivers on the evening of the 14th of April. On the next day he visited the forges and immediately started for Montreal. Owing to the rise of the water covering the road by the lake, he went by canoe to Point-du-lac ; here he took a sleigh to Montreal, where he was to assume command. A few days later general Thomas passed through the town on his way to Quebec. He stated that a reinforcement of 3,000 men was on the way. On the following day 250 arrived in thirteen *bateaux*, with two guns.

The news of Arnold's visit to the forge was now explained. Pellisier, the manager, was instructed to cast mortars of 13,

* Lord, preserve the King.

9 and 7 inches, but they would not be delivered in less than five weeks. The congress troops continued to pass day by day to the camp before Quebec. On the 3rd of May 340 arrived from New England and Pennsylvania ; on the 5th of May 240, and on the 7th 104. On the morning of the 7th the news of the successful sortie from Quebec reached Three Rivers, with the additional intelligence that frigates were ascending the river. The *religieuses* immediately assembled and chanted a *Te Deum* for the royalist success. A few hours afterwards orders were received for the congress troops who had arrived the preceding day to return to Montreal. During the night Wooster himself reached Three Rivers.

On the 9th the detachment which had proceeded on its way towards Montreal returned, having orders, they said, to establish themselves at Sorel and there intrench themselves. Nine hundred more of the congress troops passed through the city, while Thomas remained with what force he could hold together at Deschambault.

On the 12th some of the troops remaining in Three Rivers commenced to pillage the property of de Tonnancour and Normanville. The commandant was appealed to, when he ordered a lieutenant to stop the marauding, and he apparently succeeded.*

Discipline had now become relaxed, for it was believed that a retreat from Canada had been determined. On the 14th the troops arrived from Deschambault ; they were followed by Thomas, who immediately left for Sorel, where, it was stated, a stand would be attempted : 600 congress troops remained at Three Rivers. On the 21st of May there was a report that the British had again occupied Montreal, in consequence of which the remaining congress troops immediately took their departure. Four sick officers were left at the

* " Messrs. de Tonnancour et Normanville sont de retour ils ont rattrapé les voleurs et leur ont fait rendre un miroir, 2 chevaux, des nappes et des serviettes ouvrées, un lit en tombeau et d'autres articles. Les malheureux se préparaient à aller piller chez M. Guty à Machiche, mais comme ils ont été pris dans cette paroisse, l'on pense qu'ils auront passé tout droit." [Verreault. Badeaux Journal. p. 211].

1776]

THE KING'S BIRTHDAY.

39

hospital. The news proved false: it was the affair at the Cedars, of which I shall have to speak, that gave rise to the report.

On the 27th, the royal troops had reached Champlain, nine miles east of Three Rivers. Owing to the unfavourable wind they remained stationary here until the 2nd of June, when they passed in front of the city. They were saluted by a *feu de joie*, to which they replied by firing four cannon. On the succeeding day, a detachment took possession of the town, and a king's ship passing shortly afterwards saluted the new garrison with seven guns. The day following, the 4th of June, was the king's birthday, which now could be observed with the usual ceremony. There was a general parade and the ships which had arrived fired salutes. The city had again returned to its old allegiance.

I have mentioned in a former volume * that the occupation of Montreal by the troops of congress did not find universal favour and that the address of Washington, issued by Wooster, then in command, exercised no favourable influence on the general feeling. The sentiment was not unknown to those whom it most concerned, and their efforts were consequently directed to lead the Canadians, if not actively accepting the cause of congress, to observe neutrality. Fears were also entertained with regard to the Indians of Caughnawaga: Wooster strove, in every way to conciliate them, so that in the event of a retreat from Canada they would not take the field to harass the force in its march.

Walker again came into prominence. He made an attempt to incite the population of l'Assomption to take up arms in favour of the Bastonnais. When he obtained his release, some of his friends in that locality had sent him an address of congratulation. He had construed the proceeding into a continuance of his influence and popularity, and he attempted to exercise them by inducing the Canadians to take the field. The attempt miscarried. As he formed no favourable augury with regard to their future behaviour in the contest, accom-

* [Ante, vol. iv., p. 474].

panied by Price and with a strong detachment, he made a second visit to the spot to disarm the *habitants*; he was, however, only able to find a few muskets, news having been given of his intention.

Montgomery's death greatly depressed the supporters of congress who had counted upon his success; especially in Montreal. The royalists shewed the contrary sentiment, and the expression of their opinion led Wooster to send domiciliary visits to obtain the arms of those he looked upon as his enemies.* Political feeling thus excited became increased on both sides to bitterness. Those ranging themselves on the side of congress acted with unrestrained vehemence, and in many instances family ties, by these opposite feelings, were rent asunder. On the 16th of January Wooster arrested Hertel de Rouville and Gray, to send them prisoners to the southern colonies. A meeting of the citizens was held to protest against the proceeding, as contrary to the engagements of Montgomery, and on Wooster being addressed on the subject, he consented to abandon the design. He, however, took steps to disarm the suburbs. According to the report of the day, sixty-four royalists had been marked out for arrest.

In the country districts there was much to depress the inhabitants; the price of wheat had fallen and the cost of all merchandise had greatly increased. The supplies to the army of occupation being paid for in paper money, great dissatisfaction was felt. An appeal was made to the fears of the Canadians, by setting before them the fact that many were so committed to the cause of congress that it was their interest to aid in effecting the conquest of Quebec: otherwise the king's troops, proving successful, would burn their houses out of revenge and they would be ruined. The argument was utterly without effect upon a large number of the inhabitants; many, however, still adhered to the invaders. Price undertook

* They are thus named by Sanguinet: "Pierre Panet, Gray, Simon Christophe, Joseph Sanguinet, Saint Dizier, Ermatinger, St. George Dupré et deux autres personnes." [Verreault, p. 93.]

a mission to Quebec to excite the *habitants* in the neighbouring parishes to join the besieging force ; he, however, signally failed. All he could effect was to obtain, for the time, the promise of their neutrality.

Wooster did not adhere to his purpose of non-intervention with the personal liberty of the citizens, and having notified de Rouville that he would send him to the southern colonies, a deputation again waited upon him to remonstrate against such an exercise of power. On this occasion Wooster took a different tone. He told those who were present that he looked upon them as enemies, and that they were rascals, and there would be shortly a different condition of matters.

He had been greatly embarrassed by reports reaching him from the country districts, that in many cases the priests refused absolution to the sympathisers with congress. Wooster had resolved to arrest Montgolfier, the superior of the seminary, of whom complaint had been made, and send him and the other priests he had determined to seize as prisoners to New York. They were indebted to the influence of the wife of Price that this step was not taken. It is certain that none of the ecclesiastics looked with favour upon the invasion of Canada. As early as May, 1775, Briand issued a *mandement* as to the conduct the Canadians should follow in that trying time. After recording the singular goodness and gentleness with which Canada had been governed since the conquest, he recited the recent benefits conferred upon them by the establishment of their ancient laws, the free exercise of their religion, and their participation in the privileges and advantages possessed by British subjects ; and called upon them to join in the attempt to repel the enemy and to oppose the invasion of the province. The voice of religion, united with their interest, appealed to their zeal in the defence of their country.*

Wooster experienced discouragement in every direction. The convulsion of feeling arising from the failure before Quebec and the severity of duty entailed upon the men who

* Mandements des Evêques de Quebec, II., p. 264.

had volunteered to come into Canada, buoyed up by the expectation of an immediate conquest, led to numerous desertions. Wooster placed a guard at Saint John's expressly to arrest any of his force attempting to pass by that direction. Finding that the position of the congress troops in Montreal was becoming the theme of much speculative and unfriendly conversation, he issued a proclamation, in which he forbade all discussion regarding their condition, enforcing silence under the threat of the penalty of being sent a prisoner to the colonies. It was at this date he called upon the officers of the Canadian militia to resign their commissions. In the first instance they declined to do so, but agreed to enter into a pledge, in the event of the congress troops abandoning Canada, to take no step to their prejudice. Wooster answered that this declaration satisfied him with regard to the pacific feeling of the city ; but he pointed out that the officers in the country districts had placed their commissions in his hands, upon which he was told in reply, that it was the city which, in the province, gave the tone to feeling.

A few days afterwards Wooster arrested four of the principal militia officers.* A public meeting was immediately called in the recollet church on the 1st of February. Price attended, with several of the friends of congress, and prevented any resolution being carried, the ground taken by them being that the commissions should be surrendered. On the following day the officers held a meeting, and from the feeling that they were powerless to resist, it was resolved that the commissions could not be withheld ; they accordingly proceeded to Wooster's quarters and placed the commissions in his hands. The congress officers who were present did not conceal their satisfaction at this compliance, some of them even contemptuously giving expression to it. The few who still declined to accede to the demand were arrested and sent prisoners to Chambly.

Throughout Sanguinet's memoir he is unjust to Carleton.

* Colonel Dupy Desautier, lieutenant-colonel Neven Sevestre, Majors St. George Dupré and Gray. [Verreault, p. 96.]

In the preceding autumn he blamed him severely for having failed to attack and disperse the Canadians who had assembled at point Olivier in support of Montgomery and for not sending succour to Saint John's, when Carleton was without strength to take the field, when indeed he did not know on whom he could rely. At this date he repeats his complaints that Carleton did not drive the troops from their position before Quebec and make his way to relieve Montreal. Sanguinet overrated Carleton's strength to act as the assailant and also entirely underrated the force opposed to him. He endeavours to shew that the reinforcements sent to Canada amounted only to 1,213 men, between the 25th of January and the 18th of March. We know from Badeaux that a far greater number passed through Three Rivers. The whole royalist force available, independently of the volunteers, was 750 men, composed of regular troops and corps of seamen. The volunteers looked upon their service as confined to the defence of Quebec. This statement sufficiently establishes Carleton's want of power to undertake any offensive operation ; totally setting out of view the absence of all organization to commence a winter campaign, as he was perfectly destitute of the material of war and of the necessary supplies.

Whatever the strength of the congress troops, it was their policy to overawe the Canadian population and so prevent any departure from the neutrality on which their safety depended. Reports were industriously circulated of the large reinforcements which were on the way, while the hand of authority became firmer and more aggressive. The royalists were kept under restraint, so that many felt it prudent to remain in their houses as much as possible. Wooster's position was by no means so assured as the earlier successes had promised and as it was considered in the first weeks of winter. In sending up to Quebec the guns and provisions which had been obtained at Chambly and Montreal, he had recourse to the *corvées* which in 1760, at the conquest, had passed out of practice. This enforced gratuitous labour was exacted in turn from the *habitants* of the parishes through which the route

lay, a form of the liberty promised by the declaration of congress, which had certainly no very attractive features for those who suffered from it.

At the end of February, Hazen, previously mentioned, with one Antill, an attorney, returned to Montreal, having been absent on the duty of conveying to congress the news of Montgomery's defeat. Hazen had been an officer of the 44th. He was now appointed a colonel, and Antill, lieutenant-colonel of a regiment which he had undertaken to raise in Canada. It was on this occasion that Wooster published the address of Hancock,* probably brought back by Hazen, and issued on the theory that it would act favourably upon public feeling. It set forth that by the British constitution the colonies were justified in vindicating their rights as they were doing, and that the liberties of the Canadians were identified with theirs; that their only desire was the cause of liberty, and that the services rendered by the Canadians to Montgomery demanded full recognition. Every cause was liable to a reverse, "but those generous natures which were enlightened and warmed by the sacred fire of liberty" were not discouraged by such checks. Two battalions had received orders to march. Six fresh battalions would be raised for the service, and they would arrive before Carleton could receive reinforcements. It was also resolved to raise two battalions in Canada. This "assistance for the support and preservation of American liberty" would create the greatest satisfaction. The address called upon the Canadians to form associations and to elect deputies to a provincial assembly. It concluded with the assurance that "the moment was approaching when the standard of tyranny would no longer have a place in North America."

The address led to no result. The Canadians would neither form political associations amongst themselves nor take steps to elect deputies for an assembly. They in no way shewed willingness to be incorporated into regiments, and the experience of the *habitants* in the treatment they had

* This document is given on the last page of volume IV.

received had removed many illusions concerning the promised blessings which the presence of the authorities of congress was to confer. Several still clung to the cause they had so recklessly advocated : but the payment in paper money on enforced requisitions and the *corvées* re-established to assure the passage of material to Quebec had not given very favourable views of the exalted liberty so fervently promised. The great mass of the inhabitants, both of town and country, had awakened to the realities of their position as a conquered people. They felt the weight of this occupation by men from the southern colonies, who, although belonging to the same empire, were without true sympathy with them and had entered the province as invaders and enemies, to effect their own political purposes. The balance in the scale was now turned ; all that was required was some weighty impetus to give it a *momentum*. When, in a few weeks, that power was irresistibly exercised, the strength of the country acted with singular unanimity, animated by the one desire to sweep from the province the force in possession of it. With the invaders themselves, during the last few weeks of their power, the tenure of occupation was felt to be insecure. When the hour of attack came, the faintest attempt was made to retain the country, so that their retreat assumed the worst form of a confused and disorderly rout.

CHAPTER III.

The garrison of Detroit consisted of two companies of the 8th regiment; some companies of the regiment were also at Niagara and a small detachment had been left at Oswegatchie, the present Ogdensburg, under the command of captain Forster. There was no attempt, in the first years of the war, to disturb the possession of these places. Forster, however, was well aware of the success of the congress troops of the preceding autumn and that during the winter of 1775-1776 Montreal was occupied by them. His subsequent movements suggest that he had received intelligence that a strong party in the city was opposed to this occupation and was prepared, on his appearance with a sufficient force, to join in the attempt to drive the invaders from the place. Such is the intention avowed by captain Parke, who has left a narrative of Forster's expedition organized with this design.*

The detachment left Oswegatchie to descend the Saint Lawrence on the 12th of May. It consisted of a captain, two lieutenants, two sergeants, 36 rank and file of the 8th regiment, eleven British and Canadian volunteers, and 160 Indians of different tribes. On their arrival at Saint Regis, on the 14th, they were reinforced by 44 Indians of that village. They halted here for a day, and, having started on the 16th, they encamped in the afternoon near the western end of lake Saint

* The principal authority for the events which took place at the Cedars is the pamphlet published in London in 1777. "An Authentic Narrative of Facts relating to the Exchange of Prisoners taken at the Cedars: supported by the Testimonies and depositions of his Majesty's officers with several Original Letters and Papers. Together with Remarks upon the Report and resolves of the American congress on that subject." This pamphlet is of extreme rarity. It has been translated by M. Ethier and included in the documents of the date edited by Abbé Verreault. We have also the *Mémoire* of de Lorimier in the second volume "Invasion du Canada" relating to the expedition.

Francis. On the 17th, intelligence was received of the strength of the force posted at the Cedars. This information caused dissatisfaction among the Indians, and for a time it was doubtful if they would continue with the expedition. A start, however, was made, and at mid-day they halted at the river Beaudette. It was made known at this place that the congress troops had been driven in disorder from before Quebec and that a general feeling of consternation prevailed among them. The Indians were encouraged by this news, for it appeared to them as an assurance of victory, and they expressed their readiness to proceed, with the hope of attacking the enemy at daybreak. On their arrival at the head of the Coteau rapids, there was some hesitation as to the continuance of their journey that night. Fifty of the party, however, descended the rapids to Pointe-au-Diable, while the remainder encamped at the foot of the lake.

On the morning of the 18th of May, a junction of the whole force being made, the quiet water of the river was followed to within three miles of the Cedars, when a landing was made and the canoes and *bateaux* placed in safety. The main body advanced towards the Cedars, a party of Indians being sent forward to scout on the left of the force which followed the river bank. Shortly afterwards a prisoner was sent in, together with the scalp of one of the garrison who had refused to surrender and had lost his life in his attempted resistance.

The post known as the Cedars, at the second rapid, between lakes Saint Francis and Saint Louis, was held by major Butterfield with 390 men: he was there established and in a way intrenched, with two guns in position. Forster, upon his arrival before the place, demanded an immediate surrender, and when so doing, pointed out that from the small number of regular troops under his command, he would be unable to control the revengeful spirit of the Indians if irritated by resistance and loss. The commandant, major Butterfield, asked three hours to consider the demand, but before the expiration of the time he sent a flag with the proposal that his men should be permitted to retire with their arms:

the demand was refused. The attack was consequently begun and the intrenchment vigorously assailed. News soon after arrived that major Sherburne, of the congress troops, had arrived at *Quinze-chênes*,* the present *Vaudreuil*, with reinforcements and provisions, but that after hearing that the post of the Cedars had been taken, he had retreated to Montreal.

This intelligence increased the activity of the besiegers, while it exercised a despondent influence on the troops attacked. Forster, considering that he had little time to lose, on the morning of the 19th renewed the assault. Some small houses within a few yards of the intrenchments offered a cover to his men, and a vigorous fire of musketry was kept up by them. At ten o'clock they were joined by de Montigny with thirty French Canadians, and soon afterwards the news was brought that major Sherburne was again advancing by the island of Montreal; de Montigny was accordingly detached to watch and harass his march.

Forster, on his side, actively continued his assault, when, after no long interval, a white flag was hoisted and Butterfield offered to surrender, provided the lives of the garrison could be protected from the cruelty of the savages. Forster obtained a promise from the Indians, but only with difficulty, that they would observe the terms he would grant. With the greater number, their passions had been excited by the resistance offered, slight as it had been. Forster accordingly notified Butterfield that his stipulations would be accepted and that the fort must surrender in half an hour. He gave his word to protect the defenders unharmed, with the condition that they surrendered in the clothes which they wore; and that all the provisions, stores and property were

* A small stream which discharges near the old manor house of *Vaudreuil* is still known by the name of *Quinze-chiens* (fifteen dogs). The memoirs of the time, particularly those of Wilkinson, to which I shall hereafter have to refer, undoubtedly establish that the word at that date was "*Quinze-chênes*" (Fifteen oaks), a designation perfectly intelligible. These noble trees having been sacrificed to the lumberer's axe, doubtless upwards of a century back, led to their passing from memory and to the corruption of the name.

to be given over in good faith to the person appointed to receive them.

In order to prevent all insult to the garrison, Forster determined that with the regulars he would take possession of the fort, and that only five chiefs of the Indians should accompany him. On the acceptance of the terms, Forster, with these fifty men, entered the fort, and, in order to protect the prisoners from the interference of the Indians, escorted them to the spot to which they were to remove. The Indians were then admitted into the place to pillage it.

The terms were, that the prisoners were to surrender in the clothes they wore; nevertheless, as they were preparing to march out, each man was observed to carry a small packet with him. Forster pointed out that the conditions of surrender being well understood by the Indians, the proceeding might cause dissatisfaction, and lead to their resentment as a breach of the engagement. Two of the chiefs present, however, without consulting any of the other members of the tribe, gave their consent to the proceeding. This permission caused much ill feeling, and, in spite of Forster's care and precautions, some of the prisoners were forced by the Indians to give up their packets, and in two or three instances watches and money were forcibly taken by them. Two laced hats are especially mentioned as having been so obtained, but the men of the garrison received no personal ill treatment. They met with all the consideration possible in the circumstances, and for safety were placed in the barracks they had occupied. Even at this early date their officers asked that an arrangement might be entered into for an exchange of prisoners; but at that time it was a matter with which Forster did not feel warranted in dealing.

On the following day, the 20th, it became known that Sherburne was at Quinze-chênes; de Lorimier was accordingly detached, with 100 Indians, to join de Montigny. At nine o'clock de Lorimier could assemble only forty of his party, with whom he commenced his march; he was, how-

ever, shortly afterwards joined by forty more. There were also present eighteen Canadians, commanded by Maurer.

De Lorimier had proceeded but a short distance when he met Sherburne's party. He immediately attacked it, and after the loss of five or six of his detachment, Sherburne surrendered with 97 men. The affair was of such short duration that de Montigny arrived only at its conclusion, when other prisoners were taken.

Difficulty was experienced in controlling the Indians at the Cedars, who expressed their discontent that they were withheld from plundering the prisoners; but Forster persevered in his unceasing efforts for their protection. Nevertheless, there were cases when the Indians did manage to possess themselves of the property they coveted. These instances were few; and although the loss of the most simple necessities, in the trying situation in which the congress prisoners were placed, must have been painfully felt, the fact is established that there was no general "looting"; on the contrary, it was of rare occurrence. It would be difficult to shew that Forster was in any way deficient in the qualities of a good officer, or that he was wanting either in a sense of the responsibilities of his position, or in ordinary humanity.

About two o'clock the report reached the Cedars that de Montigny had been defeated, and that a strong body of congress troops were marching to attack the place. True to their instincts, the Indians, considering that their safety lay in the destruction of the prisoners, desired immediately to kill them as an assurance of their own greater security. It was their traditional policy, thus to relieve themselves from the danger of encountering greater numbers, when they looked forward to be attacked by the relieving force. They regarded it as a certainty, that the prisoners would join the ranks of their enemies. They were only restrained by firmness and resolution. It is difficult even to conceive what the end might have been, when, fortunately, de Lorimier arrived with his prisoners to calm the agitation.

An appeal to the spirit of Indian revenge had also pre-

sented itself; one of the principal Seneca chiefs had been killed, and four or five of the tribe seriously wounded. A demand arose, that some prisoners should be slaughtered, as a satisfaction to this injury to the tribe. It must be remembered, that in the skirmish under de Lorimier the Indians and a few Canadians only had been present, consequently, the troops who surrendered after the affair were looked upon by the Indians as their prize in the fight, subject to their control. Forster, in order to prevent the exercise of any cruelty, ransomed several of these captives at a high price, and presents of value were given to satisfy the relatives of the dead Seneca chief and such as had been wounded. Some of the Indians insisted on carrying away their prisoners, individually taken by them, as a right of war. These instances were rare; 97 being placed with those already taken, the total number now amounted to 427. The Indians were induced, by this purchased consideration, to make no attempt against the lives of their captives. They would not, however, abandon their right to pillage them, and many were plundered of what little they had managed to retain, when any article attracted the greed of their conquerors. Although a serious privation, it was the limit of Indian aggression, which Forster with his small force was impotent to control.

On the afternoon of the 21st, Forster marched from the Cedars to Quinze-chênes, some seven miles north on the river Ottawa, hoping to be joined by a corps of Canadians in strength sufficient to advance upon Montreal and attack the troops there. On his arrival, he was met by de Montigny only with fifty Canadians, and about the same number of Indians from the lake of the Two-Mountains. All, therefore, that could be done was to establish some post on the island of Montreal, and de Montigny proceeded to his own property, fort Senneville, at Saint Anne's, with thirty Canadians and twenty Indians. On the 23rd, two hundred and fifty of the prisoners were transferred to de Montigny's place, while the remainder were left at Vaudreuil. The congress officers were sent to the lake of the Two-Mountains, the two priests of the

parish, messires de Terlaye and Methevet, taking them under their charge and protection.

The following morning, the 24th, being informed that a force of Canadians had assembled at point Claire, about fourteen miles from Montreal, Forster crossed from Vaudreuil to the island of Montreal and advanced to that place. The prisoners remaining at Vaudreuil were placed under a guard of Canadians. On reaching point Claire, Forster found that 500 Canadians were present, and he resolved to proceed to Lachine and attack the congress troops assembled there under Arnold. When they had arrived within three miles of Lachine, Forster received intelligence that Arnold was intrenched with six pieces of cannon, and that reinforcements were rapidly arriving, the outer posts having been called in, so that Arnold's numbers would be increased to between 1,500 and 2,000 men. Forster, accordingly, retreated to point Claire, and on his arrival summoned a council of war. It was then resolved to proceed to the Cedars by passing to the end of the island, and thence to cross to Vaudreuil. Forster now knowing that Arnold's force was too strong for him to attack, and that he could look for no further success in his attempt against Montreal, felt justified in accepting the proposal made by the congress officers for an exchange of prisoners. Consequently, on the 25th, he sent an officer to the Two-Mountains, who entered into a cartel with the congress officers for a regular exchange. On the terms being accepted, the officers proceeded to Vaudreuil to complete the engagement. The cartel, dated the 26th of April, was signed by Sherburne and by Butterfield the commandant, with the four captains, Bliss, Wilkins, Stevens and Sullivan.

The men, of whom de Montigny had been placed in charge, giving ground for apprehension that some difficulty might be experienced with them, were, for greater security, transferred to a small island at some distance from his place.

We are indebted to the memoirs of Wilkinson, an officer of congress, for a narrative of what took place with the relieving

force, he having been present with Arnold.* Wilkinson, who had lately obtained a commission in a New Hampshire regiment, was one of four ordered to proceed to Canada in the spring of 1776, to be placed under the command of Sullivan. Leaving New York, he reached Albany and ascended the Hudson, whence he crossed to lake George and thence to lake Champlain. After being nearly wrecked opposite Burlington, he arrived at Saint John's on the 22nd of May. He there met Price, of Montreal, already mentioned as a strong sympathiser with congress. Wilkinson learnt from him of the "misfortune" at the Cedars, that Sullivan was at Sorel, and Arnold had advanced to Lachine. He found Saint John's without any regular garrison, but full of stragglers. Not having precise orders as to the corps to which he should report himself, Wilkinson felt embarrassed what to do, and considered the best course would be to join Arnold at Lachine. His experience on leaving Saint John's was to be surrounded by a swarm of mosquitoes, which he pronounced to be more venomous than any he had seen on the Mississippi; it was the beginning of the season when this pernicious insect appears in Canada and is most troublesome.

Wilkinson reached Laprairie on the morning of the second day, whence he proceeded onward to Caughnawaga; at this point he crossed over to Lachine, where he presented himself to Arnold, whom he had never previously seen. Arnold was engaged in fortifying a long stone building, expecting to be attacked. On the following day, having heard of the approach of Forster after his defeat of the troops at the Cedars, Arnold crossed over to Caughnawaga, and he found the officer in command, colonel Brown, had already made preparations for defence.

Arnold, hearing of Forster's retreat to the Cedars, and having been reinforced, determined to act aggressively, and, following the road to the west of the island of Montreal,

* "Memoirs of My Own Time," by general James Wilkinson. Philadelphia, 1816.

on the succeeding day reached fort Senneville.* As they approached the spot, they could observe that a part of Forster's force was crossing the Ottawa to disembark on the Vaudreuil side. This movement took place on the 26th, the day the first cartel was signed at Vaudreuil. At this date de Montigny's prisoners had been transferred to the island. We learn from the writer of the pamphlet, that it was on this occasion it was narrated, that a prisoner had been summarily shot when refusing to embark, on being ordered to leave. It is a statement in no way substantiated ; no witness is brought forward to bear testimony to the act of cruelty ; the name of the murdered man remains unknown, and it is plain that the report is unfounded.

The *bateaux* with provisions and the baggage of Arnold's force had been delayed by the rapids at île Perrot, and did not arrive until five in the afternoon. On their appearance Arnold ordered them to be unloaded, and placing his men on board without any system, proceeded to cross over to the southern side. Difficulty being experienced in steering the *bateaux* through the sheet of water which had to be passed, the water-line of the projecting point opposite the fort was followed, and a landing was attempted on the main shore some short distance to the east. It was a bright, unclouded evening, with a setting sun in the eyes of Arnold's troops. As they approached the village of Vandreuil, they found the British force drawn up to receive them, with two 4-pounders, which were actively fired upon the advancing *bateaux*, now within half cannon shot. The men rested on their oars while the current drifted them out of range. Finally, orders were given to return to the starting place on the island of Montreal. A council of war was then held ; Arnold proposed to ascend the Ottawa a few miles, to land a force and

* The ruins of this fort still remain, at the point where the branch of the Ottawa, known as the rivière des Prairies, turns to the north of the island of Montreal. It was the property of de Montigny, and on this occasion was burned by Arnold. Franquet speaks of the fort as existent in 1752. Wilkinson describes it as fort St. Anne. The fort, however, never bore that name.

attack the British at day-break and release the Cedars prisoners. The design was opposed, as it was considered that the Indians would remain on the alert, and that no surprise would be effected. The council broke up at midnight, some sharp words having passed between Arnold and Hazen, who was present and opposed the proposition.

About two o'clock a boat arrived from the opposite shore with lieutenant Parke of the 8th regiment, accompanied by major Sherburne. The object was to submit to Arnold the convention which had been entered into between the latter and Forster, and to obtain its ratification. The prisoners were to be released, on condition that, hereafter, exchanges should be made for them, and they were to join Arnold, in order to take their departure for their homes. No question arose as to any ill-treatment suffered by the prisoners. Arnold objected to the second article, in which the congress officers had agreed that the prisoners, on no pretext whatever, were again to bear arms against the British government. Forster finally agreed to expunge it, and a new set of articles was drawn up, to which Arnold made some unimportant modification. Arnold's letter to the commissioners, dated Saint Anne's the 27th of May, has been preserved.* He describes that on his arrival at the western point of the island, the prisoners were being removed to a small island a league distant on the opposite shore. He sent over some Caughnawaga Indians attached to his force, unaccompanied by any officer, to Vaudreuil to confer with Forster. It was upon the report made by these Indians, that Arnold asserts it had been resolved that if any attack were made, the prisoners would immediately be killed, and no quarter given to any other captives who should fall into their hands. Arnold describes himself as torn by the conflicting passion of revenge and humanity, and that he ordered out the boats, and found five unhappy wretches, naked and almost starved, on the island; that two of the prisoners who had been too ill to move had been inhumanly butchered, and that afterwards he reproached Forster, because he did not

* American Arch., VI., p. 595.

restrain the Indians from murdering the prisoners in cold blood.

He describes a council of war which was unanimous for an attack early next day, when, at two in the morning, lieutenant Parke of the 8th, with major Sherburne, arrived to submit the cartel agreed upon. Arnold states that Parke returned to Vaudreuil bearing the objections he had raised and came back with the articles modified. As they were not so explicit as Arnold wished, they were again sent back. The agreement in accordance with the modifications made by Arnold was brought back, signed by Forster at Vaudreuil dated the 27th. It was signed by Arnold at Saint Anne's at six o'clock of the same day. Wilkinson * narrates that as they were advancing to the attack, attention was attracted by two persons making signs to them, whom, with some difficulty, they took on board. They proved to be two of the prisoners. He gives no account of any murders having been committed or that any bad feeling was shewn on that account. On the contrary, after the signature of the articles, Arnold went over to Vandreuil and settled with Forster the subordinate arrangements. The meeting appears to have been perfectly amicable. We learn from the same source that Arnold left for Montreal the following day, the 28th. In view of what subsequently happened, these dates are important.

On the evening of the 27th, four *bateaux*, with the prisoners on board, left Vaudreuil, to cross to the island of Montreal, but the wind was very strong, and the large sheet of water so rough that they were forced to return. The wind continued in this state during the two following days; it was not until the 30th that the whole of them could leave. On the same night Forster abandoned his position to return to Oswegatchie.

It will scarcely be thought possible that an obligation of this character, deliberately entered into and accepted as binding, should have been arbitrarily violated; yet such is the fact. It was peremptorily repudiated by congress. An official

* Wilkinson's memoirs establish this fact. Vol. I., p. 47.

copy of the justification of this breach of faith was sent to two British generals. The very transmission was marked by an entire absence of the punctilio and courtesies observed by officers of character. Copies were ordered to be sent to Howe and Burgoyne; the latter the subordinate of Carleton. It was equally a disregard of military etiquette and social decency, to overlook the general-in-chief and to make the communication to his lieutenant. An explanation may be offered for the avoidance of addressing Carleton directly; he had left Montgomery's letters without notice; he had refused to receive any flag of truce, as such at Quebec, and had utterly ignored, as belligerents, the force before the city, treating them only as men in revolt. In this spirit he acted to the last, allowing the prisoners taken after the retreat of the congress troops to return home on their own parole, so that he would not enter into communication with the officer in command. It would have been sufficient to send the document to Howe, care being taken to establish its transmission; but it resembled the act of a peevish woman, in affecting to ignore the commander of the forces in Canada; especially in the circumstances of the sweeping reverse the congress troops had experienced in their expulsion from the province.

The duty was assigned to Washington of forwarding the resolves of congress to Burgoyne. His letter to Burgoyne, sent through Schuyler, consisted of a few words, while he wrote to Schuyler himself justifying the proceeding in a half-hearted manner, as if he felt it incumbent to add some expression of sympathy with the obligation entailed on him. If the narrative put forth by congress was justified by the facts, the language of Washington to Schuyler must appear tame and cold. To my mind, it suggests his disapproval of the repudiation, joined to a sense of his powerlessness to oppose an unworthy and unjust act.*

The ground on which the leaders of congress refused to carry out the conditions entered into is as untenable as it is

* Washington's letter to Burgoyne is not included in his published writings. It is to be found in *Can. Arch.*, Q. 12, p. 137, as follows:—

ridiculous. In the explanation of the causes of this repudiation, they accuse their own officer, major Butterfield, of cowardice, as if it formed a ground of complaint against those who defeated him. In so doing, they dwell upon the fact that he surrendered with the knowledge that Arnold was hastening to his relief, thus recognizing Arnold as the superior officer. Nevertheless, it is set forth that Arnold was not invested with powers for the disposal of prisoners; that it was the matter only for the determination of congress. So absurd a pretension can only be explained by the resolve to violate the convention, and the narrative, assigned as the cause, is throughout a perversion of truth. The only statement sustaining it is that of Arnold, made by him on the report of Indians. The silence of Wilkinson establishes that the outrages complained of were never committed. What, however, is of first importance is, that the whole story is repudiated by one of the hostages who signed the first cartel of Sherburne, captain Ebenezer Sullivan, a brother of general John Sullivan, afterwards known by his expedition against the Six Nations in 1779. Captain Sullivan gives the most distinct and positive contradiction of the charges brought against Forster.*

"New York, 15th July, 1776. Sir, I have it in charge from congress to transmit the inclosed Resolutions to you, and have the honor to be, Sir,

"Your most obedt.

"Hum. Servt.

"HIS EXCELLENCY

"GO. WASHINGTON.

"GENERAL BURGoyNE."

That to Schuyler is given in a note by Chauncey Ford, Vol. IV., p. 260, viz., 15th July, 1776:—

"Enclosed you will receive a letter from congress which came to hand this morning with a copy of some resolves to which you will give your attention, as their execution will be under your direction. I have also enclosed a letter for general Burgoyne, which I request you to seal and forward to him, as soon as you have perused the important and necessary resolves it contains. The spirited measures which congress have entered into, I am hopefull will make the British troops more regardful, that the faith which ought to be preserved inviolate between nations, and the rights of humanity may not be infracted in future."

* Sullivan's letter was published in the contemporary pamphlet, "The Authentic Narrative, etc.," previously alluded to. [Ante, p. 46.] It is given in [Can. Arch., Q. 12, p. 229,] bearing the signature of "Ebenezer Sullivan," and

The allegation that Forster behaved with inhumanity, abandoning his prisoners to be ill-treated and in some cases killed by the Indians is in no way sustained. That after the surrender property was taken is undeniable, but it was under circumstances which were uncontrollable. It is established that Forster energetically attempted, to the utmost of his power, to protect the prisoners, ransoming many of them at some cost. The garrison at the Cedars surrendered as they stood, and what remained in the fort was regarded by the Indians as their booty.

The numbers of the Canadians and Indians are also exaggerated ; they are reported by congress as being 100 of the former and 500 of the latter. Their numbers were 11 Canadian and British volunteers, and 204 Indians.

There is an unfortunate explanation for the act of bad faith. It had its origin in the desire to embitter the feeling towards the mother country. The expedition against Canada had ended in such disaster as greatly to lessen the confidence felt in the success of the effort to obtain independence. In order to revivify the desire to continue the contest, the sentiment of enmity to the old association was pertinaciously

is dated Montreal, 14th August. Sullivan states that the hostages are well. He is surprised that they are not redeemed according to Cartel, and that besides the refusal, congress has demanded captain Forster to answer for what it is pleased to term the massacres of the Cedars. Congress could not have so acted but from wrong information. He calls God to witness that no living man could have acted with more humanity than captain Forster, and that whoever says to the contrary is an enemy to peace and a fallacious disturber of mankind. He cannot imagine what reason can be assigned for not redeeming the hostages. Had the affair of the Cedars been really a massacre, congress should rather redeem the hostages than leave them in the hands of so merciless an enemy. Does congress regard the troops no longer than whilst they are victorious ? The evil effect of such a policy, will turn the prisoners and their friends against congress, and expose the colonies to ruin and division. "If," he adds, "we were in the hands of a rigorous power as they have wrongly represented, have they not (after so enormous a breach of faith) every colour of justice, loaded with chains in some horrid dungeon to tell us to languish out our days, under a sentence passed by our own people ? If you suspect I write this for the sake of getting my own liberty, your suspicion wrongs me ; it is not my own confinement but the breach of a treaty, which even the savages have ever held sacred, that causes me to write."

appealed to, and kept at fever heat, by every artifice of misrepresentation. It was a continuation of the efforts of the leaders, by a fancied sense of wrong and injury, to embitter the public mind to the extreme of hate. Carleton expressed himself strongly on that point.* His own conduct was a continual effort to soften asperities, and, if possible, to pave the way to better feeling. His utterances will ever remain as representative of the view which a study of these unhappy times must enforce, when the dominant desire is to attain the truth. To this day the surrender at the Cedars continues to be misrepresented,† but the time has come when its true history must obtain recognition.

In the statement put forth by congress to justify the non-ratification of the agreement, no notice is taken of the convention with Arnold; its argument is based upon the cartel with Sherburne, although the latter had been entirely superseded owing to the later ratification by Arnold; and while adhering to the proceedings taken with Sherburne, the number of prisoners is misrepresented. They are clearly specified in this document as 475; four hostages retained for the fulfilment of the agreement; eight Canadians, subsequently released. Eight captives were ransomed from the Indians: two who remained behind refused to leave them.

* "I have from the beginning been convinced that the men who kindled the flames of rebellion in America never entertained a thought of extinguishing them, but were resolved to seek their own safety and gratify their ambition in the continuance of the public confusion and public calamities. The resolves of the Congress, transmitted by Mr. Washington to Lieutenant General Burgoyne, of which your Lordship will herewith receive a copy, as well as of his letter, seem calculated to hurry on a revengeful war, in order to deprive all moderate men in the Colonies of the least hopes or thought of a reconciliation." The object of his own orders on the 4th instant was to counteract this malignant spirit. He had, previous to the receipt of these resolves, directed that all prisoners should be sent home. A list of the prisoners and copy of the orders of the 4th constituted the answer sent to Washington. [Can. Arch., Q. 12, p. 135.]

† In the introduction to the journal of Charles Carroll, recording his mission to Montreal, published by the Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, in 1876, the following astounding passage is read [p. 81]: "At the Cedars near four hundred men surrendered by a disgraceful capitulation, and a hundred or more were barbarously murdered by savages."

The statement of congress gives only 376 prisoners, and others, "of whom no specification has been transmitted."

A long narrative of unsustained assertion of the wrong and cruelty suffered terminated with the declaration, that nevertheless it was resolved to ratify the exchange, but that previous to the delivery of the British prisoners on their release, the commander in chief "be required to deliver into our hands the Authors, Abettors, and Perpetrators, of the horrid murder committed on the Prisoners, to suffer such Punishment as their Crime deserves; and also to make Indemnification for the Plunder at the Cedars taken contrary to the Faith of the Capitulation, and that until such delivery, and Indemnification be made, the said Prisoners be not delivered." *

In this form, congress evaded the obligation entered into by its officers.

The pretension was likewise advanced that the prisoners had been insufficiently fed: they received the same rations as the troops. There had been no occasion to limit the supply. Among the causes of complaint against Butterfield, it is set forth that there were provisions for thirty days at the period of his surrender. The account of Sherburne's defeat is in every respect at variance with fact. On the arrival of the news that he had landed at Vaudreuil, de Lorimier started with 87 Indians and 18 Canadians, and Sherburne surrendered before the appearance on the scene of de Montigny. The story of Sherburne's holding his ground for an hour against five hundred men, and that he retreated fighting, making a second stand for forty minutes, when he was intercepted by a second party, is simply a fable. †

* Can. Arch., Q. 12, p. 144.

† A private letter from Sherburne to some unknown person, dated New York, 18th June, 1776, is published as an official document. He attributes his defeat [Am. Arch., VI., p. 598] to the large force of the enemy, and relates that the Indians stripped and killed as many as they thought proper. He describes the number of those killed in action and in cold blood, with the wounded, as twenty-eight, and dwells on the barbarity he experienced. There is no official report given, and this statement is given to the world as a reliable document.

The sensational narrative that two men were put to death that evening, four or five others being killed in cold blood at different times, that one was shot and roasted alive, and that several were left exposed, naked, to perish from cold and hunger, is mere invention. There is not a scrap of evidence to show that any of the prisoners were killed in cold blood, or killed at all, after the surrender; no names are given of those killed or of those who were present at the outrage. The statement is a mere general declaration of an unsubstantiated assertion.*

The account given by Arnold of these proceedings is contained in the postscript to the last letter of the commissioners, whose presence in Canada I will hereafter narrate, written on the 27th of May. It takes the exaggerated tone afterwards used with regard to this event, and accepted by writers who have described it. I do not consider this postscript to be genuine; in other words, I believe that it can be clearly proved that it was not written at the time it is dated. The commissioners' own letter was written on the 27th (a Monday) and they narrate that Arnold arrived on the Sunday, the 26th. In Carroll's published journal Arnold is reported as having arrived on Sunday night, the 26th. It was only by his presence in Montreal on that day, that the information could have been obtained from him to have been forwarded by the commissioners to Philadelphia; whereas we have Arnold's own letter, written at Saint Anne's on the 27th, a date established by the concurrent events. It was, therefore, not possible for him to have arrived at Montreal before the evening of the 28th or the morning of the 29th, two days after the date of

* There was an evident desire at an early period to break this capitulation. Thompson, in one of his gasconading letters stating what would have been done, had he "arrived in this country two weeks sooner with his reinforcements," alludes to the cartel. First having asserted that he would have prevented Carleton passing Deschambault, he writes of the capitulation [2nd June to Washington, *Am. Arch.*, VI., p. 684-5]: "Mr. Chase is of opinion we may with safety break the capitulation made with General Arnold. It is extremely hard to give up all the fruits of the last year's campaign in Canada which cost so much, &c., &c., &c. But if engagements of this delicate nature are broken without the fullest testimony to support us we shall be forever undone."

the commissioners' letter. On the last named day they permanently left Montreal at three o'clock in the afternoon. Thus the events described by the commissioners on the 27th could not, on that day, have become known to them, and the strongest suspicion must be entertained that the documents were manufactured at a later time.

After the departure of the prisoners Forster returned to Oswegatchie, being covered by the Indians to Saint Regis. Hearing that some prisoners still remained with the Indians, he redeemed them by the payment of money, and they were sent to Montreal and treated with great kindness. Some of the prisoners who remained with the Indians declined to leave and embraced their savage life.

We know little of what took place in Montreal during the winter, while the city was occupied by the troops of congress. The royalist French Canadian ladies gave no recognition to them.* Their own supporters seem to have been sufficiently self-asserting. Walker, Price and Heywood were the leading personages in support of congress. When the Canadian officers were called upon to give up their commissions, de Lorimier experienced trouble, owing to some remarks which would have been more prudently left unsaid, and only by flight avoided being sent a prisoner to New York. He relates that with great difficulty he reached Saint Regis, and thence found his way to Oswegatchie, where Forster was in command. De Lorimier visited the Indians and influenced one hundred of their warriors, who agreed to meet at the full of the moon in April at Gananoque, in support of the royal cause. On his return to Oswegatchie, he recommended that hunters should be sent out to obtain food and that it should be dried and prepared for service. He afterwards descended, disguised, to the Cedars, to meet a personage named Denis, of some influence in that place. The *curé* was messire Denaut, then a young man of thirty-three, who, in 1794, became the

* "Les Dames Royalistes ont fait bande à part tout l'hiver." Mde. Veuve Benoist, to her brother, Honble. Frs. Baby, 12th August, 1776. Verreault, p. 327.

coadjutor bishop of Quebec. Both were strong loyalists. De Lorimier was desirous of making arrangements for obtaining provisions for three hundred men for fifteen days. Finding that the supplies could be obtained, he returned to Oswegatchie, and again descended the river with three *bateaux* and a party of the 8th to protect them on their upward voyage. Disguising himself as an Indian, he reached the Cedars, and after some adventure, that he somewhat melodramatically relates, he directed the *bateaux*, which had remained concealed at the river Beaudette, to proceed to the head of the rapids. It was by the possession of these provisions that Forster was able to carry out his expedition.

I have felt it a duty to narrate at length the affair at the Cedars, for the facts, imperfectly known, continue to be constantly misrepresented. The repudiation, at that early date, of the engagement entered into by Arnold, still receives justification. Whether the line of conduct pursued by congress is or is not to be condemned, forms but a secondary consideration; the real point at issue is whether a British officer encouraged, or even countenanced, murder and cruelty by the Indians of his force. The plea of this ruthless ferocity is advanced in explanation of the course taken by the authorities in Philadelphia, who were directing the invasion of Canada.

I have brought together, so far as I am able, all that is known of the event. I can now only appeal to that higher criticism, which places a writer above national prejudice, to obtain a dispassionate examination of the evidence. The event itself is utterly unimportant; it was without significance and led to no result: it, however, involves the consideration whether a British commander acted with justice and humanity, or failing in this duty, brought disgrace on his flag.

If my claim be allowed that the narrative has been honestly written, there can be but one conclusion. Those who may still desire to shield the leaders of the revolutionary movement in the rejection of the conditions entered into, must seek some other cause than that which has been hitherto assigned. The explanation is not difficult. It can be found in that word often of evil import: expediency.

SKELTON MAP



CHAPTER IV.

On the 27th of April, 1776, three commissioners, on the part of congress, arrived in Montreal ; they had been nominated by a vote of congress of the 15th of February. The duty entrusted to them was to judge the condition of the province, and especially to exercise a conciliatory influence upon the French Canadians. The commission consisted of Franklin, Chase, of Maryland, who had taken part in the continental congress of 1774, and Charles Carroll, of Carrollton. The latter, a Roman catholic, was accompanied by his brother, a jesuit, afterwards the first Roman catholic archbishop of the United States. Both the Carrolls had been educated in Europe. The priest had been a tutor in the family of lord Stourton, and, after the suppression of the jesuits, had made the grand tour of Europe.

* Father Carroll relates that they were received by Arnold, then in command,* and by several of the officers of congress and by such inhabitants of the city as sympathised with them. They proceeded to Arnold's house, where they were waited upon by several deputations. After taking some refreshment they entered another room, where a company was assembled in which several ladies, "most of them French," were present. The evening closed with a supper, followed by the "singing of the ladies."

The constitution of the commission must be regarded as an appeal to catholic sentiment, with the expectation that it would influence the Canadian ecclesiastics actively to take the side of congress. There was even a *quasi* suggestion that Canada might be allowed to retain an independent position in its relations with the more southern provinces. The commissioners declared that they themselves had no apprehension that the Canadians would side with Great Britain,

* Force, American Archives, V., p. 1167.

for it was their interest, and the commissioners had reason to believe, their inclination, to cultivate a friendly intercourse with the colonies. Self government was promised to Canada, with the right of following the religion the inhabitants professed, and an assurance was given that all abuses would be reformed.

The mission entirely failed. The religious phase of the negotiation had been entrusted to father Carroll. The remaining members busied themselves with the organization of the military force, and the political condition of the country. They assumed plenary powers: even the permits to the traders, to ascend the lakes and to traffic with the Indians, were granted under their authority.

Affairs were in a deplorable position, and as blame must be always apportioned, the commissioners threw their censure on Wooster. They declared him to be totally unfit for his command, and reported that his stay in the colony was prejudicial to the cause of congress. They described the condition under which the occupation of Canada was held as desperate. Everything was in confusion; there was no discipline; the army was unpaid, and credit so exhausted, that even a cart could not be obtained unless ready money was paid for it, or force employed. The troops were "without bread, tents, shoes, stockings, shirts, etc. Those who had fled from Quebec left their baggage behind." The men who pretended indisposition, and had been excused from doing duty, were the foremost in the flight, and carried off such burdens on their backs as hearty and stout men would labour under. The army of congress in Canada amounted to 4,000, of whom 400 were "sick with different disorders." The want of every necessary is best told in the words of the commissioners. "Such is our extreme want of flour, that we were yesterday obliged to seize by force fifteen barrels to supply the garrison with bread.* We cannot find words

* The fact of these extorted supplies is reported in a communication sent to Quebec, with the additional fact that the authorities of congress were without money of any kind, either paper or specie. [Can. Arch., Q. 12, p. 23.]

American Archives, V., p. 1166., VI., pp. 589-590.

to describe our miserable situation." Even in their first letter the commissioners looked upon their condition as bankrupt, and their cause as desperate. The general apprehension was felt, that on the arrival of the king's troops they would be immediately driven from the province; a feeling which concurred "with the frequent breaches of promise the inhabitants have experienced in determining [them] to trust our people no longer."

Nevertheless, a council of war was held, and it was resolved to hold the island at the falls of the Richelieu,* to establish a fort at Jacques Cartier, and at Chambly to build six gondolas, capable of carrying heavy cannon: this at a time when there was not a shilling in the treasury, when £20,000 was asked to supply present and immediate necessities, and not the slightest service could be obtained from the people in the country, as there was no money to pay for it. Congress at last was awakened to the miserable condition of the troops in Canada. Several letters had been forwarded by Washington and Schuyler, among them one from Hazen to Schuyler, which gloomily painted the condition in which affairs stood. They were referred to a committee for report, and on the 16th of April, they recommended that three hundred thousand dollars should be immediately† sent for payment of the army.

The commissioners were desired to publish an address to encourage the Canadians to adhere to them; and great resentment was expressed at the treatment they had received at the hands of the army of occupation. They were to be invited to state their grievances; on the other hand redress was promised for the wrongs they had suffered, and a pledge given that all who had abused them would be punished. The commissioners were called upon to see justice done to the Canadian population, and the commanding officer was directed to be "very attentive to military discipline and inflict exemplary punishment" when called for. Washington, as commander in chief, received orders to send six battalions into the

* Near Point Platon.

† Am. Arch., V., p. 1686.

province from the army of New York. The whole affair proved of no account. Nothing was done, nor was there any power to enforce obedience. It will be seen that before two months had elapsed, the troops of congress were driven from Canada utterly routed and disorganized.

On the 6th of May the commissioners had written, if money could not be procured they would recommend the withdrawal of the army, and that forcible possession should be taken of the passes on the lakes to prevent irruptions from Canada.* The commissioners had previously been informed † that four battalions were on the march, and that six additional had been ordered to leave. Some of these regiments reached Albany when they were instructed not to proceed further. Schuyler, who was in command of the northern district at fort George, had received a letter from the commissioners, ‡ to the effect that, owing to the want of provisions "a further reinforcement would only increase our distress," consequently, Sullivan was ordered "to tarry with his brigade until the provisions were sent." At this date the commissioners wrote to congress: § "We are afraid that it will not be in our power to render our country any further service in this colony." On the 9th of May, the news reached Montreal of the defeat of the congress troops before Quebec and that the British war vessels were ascending the river, the only safety for the cause of congress being in the unfavourable wind.

The news caused the greatest terror in the city. Many of the prominent English-speaking sympathisers took their departure as rapidly as they could leave. Even at this date, the commissioners undertook to explain the defeat, by reporting that only 200 troops could be collected to oppose the sortie, and that they had lost 200 prisoners. They related that a council had been held at Deschambault on Tuesday, and that it had been determined, by a vote of eleven to three,

* Am. Arch., V., p. 1214.

† Am. Arch., V., p. 1086, 26th April.

‡ Am. Arch., VI., p. 450, 10th May.

§ Am. Arch., VI., p. 451, 10th May.

to retreat to the mouth of the Richelieu, at Sorel.* On the following morning, the 11th, Franklin left Montreal, accompanied by Mrs. Walker and Mrs. Price.† He was joined the next day at Saint John's by father Carroll, and the party ascended lake Champlain, on their return to New York, as fast as they could make the journey.

On the 13th general Thompson arrived at Chambly. Thomas‡ was lying ill at this place, and Thompson assumed command. He wrote immediately to Washington§ expressing his surprise at the confused retreat from Quebec, and stating that he had difficulty in understanding that the country should be abandoned to Sorel. It was Thompson who directed the ill-conceived attack against Three Rivers on the 8th of June, which ended in his crushing defeat and he himself being taken prisoner.

Carroll, with Chase, left Montreal on the 29th for Chambly, where a council of war was held on the following days, at which it was resolved to retain possession of the country between the Saint Lawrence and the Richelieu. On the 31st they left for Saint John's. On that night Sullivan arrived with 1,400 men. The commissioners had a parting interview

* Reference to the calendar of the year shews this date to have been the 7th, the day after the defeat. Arnold, to the last, maintained that Deschambault should have been held and fortified. [Am. Arch., VI., p. 593.]

† We are indebted to Franklin for a parting notice regarding Walker, whose name has frequently been mentioned at this period. Considering the source whence the portraiture is obtained, it cannot be said that it came from one prejudiced against him. Franklin wrote to the commissioners from New York on the 27th of May: "We left Mrs. Walker with her husband in Albany, from whence we came down by land. We passed him on lake Champlain, but he returning, overtook us at Saratoga, where they took such liberties in taunting at our conduct in Canada, that it came almost to a quarrel. We continued our care of her, however, and landed her safe in Albany, with her three waggons loads of baggage brought thither, without putting her to any expense, and parted civilly, though coldly. I think they both have an excellent talent in making themselves enemies, and I believe live where they will, they will never be long without them." Franklin's Works, VIII., pp. 182-3.

‡ Thomas died from smallpox on the 2nd of June. Schuyler to Washington, 10th June, 1776. [Am. Arch., VI., p. 795.]

§ [Am. Arch., VI., p. 448.]

with him and it must have been one of the least cheerful that can be imagined. On the 2nd they ascended lake Champlain. Carroll tells us how they rowed all night, dividing their men into two relays, and that they reached Crown point at six p.m. of the 3rd. The distance from Saint John's is 106 miles.*

During this period Carleton, with the knowledge that additional reinforcements were on their way, and indeed were daily expected, resolved to wait until their arrival before actively taking the field, to drive the congress troops finally from Canada. On the 16th of May he despatched a frigate to England giving the news to that date. The vessels which he had sent up the river, owing to the unfavourable wind, had remained at Deschambault, forty miles above Quebec. He was leaving the final effort, until he could make it with such strength as to be irresistible. On the 10th of May he had issued a proclamation ordering that search should be made in the woods, in which many of the congress troops in the flight of the 6th had taken refuge, in order that they might be found, brought in and cared for; otherwise, they ran the risk of perishing from cold and exposure. Many were suffering from sickness. The proclamation declared that when restored to health they should be set free, and allowed to return to their homes. A second proclamation of a different character was issued two days later, to the effect that those who, from their known disloyalty, had been ordered to leave the city on the 22nd of November, could not return without a special permit. A general parade was held on the 23rd of the troops and volunteers who had taken part in the defence of the city, when the thanks of the commandant were given by colonel McLean, who took the command, Carleton being absent with the troops sent up the river. The volunteers were now relieved from all active duty, which from this date was performed by the garrison alone. On the 27th of May additional reinforcements arrived, when the ships immediately ascended the river for the troops to be assembled at Three Rivers.

* [Carroll's Journal, Ed. 1776.]

Reports were constantly arriving that congress was making a strong effort to retain possession of Canada, and that several regiments to reinforce the army of occupation were daily expected. These statements explain Carleton's deliberate movements, shewing his determination not to run the slightest risk, so that when he did strike, the blow would be one of annihilation. The prevalent wind, the north-west, not only delayed the arrival of the remaining transports, but also prevented the vessels which had ascended the Saint Lawrence from reaching Three Rivers, although they arrived within a few miles of that place. Carleton had left Quebec on the 22nd with the 29th and the 47th regiments, but the vessels had been unable to get past Champlain, nine miles below Three Rivers. On the evening of the 1st of June, additional reinforcements arrived under the command of Burgoyne. They consisted of the 20th, 21st, 24th, 31st, 34th, 53rd and 62nd regiments, with four companies of artillery. It has been remarked that the 29th and 47th preceded these regiments. They likewise included the German contingent. The latter consisted of the Brunswick troops, composed of "Prince Friedrich's" Riedesel's; the Grenadiers, and a regiment of dismounted dragoons, with the addition of a regiment of Hesse Hanau. I must defer for a few pages my narrative of the circumstances under which these troops took part in the campaign, and the nature of their engagement.

One of the first spectacles which the Brunswick general records was the appearance of six hundred prisoners of the congress troops. Carleton had returned to Quebec on being notified of the arrival of reinforcements, so that on the 4th of June, which was the birthday of George III., the officers waited upon him to pay him their respects. The following morning Riedesel, in command of an English battalion, the Brunswick Grenadiers, his own regiment with 150 Canadian volunteers and 300 Indians, marched from Quebec along the north shore, ascending the river side. There was not then a sign of the former attacking force* to be seen. Fraser's division remained

* "Leben und Wirken des Herzoglich Braunschweig'schen General Lieutenants. Friedrich Adolph Riedesel." Max von Eelking, II., p. 26.

on the transports and sailed up the river, until stopped by adverse winds. Finding further progress to be un hoped for, he disembarked his men and advanced to Three Rivers, which he garrisoned, throwing out strong pickets to prevent surprise. The main body of the congress troops still offered the threat of attack from Sorel, where they had been assembled in force, and it was from that quarter that any active hostility might be undertaken.

On the 8th of June Thompson endeavoured to carry out his plan for regaining possession of the territory which he considered should never have been abandoned. There was so little chance of success, that the attempt must be ascribed either to his want of knowledge of the art of war, or to his desire of acting consistently with the arrogant views he had written to Washington. Carleton in his account of the event describes it as a very bold enterprise indeed. As we follow the narrative, we can only wonder that it should have been even conceived. The sloop "Martin," and some armed vessels, with transports full of troops, were at anchor three miles below the town, and in face of this superior force a surprise was attempted. There must have been strange ignorance of the resistance to be encountered. During the 7th of June, about 2,000 men had been assembled at Nicolet, whence, during the night, they passed over in fifty boats to point du Lac, on the north shore, some eight miles west of Three Rivers. The width of the lake at this spot is about three miles.

The troops disembarked about four o'clock, before dawn, and were seen by Landron,* a loyalist captain of the militia, who made his way to Three Rivers and gave the alarm. The troops were at once called out, and posted at the approaches to the communications which the attacking force might follow. Consequently, Thompson's force came upon a strong body of the 62nd, which at once beat it back. News having been sent to the transports, a detachment was ordered up the lake, under brigadier-general Nesbitt, to cut off their retreat.

* [Verreault, p. 219.]

Owing to these preparations, no offensive movement was even undertaken. The congress troops kept to the woods, with the design of rapidly retreating in the endeavour to regain their boats.*

Fraser and Nesbitt, in the meantime, advanced along the lake shore in hopes of cutting them off. Fraser went as far as Yamachiche, while Nesbitt halted at point du Lac. The sloop "Martin" also ascended the river as far as river du Loup, and took two of their boats carrying troops, but the remainder of them succeeded in escaping to Sorel. Thompson's force suffered severe loss of killed and wounded; about three hundred surrendered or were taken prisoners, among them the chief in command, Thompson himself, and the second in rank, Irwin. The loss on the British side was twelve or thirteen, killed and wounded.

The following day the troops returned to their stations; those who had left the transports were re-embarked. Fraser received orders to march a detachment by the north shore, and arrangements were made, in the event of the wind continuing unfavourable, to send an equally strong force by the south shore. The wind, however, became fair, so that on the 14th the transports arrived opposite Sorel. Some regiments were landed in the evening, when it was found that the place had been hastily abandoned. On the following day additional troops were disembarked, and the column placed under the command of Burgoyne, with instructions to march up the Richelieu and attack the forces before him, with the view of taking possession of Chambly and Saint John's; but

* Berthelot, in his memoir [Verreault, p. 239], relates that the congress troops forced a *habitant* of point du Lac, named Ant. Gauthier, to act as their guide, and that in order to give the town time to prepare for defence, he took the troops an unnecessarily long route, occasionally even pretending to lose his way. It was not until eight o'clock that the advance guard reached a point north of the common. They were immediately attacked by Fraser. Gauthier was brought before Carleton, who, on hearing his story, told him that the congress troops would have been justified in hanging him. [*qu'ils auraient eu le droit de le pendre pour n'avoir pas rempli ses engagements envers eux.*] Carleton never affected epigrammatic sayings; the probability is that he told Gauthier he had run that risk.

not to run any hazard until the column on his right could co-operate with him. The distance from Sorel to Chambly is about forty-five miles. Burgoyne found his march unopposed. The flight of the congress troops before him had been as rapid as it was disordered. Carleton's policy was to hasten their departure from the province, and not make the contest more bitter and more difficult of adjustment, by inflicting loss with a long list of killed. Had the contrary desire prevailed, there can be little doubt that, by a forced march, Burgoyne would have severely punished those who were in flight before him.

Burgoyne left Sorel on the 15th, and reached Saint John's only on the 18th, a further distance beyond Chambly of twelve miles. He experienced no resistance of any kind in his advance. The ships with the transports sailed up the Saint Lawrence, and had not the wind failed, they would have reached Longueuil before Arnold could have left Montreal. But the wind prevented further progress, and the troops were landed at Verchères on the 16th. The British division was under the command of major-general Phillips, and formed the advance. Riedesel followed with a division of the Brunswick troops. They marched along the river to Laprairie, some twenty miles, and thence crossed over to Saint John's, sixteen miles distant. The column arrived near that place on the morning of the 19th, when they learned that Burgoyne was in possession of the redoubts at Saint John's, having held them since the previous evening. All the buildings were in flames. It had been the same at Chambly: the craft and *bateaux*, which could not be forced up the rapids, had been burned there, together with the provisions which could not be removed. No vessel of any kind was left at Saint John's; all that had been present had been brought into requisition by the retreating congress troops for safety, or otherwise taken up the lake. Twenty-two pieces of cannon were found, some of them concealed in the woods.

Fraser's corps crossed over from the north shore, and marched in the rear of the columns in advance. Several

Canadians joined Fraser and Phillips; the latter was also accompanied by a body of Indians.

Riedesel's column marched back to Laprairie, where he arrived on the 22nd; it was the station which, for the time, he was to occupy. He wrote from there to duke Friedrich that the royal troops were in possession of the whole of Canada, and that it was only the want of vessels to ascend lake Champlain which prevented them following upon the rear of the rebellion, but this most necessary means of transport was deficient. They had landed without being able to obtain carts to carry their baggage, and the officers had then worn their shirts and stockings for a week.

It was the absence of all means of transport which fettered Carleton's operations. He was without a single vessel to ascend lake Champlain. Carts and *tombereaux* to a certain extent might be obtained, but every species of craft by which his offensive operations were to be carried on had to be constructed at Saint John's, or sent in sections from England to be put together in Canada. It was the labour of the next few months to supply this deficiency, and for the time all active operations on his part were impossible.

We possess in the narrative of general Wilkinson, previously referred to, an account of the last days of the occupation of Canada by the provincial forces.

After Arnold's return to Montreal, Wilkinson was appointed his aide-de-camp. When in this position, Arnold placed in Wilkinson's hands several invoices with instructions to demand the articles specified, and give an order upon him for payment; if possession was refused, to have them seized by the guard accompanying Wilkinson. One self-asserting lady was asked for a quarter cask of Madeira, but Wilkinson received such a welcome that he was glad to leave the house without it. He saw two merchants, Forsyth and Leith. They declined to furnish the goods asked, but told Wilkinson he might seize them: as for the paper money, it was mere chaff. Wilkinson was so struck with what had taken place, that he went back to Arnold and asked to be excused from

the duty, as it was commercial, rather than military. Arnold told him that he was more nice than wise.*

On the 15th of June, Wilkinson received orders to proceed with despatches to Sullivan, who was supposed to be encamped at Sorel. Wilkinson started in a twelve oared *bateau*, and was approaching Varennes on the south shore, about fourteen miles from Montreal, when he heard a cannon shot. It was followed by a second report at a greater distance. Wilkinson thought it prudent to land and proceed towards the village, not having the least suspicion of the presence of a British force. He had reached within 200 yards of the main street, when he observed a small detachment of British troops; they had turned the corner and fired. It was plain that the advance guard was within fourteen miles of Montreal, and that Arnold was ignorant of it. Wilkinson's men left the road and took to the woods; he himself, having placed the party in charge of the sergeant to do the best he could, finding a horse at a mill door, mounted it bare-back, and rode to Longueuil at a smart gallop. Obtaining a canoe, he crossed to the opposite shore, and about six o'clock reached Arnold's quarters. Arnold had heard of Sullivan's retreat, and was making arrangements to abandon Montreal on the following day, but his surprise was extreme to hear of the danger he was in. The news of the presence of the British troops so near to him on the opposite shore, suggested that no time should be lost; accordingly he determined to leave during the night.

* There is on record [Am. Arch., V., p. 1176.] the accusation of captain Delaplace, of the 28th regiment, against both Arnold and Ethan Allen of the mode in which his property had been taken from him on the surprise of Ticonderoga. It is contained in a petition to congress dated 2nd May, 1776, a year after that event [Ante, V., p. 408], in which he set forth the loss he had suffered. "His private stock, consisting of forty-five sheep, eleven horned cattle, household and kitchen furniture, besides many other articles, such as three fusils, a silver hilted sword, a silver mounted hanger, the whole amounting to two hundred pounds sterling and upwards, for which no account has ever been made him, though assured by colonels *Allen* and *Arnold* that he should be no loser by the leaving such property behind him, . . . he wrote to his excellency general Schuyler concerning the within mentioned particulars but has not as yet obtained assistance from him."

Wilkinson was directed to proceed to Chambly, and ask that a detachment might be sent to cover Arnold's march by Longueuil.*

Wilkinson did not reach the opposite shore till dark, and, finding a horse at the priest's house, galloped into Chambly. He found Sullivan's army in an utter state of disorganization, disheartened, prostrate with fatigue, without a sentry on duty. Unchallenged, he found his way to Sullivan's quarters. All were astonished at the near position of the British troops. After some deliberation, it was resolved that Wilkinson should ride down the Richelieu until he met baron de Woedtke's force, and give orders for him to proceed with 500 men to aid Arnold in his retreat. Wilkinson experienced great difficulty in carrying out the duty. He lost his way; as he proceeded onwards he met bodies of the troops without any organization, and perfectly despondent. In some of the houses he found men without officers, in others, officers without men. The rain was falling heavily; Wilkinson, exhausted by his day's effort, took refuge in a small empty house and slept until daybreak. In the morning he tried to find the Prussian baron, and he received for a reply, that no doubt he was drunk and in the front. Wilkinson was recommended to apply to colonel Wayne in the rear. Wayne had retained his senses to gather what men he could to preserve some discipline. He undertook to march his detachment towards Longueuil. They had advanced about two miles, when they met an express messenger from Arnold with the information that he had crossed to Laprairie. Wayne's force, therefore, retired in the direction they had come. As they approached within two miles of the fort, they were taken for a British detachment. Sullivan made preparations to engage them, when Wilkinson was sent forward to remove the false impression.

* Wilkinson's statement is borne out by a letter from Arnold to Sullivan dated Laprairie 16th June. After describing what he had heard from Wilkinson, he adds "at seven p.m. I embarked the whole garrison in eleven *bateaux* and got safe over." [Am. Arch., VI., p. 930.]

A strong party was accordingly despatched towards Arnold's assistance by the road to Laprairie, but it was found that Arnold had gone directly to Saint John's. It took two days for Sullivan's army, with his provisions and stores, to reach the same spot. By the afternoon of the 18th of June the whole force was embarked, according to Wilkinson, except three guns, which were left behind. He has also placed on record that among the property on the *bateaux* was the merchandise obtained by Arnold in Montreal. Arnold had availed himself of the services of an officer, formerly of New Jersey, named Scott, but no longer in the service, to collect and take charge of it. It was finally transferred to Albany and sold for Arnold's advantage.*

When all the boats had left but the one for Arnold's embarkation, he mounted his horse, and, at his request, Wilkinson did so likewise. They rode along the road by the Richelieu. After proceeding two miles they observed the advance guard of the British force. They turned their horses and reached the landing place. Here Arnold removed his saddle and trappings, and, drawing a pistol, shot his charger dead. He requested Wilkinson to do the same; he complied with reluctance. The sun was now going down. Arnold ordered the crew on board, including Wilkinson, and, refusing all offers of assistance, himself, pushed off the boat and jumped into it, so, that he could say that he was the last man who left the soil of Canada. The boats followed the river to île-aux-Noix, which the main body had reached; and they there encamped for the night on the wet, marshy ground surrounding the fort.

* "This transaction was notorious and excited discontent and clamour in the army; yet it produced no regular inquiry, although it sunk him in the esteem of every man of honour, and determined me to leave his family on the first proper occasion." [Wilkinson, I., p. 58.]

BOOK XX.

BURGOYNE'S CAMPAIGN.

CHAPTER I.

It has been stated that several subsidized German regiments accompanied the reinforcements which arrived at Quebec in June, 1776. I feel it incumbent on me to relate under what circumstances these troops took part in the campaign, more especially as, in my humble judgment, much misconception prevails regarding the conditions under which they served. Many writers, not taking into consideration the political element in their engagement, have described it as the sale of subjects by their rulers, so that by the money obtained, the princely traffickers in men might gratify their expensive tastes and love of luxury ; that the subsidy paid was blood money ; the prostitution of power from the most selfish and unworthy motives. The stipulation of service has furnished opportunity for the expression of much indignation, that men should be arbitrarily torn from their homes and shipped across the seas to fight in a quarrel in which they had no interest ; the one object being the enjoyment of the immense subsidies paid by Great Britain to the petty rulers who furnished the troops. It is pertinent to inquire if this view be sustained by fact.

If infamy be attached to the rulers for sending troops to fight in the quarrel of their allies, it cannot be apportioned to them alone. Great Britain, which sought and accepted the aid and paid the subsidy for the service, must take her share of the disgrace. She may be even ranked in a higher degree of culpability, for offering the inducement to the commission of the crime, if such it be. She appears as the traditional tempter to struggling virtue to commit wrong. Her situation has, therefore, equally to be considered, and it may, without any circumlocution, be stated. When it was, unhappily, believed that force was the only means by which the unity of

the empire could be preserved, the first consideration which presented itself was the source whence men could be obtained to complete the regiments. Great difficulty was experienced in enlisting recruits for service. This has constantly been the case; and the same embarrassment may be felt in some future emergency. Conscription is a purely continental law, and no enforced military service has ever received legal sanction in Great Britain. The press-gang, on the contrary, was, until modern times, a recognised means of manning the navy; and whatever hardship it caused in the families of sailors, the practice was sustained by public opinion as a policy made legitimate by necessity. Both the army and navy of Britain have been always sustained by voluntary enlistment, although, during the wars of queen Anne, an attempt was made to recruit by impressment. The act, which was to have legalized the proceeding, was in the first instance abandoned as unconstitutional; but in 1707 an act was passed which gave power to the parish officers to send to the army men who had no lawful calling or employment; in its consequences another name for what was really impressment. This same law has been from time to time introduced, and was revived as late as 1757. From that date no recourse has been had to this arbitrary enactment.

The fact is often lost sight of, that active hostilities in America were actually commenced by the colonists. The affair at Lexington was caused by an attempt of the troops to seize ammunition and provisions, avowedly collected for the purpose of making armed resistance to imperial authority. The construction of the battery on Breed's Hill, or Bunker's Hill as it is called, had in view the bombardment of Boston, held by British troops and generally by loyalists; consequently, the attempt to dislodge those constructing it was an act of self-defence. The struggle of that day was acted upon by the colonists as a declaration of war. In 1775 it was the party of congress which began aggression. They seized Ticonderoga, took possession of lake Champlain, and invaded Canada. When the expedition of which the Brunswick troops

formed a part, left England, Quebec was invested by the troops of congress. With this exception, the whole of Canada was held by them as a conquered country. The primary object in the transport of these troops was, therefore, the relief of Quebec and the re-possession of Canada.

It was under these conditions that a powerful force was despatched to re-establish imperial authority throughout the colonies. The early successes had so strengthened the power of the advanced party intent on independence, that they were enabled to subdue every display of sentiment in opposition to their views. Open hostility to the mother country dominated in every direction, and the disunited scattered loyalists were unable to assert themselves. The want of judgment, the weakness, the imprudence of the British ministry, permitted this feeling to expand to such a condition of active enmity, that it could only be repressed by force. The folly in systematically leaving provincial governors without proper support had destroyed all power of appeal to the aid of the royalists, who, to the last, were to be found in large numbers in every province. With countenance and encouragement they would have proved a powerful element in the contest. If, at the early period of the revolt, divisions of troops had been established at central points, around which the royalists could have rallied in case of need, a large body of them could have been brought into the field, and the revolutionary spirit, bent on attaining independence as the final aim, would have been vigorously opposed. To the last, the party desirous of retaining the connection with the mother country was numerically strong. In place of being regarded with favour, the loyalists were neglected, left without protection, and subjected to the terrorism which formed the leading policy of the revolutionary leaders.

From the days of William III. British troops had fought on the continent in the French wars*; from time to time

* Hallam's remarks [Chap. XV., p. 345] on the necessity of these continental wars for the very safety of Great Britain establish the political relationships of the continental powers, which then dreaded the ambition of France; and, in my

Dutch and Hanoverian troops had been present in England and in the British garrisons of the Mediterranean. Dutch regiments had been quartered in England in the reign of the great king, and had fought at the Boyne and Limerick. A few months after these trying times, public feeling against their presence in England was appealed to, with the view of embarrassing the king's government. Finally the discontent grew to such a height, that in 1699 a vote of the house of commons enforcing their departure was obtained. All the battles of Queen Anne's day were fought upon the continent by British troops side by side with those of Germany. The alliance had been continued in the two following reigns, when the Hanoverian troops of the electorate had been regarded as a part of the national force in the contest against France. At the surrender of Minorca they had formed part of the garrison. German troops had been constantly present as a strong contingent of the army, and, for upwards of the last half century, an intimate political union had grown up in the common cause, as self preservation against the pretensions of France.

There was a family relationship between the rulers of Brunswick and Hesse and George III. The duchess of Brunswick was his sister Augusta. The wife of the landgrave of Hesse, then dead, had been his cousin, both descen-

judgment are applicable, *mutatis mutandis*, to those German powers which, foreseeing the active intervention of France as ultimately threatening their own political condition, recognised the necessity of taking part in the contest in order to maintain the supremacy of their ancient ally. "It was easy to excite national prejudices against campaigns in Flanders, especially when so unsuccessful, and to inveigh against the neglect of our maritime power. Yet, unless we could have been secure against invasion, which Louis would infallibly have attempted, had not his whole force been occupied by the grand alliance, and which, in the feeble condition of our navy and commerce, at one time would not have been impracticable, the defeats of Steenkirk and Landen might probably have been sustained at home. The war of 1689, and the great confederacy of Europe, which William alone could animate with any steadiness and energy, were most evidently and undeniably the means of preserving the independence of England. That danger, which has sometimes been in our countrymen's mouths with little meaning, of becoming a province to France, was then close and actual, for I hold the restoration of the house of Stuart to be but another expression for that ignominy and servitude."

dants of George II.* William, the count of Hesse Hanau, was the son of the landgrave of Hesse. Thus three of the rulers of the six powers, the troops of which entered the pay of Great Britain, were blood relations of George III.; a relationship which gave strength to the political alliance. At the same time, this alliance cannot be looked upon as a mere matter of sentiment. It was clearly to the interest of the smaller German princes that Great Britain should retain her position of strength and dignity in the European system. They were the more led by this feeling owing to the electorate of Hanover being under the government of the king of England; for it was evident that any successful assault on the integrity of the Hanoverian dominions would lead to an attack on the neighbouring German principalities. France had a century ago absorbed Alsace and Lorraine; it has been a constant ambition of that power to extend her frontier to the Rhine, and she would better attain her purpose by taking possession of those states, in whose friendly sentiment she could not confide.

The service of the troops of the smaller states, in the armies of powers of the first class, was by no means a new element in German life. It had been long established. Even previously to the thirty years war, it was regarded as a legitimate element of public policy on the part of the rulers, and on all such occasions, men of the highest rank sought to be included in the service, as offering to them an honourable career to obtain distinction. It came into full vigour in the seventeenth century. The minor princes, seeing their existence threatened

* GEORGE II.

Frederick, Prince of Wales.

1.—Augusta, born 31st July, 1737, married 17th January 1764, to Charles William Ferdinand duke of Brunswick Wolfenbuttel, died 23rd March, 1803.

2.—George III., 1738.

Anne, Princess Royal, married to William Prince of Orange, 1734, died 12th January, 1759.

Mary, m. 8th May, 1760, Frederick Landgrave Hesse Cassel, d. 1771.

by the ambition of Louis XIV., and their own narrow resources not permitting them to maintain a large force in the field, placed their troops at the disposal of the greater powers for payment. It was, after all, fighting their own battle, for they were contributing to the common defence against the enemy, who threatened them with ruin. Thus while defending the cause of Germany, in which, as Germans, they were interested for life and death, they received the indemnification which aided to restore the well-being of their land, prostrate through the terrible desolation of the thirty years war.

That formidable contest closed with the peace of Westphalia in 1648. But peace was not of long duration. The ambition of Louis XIV. renewed the war, and in 1689 Great Britain was included in the conflict. It continued almost uninterruptedly, until the treaty of Utrecht in 1713; the consequence was that the political alliance with Great Britain became more assured, especially from the relations of Hanover with the British crown. It was a natural consequence, that the king of Great Britain, in the contest with the American colonies now imminent, should seek assistance from his German possessions in the form most expedient; and that equally he should appeal to his ancient continental allies, who for a century had sided with his predecessors, to act on a common policy, and again come forward in what was considered a common cause. It was early foreseen, that France would not remain out of the quarrel, and in view of such a contingency the interest of the smaller powers lay in sustaining the pre-eminence of Great Britain, so that they might rely upon her aid, when that aid was indispensable to them.

It was not in the light of sovereigns furnishing troops for payment of a wage that George III. appealed to the German princes. He asked their co-operation as allies, binding himself to protect their country in case of attack. It was an alliance of defence and offence.* Any hostile attitude of France threatened equally Hanover, Brunswick and Hesse,

* [Schutz und Trutz Bündniss.]

and these states could with justice make common cause for their own national preservation.

German writers of history, not led away by political passion, agree in the fact that the enlistment was voluntary. Doubtless the recruiting sergeant, true to his calling, was profuse in promises, and not particularly scrupulous in the description of the service to be rendered; but the presence of the men in the ranks was a spontaneous act, and force was not used to compel enlistment. One feature in the composition of the troops was that men of good family, many possessing property, held the position of officers. Such had always been the case from the days when the contingents had been placed at the service of Christian V. of Denmark, and troops had been sent in 1687 to aid Venice in its wars with the Porte. That the men who were engaged were, as a rule, greatly interested in the enterprise is established by the journals which remain, and the letters written home by officers and men.*

* One of the misleading opinions on the subject of these subsidies is that this was the first occasion when troops took service under the standard of a foreign power; as great an error as that the only consideration was the subsidy paid. Such engagements date from early antiquity. Xenophon's narrative of the retreat of the Ten-thousand, the "Anabasis," after the defeat at Cunaxa, is the record of foreign auxiliaries taken into pay by Cyrus. When Agesilaus resolved on the expedition against Asia Minor, six thousand troops were obtained from the land allies of Sparta, "to whom the rich service against Asiatic enemies would be tempting." [Grote, IX., p. 256.]

The preaching of Peter the hermit in the days of William Rufus, 1091, to redeem the holy sepulchre from the infidels, however dictated by religious zeal, and the hope of pardon for the crimes which had been committed, was without the slightest national sentiment. In every war recorded in history, one of the greatest difficulties to be overcome has been to fill the ranks; to use the modern phrase, the recruiting of the army. At the present day, under the pressure of war, the formation of a foreign legion unfailingly follows. We hear no outcry in any direction, when necessity exacts the effort. The power, requiring the troops, considers only the best means of obtaining them. The officers entering the service are socially received with perfect respect, and every inducement is given, by bounties and the promise of pension, to obtain the men.

Von Eelking remarks on this point: "Dem Verfasser liegen noch einige Beschreibungen des Erlebten in Versen vor, darunter einige von zwei braun-

The first appeal on the part of Great Britain for aid was to her old allies in the seven years war; it was followed by an application to the rulers connected by blood with the schweig'schen Grenadieren. Unter Anderem heisst es da, wo der Abzug aus dem Vaterlande geschildert wird."

"Wir hatten damals noch guten Muth,
Wir glaubten wir würden es finden gut,
America ward sehr gepriesen,
Geduldig wir uns führen liessen."* Von Eelking, I., p. 8.

I do not forget the contrary impression conveyed by Schiller's melodrama *Cabale und Liebe* [Intrigue and Love], one of his early works described as written in the "*Sturm und Drang Periode*." A Lady Milford, the duke's mistress, receives a present of diamonds from the duke. They are so remarkable as to astonish the lady. "Man!" she asks [*Mensch!*] "what did the Duke pay for these stones?" The reply is, "they did not cost a *Heller*" [about half a farthing]. "Nothing? these invaluable precious stones!" The man again answers "Yesterday seven thousand children of the soil [*Landeskinder*] left for America. They pay for everything." "You weep," says the lady. "Yes, in these precious stones are my two sons." "But not forced to leave?" remarks Lady Milford, with emotion. The old attendant answers with bitterness, in the text of those days, Schiller wrote *lacht fürchterlich*. "No, by heaven no! all of them genuine volunteers. Certainly some obstreperous fellows stepped to the front and asked the colonel, how dear the king sold his men by the yoke? But our most gracious sovereign marched the regiments to the parade ground, and had the blustering fools shot. We heard the guns go off, saw the brains sprinkle the pavement, and the whole army shouted 'Hurrah for America!'" The lady had heard nothing of this. "No," said the man, "she had been to the bear baiting, she could not wait, as the shrill trumpets gave the notice to depart, when wailing orphans followed a living father, and a raging mother ran to impale on the bayonets the child at her breast, as with blows of the sabre they tore apart the bride from the bridegroom, as grey beards stood there in despair, and at last threw away their crutches after their young fellows going to the new world, so from time to time the loud rattle of the drum beat, that the great omniscient should not hear us pray." The lady, of course, is exceedingly moved, she will not carry the curses of the land in her hair; she assures the old man his sons will return, and in her indignation she sells the jewels to relieve four hundred families brought to beggary by a fire in a neighbouring city.

There appears to have been an original of Lady Milford, the English favourite,

* Some of these descriptions in verse, of what was then felt, are lying before the author, among them those of two Brunswick Grenadiers. With other matters the departure from the fatherland is represented:

"Our minds retained their fullest might,
We thought the future would turn out right,
America was bepraised each day,
And with good heart we sailed away."

monarch. The correspondence was, in the first instance, carried on by the king; it was only when it was understood that the request would be acceded to, that it assumed an official character.

in the person of lady Craven, a daughter of lord Berkeley, who had similar relations with Christian Friedrich Carl Alexander markgraf of Anspach. In 1791, for payment, he transferred his possessions to Prussia. The margrave passed the last years of his life in England, having married lady Craven, and raised her to the rank of an imperial princess.

Modern opinion has undoubtedly been much affected by this romance of Schiller, for it is pure invention on his part, there having been no such scene, the troops marching away in good spirits, having voluntarily joined the expedition. A glance at Schiller's life will shew under what circumstances he wrote. Born in 1759 at Marbach on the Neckar, he entered the Karlschule at Stutgard, and finally was appointed a surgeon in a regiment. *Die Räuber* (The Robbers) Schiller's first piece was played at Manheim in 1782. In order to have a just estimate of the influence of this melodrama, one must understand the interval of thought between it and Emilia Galotti of Lessing. The plot of the latter lies in the reigning duke being enamoured of a woman of rare beauty, and the chief minister engages assassins to waylay the wedding party on its return from the marriage. Her husband is killed; the wife is brought in distress to the duke's residence, for the assault is contrived near the spot, so that this result may be effected. Her father, fearing the dishonour of his daughter, kills her. The striking point, notable in modern times, is that no steps were taken to punish the guilty parties who contrived the murder; such was the autocracy of a German court.

Schiller's "Robbers" is full of democratic sentiment, and is one of the first appeals in Germany to personal liberty and against privilege. It was this sentiment which sustained the piece; and although the work of a man of genius, it is really little more than an ordinary play, full of exaggeration, written by a young man, which, in modern days, would not be listened to without its relationship to Schiller. The consequence was that the duke forbade Schiller to publish any work except in relation to medicine. It was intimated to him that this proposition would be recalled if he consented to submit his writings to the duke, who was really a man of culture, and from his own standing point desired the happiness of his subjects. Schiller's pride and his genius revolted at the very idea, and in October, 1782, he secretly left Stutgard, abandoning his position in the service. For a year he lived at Bauerbach on the estate of Frau von Wolzogen. It was here and under these circumstances he wrote "*Fiesco*" and "*Cabale und Liebe*," in which the scene I have described is found. In 1783 he went to Manheim, and there is a letter of his extant, dated March of this year, in which he speaks of the play being written, and that no definite steps had been taken with Dalberg, the manager of the theatre, for its production.

The provisional treaty of peace between France and England was signed 30th November, 1782; and the treaty of Versailles on the 20th January, 1783. The

In December, 1775, colonel Faucit proceeded to Brunswick to conclude the arrangement which had been unofficially discussed in London.* The proof that the prospect of foreign service was welcomed by the troops of the German princes, is established by the fact, that in the numerous contemporary letters and journals which have been preserved, there is no expression of dissatisfaction either with the rulers or the generals. The question never presented itself to the German mind as a matter of bargain and sale. The common sentiment was, that it was a national duty not to abandon an ally in a situation of trial and difficulty; and in those days the blood relationship of sovereigns told powerfully on the feelings of a people. It is unjust and without warrant to regard the presence of German troops in America, only from the moral standing point of their engagement by a foreign power for payment to fight in a cause in which they were in no way interested. The participation in the campaign must be regarded from its political and military aspect; the former I have endeavoured to explain. The latter is contained in a sentence. The service was voluntary, and accepted by the men who joined the ranks.

That the money arrangements were liberal on the part of

German troops did not return to their home until early in 1784. The reverse of the Hessians at Trenton by Rall's neglect, and Burgoyne's defeat at Saratoga, by which both Hessians and Brunswickers were held as prisoners in the revolted colonies, had long been a matter of painful comment. The war had been unfortunate. Great Britain had failed in her efforts to retain the colonies. There had been no honour in the campaign. The loss of men, which had been severe, had been felt in many a household, and the troops had returned with no laurels. There was much to awaken popular feeling against the campaign, for the expedition was regarded without national pride, and the war had been closed in disgrace, in which the German contingent had participated.

The historical view, however, must be established on other grounds than Schiller's reputation. The fair mode of regarding the compact is in its national aspect. As British troops, for nearly a century, had fought on the continent against the power of France, so in the emergency of Great Britain her German allies ranged themselves on her side to maintain her strength, from the assurance that France would soon find some ground for interference, and that the war would be carried across the Rhine to their own homes.

* [Hereditary prince of Brunswick to Von Schlieffen, 5th Dec., 1775.]

Great Britain, and profitable to the ruling powers can easily be supposed. The necessity which led to the application for military aid was perfectly understood by those granting it. It would exact a laborious search to examine the accounts of that date to determine the precise cost of the German contingent to Great Britain. The debt contracted during the American war, independently of the amount obtained from taxes, is set down at £121,267,993 sterling: an amount which leaves a large margin of payment in any one class of expenditure. The subsidies paid to Germany by the British government are not open to publication in the courts where they were received; they still remain closed to examination. The parliamentary documents of Great Britain are, however, accessible, and may be examined by all who have the industry to seek for information. This task has been undertaken by von Eelking. I avail myself of his labours, when presenting the following estimate of monies received in Germany during the war:—

			Thalers.
Hesse Cassel	[8 years]. . . .	£2,959,800 sterling	20,718,500
Brunswick	"	750,000 "	5,250,000
Hesse Hanau	"	343,130 "	3,802,000
Waldeck	"	140,000 "	980,000
Anspach Bayreuth	[7 years]. . . .	282,400 "	1,977,000
Anhalt Zerbst	"	109,120 "	763,000

Moreover, according to agreement, the subsidies were to be paid for two years after the close of the war. This sum for the whole force amounted to 8,100,000 thalers. The enlistment money for 22,000 men, at 30 thalers, amounted to 660,000 thalers. There was a special payment for the artillery of 196,000 thalers. There was also an extraordinary amount granted for the maintenance of the troops in the field of 350,000 thalers, with several special allowances. It is estimated that the annual payment to the German princes was 6 million thalers annually, about £875,000 sterling.

The agreement with Brunswick was signed on the 9th of January, 1776, by Feronce von Rotenkrenz. On the 15th of the same month, general von Schlieffen concluded the agreement on the part of Hesse Cassel. Hesse Hanau became

bound on the 5th of February, the conditions being signed by baron von Malsburg. The arrangement with Waldeck had been signed in England the previous year by the prince himself. The contingents of Anspach, and of Anhalt Zerbst, were of later date, the former taking the field in 1777, the latter in 1778. Hanover furnished five battalions, which were detailed to garrison Gibraltar and Minorca, so that the troops stationed there could be set free, to be despatched to America. No Hanoverians were sent across the sea.*

* The total number of continental troops sent to America during the war in 1776-1782 is as follows :

Brunswick.....	5,723
Hesse Cassel.....	16,992
Hesse Hanau	2,422
Waldeck.....	1,225
Anspach.....	1,644
Anhalt Zerbst.....	1,160
Total.....	29,166

Account of the loss of the German troops during the American war:—

Nationality.	—Numbers Sent Out—		Numbers Returned.	Loss.
	Detail.	Total.		
I.—Brunswick furnished, 1776..	4,300
Recruits sent out, March, 1777..	224
“ “ April, 1778..	475
“ “ April, 1779..	286
“ “ May, 1780..	266
“ “ April, 1782..	172
		5,723		
Returned in August, 1783..			2,708	3,015
II.—Hesse Cassel furnished, 1776..	12,805
Recruits sent out, Dec'r, 1777..	403
“ “ March, 1778..	993
“ “ May, 1779..	915
“ “ April, 1780..	915
“ “ April, 1782..	961
		16,992		
Returned in August, 1783, and spring, 1784.			10,492	6,500
III.—Hesse Hanau furnished, 1776..	2,038
Recruits sent out, April, 1781..	50
“ “ April, 1782..	334
		2,422		
Returned in August, 1783..			1,441	981

The officer in command of the Brunswick troops was general Friedrich Adolph Riedesel, *Freibern** of Eisenach. He was born in 1738; at this date he was in the prime of life, being thirty-eight years old. He had served with distinction as a hussar officer in the seven years war, and he had also been a favourite aide-de-camp of the celebrated Ferdinand, duke of Brunswick. Few generals have possessed more fully the confidence of his men, and his selection for the command was suggested by his high character and his repu-

Nationality.	—Numbers sent Out.—		Numbers Returned.	Loss.
	Detail.	Total.		
IV.—Anspach furnished.....	1,200
Recruits sent out, April, 1781..	208
“ “ April, 1782..	236
	1,644			
Returned in August, 1783..			1,183	461
V.—Waldeck furnished, 1776..	670
Recruits sent out, April, 1777..	89
“ “ Feb'y, 1778..	140
“ “ March, 1779..	23
“ “ April, 1781..	144
“ “ April, 1782..	159
	1,225			
Returned in August, 1783..			505	720
VI.—Anhalt Zerbst furnished, 1778..	600
Recruits sent out, April, 1779..	82
“ “ May, 1780..	58
“ “ April, 1781..	420
	1,160			
Returned in autumn, 1783..			984	176
Total		29,166	17,313	11,853

Translated from the *Staats Anzeigen* of Schlösser, Vol. VI., p. 521.

It is not to be said that the missing troops, 11,853, lost their lives during the war. Many remained behind to establish themselves in Canada and in the United States. The above statement, which furnishes the state of those leaving and returning, cannot be considered to account for those who did not reappear in Germany. The latter must be divided into the three classes, viz., troops killed in action, those who died from sickness, and such as accepted the offer of citizenship in the United States, or, by permission, settled in Canada. It is not possible to determine the exact proportion of the different numbers of each class; but whatever this subdivision, the total number of those not returning amounted to three-fifths of the whole.

* [A title of the rank of baron in Great Britain.]

tation in the field. During the few months he was actively engaged, he behaved with unfailing gallantry and judgment; and the entire battalion was characterized by discipline and courage. No dishonour was brought on the German name by the surrender at Saratoga. It was the fault, neither of the Brunswick general, nor of the troops he led, that disaster tarnished the British arms. In the trying days before that extreme measure became imperative, the Brunswickers remained steady at their duty, perfectly under command, and reliable in any emergency when their service was called for, however trying it might be.

Mention must likewise be made of baroñess Riedesel, who joined her husband in Canada and accompanied him in the campaign. The letters which she wrote home from the province to her mother were afterwards embodied in a volume, and we learn from her graphic pages much concerning the last days of the disaster till the final surrender. Her narrative throws much light on Burgoyne's generalship. Frederika von Massow was eight years younger than her husband, and was married in 1762, when sixteen. She would have accompanied him from Germany, but the prospect of maternity made that step impossible. It was not until the birth of a daughter that she could leave Wolfenbüttele. Her family, who understood the risk of the journey, were much opposed to it, no one more so than her mother. She had, however, obtained her husband's permission to join him, and she resolved to run every risk to do so. Carrying with her three children, Gustave, four years and nine months, Frederika, two years, and Carolina ten weeks old, she proceeded to England. An attendant, Rachel, who had been many years in her father's family, accompanied her as a confidential servant. She left Wolfenbüttele on the 14th of May, 1776. She did not, however, reach Canada until the 11th of June, 1777, having been delayed in England. On reaching Quebec, she lost no time in joining her husband at Chambly. On the expedition taking the field, when the troops were established at fort Edward on the Hudson, she proceeded thither with her children. She accompanied the

army in the march, and was present through the hardship experienced after the action of the 7th October, until the final signature of the convention on the 16th. During the whole of this time she was but indifferently protected from the extreme danger of the situation, and underwent great privation, to which she submitted without a murmur. Her narrative of the events of these days has never been called in question.*

I have endeavoured to shew that the presence of the German troops in the ranks of Great Britain in America does not deserve the reproach which has been cast upon it. I cannot myself see how the political character of the service can be lost sight of. It was in accord with ancient custom for the rulers of the smaller states to receive payment for the troops furnished in the field to an ally in an emergency; and it is no argument to advance that the Brunswickers and Hessians had no interest of any kind in the dispute between Great Britain and her colonies, for it did not enter into the question. One of the considerations was, that the loss of her colonies would degrade Great Britain from the position of a first class power, for so it was held at that day, and hence her strength in Europe would be weakened; a consequence which would add to the preponderance of France, and render her the more dangerous in Germany. The interest of the smaller powers in the success of Great Britain in the contest,

* The title of Madame Riedesel's work is "*Die Berufs-reise nach America. Briefe der Generalin von Riedesel auf dieser Reise und während ihres sechs jährigen Aufenthalts in America zur Zeit des dortigen Krieges in den Jahren 1776 bis 1783 nach Deutschland geschrieben.*" Berlin 1800, 2nd edition 1801.

[The service journey to America. Letters of Mde. General Riedesel, on her journey and during her six years' sojourn in America at the time of the war in the years 1776-1783, written to Germany.]

Von Eelking thus introduces her name. [Die deutschen Hülfsstruppen, I., pp. 256-7.] "She left her home to follow over the wide ocean her beloved husband to the distant shore, to participate with him in the dangers and terrors of a wild war, the privations and discomforts of a troublous life. She remained always true and brave in all situations, in all dangers. . . . Therefore in the first place 'hats off' in the presence of a German woman who redounded to the highest honour of her sex." [Darum im Voraus den Hut ab vor einer deutschen Frau die ihrem Geschlechte sur höchsten Zierde gereicht.]

now that it was plain that it had to be fought out, was that the strength and prestige of their ally should be maintained. It became thus a matter of policy to anticipate what was foreseen on the part of France, that her intervention would take place, only if successes on the side of the colonists made the triumph of their cause possible. It may thus be said that the appearance of the German troops in America was a demonstration in the interest of the smaller powers against the possible action of France. Mere declamation cannot set this consideration out of view, whatever subsidiary motives may be brought into prominence in view of the service rendered. It is true that large subsidies were paid by Great Britain. It could not well be otherwise. But to urge that the receipt of this money was the sole inducement which led the smaller rulers to furnish the troops, appears to me an injustice, and an exaggeration, contradicted by the previous history of the continent, and unsustained by our knowledge of the conditions under which the alliance was formed.

CHAPTER II.

Canada being now cleared of the invading forces, it became Carleton's duty to repair, as he was best able, the injury which had been caused by their occupation. He had a strong force at his command, but it was powerless until he was master of lake Champlain ; consequently, his first effort was directed to the creation of a fleet, by which he could regain possession of those waters. He was entirely without vessels ; all the boats which had been available at Saint John's had been removed, or destroyed, by the departing congress troops. It was accordingly incumbent upon him to construct anew the vessels he required. The season was far advanced for the commencement of the work, and it must be remembered, that it had not been possible to make even the slightest preparation for its execution.

It was not until the last week in June that Montreal was occupied. The first step for future operations had been taken in connection with Sir John Johnson, who, with two hundred followers, arrived in Montreal the following day. He reported that there were many loyalists in the province of New York anxious to serve, and he received authority to raise a battalion to be called "The King's Royal Regiment of New York."

Carleton himself proceeded to Chambly to carry out the plans he had formed and to organize the force for future operations. The staff of the army consisted of lieut.-general Burgoyne, two major-generals, Phillips of the Artillery, and Riedesel, and four brigadier-generals, colonels Nesbitt of the 47th, Fraser of the 24th, Powell of the 53rd and Gordon of the 29th, with a total force of 6,430 men of all ranks of British troops. The Brunswick and Hanau contingent num-

bered 2,921.* The troops were employed in perfecting the fortifications, and throwing up intrenchments. All the men of any experience in carpentry work and with any capacity in that direction, were set at ship-building.

Saint John's, at the head of the navigation of the Richelieu, was the scene of this activity ; some vessels had been forwarded from England, disjointed, in parts to be reconstructed for service. The younger soldiers were daily exercised at their drill, and, as the boats were finished, the men were practised in rowing. Ile-aux-Noix was also occupied, placed in a state of defence, and barracks were commenced. The Brunswick troops were stationed at Laprairie. Riedesel

* Return of forces, Headquarters, Chambly, 1st of July, 1776 :

Regiments.	Officers of all ranks.	Staff.	Sergeants.	—Rank & File & Drummers.—			Total all ranks.
				In Hospital	With the regiment.	Present not for duty	
9th.....	25	3	29	21	18	451	547
20th.....	21	3	30	23	—	477	554
21st.....	24	3	30	8	6	541	612
24th.....	27	3	28	27	16	494	595
29th.....	26	4	21	37	33	504	625
31st.....	27	4	29	68	20	475	623
34th.....	26	4	30	21	37	474	592
47th.....	22	4	28	18	24	374	470
53rd.....	25	4	30	3	9	451	522
62nd.....	24	4	30	13	5	502	578
1 Batt. Royal Emigrants ...	19	4	20	14	—	359	416
4 Com. Royal Artillery.. ...	21	5	11	—	—	259	296
Totals.....	287	45	316	253	168	5361	6430

Return of Brunswick and Hanau troops serving in Canada at the end of July :

Regiments.	Officers of all ranks.	Staff.	Sergts. and non-com. officers.	Drummers, Fifers, &c.	Provost's men, servants, amoultiers.	—Rank and File.—			Fit for duty.	Total of all ranks.
						Sick.	In Hospital.	In Quarters.	On Comm'd.	
Regiment of Dragoons.	14	9	24	12	34	20	16	88	116	333
Prince Friedrich.....	22	10	51	19	42	16	38	207	264	669
Riedesel ..	20	12	50	20	41	9	29	25	488	694
Grenadiers.....	12	6	39	20	28	4	25	1	419	554
Hesse Hanau... ..	24	8	48	27	5	—	4	—	555	671
Totals	92	45	212	98	150	49	112	321	1842	2921

took the greatest care of their health, for many suffered from diarrhoea and fever; in the middle of July, 224 were sick and unfit for duty. Markets were established at the cantonments, so that the men could obtain fresh vegetables. On the first arrival of the German regiment, seventeen deserted. With the exception of three, however, the men returned and were pardoned; the others, more unfortunate, were taken prisoners, and had to undergo the cruel ordeal of running the gauntlet: the Canadians, who had aided them, being arrested, received "the knout." The men were carefully drilled to skirmish in woods, and taught to avail themselves of every protection which might offer; as it was looked for that much of the warfare would be conducted in thick woods, and the only means of meeting the troops of congress would be to fight in their manner, which was that of avoiding all close contact. It was expected that their attack would be governed by the individual skill of each man with the musket. The drill of all the troops was in anticipation of this species of warfare.

At the end of June, the 28th, Carleton held a meeting with the Indian chiefs of the Iroquois in the Jesuits' church, Montreal; about three hundred were present. Through their interpreter they expressed their devotion to Great Britain, adding that they had arrived in Montreal to offer their services in her cause. Dissatisfaction was expressed with the Caughnawagas, and they were reproached with having, during the attack of congress, observed neutrality, and not having taken part with the British. Those present of that tribe cast the blame on an old man of eighty, who had wisely abstained from appearing. An arrangement was entered into for the services of the Iroquois for a year. At the conclusion of the ceremony, they passed by Carleton, each one giving him the hand. The night passed in feasting and dancing. We also learn that they brought with them some scalps lately obtained, which they presented to Carleton, Burgoyne and Phillips.*

* Riedesel, *Leben und Wirken*, II., p. 32.

On the 18th of July Carleton received at Montreal another deputation of Indians from the west, consisting of the Ottawas, Sauteurs and tribes from the lakes; about 180 attended. They offered their aid to their great father, the king of England, and to their father Carleton. From the distance they had travelled they were received with particular distinction. Carleton did not accept their active service. He exhorted them, however, to be true to the cause of their king, and to hold themselves in readiness for warfare, and be available when their services would be required. In the meantime, he called upon them to protect the province from their side, so that no other nation could interfere with the success of the British arms. He thanked the tribes for the good discipline they had observed on their descent of the Saint Lawrence, and he promised to present them with silver gorgets. As, unfortunately, the gorgets were not ready for distribution, he suggested that some of the more elderly should be left behind to receive them. The Indians were delighted with the offer, and declared that they would wear the decoration as a proof of their fidelity. Carleton promised them likewise additional facilities for their trade. A second audience was granted, after which they took their leave.

On the 20th of July Carleton returned to Quebec, and Burgoyne took command in Chambly. Shortly afterwards, a scouting party, consisting of twelve volunteers of the regulars, a party of Canadians, and a detachment of Indians, were despatched to learn something of the movements of the congress troops. Reports were constantly received so differing one from the other, that they established their unreliability. This party, under the command of major Carleton,* in the neighbourhood of île-aux-Noix, came in contact with a strong force of congress troops. Carleton immediately attacked it, taking thirty-six prisoners, three of whom were officers; his own loss was an Indian killed, and a Canadian wounded. The result of the reconnaissance was the knowledge that Crown point was garrisoned by five hundred men.

* Major Carleton was both nephew and brother-in-law to the governor in chief, having married the lady Anne Howard previously to his uncle's marriage.

On the 23rd, a man was taken prisoner near Laprairie. He described himself as one of a scouting party of one officer and five men, which he represented as having left with fourteen days' provisions. It was from information given by this prisoner that the murderers of Gordon were known.*

The murder of brigadier Gordon, and there is no other language to apply to the act, was perpetrated on the 24th of July : one of the foulest acts in cowardice and treachery committed during this unhappy war. In the whole history of the continent, it has been exceeded by no act of Indian remorselessness. The connection between Saint John's and Montreal was kept up by the road to Laprairie, the length of which is about nineteen miles, when the Saint Lawrence has to be crossed, in the traverse of seven miles, by a *bateau* or canoe. To pass by Chambly, the land route is prolonged to twenty-nine miles to Longueuil ; consequently, the road by Laprairie was invariably followed. There were no hostile troops in the province, and it was not supposed any marauders would attempt an attack ; therefore, no escorts were furnished, and the distance between the two places was travelled in the ordinary manner. There were, however, pickets at certain localities.

Benjamin Whitcomb, who committed the outrage, was a lieutenant of Connecticut ; with four men he went out as a scouting party to seize prisoners, so that information could be obtained. The carelessness observed in passing between

* Whitcomb is thus described in the general orders issued on the occasion. "The Person who commanded the Party which attacked General Gordon is Whitcomb of Connecticut, calling himself Lieutenant. He is between 30 and 40 years of Age to appearance, near 6 feet high, rather thin than otherwise, light brown Hair tied behind, rough Face, not sure whether occasioned by the small Pox or not. He wears a kind of under Jacket without Sleeves, slash Pockets, leather Breeches, grey woolen or yarn Stockings and Shoes. Hat flapped, a gold Cord tied round it. He had a Firelock, Blanket, Pouch and Powder Horn."

"Should he, or any of his Party, of the same nature, come within reach of our Men, it is hoped they will not honor them with Soldier's Deaths if they can possibly avoid it, but reserve them for due Punishment, which can only be effected by the Hangman." [Hadden's Journal, p. 236.]

the two places became known, and it was thought possible that a prisoner could be taken on the route. Gates was then in command at Ticonderoga ; it was under his instructions that Whitcomb started on this expedition. The report of Gordon's death was made directly to Gates, and he shewed his approval of the act by subsequently employing Whitcomb in a similar attempt. Whitcomb safely made his way through the woods to the Laprairie road, and placed himself in ambush. From time to time he saw carts with provisions passing. On the 24th, at noon, observing a mounted officer riding by, his party fired upon him ; it was brigadier Gordon who was quartered with his regiment, the 29th, at Laprairie, of which post he was in command. On the 23rd he had ridden over to Saint John's to visit general Fraser. On his return, he had reached the wood, within about six miles of Laprairie, when he received a volley, fired from the bush. The probability is that the whole party fired, for he was hit by two balls ; in the right arm and the right shoulder. He still kept his seat, and rode some distance, when, from loss of blood, he fell from his horse. He was found by a man of the 21st regiment, and carried to the hospital. He recovered sufficiently to state that he had been shot by an unseen enemy. Gordon died of his wounds on the 1st, and was buried with military honours on the 3rd of August.*

Carleton's design in returning to Quebec was to take steps to re-establish the courts of justice and to restore the legislative council to its functions. He issued commissions for

* Wilkinson, who was aide-de-camp to Gates, in his memoirs speaks of the act as an abominable outrage on the customs of war and the laws of humanity. He can scarcely have represented Gates' views, for in September, Whitcomb, with his party, on the same route and on the same duty, surprised and seized quarter-master Saunders and a man with him, and before they could make resistance, tied their arms with ropes, and blindfolded them. He reached Ticonderoga with his prisoners, when they were admitted to parole. Within two months of the murder of Gordon, Gates recommended Whitcomb to have the command of two independent companies, with power to select the officers, and to recruit the men, adding "that his sobriety and truth illustrated his military talents." The following winter Whitcomb was promoted to the rank of major. Thus the murder was justified, and its perpetrator honoured.

the creation of judges in the districts of Montreal and of Quebec; he established a court of appeal, and gave the judges authority to examine into and report on the damages suffered during the invasion by the congress troops. He complained to Germain of the abuse of the appointment of deputies to offices granted by patent, and by the issue of the writs of *mandamus*.* While thus engaged, he received intimation from Germain that Hey would not return to Canada; that Livius was appointed chief justice; Southouse, then attorney-general, was to be made a judge, and Monk, solicitor-general of Nova Scotia, was to succeed him.†

Carleton replied to Germain's expression of regret that insufficient information had been sent, by stating that when he had written he was engaged in the expulsion of rebels from the province, and his next operation had been the formation of a naval force to take possession of lake Champlain. He expressed his disappointment that the flat-bottomed boats for which he had applied had not arrived, ready to be put together. Only ten such boats had reached him, with material for building fourteen more. Congress had formed a considerable naval force at the entrance of the lake. As early as the end of September,‡ Carleton again wrote, that from the lateness of the season, he was afraid that he could do

* Of these appointments Carleton wrote in 1777 to Germain [Can. Arch. 13, p. 160, 23rd May]. After expressing his agreement in the policy of rewarding those who had preserved their fidelity and punishing those who had abandoned their allegiance, Carleton adds—"Your Lordship has turned out of their employment two men of abilities and good character. Mr. Grant has acted as Attorney General ever since Mr. Kneller left the Province, and Mr. Fraser, as Judge of the Common Pleas at Montreal, ever since the first establishment of the Civil Courts of Justice in 1764. These gentleman have both exposed their lives more than once to oppose rebellion; Mr. Fraser, for the same cause, has suffered in his property, been personally injured, and is still detained a prisoner by the rebels. The power I have not; I am at a loss to know, after the fate of these gentlemen, how I can even talk of rewarding those who have preserved their loyalty, without the appearance of mockery. Of this you may be assured, that such things will occasion no small exultation among the King's enemies."

† [Can. Arch., Q. 12, p. 92, 22nd August.]

‡ [Can. Arch., Q. 12, p. 188, 28th Sept.]

no more than draw off attention from Howe. The statement is important, in view of subsequent events to be narrated.

At the end of August Carleton was again at Chambly personally urging on the preparations for the advance up lake Champlain, and was indefatigable in his efforts to complete them.*

The troops were cantoned from Laprairie to Saint John's, and thence to Saint Thérèse and Chambly, with detachments on the Richelieu at Saint Ours, Saint Denis and Saint Charles, the design being to secure the navigation of the river from any sudden raid on the *bateaux* bringing provisions; by these means giving confidence to the boatmen. From Belle-isle to Chambly the posts were on the west side. An excellent road was formed between Saint John's and Chambly, so that no delay might take place in the transport of material in this distance. The construction of barracks and the fortifications at île-aux-Noix were actively carried forward, and the work of preparation of vessels for the ascent of lake Champlain unceasingly continued. By the first week of September the small fleet was generally fit for service. Troops were sent forward to take position higher up the lake. Major Carleton, with four hundred Indians, and one hundred volunteers from the British troops, occupied the ground above point au Fer. Fraser, with the grenadiers and light infantry, had advanced to Lacolle. Burgoyne, with his brigade, was at île-aux-Noix. The remaining troops were moved around Saint John's. Riedesel was despatched on a reconnaissance to point au Fer and île La Mothe. In a few days captain Fraser's force of Canadians and Indians had arrived at the head of Cumberland Bay, and major Carleton was established on île La

* Pausch waited upon Carleton to appeal against an order that the transport on which his troops had arrived, drawing 14 feet of water, should not be ordered to attempt a passage through lake Saint Peter to Sorel, on which the depth of the flats was known only to be 10 or 11 feet. Both the captain and pilot of the vessel, from the danger of the attempt, refused to proceed. Pausch relates that this order was not countermanded in spite of the objections urged, and hence his appeal to Carleton. [Pausch Journal, p. 62, 29th August.]

Mothe ; parties were constantly sent out to learn if any tidings could be heard of the congress fleet. The main force of the Brunswickers was moved from Laprairie to the Savanne, half way between Saint John's and Laprairie, and colonel von Speth was ordered with a detachment of his regiment to Saint John's, to take the place of the 24th, despatched to île-aux-Noix. The island had been definitely established as the depot for munitions of war and provisions, during the operations on the lake.

On the 5th of October, the vessels constructed during the preceding three months left Saint John's. The Richelieu is shallow for the first fifteen miles, before reaching île-aux-Noix, the navigation not exceeding eight and nine feet of water ; the guns and provisions were accordingly put on board at the island, and the vessels ascended to point au Fer, eighteen miles higher up. A block-house had been constructed at this spot, and four companies detailed to defend it. The main body, under Burgoyne, had advanced to the river Lacolle, nine miles north ; but on the 11th, this force took ground at point au Fer.

On the 10th the small fleet had reached île La Mothe, in modern geography between Rouse's point and Plattsburg. Carleton was himself present ; captain Pringle, of the navy, was in command. A large force of Indians, in their canoes, accompanied the ships.

About eleven o'clock on the 11th, one of the congress vessels was seen not far from Cumberland Bay, formed by the projecting point opposite Grand island, near which the river Saranac discharges, where the town of Plattsburg now stands. On being pursued, she attempted to join the other ships lying at anchor between Valcour island and the shore, where the waterway is about a mile wide. Valcour island, from four to five miles in length, lies in the channel, some few miles above the southern point of Grand island, which forms the eastern channel line. The wind being fair for ascending the lake, her captain, finding her pursuers gaining upon her, ran the vessel ashore on the east of Valcour island,

and abandoned her, while the crew made their way across the land to join the main fleet, anchored between the western shore of the island and the main shore. The vessel proved to be the "Royal Savage," fourteen guns, which had been seized at Saint John's the previous year.

The congress fleet was formed in a crescent between the north of Valcour island and the main shore; it consisted of three row-galleys, two schooners, two sloops, and eight gondolas, the whole carrying ninety guns.

The British fleet, differently constituted, included the "Inflexible," of twenty 12-pdrs. and ten smaller cannon; the "Lady Maria," fourteen; "The Carleton," twelve; the *radeau* or raft, one gondola, and twenty-two gun-boats. The latter were from 30 to 36 feet long; 10 ft., 16 ft. and 18 ft. wide. Each boat carried a gun or howitzer in the bow, with seven artillerymen and four seamen, and was under the command of an artillery officer. Including the howitzers, the total number of guns of the force was eighty-seven.

As the crew of the "Royal Savage" were crossing the island to join the other congress vessels, they were harassed by the British gun-boats. The firing awakened the attention of the congress fleet, when four vessels got under way to support the "Royal Savage." The British gun-boats in the attack, having become crowded together, became exposed to this fire, when the order was given to form in open order.

The pursuit of the "Royal Savage," although resulting in her abandonment, was unfortunate; for, the wind blowing from the north, the pursuing vessels were carried past Valcour island. It would have been more advantageous to have made the attack on the congress fleet from the north; but no such movement was now possible by the larger vessels, for they had been carried beyond the scene of action. These were not the days of steam, and it was only by tacking that they could regain their place to the north.

The gun boats alone commenced the action which, unsustained, they vigourously continued for two hours. "The Carleton," having the governor on board, succeeded in entering

the strait. She was commanded by captain Dacres of the navy, and effectively supported the gun-boats. For an hour she received the concentrated fire of the congress fleet, the remaining vessels not having been able to come into action. As she was beginning to suffer from the damage received in this unequal contest, she was towed out of the range of fire by the boats. Many of her crew were seriously wounded.*

The gun-boats, totally unsupported, had to continue the attack against the entire fleet. About one o'clock a British gun-boat, commanded by lieutenant Dufais of the Anhalt artillery, was blown up by a shot passing through the powder magazine. Dufais' vessel sank, but his men were taken on board by captain Pausch of the Anhalt artillery, and another gun-boat. Two of the men were unfortunately drowned, the remainder of the crew with the gun were saved. During the attack, the Indians who accompanied the expedition landed at Valcour island and on the mainland, whence they uninterruptedly fired upon the congress boats.

The gun-boats having expended all their ammunition, and it not being held advisable to continue the attack in this form, they were recalled, with the determination of renewing the combat on the morrow with the whole British fleet.

The gun-boats, accordingly, formed across the water way from the main shore to the south of the island, with the four vessels and the raft anchored in support. There was a confident expectation that the congress vessels could not escape, that they must surrender or be destroyed. The loss of the British had been twenty, killed, wounded and drowned.

* Carleton, in his official report [Can. Arch., Q. 12, p. 224]. "On board the 'Maria' off Crown Point, 14th Oct. 1776. I cannot omit taking notice to your lordship of the good service done in the first action by the spirited conduct of a number of officers and men of the corps of artillery, who served the gun boats, which, together with the 'Carleton,' sustained for many hours the whole fire of the enemy's fleet, the rest of our vessels not being able to work up near enough to join effectually in the engagement."

Dacres has been described as being so seriously wounded that he was on the point of being thrown overboard as being dead; but, as on the 14th Carleton states that he has selected him as the bearer of despatches, his wound could not have been so severe as has been stated.

Arnold was in command of the congress fleet ; his losses had been severe, and from the result of the first day's action, which had taken place on conditions favourable to himself, he had little hope of avoiding disaster and defeat on the morrow. As he felt he had not strength to fight, he determined to retreat, and carried out his purpose with resolution and much skill. The wind was favourable for his design ; and with muffled oars he passed through the interval left in the navigable water by the British gun-boats, which had been formed in line to intercept his passage. The western boat of the British line must have been at some distance from the shore to admit of the movement. The probability is that no such attempt was considered possible. The retreat, however, must have been conducted with great caution and prudence, and its success does not speak favourably for the watch maintained by the British vessels, or the skill with which the line was formed.*

At the close of the first day's engagement, Carleton had given orders for the "Royal Savage" to be set on fire. She burned brightly for the most part of the night. As events turned out, this extreme proceeding was not necessary ; for the vessel could have been got off, and the stores taken in possession. But any defect in Carleton's character was on the side of caution. He never ran useless risks, or failed from want of prudence. Had the British attack not succeeded, the vessel

* On this point the German writers are plain spoken ; they thus describe the British fleet : "Wo man in allzugrosser Sicherheit, zu wenig Acht hatte, und so schlüpfen die Amerikaner in der dunkeln Nacht glücklich durch, ohne das man dort Etwas gewahr wurde. Am andern Morgen als man den sicher gewähtnten, Fang machen wolte, rissen die Engländer die Augen nicht wening auf, als sie diesen entwischt fanden. Der General Carleton war wiithend darüber, er liess sogleich die Anker lichten und setzte den Entwischten nach." [Riedesel, Leben und Wirken, ii., p. 57].*

* ["Where, with a too great sense of security too little heed was given, and so the Americans, in the dark night, slipped fortunately away without anybody knowing anything about it. On the following morning, as the English prepared to make the catch, regarded as so certain, they opened their eyes not a little as they found the ships had escaped. General Carleton was raging in the matter. He caused the anchor at once to be raised, and sailed in pursuit."]]

could have been recovered by the congress force, and there would have been the additional strength of her presence to overcome in the future. We may explain her destruction by this consideration. The congress fleet for service on lake Champlain had been organized at Skenesborough on the troops being driven from Canada in June 1766. The duty of constructing the additional vessels had been confided to Gates in command of the lake, and the special superintendence assigned to Waterbury, subsequently taken prisoner. The command of the vessels when on service was given to Arnold.

After the withdrawal of the British gun-boats on the 11th, a council of war was held by Arnold, when it was resolved to attempt to escape by passing through the gap by the main land. The nights in October close in early; the sun sets shortly after five. So soon as it was dark, and it was thought the movement could be attempted, it was cautiously effected; with what skill, its success is the fullest proof. Both the conception and the execution of the movement exact respect. It must have been seen that the British vessels were ranged so as to make the attempt feasible, and it must have been well known that there was sufficient depth of water. With the approach of light the escape of the vessels was discovered. No time was lost in sailing in their track. The pursuing vessels were making good headway, when a storm burst forth, and the wind blew with such force that both fleets had to come to anchor.

The congress ships safely reached Schuyler's island, some fourteen miles south of Valcour island; while at anchor at this place, their damages were repaired and the leaks stopped as far as practicable.* At two in the afternoon the wind had

* Arnold, on the 12th of October, wrote from this place describing his losses. "The Congress," his flagship, had greatly suffered. On the "Washington" the lieutenant was killed, the captain and master wounded. The "New York" lost all her officers except her captain. The "Philadelphia" sank an hour after the engagement. The killed and wounded amounted to sixty. He describes the retreat as having begun at seven o'clock; he further adds, "the enemy did not attempt to molest us." Hadden, in his journal, names a later hour. He relates the escape "and the ships passing through our fleet about 10 o'clock at night

abated and a start was again made. About six they were off Willsborough, some sixteen miles further south. The object was to gain Crown point, and attack Carleton's vessels with the guns of the fort.

The British fleet continued in pursuit during the night ; as the wind fell, the boats towed the rigged vessels. Early on the morning of the 13th they were close on the congress fleet. The attack was immediately commenced. The "Washington" and "Congress," in the rear, were the first to receive its fury. After a few broadsides, the "Washington" surrendered, with a gondola. Arnold ran the other vessels in shore, and set fire to them.* All that escaped were the "Revenge," a schooner, a sloop carrying ten 4-pdrs., and the "Trumble," row-galley. Landing his force, Arnold set fire to the buildings at Crown point, with the view of thoroughly destroying them. The fort was generally dilapidated ; he trusted to rendering it entirely untenable. Thus the congress fleet was annihilated, one schooner, not in the action, being the only other remaining vessel, with an unfinished row-galley at Ticonderoga. One of the noteworthy events in this second attack is that only one man in the British fleet was wounded. The exception was Carleton, struck with a slight splinter which caused little concern.†

effected it undiscovered." Waterbury, subsequently taken prisoner, wrote of "the retreat through the fleet . . . which was done with so much secrecy, that we went through them entirely undiscovered." There is an entire *consensus* in the narrative as to the route followed.

* A serious charge has been brought against Arnold by Von Eelking in his "Deutschen Hülfsstruppen," on the authority of Riedesel's journal: that he set his ships on fire without removing the wounded, their cries being heard above the crackling of the flames. "Dass er die an's Land gebrachten Schiffe habe in Brand stecken lassen, ohne die darauf befindlichen schwer Verwundeten erst gerettet zu haben, deren Wehgeschrei man noch durch das Prasseln der Flammen gehört hätte." [Vol. I., p. 162.]

† "Eine unbedeutende Verletzung am Kopfe." [Leben und Wirken Riedesel, II., p. 58.]

CHAPTER III.

Carleton, with his captures, made his way to Crown point. He had 110 prisoners, including Waterbury, Arnold's second in command. The wounded were placed under the care of the regimental surgeons, the remainder treated with forbearance. In a few days the whole were released on *parole*, on their engaging not to bear arms against Great Britain until regularly exchanged. They were sent to Ticonderoga under the command of captain Craig, known thirty years later as sir James Craig, governor general of Canada. The released prisoners spoke so highly of the kindness they had received at the hands of Carleton, that the officer who received them considered it dangerous to the revolutionary cause for them to have any intercourse with the garrison; they were accordingly sent on to Skenesborough [Whitehall] without landing.*

Lake Champlain being freed from the vessels of congress, Carleton had to consider the policy he would pursue. He took possession of Crown point, which, being but ten miles from Ticonderoga would have been available as a basis of operations against that place, then strongly garrisoned under command of Gates. The buildings at Crown point required to be restored before they could be occupied. The fort had been rebuilt by Amherst in 1759† during his advance up lake Champlain, after its abandonment by the French. The whole buildings were at this date much dilapidated, a part having been accidentally destroyed by fire some years previously; the fort, however, had been occupied by a sergeant's party the preceding year. The congress troops had not taken possession of the fort,

* Trumbull's Reminiscences, p. 36.

† Ante., Vol. IV., p. 336.

but had constructed some works across the tongue of land for the protection of their boats. It was from Crown point, on the 14th of October, that Carleton wrote his despatch to Germain, carried to England by Dacres, reporting the destruction of Arnold's fleet, and that lake Champlain was in his possession. Evidently, it had been Carleton's first intention to occupy Crown point, for he ordered the repair of the buildings, and he himself remained on the spot, while Burgoyne was summoned from point au Fer to meet him to discuss further operations. Ticonderoga was reconnoitred by water, and the boats approached sufficiently near to be fired upon. It was finally determined that, owing to the lateness of the season, no movement at that time should be made against Ticonderoga, and Crown point was abandoned towards the end of October. The force with the stores was sent back to île-aux-Noix and Saint John's. The last division left on the 15th of November.

There can be little doubt of the wisdom of this decision. As the facts clearly establish, Ticonderoga was then held by a strong garrison well supplied, and within easy distance of the district whence food could be constantly furnished. Crown point, on the other hand, is nearly 110 miles from Saint John's, the base of Carleton's operations. During November, lake Champlain is frequently so rough as to interfere with the passage of *bateaux*. By the end of this month navigation entirely ceases. Within the few days remaining of open water, it would have been utterly impossible to have delivered the supplies necessary for the subsistence until spring of the large garrison indispensable to maintain possession of the place. Consequently, the food and ammunition required during winter must have been carried by land through an unsettled country of one hundred miles, without roads, on sleighs, constantly exposed to attacks from ambush; when the column would have been long and straggling, subjected to the interruption of frequent halts, caused by the breaking down of vehicles and the failure of draught animals. Even when attended by strong escorts, such pro-

vision trains would have only tempted aggression and have severely taxed the strength and health of the men. At the same time, it was perfectly plain that, on the opening of the navigation, possession could be taken of Crown point by a powerful force without difficulty; and, the congress fleet having been destroyed, there could be no opposition to its re-occupation. This sensible view prevailed, and the troops returned to winter quarters in Canada.

In 1778, when Burgoyne spoke in the house of commons in vindication of his character, there was no point on which he dwelt with more force than on the difficulty of moving his supplies. He related, that from Ticonderoga they had to be carried to lake George, placed in *bateaux* on that lake, transferred to waggons to reach fort Edward on the Hudson, to be again placed in *bateaux* to proceed six miles to the rapids of fort Miller; then another series of boats was required for transfer to the western shore of the Hudson. Any student of the art of war will naturally ask, Why was not this foreseen, when the expedition was considered? The route to the Hudson was not a discovery. Undoubtedly, one of the causes of Burgoyne's failure was that these difficulties were not anticipated and provided against. Moreover, even antecedent to moving a pound of provisions, the boats necessary to transport had themselves to be moved to the three water stretches from lake Champlain, in itself a work of great labour; first to lake George, a portage of a mile, the height to be overcome being about 260 feet; thence by the road from the head of fort George to fort Edward, 14 miles, and the short portage south of fort Edward to gain the reach at that place. Burgoyne's force amounted to 7,200 fighting men, for whom each day's subsistence had to be carried under the circumstances described. When Burgoyne, almost pathetically, dwelt upon this difficulty in the house of commons, he became eloquent from the memory of his own misfortunes. At the close of 1776, there was no thought of the hardships and danger attendant on the duty of furnishing supplies to a large garrison at Crown point, through the

wilderness from Saint John's, for such it was at that time, when the navigation is closed along the western shores of lake Champlain. That Carleton had the prescience to comprehend all the labour and possible disaster which might accompany the attempt, led to the accusation that he was deficient in enterprise, and his prudence and judgment were made the ground of accusation against his capacity. There was a class of officers in the army who saw only weakness in his conduct. They strongly advocated an immediate demonstration against Ticonderoga, and that Crown point should not be temporarily abandoned. They were the unthinking and inexperienced, who, without reflection, judge events by the surface. I cannot conceive any accusation more unjust, more unwarrantable, more betokening the utter absence of that sound consideration of consequence, so indispensable to the formation of any judgment on military operations.

These opinions are expressed even at the present day ; and United States writers have asserted that Burgoyne urged the assault of Ticonderoga. No proof, however, is given that such was the case. We also learn that the army was generally of opinion that the commander might have shewn more energy. There may have been many who at the time so thought, but such opinions are to-day worthy of little attention. Those who expressed them were of the numerous class who anticipated no resistance to an onward movement. They accepted all the rumours which reached Canada as to the success of the royal cause in the south, and implicitly believed the statements of the deserters and stragglers who came into the camp, that everywhere there was great fear felt of the failure of the cause of congress.

Undoubtedly, a spirit of despondency had become prevalent owing to the events of 1776. Had the commander at New York been of different calibre from Howe, and had no such bad minister as lord George Germain been entrusted with the conduct of the war, there is ground for the belief

that there would have been during 1777 a different result from that which is recorded.

The invasion of Canada by Montgomery exercised a powerful influence upon the revolutionary spirit in giving it strength, determination and vigour, and it had the greater merit with the extreme party bent upon independence, that it committed the entire country to armed resistance. But the total failure of the invasion, and the rout of the congress troops caused consternation. It is not impossible that if the reinforcements had arrived at New York two months earlier, and the movements of the British force had been conducted with skill and judgment, the cause of the colonies would have collapsed at this early date. But delay in the operations gave time for confidence to return, and the want of wisdom and judgment in the British generals met the fate which always attends incapacity. The extraordinary inability of the men in authority to judge the true condition of the provinces, and the strength of the force against which they had to contend, strikes the modern reader with bewilderment. They would take no just account of the numbers in the field, or of the fighting capacity of the troops they had to meet. The opinion prevailed that there might be some temporary resistance by men who fired from shelter, but the belief was general that the force gathered at Saint John's and Chambly was irresistible, and had only to appear for all attempt at opposition in the field to cease.

While, at this time, the spirit of the royalists had been to a great extent crushed and they had been so persecuted by the dominant party, that even neutrality was not permitted them, it was believed both in London and in Canada that numbers were waiting with eager impatience for countenance and assistance so that they could enrol themselves in the royal army. There always remained, it is true, a strong loyal party, but its members were scattered, without leaders, and exposed to the most arbitrary treatment on the mere suspicion of entertaining this opinion. No such condition of things was recognised in the British ranks by the command-

ing general. The belief was, that in all directions they would be welcomed by a loyal population who would join their ranks and supply their wants. It was too late when Burgoyne, only too surely, discovered how futile this hope was.*

* Mr. de Fonblanque, in his life of Burgoyne, to sustain this view publishes a private letter of general Phillips of the artillery to Burgoyne. I must confess to a feeling of some unpleasantness at its publication, for it suggests no favourable opinion of the character of one who, in all the relations of life, behaved admirably. Phillips' letter shews that he had fallen into the error of many military men of that time, of looking upon the congress troops as incapable of withstanding a disciplined force. Read by the light of the evidence of the time, the opinion expressed in this letter is unsustained by facts then known, and by no means warranted by the result. Mr. de Fonblanque himself expresses the opinion, that the abandonment of Crown point "appears to have been a great error on the part of Carleton." I have given my reasons in the text, why the act should be regarded as one of wisdom and necessity.

Phillips in his cheery belief tells Burgoyne that there are thirteen vessels, some of them ships of war, on the Hudson above the Highlands, on their way to Albany, a rumour without a shade of authenticity; and he adds the belief that it will be Howe's army from New York that will take the post of Crown point. A few pages of my narrative will shew the positive folly of this assertion. Phillips considered that the campaign on the lake, notwithstanding its successes, had terminated ill. His opinion was, Crown point should at least have been held; otherwise, that an attack should have been made on Ticonderoga. But his instincts as a soldier came to his aid. He added, if they had failed after a strong feint, they could have retired, and he based his hope of success "on the strong panic which has taken the rebels." "I never was of opinion," adds Phillips, "to attack the entrenchments seriously."

There is much in this letter scarcely explicable. "I write my mind freely to you, and repose my grief in the bosom of a friend," says the writer. "The next year must divide this army. We will go together if it be possible. Take care of our cause in England. I rely on your goodness and regard for me to represent me favourably to the king, if you think I deserve it, and keep me third in this army unless a second lieutenant general is sent." All this is very suggestive. It points to private conversations between Phillips and Burgoyne, to what extent it is difficult to surmise, in which it is more than hinted that the future command of the expedition was to rest with Burgoyne, and that Phillips was worshipping the rising sun. It was Phillips' fate to lose his illusions one by one, till the final surrender enforced upon him the fact of his entire miscalculations. Madame Riedesel throws some light on this feeling. She says [p. 176]: "Towards evening, it was the 9th of October, after the fight of the 7th, we at length came to Saratoga, half a mile away [the German mile = 3.897 English miles] from the place where we had passed the day. From continual rain I was wet through and through, and was obliged to remain so the whole night, as I had no place where I could change my linen. I placed myself before a good fire and undressed my

It was this wise and well considered determination which furnished the ground to lord George Germain for addressing the reproof that Carleton so bitterly resented, and that caused him to resign his government. No greater misfortune in these troublous times could have happened than the presence of Germain in a position of authority and power, especially with a minister of the character of lord North, whose conduct during the American war was one continual course of weakness, vacillation and error. Germain, without courage in the field, as his conduct at Minden established, was ambitious of a reputation for strategy, without possessing the judgment, ability and foresight indispensable to eminence in that difficult art. He had the ear of the king, and was enabled to exercise his mischievous influence in suggesting a military policy, which, once accepted by the monarch, was clung to, with the obstinacy of his character. Germain was responsible for the ill-considered attempt of St. Leger to arrive at the

children, and then we lay down together on the straw. I asked General Phillips, who came towards me, why we did not continue our retreat while there was yet time, as my husband had pledged himself to cover it, and to bring the army through. 'Poor woman,' he answered, 'I admire you. Quite soaked through, you have still the courage in this weather to desire to go farther. Oh! that you were our general in command. He considers himself too tired, and will remain here the night and give us supper.' Indeed, Burgoyne was very jovial; he passed half the night singing and drinking, and amused himself with the wife of a commissary who was his mistress, and, like himself, greatly relished champagne."*

* "Gegen Abend kameu wir endlich nach Saratoga welches nur eine halbe Stunde Weges von dem Orte war, wo wir den ganzen Tag zugebracht hatten. Ich war von häufigen Regen durch und durch nass, und musste die ganze Nacht so bleiben, da ich gar keinen Ort hatte, wo ich die Wäsche wechseln konnte. Ich setzte mich also vor ein gutes Feuer, zog meine Kinder aus, und dann legten wir uns zusammen auf eine Streu. Ich fragte den General Phillips, der an mich heran kam, warum wir nicht unsern Rückzug fortsetzten, während es noch Zeit wäre, da mein Mann sich anheischig gemacht hatte, ihn zu decken, and die Armee durchzubringen. 'Arme Frau!' antwortete er mir, 'ich bewundre Sie! Ganz durchnässt, haben sie noch den Muth, in diesem Wetter weiter zu wollen. Wären sie doch unser kommandirender General! Dieser hält sich für zu sehr ermüdet, und will die Nacht hier bleiben, und uns ein Souper geben.' In der That war Burgoyne gern lustig, brachte die halbe Nacht singend und trinkend zu, und amüsirte sich mit der Frau eines Commissärs die seine Maitresse war, und, wie er, den Champagner liebte." p. 176.

Mohawk, which, in the form it took, was foredoomed to failure. The scheme of penetrating to Albany from Canada was the particular plan of Germain. The suggestion, probably, in the first instance, originated with Burgoyne,* but the arbitrary mode in which the plan was conceived and enforced was the act of the minister himself.

It may here be mentioned that when Burgoyne returned to England at the close of 1776, he carried with him a memorandum of Carleton, giving the plan of campaign for the following year. Carleton's own remarks are very brief; they were argumentatively sustained at some length by Burgoyne's "observations." Carleton asked for a reinforcement of 4,000 men, and recommended that the regimental companies should be increased, each to one hundred. With this additional strength, he considered that a large force might be spared to pass lake Ontario to operate upon the Mohawk; the main body to take possession of Ticonderoga as a central point, from which operations could be carried on against Connecticut. There is no mention of an expedition to the Hudson.† He calculated that the number to feed, including Indians, Canadians, artificers and seamen upon the lakes, must be considered as one third additional beyond the fighting force. He estimated that Canada could furnish corn, but not live cattle; there had been such a drain upon this supply during the last campaign that little could be expected in that direction. A corps of boatmen would be necessary to forward supplies. He likewise advised that a battalion of three hundred seamen should be raised to serve in America, to do away with the necessity of taking men from the transports and other vessels at Quebec; a proceeding which, owing to the impressment of crews, led to great expense, the ships from which they were taken being prevented from sailing, and thus claiming compensation.

By this plan, the expedition to the Hudson not being named became a matter for future consideration. It is

* Ante, Vol. V., p. 389.

† [Can. Arch., Q. 13, p. 3.]

evident that Carleton's design in the operations suggested by him, was to have established himself at Ticonderoga. Indeed, his letters express this intention. From this point he could have protected Canada ; reducing its garrison to the lowest possible strength, he would have been able to have detached a force, in case of urgency, sufficiently strong to defeat any hostile expedition from any quarter. He would have mastered the territory around the Connecticut river, and he could have threatened the Hudson, establishing advance posts in a fortified camp at fort Edward, in a position to act energetically on the first call of necessity.

Burgoyne, when in Canada, sustained Carleton's opinions, but, unfortunately for himself, accepted the plans which Germain had drawn out in London, without giving a thought to the exigencies and difficulties of the undertaking. Nevertheless, Burgoyne still clung to the design of threatening Connecticut. But as he engrafted it upon the greater scheme, his theory was only mischievous, for it diverted his strength from the main lines of his advance. This fact will be more fully apparent when his operations are described. Whether it was personal feeling against Carleton ; whether the determination to appoint an officer of his own selection in the hope of his greater subserviency ; whether he was influenced by the powerful Derby family,* Burgoyne having married a daughter of that house, or whether influenced by Burgoyne himself, who, undoubtedly, paid court to the minister, Germain resolved to constitute him the leader of the proposed expedition to Albany, likewise placing St. Leger under his orders. Burgoyne had arrived in England in the middle of December, being the bearer of the memorandum I have described, which he presented to the minister. During his intercourse with Germain he had written a private letter to him,† which, the latter explained had been accidentally

* The letter of Germain to lord Derby, 29th August, 1777, congratulating him on Burgoyne's success [de Fonblanque, p. 248], suggests that the influence of lord Derby had not been quite quiescent.

† One passage of this letter is as follows : After informing Germain that he had a personal interview with the king, he adds that "as the arrangements for

published. It was read to Burgoyne's disadvantage, as giving ground for the belief that he regarded Germain as a "patron and friend." In the house of commons Burgoyne protested against this meaning being given to his words, and at the same time declared that in no way had he endeavoured to supplant Carleton.

It was not until the opening of navigation that Carleton learned that he was superseded in his command. After the abandonment of Crown point, at the commencement of November, 1776, the troops had gone into winter quarters.*

Carleton established himself at Quebec. His wife, the lady Maria, with her three children, was now in Canada. She had joined him in Montreal, being the bearer of the order of the Bath, which she had received from the hand of the king to present to her husband.

It is not to be supposed that the anniversary of the memorable night of the 31st of December, 1775, was allowed to pass unnoticed, and it was commemorated with great ceremony.†

the next campaign might possibly come under his royal contemplation before my return [to London], I humbly laid myself at his majesty's feet for such active employment as he might think me worthy of."

* Ile-aux-Noix, Saint John's and Chambly were held by British regiments. Montreal was occupied by general Phillips with the artillery, including the company of Hesse Hanau and the 29th regiment. Detachments were quartered at Lachine to the west, and in the parishes to the east of Pointe-aux-Trembles, Contrecoeur, Varennes, Verchères, Boucherville, likewise at St. Ours, Saint Denis, Saint Charles and Saint Antoine on the Richelieu. McLean's regiments and that of Sir John Johnson were quartered on the island of Montreal, and the 9th regiment at Ile Jesus. Quebec was garrisoned with the 34th. The 62nd was at Point Levis, with two companies at Kamouraska.

The German troops were quartered at Repentigny, L'Assomption and Saint Sulpice; on the south shore below Sorel, in the parishes of Saint Francis, Yamaska, Saint Antoine, and from Nicolet to Becancour. Riedesel himself was established at Three Rivers. He arranged the old government buildings so as to become a barrack for two hundred men. The order from Carleton was positive, that only two men should be billeted in any one house, and from time to time a change of quarters was made, by the men being ordered to Three Rivers.

† Riedesel has left us a description of the day's ceremony; although suffering from a sprain he was present. At 9 o'clock, grand mass was celebrated by the archbishop in the cathedral. On this occasion, those who had shewn sympathy

The whole winter was devoted to preparations for the coming campaign; provisions were gathered and stored up, and every effort was made to combine all that was necessary to success. In his address to the house of commons Burgoyne bore testimony to Carleton's unremitting exertions. "Had that officer," he said, "been acting for himself, or for his brother, he could not have shewn more indefatigable zeal than he did, to comply with, and expedite my requisitions and desires."* While engaged in these duties, which he was carrying on with the system and judgment characteristic of all Carleton's proceedings, he was informed by letter from Germain that Burgoyne, or some other officer, was to be placed at the head of the troops that could be spared from the defence of the province, to proceed by way of the Hudson to join Howe, and put himself under his command.

In the opening sentence Germain states that a letter to this effect, written on the 22nd of August, 1776, had been intrusted to one of Carleton's aides-de-camp, captain Le Maistre, who had been three times in the gulf of the Saint Lawrence, and found it impossible to reach Quebec; consequently he had returned to England with the despatch. He then proceeds to instruct Carleton that, after the defeat of the rebel forces on lake Champlain, he should return to Quebec to aid in preparation for the coming campaign in accordance with the plan as it had been determined in London, equally with regard to Burgoyne's expedition to the Hudson, as to that of St. Leger to the Mohawk.† The number to be retained

with the congress troops had to perform public penance. The officers of the garrison and of the militia, with the British inhabitants, met at 10 o'clock, and waited upon Carleton; they afterwards proceeded to the English church. After church a parade took place, when a *feu de joie* was fired. Carleton himself gave a dinner to sixty people. A public *fête* was given at seven o'clock, which ended with a ball. A melancholy incident took place on this occasion. Captain Gailard, in one of the dances, was struck with apoplexy. He was immediately carried from the room. The fact of his death must have been suppressed, for the rest of the company danced until the morning. [Vol. II., p. 72.]

* State of Expedition, [p. 6].

† This letter appears in Burgoyne's state of the expedition, and is given by Mr. de Fonblanque, p. 229. It was only in the report of Can. Arch., 1885, that Dr. Brymner published the suppressed passage given in the text.

for service in Canada is specifically set forth in detail, viz., 3,770 men, and no latitude of any kind is left to Carleton more than that he has to exert himself in carrying out the orders he has received. Among other points that shewed Germain's incapacity to understand the situation, Carleton was called upon to furnish a large body of Canadians to join the expedition, as if they could be obtained as a matter of course, and he was limited in the most arbitrary manner to his duties as governor of Canada. That this conduct was dictated by bad, malignant feeling on the part of Germain, is proved by a letter of the king to lord North on the 20th of February. The king writes, " Germain wants Carleton to be recalled, but I have thrown cold water upon that."

It has always been supposed that it was upon the receipt of this letter, which set a limitation to his powers as governor general, that Carleton resigned, and the course followed by him has been described in a way to suggest petulance on his part. Whereas the letter contained a passage, not merely indicating the malevolence of Germain towards Carleton, but also shews his ignorance of ordinary geography and his absence of all knowledge of the events of the campaign.

When Germain despatched his letter, on the last occasion, the disaster at Trenton, on the early morning of the 26th of December, was well known in England. The post had been surprised by Washington, Rall the commandant killed, and 868 Hessians of all ranks taken prisoners. Trenton is upon the Delaware, in New Jersey, north of Philadelphia. The distance from lake Champlain is so great that it must be described by degrees of latitude. Crown point, approximately, is at the 44th parallel. Trenton somewhat north of the 40th. The Hudson separates New Jersey from the state of New York, the whole extent of which state intervenes before the northern limit at Ticonderoga is met. The operations carried on around New York were 180 miles from Albany. No attempt had been made to ascend the Hudson. Further, from Albany there is a distance of 45 miles to reach fort Edward, the latter 14 miles from lake George, which is 35

miles in length. No event that took place in either of these extreme points could have exercised any simultaneous influence on the events that happened at the opposite extremity. The very supposition presupposes an amount of ignorance which would be conceived impossible in any public man. Nevertheless, Germain, in his letter to Carleton, saw fit to affiliate to Carleton's prudence in leaving Ticonderoga unattacked at the close of the navigation, the cause of Washington's attack on Rall, nearly 300 miles south. I will, in another place, have briefly to relate this event. It will then be seen that Washington's energy and enterprise were suggested by Howe's bad generalship in occupying New Jersey in detachments, unprotected by intrenchments, and by Rall's self-indulgent habits, in failing to enforce discipline and disregarding the dictates of ordinary prudence. All this disgraceful want of care and unsoldierlike neglect of duty were traceable to the feeling of contempt in which the congress troops were held after their continual defeats in 1776, joined to the belief that they were so broken that their cause was lost.

Germain's letter to Carleton contained the following passage which has too long been suppressed: "Since I wrote that letter, I have had the mortification to learn that upon your repassing lake Champlain a very considerable number of the insurgents, finding their presence no longer necessary near Ticonderoga, immediately marched from thence and joined the rebel forces in the provinces of New York and Jersey. That unexpected reinforcement was more particularly unfortunate for us, as it enabled the rebels to break in with some degree of success upon parts of the winter quarters that were taken up by the army under the command of Sir William Howe."

In the narrative of the events of 1775-1776 that I have endeavoured to give, the reader cannot fail to have observed Carleton's devotion to duty during this period, in his successful defence of Quebec, followed up by his defeat of the congress troops, and, in a few weeks, driving them from Canada; subsequently, in constructing and forming a fleet

for operation on lake Champlain, which, in a few days, successfully swept away the entire naval force of congress. Carleton's whole career, viewed in the aspect of his private life, shews him to have been a man of delicate and nice honour. In the most dark and untoward circumstances he was sustained by the sense of performing his duty, regardless of self. He had been many years in Canada, and had carefully studied her political and administrative requirements in connection with the strength of her position, as a military base of operations. He had never attempted to attract attention by a showy, questionable policy, only to meet condemnation in the future. He had striven to develop the resources of the province, and, in the troubles which had arisen, while acting to aid the imperial cause, he had avoided all doubtful operations by which unnecessary risk would be incurred. His astonishment at receiving such a letter from Germain could only have been exceeded by a sense of its insulting injustice, and the ignorance the writer shewed of the events he was in the position to control. He replied with a dignified protest in two letters, dated the 20th of May and the 22nd of May. The former I give *in extenso* at the conclusion of this chapter, as a portion of the history of the time. In the latter, he dwells upon the weak garrison which then held Canada, and expresses the hope that Howe will take measures for its protection. Had he been left with discretionary power, he would have watched Canada from Ticonderoga, and have been ready to place troops in any operation of offence or defence. Carleton concludes by saying that Germain's recognition of his influence with the Canadians and the Indians had been lessened by the general report, that when appointed minister, Germain's intention had been to remove him from his command, and, in the meantime, to render his position as irksome as possible by every kind of slight, disregard and censure, which occasion and events might render feasible. The removal might have taken place without public evil, but the system chosen to effect

it struck at the king's government. The danger arising from the indulgence of private resentments by a secretary of state, and from the cabals encouraged by his protection, were perilous to the state ; for it was pretty generally believed that the surest way to obtain favour with lord George Germain, and support from his selected friends, was to promote opposition in Canada and to forward materials for the same business at home.

Germain made a feeble attempt at a reply. He referred to the king's orders for the appointment of Burgoyne to an independent command. He disclaimed being influenced by private pique or resentment, and expressed his astonishment that it could be supposed that he would condescend to encourage faction and cabal. Nothing was said in palliation of, or apology for his unjust, unworthy and contemptible attack on Carleton with regard to his withdrawal from Crown point.

Carleton remained at his post to aid Burgoyne in every way he could, with all the ability and loyalty of his character. On June the 27th he resigned his position. He wrote that he found he could no longer be of use to the king's service, either in a civil or military capacity, under Germain's administration "On the contrary, apprehending that I may occasion no small detriment to it, for all the marks of your Lordship's displeasure affect not me, but the King's service and the tranquillity of his people ; I therefore flatter myself I shall obtain his royal permission to return home this fall, the more so that from your first entrance into office, you began to prepare the minds of all men for this event, wisely foreseeing, that, under your Lordship's administration, it must certainly come to pass, and, for my own part, I do not think it just that the private enmity of the King's servants should add to the disturbance of his reign. For these reasons I shall embark with great satisfaction, still entertaining hopes and ardent wishes that after my departure, you may adopt measures tending to promote the safety and tranquillity of this unfortunate Province ; at least that the

dignity of the Crown may not appear beneath your Lordship's concern."*

Carleton, however, did not leave Canada till the 27th of June of the following year, when he was replaced by Haldimand.

* [Can. Arch., Q. 13, p. 299, 27th June, 1777.]

The following is Carleton's letter to Germain, mentioned at p. 127 :—

QUEBEC, 20th of May, 1777.

MY LORD,—Had your Lordship's despatch of the 22nd of August arrived in due time, it might have relieved me from many doubts ; I thereby should have learned your wishes were not for my remaining on this side Lake Champlain the remainder of the year, as I at times apprehended. My fears did not arise from your silence on that head, this I imputed to an opinion, pretty general, that any officer entrusted with the supreme command, ought, upon the spot, to see what was most expedient to be done, better than a great general at three thousand miles' distance ; but considering your Lordship well knew how impossible it was for me to make the least preparations during the winter ; and that, agreeable to my desire, your Lordship had frequently importuned for boats, prepared timbers, with other materials necessary for suddenly putting together and equipping a marine force, for the lake service, and its immediate passage ; and seeing all those solicitations disregarded by your Lordship ; that the artificers, sent out for this great work, dropped in, few at a time, and mostly late in the season, as if destined only to prepare matters for the following year, I naturally concluded, either that your Lordship had taken your measures with such great wisdom, that the rebels must immediately be compelled to lay down their arms, and implore the king's mercy without our assistance, or that you had suspicions the forces here might become necessary for the defence of the Province, and that your Lordship might not wish I should have the power, least, with an indiscret ardour, I should push on so as not to be able to return, as might become necessary, for the defence of Canada.

At times I flattered myself our progress had outstript all your hopes, that you judged the aids I had demanded for a marine, could not possibly be employed in '76, and that before '77 all must be over.

These doubts might have been removed by your Lordship's letter, No. 5, wherein you tell me you hope soon to hear I have driven the rebels across the lakes, and taken possession of those posts upon the frontiers which may effectually secure this Province from any future insult ; but the order for detaching that part of the force which might be spared from the immediate defence of this Province, to carry on such operations as should be most conducive to the success of the army acting on the side of New York, the officer commanding to correspond with, and put himself under the orders of General Howe, this would have embarrassed me exceedingly.

Your Lordship's letter was dated 22nd of August ; I might have received it early in November.

To set out upon such operations, in that season of the year, and in this climate, under the circumstances that then existed, that detached corps, my Lord, must have perished by hunger or cold, or been cut off by the insurgents, before it could have joined General Howe's army ; I say this, fully persuaded they would have done everything that ought to be expected from good troops, led by an able officer.

A little reflection on the nature of this climate, will, I hope, convince your Lordship. Troops cannot encamp in that advanced season, without perishing from cold alone ;—the inhabited country at a great distance ;—and should the

troops when there, avail themselves of the thinly scattered houses, for protection from the weather, they must have been dispersed, so that not one quarter only, but all might have been cut off, before they could have reassembled for their mutual defence.

Your Lordship perceives I here make no difficulties, even in that country, about transporting of baggage, military stores, provisions and such matters, as are not attended to by persons little used to the movements of armies, the objects of great importance with officers of service; nor do I suppose an enemy in their way till they arrive in the rebel country, but if an enemy had been found strongly posted, as at Ticonderoga, this with the frost must have multiplied the difficulties, so that I regard it as a particular blessing, that your Lordship's despatch did not arrive in due time.

Your letter of the 26th March recapitulates these orders, and imputes to my repassing Lake Champlain, that the rebels were enabled, with some degree of success, to break into the winter quarters of Sir William Howe's army.

If your Lordship means the affair of Trenton, a little military reasoning might prove the rebels required no reinforcement, from any part, to cut off that corps, if unconnected and alone; the force they employed on that occasion clearly demonstrated this. Without my troubling your Lordship with any reasoning upon the matter, a little attention to the strength of General Howe's army will, I hope, convince you that, connected and in a situation to support each other, they might have defended themselves, tho' all the rebels from Ticonderoga had reinforced Mr. Washington's army.

After this severe charge, your Lordship proceeds to tell me, that on these accounts, and in order to quell the rebellion speedily, Lieutenant-General Burgoyne is to have the command of almost this whole army, to attack Ticonderoga, which you consider as one of those posts necessary to possess upon the frontier, in order to secure this Province from future insults; and I am ordered to remain behind at a time your Lordship must know all business of legislation is over till January, and where there is a Lieutenant-Governor, whose experience, abilities, and attachment to the King's service entitle him to no small confidence.

All this is stated in such a manner and so strongly pointed at me by your Lordship, that I shall add a little to convince you, from a parallel instance, more was done last year, on this side, than you had reason to expect, as I already have, I hope, that more was done, than I had reason to imagine, till very lately, your Lordship really wished.

Permit me to remind your Lordship of the campaign fifty-nine when General Wolfe was sent with a small army to reduce Quebec. You cannot be a stranger to the difficulties he had to contend with; a considerable body of regular Troops to oppose him, many Indians, a multitude of excellent and obedient Militia, the whole commanded by an officer of reputation; add to all this a climate so severe that unless the place was taken before the cold weather set in, the whole armament must retire, and all begin anew the following campaign.

General Amherst could not but know all this, and your Lordship must allow, seldom are stronger motives to induce a co-operating General to exert his utmost endeavours, than General Amherst had upon that occasion to urge him to make

every effort, in order to draw off part of those great numbers which opposed Mr. Wolfe, and no doubt he did everything in his power.

General Amherst had a very superior army, his situation furnished him with as many artificers, labourers, and materials for building a marine on Lake Champlain as he could wish, with every other assistance that the hearty concurrence of all the English colonies could supply.

He was at liberty to arrange his own Plan, and make his own preparations ; amidst all those advantages, from the preceding autumn, to say nothing of those already prepared by his predecessor, General Amherst was free to begin his march, as early in the spring as he thought proper ;—met with no enemy to impede his progress, and tho' his arrival on the Canada side in due time, might have been of the most essential use to Mr. Wolfe's army, and the King's service, yet Mr. Amherst did not pass this same Lake Champlain, that critical campaign, tho' the French had but a small Marine Force upon the Lake, and a small Land Force at the Isle-aux-Noix ; notwithstanding which, General Amherst received no censure from the then Minister, who was not, I believe, over indulgent to officers who neglected opportunities to exert themselves for the king's service ; nor was an opinion encouraged, that the misfortunes, which happened in this neighbourhood the following spring, were occasioned by General Amherst, because he retired into quarters in November, in place of continuing his operations during the winter ; and your Lordship should know such measures are less impracticable on this side the Lake than on the other.

But I, pent up in this town till May, in a Province, mostly disaffected, and overrun by rebels ;—when troops arrived a numerous enemy to expel, who, in their retreat burned and destroyed all that might be of use ;—arrived at the end of those navigable waters, not a boat, not a stick to employ ; neither materials nor workmen, stores nor covering ; trees and axmen, all must be sought for amidst confusion, and the distracted state of an exhausted Province.

In spite of every obstruction a greater marine force was built and equipt ; a greater marine force was defeated than had ever appeared on that Lake before ; two Brigades were taken across, and remained at Crown Point till the 2nd of November, for the sole purpose of drawing off the attention of the Rebels from Mr. Howe, and to facilitate his victories the remainder of the campaign. Nature had then put an end to ours. His winter quarters, I confess, I never thought of covering ; it was supposed, 'tis true, that was the army favoured by your Lordship, and in which you put your trust, yet I never could imagine, while an army to the southward found it necessary to finish their campaign, and to go into winter quarters, your Lordship could possibly expect Troops so far North should continue their operations, least Mr. Howe should be disturbed during the winter ; if that great army, near the sea coast, had their quarters insulted, what could your Lordship expect would be the fate of a small corps, detached into the heart of the rebel country in that season. For these things I am so severely censured by your Lordship, and this is the first reason assigned why the command of the Troops is taken from me, and given to Lieutenant General Burgoyne, to attack those Posts upon the Frontier, essentially necessary for the security of this Province.

He shall have every assistance in my power, and my most ardent wishes for the prosperity of the King's Arms ; 'tis in no man's power to slacken this ; the Troops

and Armament, destined for his expedition, had immediate orders to receive and follow his directions, that he may combine their movements as he thinks proper ; the same, so far as concerns Lt. Col. St. Leger's Expedition, the Hanau Chasseurs excepted ; I have no such corps in this army, nor any information concerning it in your despatch, but it is set down as part of the corps I am to put under his command. At first I thought it might be a mistake, and that the Brunswick Chasseurs were meant. Lt. General Burgoyne says not ; that these are to go with him, and that he thinks the Hanau Chasseurs are on their way hither.

All the Indians in the neighbourhood of Niagara and Lake Ontario have orders to join Lt. Col. St. Leger ; those in the lower part of the Province, and those ordered last year from Michillimakinac are to attend Lt. General Burgoyne. Three hundred Canadian Militia are also to make the campaign, to be disposed of by Lieutenant General Burgoyne,—the same I had ordered, while I flattered myself I should have the conduct of the war on the frontiers of this Province, which Canadians, with those necessary for scouring the woods towards the New England Provinces, and a great number which must be employed for the forwarding all things for those two Expeditions, is, I think, in the first dawning of good order and obedience, as much as ought, in prudence, to be demanded from this unfortunate Province, more worthy of compassion than blame.

The marine has been greatly improved and augmented, which the impatience of last year's service would not permit. Those on Lake Champlain have been put under Lieutenant General Burgoyne's command, and the greater part of those on Lake Ontario will attend Lt. Col. St. Leger.

Your Lordship's letter No. 14 contains orders for Captain Hamilton, Lt. Gov'r. of Detroit, in consequence of his correspondence directly with your office ; these have likewise been forwarded.

Herewith is enclosed an account of all the intelligence worthy your notice. I am only to observe thereon, that the best accounts are mixed with lies, and this frequently from deceit, as well as ignorance.

I am, with all due respect,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient and most humble serv't.,

GUY CARLETON.

LORD GEORGE GERMAIN.

CHAPTER IV.

As it appears to me that it will be difficult to follow the events which happened at this date in Canada; without some knowledge of the contemporary occurrences of the American revolutionary war, I deem it my duty to relate the progress of that deplorable contest, to the extent that it will throw light on Canadian history. In so doing, I purpose to limit myself, so far as is expedient, to the record of the principal events, in as brief a form as I can intelligibly present them.

I have described, in a previous volume, the occupation of Boston in 1775 by a British force, where the garrison was subjected to much petty suffering and even privation. Howe had succeeded Gage in the command. The change, however, had done little to better the condition of the troops. The failure of the fleet, although of sufficient strength to clear the sea of privateers, had made provisions very scarce, so that to obtain fresh meat and vegetables had become almost impossible. The town was blockaded by land, and neither food nor fuel could be purchased in the neighbourhood. Owing to the deficiency of the latter, it had become necessary to pull down wooden houses to supply it. The surrounding population was generally inimical; those, who were not so, had either sought refuge in Boston, or were forced by terrorism into inactivity. Siege operations had been commenced by Washington's batteries having been opened on the eastern and southern approaches, and for fourteen days the bombardment had been continued. It was at this period the order came from England to withdraw from the city: an abandonment avowedly dictated by the design of taking possession of New York, which, from its more southerly position, was looked upon as offering a better base for the operations of 1776. Had the resolution been formed to con-

tinue in possession, the duty would have been entailed of destroying the works, that threatened the city. The British general failed to make any effort to better his situation, or he may have heard indirectly of the proposed abandonment of the place, and so have regarded as inadvisable all endeavour to change his condition. Howe, with his force, consisting of 7,600 men, left Boston on the 17th of March, 1776.

On the departure of the troops, about 2,000 of the loyal population accompanied them. Howe left behind him 250 guns, half of which were serviceable, four 13-inch mortars, 2,500 chaldrons of coal, 25,000 bushels of wheat, 2,300 bushels of barley, 600 bushels of oats, 100 jars of oil, and 150 horses. Great care had been taken to leave the place in good condition and in perfect cleanliness. There was also a quantity of bedding and clothing, of the greatest use to Washington's force. If Howe could not place them on his vessels, he ought never to have left them behind. We may well ask to-day why he was not able to carry them away.*

* The extraordinary fatuity displayed in the abandonment of Boston, whether the fault of Howe or the admiral, remains a monument of disgraceful neglect. I copy the account given by Stedman I., p. 168: "Though at the time when Boston was evacuated it was understood that the squadron with reinforcements was at sea, no care was taken to have a sufficient force off the harbour to prevent them from running into the throat of the enemy. In consequence of which neglect, lieutenant colonel Archibald Campbell, with seven hundred men, ran right into Boston harbour, not knowing but that place was still in our hands. He was treated in a cruel and savage manner." There is a letter from Campbell to Howe, dated Concord Gaol, 14th February, 1777. He relates that in eight days he was stripped of half his property and the very necessities of life, and that he had been informed that the side arms of his officers, though they had been restored to them, had been "disposed of." Campbell was sent on parole to Reading, and under pretence that Howe had refused to exchange general Lee, then a prisoner, for six field officers of whom Campbell was one named, on the 1st of February he was committed to Concord gaol.

I will follow Campbell's description of the treatment he received.

"I am lodged in a dungeon of twelve or thirteen feet square, whose sides are black with the grease and litter of successive criminals; two doors, with double locks and bolts, shut me up from the yard with an express prohibition to enter it, either for my health or the necessary calls of nature. Two small windows strongly grated with iron introduce a gloomy light into the apartment, and these are at this time without a single pane of glass although the season of frost and

The first events in the campaign of 1776 happened in the south. An attempt was made by the royalists to obtain possession of Wilmington. The design was to effect a junction with a force to be landed from the king's ships, but neither ships nor troops appeared, and the attempt ended disastrously for those engaged in it.

Later, on the 12th of February, the expedition, under the command of Cornwallis, came off the coast under the convoy of admiral Parker. It consisted of six regiments: the 15th, 28th, 33rd, 37th, 44th and 57th, likewise some companies of the 46th. As on many similar occasions in the performance of public duty in those unhappy times, the fleet had been late in leaving Ireland; consequently, it failed to appear when its presence would have worked the effect looked for. Clinton shortly after arrived, and took the chief command. A landing was made at cape Fear, and the town of Brunswick was taken in possession. The inhabitants for the most part had left their houses, so, after obtaining some fresh provisions, the detachment returned to the ships.

The instructions given to Clinton were, that he should test the extent to which the loyalists, reported to be numerous, would take up arms, and, if he felt that circumstances warranted his so acting, he should leave a force to co-operate

snow is actually in the extreme. In the corner of the cell boxed up with the partition stands a necessary house which does not seem to have been emptied since its first appropriation to this convenience of malefactors. A loathsome black hole decorated with a pair of fixed chains is granted me for my inner apartment, from whence a felon was but the moment before removed to make way for your humble servant, and in which his litter and excrement remain to this moment. The attendance of a single servant is also denied me, and every visit from a friend positively refused. In short, sir, was a fire to happen in any chamber of the goal, which is all of wood, the chimney stacks excepted, I might perish in the flames before the gaoler could go through the ceremony of unbolting the doors, although, to do him justice in his station, I really think him a man of humanity, his house is so remote that any call from within, especially if the wind is high, might be long of reaching him effectually."

Many store-ships also entered the harbour to be captured. The "Hope" proved a valuable prize. She had on board 1500 barrels of powder, with carbines, bayonets, travelling carriages for heavy cannon, and a supply of intrenching tools.

with them. With that reckless, minute interference with detail which characterized Germain's instructions during the war, Clinton had received positive orders to proceed to New York to join Howe. They were given regardless of the consequences which might result from Clinton's presence, and have called for further action on his part. Under these restrictions, Clinton's operations were somewhat fettered; considering, however, that he had sufficient time at his disposal before proceeding northward, he determined to make an attack on Charleston harbour. His object was to stop the trade of the city being continued by sea. This commerce was directed to increase the resources of congress, and any interference with it would have been seriously felt. Moreover, success in the attempt would have established an important position in these waters, as the basis of any future operations. The first object of attack was fort Sullivan, at the entrance of the harbour.

Although the additions to his force looked for by Clinton were still expected, he resolved upon making the attempt before their arrival. He was, however, joined at cape Clear by the ships and transports which had been delayed, and with them sailed towards Charleston. He arrived before the fort on the 4th of June. Lee, with a force, was encamped on the main land northward of Sullivan's island, having communication with it by a bridge of boats. Carleton landed his troops at the spot known as Long island, on which he threw up batteries to cover the landing of the troops. The operations commenced on the 28th of June. During the attack three of the frigates ran aground on the shoals. The "Actæon" was stuck so firmly that she could not be got off in spite of every effort. She was therefore abandoned and burned, to save her falling into the hands of the congress forces. The vessels suffered severely from the fire. The fort was gallantly defended by Moultrie; he entirely succeeded in beating off the ships in the attempt to take up a position by which the ramparts could be enfiladed. Clinton had been given to understand that Long island was only divided from Sulli-

van's island by a shallow channel, fordable at low water, being separated from the main shore by navigable waters. On examination the channel proved to be seven feet in depth. There was, therefore, no possibility of any co-operation by the land force unless by boats, and they only admitted of landing 700 men. Clinton, nevertheless, expressed his readiness to the admiral to make a diversion in favour of the ships, if the troops could be protected in landing. The admiral, Sir Peter Parker, declined this co-operation, believing that the ships were sufficient for the attack. The fort was built of palmetto, a soft, porous wood, easily penetrated by the cannon balls, which sank within the timber work without destroying the structure.

The failure of this attempt gave great confidence to all who advocated the cause of congress, and, coming so soon after the abandonment of Boston, promised the colonies an early and fortunate termination of the war. Consequently, it had great influence at this stage of the contest, in increasing the hostile feeling, and in justifying the armed attitude which was becoming week by week of greater importance. From a passage in the admiral's despatch, some attempt was made to throw censure on Clinton, as having failed to apprise himself of the condition of the fort, but it was proved that he had made full communication of the information he possessed ten days before the attack. The ships remained before Charleston until the 21st of July, when they left for New York.

Howe sailed from Halifax on the 11th of June and arrived at Sandy Hook on the 29th. His design was to occupy a position in the neighbourhood of New York. His force amounted to 6,000 men, with which he established himself on Staten island.

On the 12th of July he was joined by his brother, admiral lord Howe, and on the 17th of August by the transports bringing additional troops, among them the Hessian corps under von Heister. His total strength was 12,500 men, of whom 7,000 were British. One of the first steps taken, both by British and German officers, was to remove the gold and

silver lace from their uniforms, so as not to furnish a destructive mark to the congress riflemen.

Howe determined to take possession of Long island, and to drive the congress troops from the fortified post held by them on the Brooklyn Heights, before New York, as the first step in the operations of obtaining possession of that city. Their dislodgment was indispensable to his farther advance. A landing was effected between the 19th and 21st of August. The British divisions were under the command of Clinton, who had previously joined Howe, and of Cornwallis. The advance guard was under the command of von Donop, whose untimely death in the following year, near Philadelphia, under peculiar circumstances, I shall have to record. Several skirmishes took place between the 23rd and 26th, when the advance posts were attacked.

On the 27th, the action known as the battle of Long island was fought, when the congress troops were defeated with great loss. Howe reported their casualties at 3,000 killed and wounded, with 1,100 prisoners, including two generals, Sullivan and the self-styled lord Sterling. Howe's loss was : British killed, 5 officers, 56 rank and file ; wounded, 12 officers, 245 rank and file ; Hessians, 2 killed, 3 officers and 21 men wounded : making a total of 344. The British force on the field was 8,000 strong ; the congress troops numbered some 10,000. Had Howe pursued the advantage he had gained, he would have carried the redoubts, and probably have captured the entire congress army. His subsequent explanation was, that he felt confident the lines would fall into his possession, and accordingly determined to take them by regular approaches, and not risk the loss of men which could be avoided. Possibly he over-estimated the strength of his opponent ; it was really the first step in his career of incapacity. Howe neglected every opportunity offered to him. Indeed, his incompetence was the primary cause of the success, which, during the first years of the war, in spite of reverse and misfortune, was through Washington's determination and genius, obtained by the congress troops. It may be

said of Howe's command, that every advantage, gained by the discipline and courage of his army, was lost to the British, and turned to the advantage of his opponent.

The time allowed to Washington after his defeat enabled him to make preparations to evacuate his post, and on the 29th, under cover of a fog which fortunately for him arose, he carried over to New York his whole army, stores, provisions, and cannon, excepting the very heavy guns. Leaving a considerable force in New York, Washington, with his main body, established himself intrenched on Harlem Heights. The stores were sent to Morrisanna, across Harlem river, and here Washington placed his headquarters.

Lord Howe, the admiral, with his brother, the commander-in-chief, had been appointed commissioners to attempt the pacification of America, and the former had brought the commission which conferred authority to act. Its powers were limited, and were not adapted to meet the condition of feeling with which it had to contend. It declared, as a preliminary to peace, that every existing provincial association must be dissolved, power being conferred to receive submission where offered ; to grant pardon, and to entertain grievances, when submission had been made. There could be little hope of success in such a mission.

Lord Howe, considering that Sullivan might be of use in the approaching congress in obtaining some terms of reconciliation, especially after the reverse which had been experienced, released him on parole, making him the bearer of a communication that the two brothers were anxious to meet some leading men on the side of congress, as private persons, to discuss if there were any means of reconciling the quarrel. A reply was sent that, as representatives of the independent states of America, they could not depute any members to attend in their private capacity ; but that congress would send a committee to meet the British representatives, who could assign to the members sent such position as they saw fit.

Franklin, John Adams, and Edward Rutledge accordingly

proceeded to Staten Island at Amboy ferry. The meeting was held on the 15th of September. As might have been expected, the conference led to no result. The three delegates declined to enter into any negotiations, except as representing free and independent states, and argued that it was the policy of Great Britain so to acknowledge their national existence.

A proclamation was consequently issued by the Howes, in which redress was promised with regard to the instructions given to the governors, and the acts of parliament by which the colonists considered themselves unjustly treated. An appeal was made to the value of these promises, as offering a more assured future to the provinces by returning to their allegiance, than if they trusted to the pretensions of congress.

Hostilities, in the meantime, had not been suspended. On the 13th of September the British fleet ascended the east and north rivers, and a battery was erected near Hell gate. In this uncertainty where the attack would be made, a landing was effected, on the morning of the 15th, at a place then called Kipps' bay, three miles above the city. Clinton was in command of the expedition; Cornwallis, of the advance guard. No opposition was made, the congress troops deserting their post, so that by eleven o'clock the landing was effected. Donop was sent forward to feel the country, and a skirmish took place, in which seven officers and fifty men were taken prisoners. A second division of the British force was landed at Turtle bay.

Washington had by this time given orders for the evacuation of New York. Such of the inhabitants as had been strong supporters of congress, with what property they could carry with them followed the troops in their disorderly retreat. Two British brigades were sent to occupy the city. General Robertson was provisionally placed in command. The main body was formed across the island, facing Washington's force, the left at Bloomingdale, on the Hudson, and the right at Horens-hook. The congress troops occupied the

heights by King's bridge, and a second force was posted on the west side of the Hudson.

Putnam, who had been placed in command at New York, had difficulty in withdrawing ; he was unable to carry off his heavy artillery, and likewise left behind a large supply of provisions and stores. Had Howe shewed proper attention to his duties, Putnam could not have escaped. German writers distinctly state that it was owing to Howe's want of activity that Putnam succeeded in safely bringing his troops away. In place of attending to his duties as commanding general, he paid a visit to the house of a New York beauty, a Miss Murray, and discredibly dawdled away his time.

What enterprise was shewn was on the part of the congress leaders ; a feint was made on the British left wing by a small detachment, which retired, to draw after it the force it had engaged, within a wood where 3,000 troops were posted. Leslie, who was in command, fell into the trap, and had not reinforcements arrived, he would have had difficulty in extricating himself. The fight was well contested ; the congress troops left behind 300 dead and wounded. The British loss was 14 killed and 78 wounded, among the latter 7 officers.

It remains a matter of dispute, whether the fire which desolated New York on the night of the 20th-21st of September was accidental, or the deliberate work of men resolved on the destruction of the city, to prevent it becoming the winter quarters of the British troops. On one side, it is affirmed that it was the matter of accident, attributable to the long heat of summer ; that from the scarcity of rain the buildings, chiefly of wood, had become highly combustible ; and that the fire gained so great a power that it could not be subdued. One-third of the city was destroyed, including Trinity church, before it could be extinguished. On the other hand, it is said that a proposition had been made by the extreme New England party and the Philadelphians, after the action at Long island, to burn New York and retire up the river, leaving the British without shelter or the means

of obtaining supplies. The project was opposed by those belonging to the city, and caused serious altercation. On the night of the fire, it was discovered to break out simultaneously in many spots, and the evidence strongly suggests that it was a matter of design. Several persons were discovered engaged in setting fire to buildings. Such men as these were quickly despatched, or thrown into the flames.

A party of sympathizers placed themselves on the roof of Saint Paul's church and testified their approval of the act by shouts of satisfaction, when any prominent building collapsed, encouraging each other by their jests on the success of the enterprise. The garrison was turned out; and by disciplined unrelaxed effort to subdue the fire, the remaining portion of the city was preserved.*

One of Howe's first acts was to establish a journal in the interests of the British cause. It was the origin of the "Royal American Gazette."

Howe having at length decided to advance against Washington, the British vessels ascended Long island sound to the town of West Chester and Frog's Neck point, afterwards to Pitt's Neck. Some opposition was made to the landing, but the congress troops shortly retired. This movement to the mainland led Washington to withdraw to White Plains, where the army was posted in four divisions, under Lee, Heath, Lincoln and Sullivan.

Towards the end of October, reinforcements reached the British force, including the 10th Light Dragoons, and a large force of Hessians under general Knyphausen.

On the 23rd of October Howe made a reconnaissance in force, and a sharp skirmish followed, owing to captain Ewald pushing forward his company of Jägers far in advance of the main body. He came upon a force greatly outnumbering his

* The fire has been attributed to the extreme New England party, committed to independence. Donop, in his journal, states that the active agent was one colonel Scott, who organized a party of forty desperadoes to carry out the project. Provided with the necessary means of combustion, they were distributed among the houses of the absent fugitive royalists. Scott was subsequently arrested, and his papers, which were seized, revealed the plan.

detachment, and but for the support furnished by a highland regiment would have been driven back.

On the 25th a further movement was made when the troops reached the small stream the Brunx, but the water was deep and the banks on the opposite side high, so the troops encamped on the east side. On the 26th, Howe manoeuvred in the hope of bringing Washington from his intrenchments: a skirmish took place in which the congress troops retreated, after some slight loss of men and prisoners. A heavy storm of rain prevented further advance. On the 27th, the British war ships ascended the Hudson, and cannonaded forts Washington and Lee, more with the design of attracting attention than of making any serious attack, Howe having resolved to assault the congress camp. It was situate on a rocky height; the river Brunx covered its right, on the left there was the protection of a small lake, separated from the position by swampy land. The height, Chatterton Hill, had been fortified.

On the morning of the 28th the attack on the position was made. It was held by a detachment 1600 strong under McDougall. Chatterton Hill was stormed, the burden of the assault fell on the Hessian troops, who lost 286 killed and wounded. The loss of the congress troops was 250, with some prisoners. In spite of this success, Washington so fortified his position that Howe hesitated to renew the attack. He, however, determined to make the assault on the 31st, but a heavy storm coming on towards night, caused him to defer it. Washington being resolved not to risk the further loss of men, on the night of the 1st of November abandoned his camp, and established himself two miles to the rear at North Castle, on some high ground capable of being thoroughly fortified. As his force retired, they burned the village of White plains, the inhabitants of which were mostly royalists.

Howe did not follow Washington to his new position, but directed his operations against fort Washington on Harlem Heights, in order to obtain entire possession of New York island. The attack was made on the 16th of November. The fort, under the command of colonel Magan, was stormed

with great gallantry ; it surrendered with 2,870 men, the provisions, stores and artillery. The loss of the defenders numbered 53 killed, and 15 wounded of all ranks. The casualties of the British amounted to 589 of all ranks, the killed being, British 20, Hessians 53 ; wounded, British 103, Hessians 413. The Hessians suffered severely in storming the defences, which were protected by strong *abatis*. Their leader was colonel Rall, who in a few weeks was to encounter the disaster at Trenton and there meet his death.

It was now resolved to attack fort Lee on the Jersey shore. On the night of the 20th of November a force under the command of lord Cornwallis crossed the Hudson. The landing was a matter of some labour and hardship, but it was rapidly and safely accomplished. During the night the fort was evacuated. German writers state that captain Ewald, sent forward with his Jägers, discovered the retreating columns as they were leaving the fort, and announced the fact to Cornwallis. Had the detachment been attacked it is possible that the whole would have been destroyed, but Cornwallis would not depart from his orders, and remained stationary. It was only on the following afternoon that he advanced against the fort, to find that it had been abandoned. The guns, tents, stores and ammunition, which were considerable, fell into the possession of the British.

Washington, feeling the danger of his position, which, from the strength of Howe's force, he was unable to hold, resolved to cross the Hudson to the Jersey shore. From the presence of the ships of war he was forced to ascend to King's ferry, at the entrance to the Highlands, some forty miles from New York. Marching through New Jersey, he reached Trenton, whence, on the 2nd of December, he safely crossed the Delaware with his stores and baggage, and entered Philadelphia.

Cornwallis followed up the success of fort Lee by advancing to Elizabethtown, New Jersey, where he arrived on the 2nd of December. He found all the bridges broken ; but the troops waded through the streams in spite of the cold of the season. On the 8th of December Howe arrived at Trenton,

to find that all the vessels had been removed from the Delaware, and that there was no means of passing the river.

During the march, when opportunity offered, detached parties had been attacked by Lee. He had followed a route, through New Jersey, some twenty miles to the west of Howe's column. On one occasion he had taken up his quarters at a house some three miles from his main body. The fact having been made known by some loyalists, a strong party of cavalry was sent to surround the house, and Lee was made prisoner.

Stedman gives the detail of Howe's dilatoriness in his movement across New Jersey, which destroys every shred of his military reputation.* On the 24th of November Cornwallis commenced his march; having passed through New-bridge, Hakensack, Newark and Elizabethtown, he arrived at Brunswick, where the Raritan, at certain periods of the tide, is fordable. Nevertheless, Cornwallis remained inactive at this spot for a week; the congress troops, in no greater force than 3,000, with their heavy cannon and baggage, being at Trenton, 29 miles, and at Princetown, 17 miles distant. On the 7th of December Cornwallis left Brunswick at four in the morning, and arrived at Princetown at four in the afternoon, an hour after Washington had marched out. At Princetown Cornwallis remained seventeen hours, and on the 8th, only marched at nine o'clock, to arrive at Trenton at four o'clock, when he saw the last boat bearing Washington's army crossing the river. These movements, if they had been calculated to allow Washington to escape, could not have been more nicely timed.†

* [Vol. I., p. 219.]

† It is scarcely possible to find in history a more outrageous neglect of an opportunity on the part of a British general. As if in irony of Howe's movements, at the Mischianza, the farewell absurdity presented to him at Philadelphia, on his departure, one of the emblems was an arch on which the figure of fame stood, with the words, "I bone quo virtus tua te vocet: *I pede fausto*." *

* "Go, thou good man, where thy excellence may direct thee: go with thy foot of happy omen."

Howe was now in possession of New Jersey, at the Delaware, without means of passing to the opposite bank. He contented himself with leaving detachments, which as he believed would hold the country unassailed, and with Cornwallis returned to New York. He placed garrisons at Trenton and Bordentown, sustaining them by strong detachments at Princetown, Brunswick and Elizabethtown. The disposition made by Howe of his troops gave ground for the belief that he considered his possession of New Jersey assured against all attempt at its disturbance.

Indeed, at this time, the cause of congress was desperate. Had Howe possessed judgment and capacity, the quarrel might have been adjusted. The proceedings taken by him suggest that he firmly believed that there was neither strength, resources, nor inclination on the part of congress to continue hostilities; that the worst had passed; that hereafter he would be unopposed; that the adjustment of the quarrel must be referred to diplomacy; that the supremacy of his arms was unimpregnable. The wrongfulness of this self-deception was soon made manifest in the loss and discredit which followed.

By virtue of the commission held by the admiral and himself, they published a proclamation calling upon all in arms opposing the government to disband, requiring all political organizations to cease the exercise of the powers they had assumed, and allowing sixty days for the period within which submission should be made. The consequence was that many did come forward and take the oaths, and congress, on its adjournment on December the 12th, agreed that the next meeting should be held at Baltimore.

In place of following up the success he had obtained in the possession of New Jersey, and completing it by an expedition by water, ascending the Delaware and occupying Philadelphia, Howe organized an expedition against Rhode island, under the command of admiral Parker, Clinton being at the head of the land force. The expedition was secretly prepared in the East river. On the 27th of November the

expedition started, admiral Parker in the van, commodore Hotham bringing up the rear. The fleet steered eastward by the sound, experiencing on the 5th of December a terrible storm. On the 7th they lay before Newport. No ships were in the harbour; on all sides the red flag waved defiantly to suggest a determined resistance.

The troops were landed on the 8th; no defence was attempted. The ships and privateers which lay before the place, with the garrison, ascended Narragansett sound to Providence, where they were blockaded. It is said, on the authority of German writers, that the retiring congress troops desired to burn Newport when evacuating it, but the inhabitants prevented this destruction. The place was entirely built of wood, and could easily have been destroyed by fire. Lord Percy for some time held the command, but on his leaving for England in April, he was replaced by general Prescott.

When the expedition was under consideration, Clinton earnestly pressed that it should be directed against the Delaware. Had this advice been followed, a whole series of disasters would have been averted. There is little doubt that Philadelphia would have fallen. But Howe persevered in his view of possessing Newport, from the necessity, as he said, of securing the port for the British fleet. It was a great error in a military point of view, for, with the possession of New York, the Hudson, the East river and the Delaware, Rhode island would in the spring have fallen to the British with little effort. The successful ascent of the Delaware, even the attempt, would have prevented those expeditions on the part of Washington, which were the key to his possession of New Jersey within a few weeks of its abandonment, and his remarkable subsequent successes in the face of adverse fortune.

While to this date the cause of the loyalists had been weakened by no reverse, and the feeling was daily gaining ground with moderate men, that the pretensions of congress would, after causing great tribulation, end in ruin; that it

would be wise to accept the offers of the mother country for peace, guarantees for the future being assured, and the past forgotten, one of those events took place, in themselves of no great importance, but which exercise an influence scarcely possible to estimate. I allude to the surprise and defeat of the Hessians at Trenton on the early morning of the 26th of December ; a reverse attributable to Howe having placed the wrong man in a position of responsibility, and to the neglect on his part of all caution and discipline.

Cornwallis had hitherto been in command in New Jersey, with his head-quarters at Brunswick. Having obtained leave of absence to return home, the command of the troops fell upon general Grant. The latter was the member of parliament who had declared in the house of commons, that with ten thousand troops he would march through the British colonies. The disaster, to a certain degree, may be attributed to him. Had he ordered the detachments to intrench themselves, and to be vigilant against surprise, it may be safely said, that Washington's attempt at Trenton would never have been made. Grant's name has before appeared in this history.* It was he who, in 1758, turned the reconnaissance of fort Duquesne into an attack, in which he was defeated with serious loss, having shewn, on the occasion, personal courage, with its too frequent accompaniment in these days of painful memory, the absence of all judgment and military capacity.†

* Ante, Vol. IV., p. 201.

† The identity of Grant is established in one of Lee's letters to Burgoyne during the extraordinary correspondence which took place between them. The following passage occurs [de Fonblanque, p. 165.] "As to the idea that the Americans are deficient in courage, it is too ridiculous and glaringly false to deserve a serious refutation. I never could conceive upon what this notice was founded. I served several campaigns in America last war, and cannot recollect a single instance of ill-behaviour in the provincials, where the regulars acquitted themselves well. Indeed, we well remember some instances of the reverse, particularly where the great Colonel Grant (he who lately pledged himself for the general cowardice of America) ran away with a large body of his own regiment, and was saved from destruction by the valour of a few Virginians. Such preposterous arguments are only proper for the Rigbys and Sandwich's from whose mouths truth never issued, and to whose breasts truth and decency are utter strangers." Rigby had made an equally absurd speech in the house of commons.

Grant stationed the Guards at Brunswick ; Leslie was in command at Princetown ; Rall, with some Hessian regiments, occupied Trenton. Rall had greatly distinguished himself in the taking of fort Washington ; and in the previous action on White Plains, his brigade had been in the van, and he at the head. Howe, as an acknowledgment of his gallantry, had promised his regiment the best winter quarters. Rall had applied to be placed at this post with the hope of ultimately reaching Philadelphia.

While great depression prevailed with those in arms against the mother country, and there was a widely entertained feeling that their cause was lost, the success of the British had led to a sense of security, based on the belief that in a few months the contest would be terminated ; accompanied by the feeling that there was no danger from the troops opposed to them, who from their late defeat were incapable of resistance, and in the field little to be dreaded. Howe had not the judgment to comprehend that the crisis called for the strictest discipline, or if the thought crossed his mind, he neglected to profit by it. He preferred the agreeable society of New York, and left matters to his lieutenants, who, with the exception of Clinton, for the most part looked upon events as he did. On all sides there was the feeling that if the congress troops were let alone, they were without the enterprise to attack the British lines.

Trenton, on the banks of the Delaware, was on the road then travelled from Philadelphia to New York, at that date a straggling place of about 150 houses ; it was 12 miles from Princetown, where there was also a strong force, and about thirty miles from Philadelphia ; a small stream, the Assanpink, ran through the place, forming approximately its centre. To the south, a road passing over a bridge led to Bordentown, occupied by Donop. All the precautions taken by Rall had been to send out nightly a small picket from the main guard, and also a patrol, which marched northwards. The troops, divided by the stream running through the town, were quartered in the houses. Rall established no communication with the other detachments separated from him at Prince-

town and Bordentown, and shewed the greatest indifference as to his own position. A general looseness of discipline crept through the force. Major von Dechow, one of his officers, proposed the construction of intrenchments. Rall treated the proposition with contempt, as if even the supposition of any attack was ridiculous. Suggestions were made to take steps to cover the exposed flanks, but Rall in reply made reckless, fatuous remarks, so coarse that they are not recorded.

Washington, informed of this absence of caution and foresight, and having the means of crossing the Delaware, detached small bodies capable of rapid movement to harass continually any weak detachments or small parties when foraging or seeking supplies, or on any special duty. As a proof of Rall's unfitness for command and want of good sense, having sent a despatch to Leslie at Princetown by two mounted orderlies, who were attacked in passing through a wood, one being shot, he ordered out a party of 100 men in the worst weather, whose sole duty was to deliver his letter and return as quickly as possible. The consequence was that many succumbed. Donop, from Bordentown, called upon Rall to intrench himself, and sent an engineer officer to carry out the work. Rall replied that he only hoped the attempt would be made with Washington at its head, so that he could make him a prisoner.

The insufficient means taken by Rall for the protection of the detachment led the staff officers present to address von Heister, the Hessian general in command at New York, calling his attention to their situation. Their letter, however, was sent too late to be acted upon. Grant equally neglected his duty; clearly he ought to have visited the posts, and have seen that discipline was preserved and precautions taken for safety. It is recorded that when Rall recommended to Grant that a small detachment should be stationed at Maidenhead, between Trenton and Princetown, he refused to entertain the request, with the remark "that

he would keep in order the Jerseys with a corporal's guard."* Grant, however, did give the order that twice or thrice a week Leslie should send a strong patrol to Trenton, and Rall to Princetown. On the 24th, Leslie's first patrol reached Trenton with the message to Rall to be on his guard, that Washington was organizing his force for some movement, and that one or both might be attacked. Rall was also informed by deserters that Washington had issued four days' provisions, and he received special notification from an inhabitant of the place that he was in danger. Rall, in reply, made the senseless remark, "Let them come."

To make his attack more secure, Washington, to draw off Donop from Bordentown, despatched a force of militia to Mount Holly. Their orders were to manœuvre as if intending to attack, and, when necessary, to retire. Donop, hearing of their presence, marched against this insignificant force with his whole strength, a distance of 12 miles. The militia dispersed, not waiting to be attacked. Donop, however, instead of returning to his post, remained two days at Burlington, to the south, as if expecting again to be assailed from the same direction.

Christmas day at length came, when the Hessians were fated to receive a fearful Christmas gift.† The day had been blustering, and the night was dark and stormy. In the afternoon the pickets had been attacked; a skirmish followed, when six men were wounded. The troops were turned out, and the assault repelled without difficulty. A small party was sent to observe the retreating force, but, after proceeding

* This statement is made on the authority of Von Eelking ["Die deutschen Hülfsstruppen," I., p. 116]: "Der britische General Grant scheint sich einer gleichen Sorglosigkeit wie Rall hingegeben zu haben. Als Letzterer nämlich an Jenen schrieb: zur bessern Verbindung ein Detachement nach Maidenhead, zwischen Trenton und Princetown zu geben, ertheilte er ihm in nicht sehr zarter Weise eine abschlägliche Antwort und sprach ebenfalls sehr verächtlich von den Amerikanern. Er soll unter Anderem spöttisch gesagt haben; 'Wozu? Ich will jetzt mit einer Corporalschaft die Jerseys im Zaume halten!'"

† "Den Hessen wurde in dieser [Christnacht] eine furchtbare Bescheerung zubereitet."

two miles was ordered to return. Rall looked upon the affair as the attack, against which Leslie had warned him. As his assailants had been beaten back, he thought all was over, and prepared with unrepressed gaiety to observe the day so venerated in his fatherland. Rall lived with a Hollander, one van Dassel, the proprietor of a large tannery. There are writers who speak of this man as a supporter of congress, and say that he pretended friendship to Rall and encouraged him to revel and indulge. He was giving a supper on this occasion to Rall and many of the Hessian officers, and the revelry was prolonged to a late hour.

It is an old saying that no man was ever pulled down but by himself. Misfortune and miscalculation of circumstance may happen to the best of us, when, if such a reverse bring affliction, it is without disgrace. Rall's self-indulgent habits were the cause of the defeat of his detachment, and of his own death. He loved music and to linger convivially over the bottle; on this occasion he revelled to so late an hour that when awakened from sleep he was stupefied. Had he been himself, he would, at least, have made a gallant resistance, and it is not improbable that he might have fought his way through to Princetown, but the state in which he was likely to be found was one of the conditions of the problem of Washington's attack.

Washington's force consisted of 2,500 men, with generals Sullivan and Greene. The passage across the Delaware was a matter of difficulty, owing to the river being covered with floating ice; but it was safely effected.

The early dawn of the 26th broke with snow and rain drifting with violence. The pickets had returned with the report of nothing extraordinary; that there was no expectation of attack. The men had sought refuge from the storm in a house, when, by chance, the officer in command went out to the roadway. To his bewilderment the congress troops loomed up around him. The alarm was given, shots were fired, and the picket retired, discharging their muskets to warn the garrison of its danger. The troops were hastily

and irregularly collected. There was no superior officer to give orders, for Rall, on the first commotion, could not be awakened, and the assembly was made in great disorder. The congress troops continued to press onward to surround the Hessians. Finally Rall appeared mounted, and ordered his regiment forward.

His opponents had now penetrated into the place from the opposite side, and had taken possession of the houses and gardens, from which they rapidly fired. There was no opportunity of charging with the bayonet, for the attacking force protected themselves behind walls and trees. Their fire became stronger, as that of the Hessians, who, in their surprise, had failed to protect their weapons from the snow, became weaker. The guns were brought out and served, but the horses and men were killed or wounded. Rall himself received two wounds, and fell from his horse. Colonel Scheffer now took the command. An attempt was made to cut a way through to Maidenhead, but Scheffer found himself confronted by a strong force with artillery to play upon his advance. Depressed by Rall's death-wound, his men separated from the other wing of the force, their muskets wet with the snow and without ammunition, Scheffer saw no possibility of further successful resistance. He summoned the senior officers together, and they agreed with him that there was no hope of contending with the force in their front, and that, in order to save further bloodshed, the only course open to them was to surrender. Accordingly, they became prisoners of war.

The other portion of the force waded through the creek, which in some parts reached to their neck, and succeeded in gaining Princetown; several were drowned. The British cavalry and the Jägers thus made good their retreat, forcing their way through the resistance they met. The loss of the Hessians on this occasion was 17 killed and 78 wounded, total 95; 84 officers, 25 musicians and 759 rank and file surrendered as prisoners, total 868. The Jäger battalion, numbering 398, escaped. Rall died a few hours after the affair, in one sense a fortunate matter for him, for he would have been held to stern account.

The attack did not last two hours. The success of the enterprise necessarily raised the courage of the troops of congress, as it seriously depressed Howe. It was impossible for him not to feel the blunder he had committed in having entrusted these important advanced posts to the Hessian commanders, who knew no English, were quite ignorant of the manners of the people and were specially liable to be imposed upon. Moreover, the officer in command of such a post required to be conciliatory, and prove to the inhabitants among whom he was living, that on all occasions he was governed by a spirit of justice and moderation. From his ignorance of English, Rall could not so act, although not wanting in geniality and natural kindness. His habits were, moreover, against this line of conduct, for there is a *consensus* of opinion regarding his habitual intemperance. Among the many records of Howe's incapacity, none can have greater weight than the disposition of his detachments on the Delaware.

There was no service rendered by Washington during the struggle of greater value to his cause, or more characteristic of his wisdom and judgment than the attack at Trenton. It was no fortuitous event, but the result of calm foresight and deep calculation. Washington knew the desperate condition of the colonists, that they were losing faith in the future and distrusting their leaders. The first requisite, consequently, was to raise their courage, establish a firm trust in their own power, and justify their faith in the conduct of the war by some distinguished act of success. His spies had brought him intelligence of the folly and recklessness of Rall. He saw the opportunity that was offered of re-establishing the self-confidence which was passing away. He carried out his purpose, which exacted great effort, and was attended by much danger, with resolution, judgment and military skill; and his success must deservedly take the very first place in the sorrowful chapters of these records.

CHAPTER V.

Although Washington had succeeded beyond his expectations, he felt he had not a moment to lose in re-crossing the Delaware. He dreaded the advance of Leslie from Princeton, and of Donop from Mount Holly, and therefore, without delay, returned to Philadelphia, carrying with him his prisoners. They were moved from place to place, much as a spectacle when passing through the country to re-awaken the depressed courage of the people. The effect of the appearance of these formidable Hessians, as prisoners, is represented as having worked a wonderful effect.

Howe's duty was immediately to have re-established his posts, to have intrenched the detached forces and to have placed a different general to Grant in command. If he was to preserve the Jerseys, he had to shew that British strength was capable of holding them. There was no difficulty in doing so. He had six times the number of Washington's force, highly disciplined, well provided; while Washington's soldiers were badly supplied in all respects, imperfectly disciplined, and with few officers of knowledge and experience.

Consequent upon Rall's defeat, Donop abandoned his post at Bordentown, and hurried to join Leslie at Princetown. Their united force was much superior to that of Washington, but, in place of re-establishing themselves on the Delaware, the two posts indispensable to the British possession of the Jerseys were left unguarded, so that Washington, at the end of eight days, again crossed the river with 4,000 men, and took possession of Trenton.

Howe was much troubled at this proceeding, and made some effort to regain the territory he had for a few days possessed. Cornwallis, who was on the point of leaving for England, was replaced in command in New Jersey. He pro-

ceeded at once to take steps to drive Washington from his position. On the approach of the British forces Washington retired from Trenton, and occupied some high ground where he established himself, apparently with the design of awaiting the attack. A cannonade was exchanged. Washington, however, had no intention of running the hazard of a battle. At two in the morning of the 3rd of January, leaving his fires burning, and having advanced some small pickets as if to guard the river, he abandoned his camp, and taking a circuit through Allentown, he advanced towards Princetown to surprise the regiments left there by Cornwallis, the 17th, the 40th and 55th. Colonel Mawhood, who was in command, had received orders on the 3rd of January to march to Maidenhead, between Trenton and Princetown. At the break of day, Washington came up with Mawhood's column, which had just started. Owing to the foggy morning, it was first believed that it was a Hessian regiment. Mawhood was not long in learning the truth, but without knowing that the whole of Washington's force was upon him. Consequently, he commenced the attack, and with his artillery did some execution. But, numbers pressing upon him, his situation became critical. The 17th charged with the bayonet, and succeeded in reaching Maidenhead. The 40th and 55th, unable to follow, retreated to Brunswick, which they reached with the loss of half their number. The loss of the British in killed and wounded was very great, and that of the congress troops was also severe.

So soon as Cornwallis saw that Washington had abandoned his position, he marched for Princeton. Washington had already continued his advance towards Brunswick. The officer in command, Mathews, hearing of his approach, sent away the stores, and placed himself on a height to impede further progress. Cornwallis so pressed Washington in his rear, that the latter discontinued his operations and crossed the Raritan, taking possession of the country more to the north, opposite Staten island, where he could obtain supplies and keep up his connection with the Delaware. Cornwallis's

troops were so harassed and fatigued, that he was unable to pursue Washington, who leisurely retired, while Cornwallis contented himself with remaining at Brunswick. Of all the posts lately held by the British in New Jersey, Brunswick and Amboy were the only two places they retained.

This was the result of Howe's generalship. He had lost the Jerseys, when at the head of a numerous, well-appointed army; out-generalled by a force with little discipline, so small in comparison, that the result, if a matter of prophecy, would have been held to be impossible. Howe's career is an example of how much mischief can be effected through the folly of one man. For while Washington occupied Morristown, and for the whole winter harassed the British garrison, Howe continued in his quarters at New York, enjoying its social life, his troops in New Jersey passively submitting to repeated insults, and a continuance of attacks.

Matters had now turned so favourably for congress, that Washington issued a counter proclamation to neutralize that of Howe, absolving all who had been induced to take the oath of allegiance to the British on accepting the prescribed oath. The Jerseys had been for the most part loyal to Great Britain when Howe appeared, and the population had trusted to his promise of protection. But there had been much plundering and ill-treatment of the inhabitants during the occupation of the British, so as to cause a revulsion of feeling. On the first appearance of Howe's force, numbers had joined the royal army, and two brigades of provincials had been formed, who behaved well. The treatment, however, which the population received caused an entire change of sentiment, and led a great number to embrace the cause of congress, willingly furnish provisions to its force, and give intelligence whenever it could be of use.

On the other hand, all protection had ceased for the loyalists, who were remorselessly plundered and ill-treated by the congress troops. Several were thus unwillingly driven into the opposite ranks. Howe's occupation of the Jerseys and his subsequent abandonment of them, together present a

painful episode, and their narrative furnish an unanswerable condemnation of his conduct. Independently of his personal courage, Howe possessed no capacity for war, nor would he listen to those who could have wisely advised him ; his incapacity only added fuel to the fire, and advanced the cause he was present to combat. Moreover, there was an utter want of energy on his part. In April, however, Cornwallis shewed some enterprise in attacking Lincoln at Boundbrook. Lincoln, although surprised, managed to retreat, but with the loss of guns and men.

The early months of 1777 came and passed without any serious attempt on the part of Howe to recover the Jerseys which he had so weakly abandoned. He had received reinforcements and must have had under his orders upwards of 30,000 men, but he loitered away his time in New York, as if to shew the extent to which inactivity could be carried. Washington had not 8,000 men. He had remained during the winter unmolested at Morristown, and now advanced to Middlebrook within ten miles of Brunswick, then held by the British. About the middle of June, Howe appeared at Brunswick, as if he had determined to renew the contest for the province, and make his way to Philadelphia. His object was, if possible, to bring on an engagement. With this view, he evacuated Brunswick as if definitely leaving it, and marched for Amboy, followed by Washington to Quibbleton. Howe suddenly reversed his march, and endeavoured to reach the high land, but Washington anticipated the attempt, and regained his strong position at Middlebrook. During these movements lord Cornwallis came upon Stirling's division, and routed it with the loss of men and artillery. This trifling success in no way affected the general result. Howe, with his superiority of force, was completely out-generalled, and could do nothing. He looked upon Washington's position as too strong to be attacked, and abandoning the project of assailing him, he resolved to remove his entire force from the Jerseys and approach Philadelphia in another direction.

The troops were withdrawn from Brunswick and Amboy. As these were the only places held by Howe, the Jerseys ceased to be under British rule. Judged by subsequent events, from a military point of view, the movement was not to be justified. Regarded from the moral influence which it exercised, it was an admission of failure in his attempt to hold the province, and was an abandonment of the loyal population who had accepted his cause. It exposed all who had shewn Howe favour, to persecution and tribulation, for they would, as a necessity, suffer from the now dominant party; and it taught a lesson of caution to those who favoured the cause of the mother country, not to embrace it without full consideration.

At this time the seizure of general Prescott took place at Rhode island; one of the many examples of the disregard of prudence characteristic of the British generals. He had established himself in a pleasantly situated house five miles from Newport, and a mile from the water side. Some sloops lay in the bay, while, about 200 yards from his house, there was a picket of 200 men. Such was the carelessness and the want of discipline on the part of the detachment, that forty volunteers successfully entered the house, seized Prescott when in bed, gagged him, and without allowing him time to dress himself, forced him on board their boat, and successfully carried him away a prisoner. Prescott was the same general who had surrendered the vessels at Lavaltrie in the Saint Lawrence.* It is seldom that an attempt attended with such difficulty and danger has been so successfully accomplished.

In the narrative of Burgoyne's campaign, it will be seen that he entered upon it with confident expectation that Howe simultaneously would force his way up the Hudson, and the two would meet above Albany. There is, therefore, the greater reason to follow Howe's movements in the commencement of 1777, for they were entirely at variance with the assistance on which Burgoyne confidently relied. Burgoyne acted on the plan traced by lord George Germain. Indeed,

* 19th November, 1775. Ante, Vol. V., p. 463.

his instructions went so far as to state that when the armies met, Burgoyne was to place himself under Howe's command.*

These orders were never sent.

Howe never knew that Burgoyne was acting in dependence on his assistance. His letters shew that he regarded Burgoyne's operations entirely apart from his own, and independent of them. In accordance with this view he proceeded to execute his own plans, totally regardless of Burgoyne's movements; indeed, as if no organization for the campaign from Canada was being made, and it was an expedition in no way calling for co-operation on his part.

Leaving Sir Henry Clinton, such was now his rank, in command of New York with 5,000 men, Howe assembled his force at Staten island. It consisted of 16,500 British and 4,500 Hessian troops; a limited number of the latter were mounted, and the staff officers were provided with horses. Washington's spies informed him of these preparations, but all attempt to discover their objective point failed. The expedition, in a large fleet of transports, left Staten island on the 23rd of July. Bearing in mind the theoretical relationship of Howe's army with Burgoyne's expedition, it may be remarked that Burgoyne, on this day, made his first advance from Skenesborough [Whitehall] towards the Hudson, the leading corps occupying fort Anne.† Six days later, the 29th, Burgoyne reached fort Edward, with the design of forming a junction with Howe at Albany.

While, with this view, Burgoyne was gathering his provisions for thirty days, Howe was sailing in the Atlantic ocean far to the south of the mouth of the river, which Burgoyne confidently believed he was ascending.

On the 15th of August, Howe entered Chesapeake bay, which he followed as far as the head of Elk, on the northern branch, where the force disembarked on the 26th. The troops were not in good health. The crowded condition of the transports, the bad food, and the stormy weather

* Germain 26th March, 1777. State of the Expedition, appendix ix.

† Rogers' Hadden, p. 90.

experienced, had worked their ill effect. On landing, there was a violent rainstorm for thirty-six hours, which spoiled a great quantity of the supplies, and being succeeded by intense heat, caused an epidemic of putrid fever. Howe here issued a proclamation promising pardon to all who would submit, and giving assurance of his protection and security.

Philadelphia, sixty miles distant, was his objective point. Dividing his small army into two columns, one led by himself, the second by von Knyphausen, he commenced his march.*

Washington had at this time concentrated his forces at Wilmington. On the first report of Howe's movements, he had assembled his force at Germantown for the defence of Philadelphia. The regiments he could bring together amounted to about fifteen thousand men, and on hearing of the landing of Howe, he turned southward to intercept him. As Howe went forward in his march he found most of the houses abandoned; it was, however, possible to obtain cattle and other supplies. Cornwallis was placed in command of the advance guard. On the 30th of September, near White Clay creek, the first skirmish took place. After a loss of forty men and some few prisoners, the congress troops retired. For a short period, owing to the superiority of numbers brought against them in the first attack, the Jägers had been placed in a trying position. The excellent conduct of the men of this regiment extricated them from their danger. The gallant stand made by them until reinforced was mentioned in general orders.

Washington retired behind the Brandywine, and took up a position with a determination to await the attack. The passage across the stream was protected by artillery. Howe accepted the battle. He formed his army in two divisions. Cornwallis, in command of one, was ordered to pass by the

* German writers relate that at the head of Elk several vessels laden with tobacco which had sought refuge here were found. The cargoes were taken in possession and divided, each man receiving his share. As von Eelking records "Jeder konnte jetzt seinen ächten Virginier gratis schmauchen." [I., p. 199.]

upper forks and take the congress troops in flank, while Knyphausen was in front to assail the right wing at Chaddsford, and turn its strength against himself. He was not to engage actively until Cornwallis' movement was known to have succeeded, and when that result had been obtained, he was to push forward with determination. Howe accompanied Cornwallis; in carrying out his orders, Knyphausen, in his advance towards the ford, found himself vigorously opposed by the strong force before him. He had, however, to refrain from any offensive movement, until he heard the fire of Cornwallis' division on his right.

The march of the latter was long, and a work of toil, and was not accomplished until four o'clock. Sullivan had been sent with three divisions to hold him in check, but Cornwallis' attack was irresistible. Sullivan's division was driven back in confusion.

Knyphausen on hearing, by the firing, that Cornwallis was engaged, immediately effected the passage of Chaddsford, and pressed forward in a well directed attack. But by this time, Wayne, who was opposed to him, hearing of the defeat of the left wing, and finding that he could not resist the force by which he was assailed, abandoned the field. Darkness came on. Howe remained on the ground of which he was possessed. The main body of the congress troops reached Chester, but many of the regiments continued their hurried march to Philadelphia. The remaining divisions reached the city the following day. The British loss is stated at 89 killed, 488 wounded and missing. The congress troops lost 300 killed, 600 wounded; 400 prisoners were taken.

The action at Brandywine furnished another instance of the extraordinary incompetence of Howe to profit by a victory. He remained during the 12th and 13th inactive on the ground. He took no steps to follow up his success. No energy was shewn by him to complete the 'destruction of the army he had defeated. A resolute pursuit would have inflicted irreparable injury on the retreating force. There was no encouraging display of unopposed power to awaken

those loyally inclined, or to depress the active enmity against restoration of amity with the mother country. Many of the latter, indeed, were so desperately committed, that their only safety lay in a continuance of the quarrel. Thus, they advocated the most active perseverance in hostilities, at the same time striving to excite hate by continual misrepresentation, as to the arbitrary designs of the home government. The crisis demanded the display of energy and judgment ; nevertheless, Howe did nothing. On the 13th, he sent a regiment to take possession of Wilmington. On the 14th, the prisoners were escorted there. On the 16th, some additional troops were ordered to that place, and on the same day the main body of the army moved forward : the fifth day after the action.

If Cornwallis' division was wearied by its long march, that of Knyphausen was perfectly fresh, and equal to any tax on its endurance. Knyphausen even proposed to Howe, that he should pursue the retreating troops, but Howe declined the proposal.

Washington, even with this reverse, did not abandon the hope of saving Philadelphia. He again crossed the Schuylkill, and made an attempt to turn the British left. The attack failed, and a violent storm burst forth, which impeded the movements on both sides. One of Washington's divisions under Wayne was, however, intercepted by general Grey before it could rejoin the main body, which had recrossed the Schuylkill. Wayne's force was entirely routed, with the loss of 300 men ; the British loss was but seven.

With slight opposition on his march, Howe's army reached Philadelphia, which he entered on the 26th of September, and the city became once more subject to British rule. It was to prove the last months of such occupation. It was another opportunity vouchsafed to Howe, if he had possessed the capacity to use it, to have gained advantages which might have terminated the contest. The future will show his failure to profit by it, and the extent to which the blight of his incapacity caused every chance of permanent success to wither and disappear.

Undaunted by his misfortune, Washington remained with the troops he had collected at his camp on the Schuylkill, fourteen miles from Germantown. It was at this spot, ten miles distant from Philadelphia, that Howe concentrated the greater part of his force. Four regiments only were quartered in the city, under the command of Cornwallis; the main body had likewise been weakened by detachments sent across the Delaware, and to the south to Chester, to bring up provisions.

Germantown consisted of a long straggling street. Howe's force was encamped across it in one line, without any protection. Howe had placed himself, undefended, in this exposed position, as if in a friendly country. He had been warned by the loyalists that an attack might be looked for, and Ewald had received information which led him to believe an attempt was designed. He reported the matter to Howe. With the fatuity which characterised Howe's conduct, he paid no attention to the warning.

Washington, through his spies, was informed of the unprotected state of Howe's camp, with its reduced strength, weakened by detachments despatched on special duty. He here saw the opportunity of redeeming the reverses of the last weeks, and of inflicting such losses on Howe as to make the continued occupation of Philadelphia impossible. He had learned to estimate correctly the defects of Howe's character when entrusted with the chief command, and he resolved on the desperate step, with his force depressed by previous defeat, of making one more attempt to retrieve his ill fortune. He determined to assail Howe in his exposed position at Germantown.

Washington's attack was made at four in the morning of the 4th of October. It was an entire surprise. The alarm was given to Howe's army by the firing upon the outposts of the right flank. The attack was beaten back. A thick mist hung over the ground, and owing to the dim light of the early dawn the strength of the assailing force was not known. A concentrated attack was now directed on the regiments of

the 2nd battalion, which covered the headquarters encamped on the line of street. They were sustained by the 40th. But from the mass of troops brought against them, they had to retire, when colonel Musgrave, with 150 men, threw himself into a stone house. The congress troops surrounded it, but failed to make an impression on its occupiers. The commandant sent a message calling for a surrender, but the bearer of the white flag was shot. Artillery was now brought against the house; nevertheless, the defenders gallantly held the ground until help came. It appeared with the column of colonel Grey. The half hour's struggle at this spot gave the British troops time to recover from their surprise, and their discipline enabled them to oppose the attack with determination. The congress troops had, in other quarters, pushed forward, and for a short time a hard fight ensued. But they fell into confusion, and in the mist mistook some of their own regiments for foes, and fired on them.

Howe was among the first to take his place. In occasions of this character his personal courage was irreproachable. He ordered fresh troops to the front and vigorously directed the attack. It proved irresistible, and the congress troops giving way, a panic led to a rout. Nevertheless, for a long period there was every promise that Washington's attack would succeed, but eventually it was turned into a thorough defeat. The British loss was 71 killed, 444 wounded, 14 missing. Of the congress troops, 150 were killed, 521 wounded, and 400 prisoners; among the number were 54 officers.

Had the fight been prolonged the defeat of the congress troops could not have been retrieved, for Cornwallis at Philadelphia, hearing the firing, without orders proceeded by a forced march to the scene of action. He arrived in time to join general Grey in pursuit of the fugitives.

As the fight was going against him and he saw nothing more to be done, Washington succeeded in carrying away the bulk of his force, and established himself in the country some twenty miles back, still threatening Philadelphia with the force which remained.

From the account that I have given of Howe's operations in 1776 and 1777, deeming it my duty to relate them, the reader, in the perusal of Burgoyne's campaign, while following its operations, will the more readily understand the depressing disappointment experienced at his continual failure to obtain tidings of Howe, and the utter fallacy of Burgoyne's hope to be sustained by him. The surrender at Saratoga is among the best known facts in modern history ; indeed, it has been represented as one of those important events from which great constitutional changes have resulted, to affect the whole political condition of humanity. It has even been regarded as the starting point of that modern intellectual activity which impresses every department of thought, year by year to increase in depth and power. In my humble judgment, Burgoyne's campaign would have remained incomplete without the synchronous narrative given by me.

That expedition must remain an integral part of Canadian history. It is almost what may be called the irony of fate, that the fight at Germantown and Burgoyne's last attempt to force his way down the Hudson should have occurred within a few hours of each other and at several degrees of latitude apart, when Burgoyne was looking for Howe's appearance to extricate him from ruin.* The two episodes are part of one and the same drama.

There is much to be learned from the teaching of these days. If history has at all a mission, it is to lead us to estimate our own times correctly. We may read in these records how one man of genius can wisely direct the policy of a nation ; on the other hand, the extent to which a showily endowed personage, be it in war, literature, politics, or some attainment by which he has gained public confidence, can in the hour of trial and misfortune, bring disaster on his country. Change is a law of political as it is of physical life. One series of opinions, one chapter of political ethics, follows the other, as generation follows generation, as an "Amurath an Amurath succeeds." In the past we possess the facts, and

* Germantown, 4th of October. Burgoyne's defeat in the field, 7th of October.

the consequences to which they have led, so that those engaged in the problems of life may wisely apply them as guides to shape the future. History is no longer the so-called patriotic suppression of facts painful to read. The sole condition on which it can be presented, is the truth, honesty and fairness with which it is written. All peoples, in their triumphs as in their reverses, have much to consider by which they can direct their policy in the hour of trial; and prosperity is even a trial. The United States may learn by Washington's career in those two years of depression from which he so nobly emerged, that his success was not the consequence of cunning party combinations and pandering to popular clamour; but of high principle, and devotion to the cause he accepted. He correctly judged the situation, that whatever the risk, it was his duty to attack the opposing general at all times and under all circumstances. Fortunately for him that general was Howe. What a contrast between the constant activity, the unwavering determination, the wise, thoughtful vigilance of Washington, and the irresolute, neglectful, inactive, even indolent movements of his opponent. We, too, have our lesson in the warning given us by the career of Howe and Burgoyne; never, in any circumstances, to entrust the fortunes of the empire to men who may dazzle us momentarily with their superficial capacity, but, unhappily for the country, in the hour of trial will plunge it deeper into misfortune.

Previously to entering upon the more important campaign of Burgoyne, I will describe St. Leger's attempt on the Mohawk. Although unattended by any direct consequences, and it ended in failure, the narrative of the operations is worthy of record, if only to shew the folly with which they were conceived. They formed part of the plan laid down by lord George Germain for the invasion of the province of New York. Burgoyne was to penetrate from Canada by the Hudson to the mouth of the Mohawk, St. Leger to gain the upper waters of that stream, descending and following it to the Hudson. It was St. Leger's orders to join Burgoyne when he had effected the destruction of fort Stanwix. On

reaching Albany he was to place himself under the command of general Howe. Germain even detailed the force he was to command, amounting to 675 men.*

St. Leger left Montreal in the middle of June with a detachment of the 34th and the Royal Regiment of New York, under Sir John Johnson, lately increased to 300 men, a company of Canadians, and some Indians. At Oswego he was to be joined by a company of the 8th from Niagara, and some Indians of the Six Nations and the Mississagas. The Hanau chasseurs had not reached Quebec when St. Leger started; one hundred subsequently arrived, and they were sent after him.† Two field guns were obtained from Pausch's battery, with an officer and eighteen rank and file. This was all the artillery which accompanied the expedition.‡ On the arrival of the remainder of the Hanau regiment, a few weeks later, the troops were sent up the Saint Lawrence, but they reached St. Leger only towards the end of August, at Oswego, on his retreat, fifty of them being sick.

The arbitrary orders of Germain with regard to this expedition admitted of no exercise of discretion; indeed, in Canada, it was considered as Germain's own conception. In Carleton's memorandum taken to England by Burgoyne, he had spoken of an expedition by the Mohawk as possible. From the mode in which it is mentioned, and his silence with regard to the descent of the Hudson from fort Edward, it is not improbable that by this route he would have approached Albany. It must be recollected that there is a water communication the whole distance, interrupted by rapids on the Saint Lawrence; but there would have been no demand for

* Detachment from the 8th Regiment	100
“ “ 34th “	100
Sir John Johnson's Regiment of New York	133
The Hanau Chasseurs	342

675

With a sufficient number of Canadians and Indians. [Germain to Carleton, 26th March, 1777. *Can. Arch.*, Q. 13, p. 78.]

† Carleton to Germain, 26th June. [*Can. Arch.*, Q. 13, p. 188.]

‡ Pausch Journal, p. 131.

the excessive labour experienced in the removal of material and ammunition from Ticonderoga to fort Edward. In point of distance, the route by the Saint Lawrence is much the longer, interrupted by many rapids ; but it must be remembered that the labour of the portages would have been called for in Canada, and was consequently under control. When the Mohawk is gained, the stream descends to Albany. Certainly, had Carleton carried out the expedition, it would have been constituted differently from that of St. Leger. As far as possible he would have organized an expedition, with full consideration for the ascent of the rapids of the Saint Lawrence and for the establishment of the depot for supplies at Oswego ; from which point the one trying *portage* would have been the six miles at Wood's creek.*

* A brief comparison of the two routes may be acceptable to those not acquainted with the geography.

The water route by the Hudson from Montreal to Albany, via lake Champlain and the Hudson is 307 miles, viz. :

	Miles.	Miles.
By the Saint Lawrence to Sorel	45	
Sorel to Chambly by the Richelieu	45½	
	—	90½
Chambly to Saint John's, with an intervening portage.		12
Saint John's to Ticonderoga, lake Champlain.		110
Lake Champlain to lake George—Portage.	2	
Water.	3	
	—	5
Lake George.		30
Fort George to Fort Edward.		14
Fort Edward to Albany.		45½
		—
Total		307

The route by the Saint Lawrence to Albany, via Oswego, is about 420 miles,

viz. :

	Miles.	Miles.
The Saint Lawrence from Lachine, Lake Saint Louis, to Cascade Rapids.	15¼	
Cascade Rapids	3	
From Cascades to Cedars.	1¾	
Cedars Rapids	3	
From Cedars to Coteau Rapids.	5¼	
Coteau Rapids.	2¾	
From Coteau Rapids to Long Island, Lake St. Francis	30½	
Long Sault Rapids.	11½	

It is surprising that better information had not been obtained with regard to fort Stanwix. It was a small, square, log-fort, with four bastions and stockaded, defended by artillery. So long as the place was provisioned, it could not, unless stormed, be affected by a musketry attack. The only means of assailing it was by artillery of sufficient calibre. When Montcalm attacked Oswego and William Henry* in 1756-1757, he was supplied with artillery, and it was by its use that he succeeded in the siege. The light field guns brought by St. Leger were in this respect valueless, and from the want of the necessary cannon he was powerless for attack. The fort contained a garrison of 700 men, under the command of general Gansevoort.

The Jäger company of Hesse Hanau, which constituted an important portion of St. Leger's force, was as little adapted to the service as it was possible to be. The first division arrived only on the 11th of June, and the men were immediately assigned to the expedition, perfectly unacquainted

	Miles.	Miles.
To Farren's Point.....	5	
Rapid.....	$\frac{3}{4}$	
To Rapid Plat.....	$10\frac{1}{2}$	
Rapid.....	4	
To Point Iroquois.....	$4\frac{1}{2}$	
Rapid.....	3	
To Galops Rapid.....	$2\frac{3}{4}$	
Galops and Point Cardinal Rapids..	2	
To Lake Ontario.....	$66\frac{1}{2}$	
	—	172
Lake Ontario to Oswego.....		50
From Oswego by River Onondaga....	21	
River Oneida to lake Oneida.....	16	
Lake Oneida.....	23	
Along Wood's Creek.....	9	
	—	69
Portage, Fort Stanwix, site of the present city of Rome		6
By river Mohawk to junction with river Hudson....	116	
River Hudson to Albany.....	7	
	—	123
Total.....		420

* Ante, III., p. 562 ; IV., p. 51.

with the country and unfit for the service they had to perform. No greater contrast could have been suggested to them than their previous military career in Europe and that they were undertaking, of forcing their way up the Saint Lawrence and carrying on a contest in the woods at the Mohawk, around fort Stanwix. They left Montreal in the first days of July, at which date the Indians had been assembled. The ascent of the Saint Lawrence was extremely trying to the men, from their inexperience in ascending a river with the impediments they had to encounter.

St. Leger, when his detachment had been collected at Oswego, followed the river to lake Oneida for the attack on fort Stanwix. He arrived on the ground on the 3rd of August. He found Wood's creek choked up to prevent his advance, a work of some days on the part of the garrison. He removed these impediments, and constructed a road, described by him as from Pine Ridges, to Fish creek, sixteen miles in length, in order to bring up his two guns and provisions. While so encamped, his scouts brought him word that a force of militia of 800 men were on the march to reinforce the fort, and were then at Oriskany, twelve miles to the eastward. St. Leger determined to attack them on the march. He sent out a detachment of eighty of his men, with the Indians who had joined them, the whole being under the command of Sir John Johnson. They left at five in the evening, and choosing their ground, placed themselves in ambush. About five on the following morning, the congress troops were suddenly assailed. The surprise in every way succeeded. The impetuosity of the Indians in commencing the attack to some extent affected the result, for those in the rear were enabled to retire and recover themselves, and fall back to a more advantageous ground, where they made a stand. Finally, the congress troops retreated, maintaining a running fight for an hour. Over 400 killed and wounded were left upon the field, among them their general, Herkeimer. The Indians suffered greatly, thirty being killed and thirty wounded, including several prominent chiefs.

While the engagement was taking place, lieutenant Bird, who, with twenty regulars and 200 Indians, had occupied an advanced post to intercept the communication of the fort with the lower country, hearing that Johnson was greatly harassed, left his post to march to his assistance, leaving the camp unprotected. In this condition it was assailed in a sortie from the fort, and plundered of much that it contained. The loss of provisions and baggage was seriously felt, especially from the difficulty of obtaining supplies.

The fort was now invested and batteries were constructed. Gansevort was summoned to surrender, and his reply was a determined refusal. St. Leger, accordingly, commenced his attack, but it proved perfectly impotent. His small field guns were without the least effect upon the sod work, and the shot thrown by them were without impression on the plank protection of the magazine, the object of his attack. Indeed, they failed to penetrate any of the defences.

Nevertheless, St. Leger made the most of the action at Oriskany. He addressed a long report to Burgoyne, describing the total route of the force sent to raise the siege. Colonel Butler gave a similar account to Carleton. At the time this glowing description was written, there could not have been much hope of ultimate success. In his letter to Burgoyne, St. Leger stated that 400 men lay dead on the field, and that in his opinion the militia would never rally. Shortly afterwards letters were received on the Hudson by the commanding officer of one of the Brunswick regiments on the Burgoyne expedition, colonel von Gall, evidently inspired by the commanding officer of the Hanau Jägers, von Kreutzburg. They reported the action to be of no great account. Moreover, the description of the condition of affairs on the Mohawk, of the severe service, the constant fatigues, and the strong reinforcements against them which were being sent forward, gave little hope of any fortunate result. It was, indeed, only the prognostic of what actually took place.

While St. Leger was engaged in his impotent attempt on the fort, news was brought that reinforcements were rapidly

ascending the Mohawk. The column, under the command of Arnold was 2,000 strong, well supplied with provisions, and with heavy guns to raise the siege. The Indians on hearing the news became unsettled, and finally determined to withdraw. A council was called. Neither the personal representations of Sir John Johnson, nor the influence of the superintendents Claus and Butler, could influence them. They complained of the presence of the few regular troops, and were at the same time depressed by the losses they had experienced.

Shortly afterwards it was known that 200 of the number had left the expedition. St. Leger saw no course open to him, but himself to retreat. Leaving his tents standing, and abandoning his stores and guns, he rapidly made his way to Oswego. Arnold, with his reinforcements, arrived at the fort two days after St. Leger's departure, when the latter had been successful in reaching lake Ontario.


The expedition had at least the fortunate consequence that no loss was experienced, beyond that of the Indians at the attack of the Oriskany. With the abandonment of the tents and guns, St. Leger safely descended the Saint Lawrence. On his arrival at Montreal, he was ordered to Saint John's, with the design of joining Burgoyne. Had the operations on the Hudson been unattended by calamity, St. Leger's abortive attempt would have had little influence on the campaign; but the abandonment of the siege, following rapidly on the disaster of Bennington, exercised great influence in restoring confidence, and awakening the spirit of resistance among those eager for independence, and in depressing the loyalists. The defeat of the retiring force at Oriskany was represented as a victory, and the rapid retreat of St. Leger, abandoning his tents and guns, gave warrant for the claim that he had been decisively defeated.

St. Leger's letters do not suggest a favourable opinion of his abilities. He assumed the title of brigadier, owing, as he explained, to the disparaging reports made concerning his force. The title, he said, had discouraged the congress troops

and had encouraged the Indians. Although his force but little exceeded 600 men, he applied to be permitted to appoint a deputy-adjutant and quartermaster-general, a major of brigade, a surgeon, a commissary, and an inspector of *bateaux*. Carleton treated the application as unwarrantable.* St. Leger started upon the expedition with no correct views as to the duty he had to perform, evidently believing that all that was required was personal courage. On that point he was irreproachable. But the impression left by the narrative is that the expedition was ill conceived, ill equipped, not carried out with judgment, and foredoomed to failure. The one redeeming feature was that St. Leger brought his force safely out of the dangerous position in which Arnold's advance would have placed it. Had he not so acted, a Saratoga convention, on a smaller scale, would have been repeated on the upper waters of the Mohawk.

* [Can. Arch., Q. 13, p 225.]

Skeleton Map
Explanatory of the operations under
Carleton on lake Champlain 1776;
of St. Leger's Repulse before Fort Stanwix
August 1777; and Burgoyne's expedition from
Canada terminating in his surrender
Saratoga on the 16th of October 1777.





CHAPTER VI.

Burgoyne left London on the 27th of March,* and arrived at Quebec on the 6th of May. Carleton, without delay, placed under his control the arrangements for the campaign, and on the 10th, Burgoyne assumed command of the regiments destined for the expedition.† Their strength was 3,724 men, deducting those to be left in Canada. The Brunswick regiments included in the expedition numbered 3,116. Thus the total force was 6,840: 357 artillery have likewise to be added, consisting of 257 royal artillery, and 100 men of the Hesse Hanau battery.

The troops detailed to remain in Canada consisted of the 29th, 31st and 34th regiments, with 711 men of the German brigade, generally selected as being the least fit for active service. Of the reinforcements expected from England, some companies of the 11th were to remain in the province.

Burgoyne reached Three Rivers on the 15th, when he discussed with Riedesel his plan of future operations, and

* Horace Walpole relates [February, 1776, Last Journals, II., p. 15] that Burgoyne's return from Boston at this date was looked upon as "not much to his credit nor to the satisfaction of the court." Walpole adds, "Burgoyne, on his arrival, had been very communicative of complaints even to Charles Fox, and the Opposition, for Burgoyne knew the Ministers, and probably the Opposition too, and had the latter had any activity they would have questioned him in Parliament before the Court had had time to buy off his affected dissatisfaction. But before there was a single question started in the House of Commons Burgoyne's rank and pay were raised, fifteen men added to each company of his regiment (all to his profit) and four cornetcies given to him to sell; besides an extraordinary promotion for his wife's nephew, Mr. Stanley, which was stopped by the Secretary of War's partiality to captain Stanhope, Lady Harrington's son over whose head Stanley would have stepped. After these favours nobody more reserved than General Burgoyne on any mention of America in Parliament. In April he sailed for Quebec."

† These regiments were the 9th, 20th, 21st, 24th, 47th, 53rd and 62nd.

expressed the determination that so soon as provisions sufficient for six weeks had been obtained at Chambly and Saint John's, with the vessels necessary for the movement of the troops, he would begin the campaign. Captain Ludridge, of the navy, was placed in command of lake Champlain, with instructions to keep its waters clear to Crown point, so that no interference with the advance of the expedition would be possible. On the 28th, Riedesel received orders to concentrate his troops for embarkation. The energy shewn by Burgoyne gained for him general confidence. There was a common feeling that the campaign would be vigorously conducted, and his pleasing manners confirmed this belief in his capacity.

On the 30th, Carleton arrived at Three Rivers. He breakfasted with Riedesel. The two generals had learned sincerely to respect and esteem each other. In his memoirs, Riedesel expresses his deep regret for Carleton's removal from the command, for he had formed the highest opinion of Carleton's ability and character. The latter was proceeding to Montreal to make final arrangements for the embarkation of the British regiments, equally as Riedesel on the following day, the 31st, carried out his orders for the march of the Brunswick contingent. The Brunswick troops crossed the Saint Lawrence, and marched to Saint Thérèse, where they remained until they were despatched to point de Fer, at the head of Cumberland bay, lake Champlain. Riedesel himself remained at Chambly.

The British regiments were assembled at Saint John's and Chambly, ready for embarkation. On the morning of the 1st of June Carleton arrived to make his last inspection, and, finally, to consult with Burgoyne as to the future. After the general parade, the officers waited upon Carleton to pay him their respects; they were all greatly attached to him, and it could not be otherwise. The leave-taking was marked by much emotion, for who of those present knew they would ever again look upon their old general. Hitherto, their career with him had been one of success and triumph. They were now to part in a future of uncertainty, and it is in a moment

of this character men realize that it may be a separation for them never again to meet.*

General Phillips entertained the higher officers at lunch after the parade; while they were at table, the news came that the war-ships and transports had arrived at Quebec. They consisted of thirty-nine sail. Eleven companies of British infantry and 400 Jägers of Hesse Hanau were on board; there were also some Brunswick recruits. Among the passengers were baroness Riedesel and her three children. On the following day Carleton proceeded to île-aux-Noix to inspect the troops quartered there. On the 14th he was again at Saint John's, and reviewed the Brunswick troops present; in the afternoon he left for Montreal.

On the 15th, Burgoyne himself proceeded to île-aux-Noix, and by the 18th the whole of the troops of the expedition were assembled at Cumberland bay. The army was formed into two divisions; the right, under general Phillips, consisted of the British regiments, with the small force of Canadians and provincials. The latter acted as an advance guard. Brigadier Fraser commanded the 24th, with the grenadiers and light infantry; brigadiers Powell and Hamilton the centre and left.

The left division under Riedesel consisted of the Brunswick troops; colonel Breyman was in command of the light infantry and grenadiers; brigadier Specht and von Gall, of the other regiments.

On the 20th the troops embarked. The previous day, Fraser, with his brigade, proceeded to the river Bouquet; he was there joined by some hundreds of Indians, who remained with him. A division of them had been sent forward to Crown point, where they surprised a small detachment, ten of whom they killed and scalped. When at the river Bouquet, on the 21st of June, the Indians present were assembled

* Von Eelking's expression is "that he had won all hearts." "Sämmtliche Officiere machten dem von der Armee scheidenden General, der sich in dieser alle Herzen gewonnen hatte, die Aufwartung, sie waren alle tief bewegt." Riedesel, *Leben und Wirken*, II., p. 92.

and addressed by Burgoyne. The history of this continent establishes the difficulty, which on all occasions has been experienced in controlling these tribes. There is a common belief that it is necessary in addressing the Indian, to use the figurative and poetic jargon which novel writers employ, and that when gathered together they can only be spoken to in tropes and metaphor. It is, however, a simple fact that the able men, who have obtained influence among them generally used the language of plain good sense, and gained their confidence by the judgment they displayed and by their personal character. Especially, by pointing out the practical benefit the Indians themselves would gain by following the line of conduct asked of them. Burgoyne was never on good terms with those attached to his force; he failed to impress them. Much in his address must have been totally above their comprehension.

Burgoyne, however, plainly told them that he forbade bloodshed; that women, children and prisoners must not be slaughtered, and that they would receive compensation for the prisoners they seized and spared. They might take the scalps from the dead, but not from the wounded or dying. This announcement was made with unnecessary abruptness, as if for dramatic effect; the same admonition could have been more wisely and effectively expressed. Their commander was La Corne Saint Luc, of a known French Canadian family. He was now sixty-six, but in full vigour, and had seen service in the French wars. He had been present at Dieskau's defeat in 1755; at Wolfe's victory before Quebec on the 13th of September, 1759, he had fought in Montcalm's army; and he accompanied de Lévis on the 28th of April, 1760, in the attempt to regain Quebec. He had received the cross of Saint Louis.

Sanguinet does not give a favourable view of his character. When sent to Terrebonne by Carleton in 1775 to encourage the Canadians to enrol themselves, he acted with great indiscretion. From the respectability of his family and his own ability, he was appointed a member of the first legislative

council. Nevertheless, when the cause of congress promised to be successful, through the Caughnawaga Indians he made his peace with Montgomery, then before Saint John's. Subsequently, from the conviction that the British would prevail, he courted the favour of Carleton, who apparently gave him his confidence. That La Corne was so distinguished by the governor was a source of dissatisfaction with the loyalists, who, knowing the advances made by him to Montgomery, mistrusted him. When accepting the capitulation of Montreal, Montgomery excepted La Corne by name; he had, at this time, taken his departure with Carleton, but unfortunately for himself was included in Prescott's surrender. He was not allowed to land at Montreal, but was sent a prisoner to Boucherville. Finally, through the intervention of Hazen, he received permission to remain at Montreal. His friends, however, persuaded him to leave the city, it being believed that he would again take the congress side. Wooster, conceiving him to be a dangerous person, sent him a prisoner to New York, and he remained in confinement at Esopus, the modern Kingston, on the Hudson for a year.

On his return to Canada, he expressed himself much embittered, owing to the treatment he had received when a prisoner. His relations with Burgoyne were never cordial. The latter accused him of deserting the force after the disaster at Bennington. La Corne himself declared that the Indians abandoned the service from being disgusted with the treatment they had received, and that he was sent to Canada with despatches. However the matter may be explained, the great body of the Indians did not adhere to Burgoyne, fifty only crossing the Hudson with him.

There was much declamation, at the time, against the employment of Indians in the campaign, to the effect that it was an act of barbarism and inhumanity. Many modern writers have pronounced the same condemnation. It was the repeated theme in the house of commons of all who were the avowed supporters of the colonial pretensions, even to the extreme act of defiance of appearing in arms against the

authority of the mother country, on the ground that they were simply maintaining their right as British subjects, and that they in no way desired ultimate independence. Prominent in this class were Chatham and Burke. No one more willingly than Chatham had seen the Indians on the British side in the French wars, which he had directed with such remarkable genius and vigour. It has been claimed that he recognized their employment on the ground that it was to oppose the French Indians, who were constantly active in the field against the British. It was not from want of will that congress had no Indians accompanying its force, for every effort had been made to enlist them. But considering the question on abstract principles, it is evident that the state of war loosens the bonds which bind humanity in common intercourse. The main condition is to subdue the foe; it is the end primarily desired. It is said that revolutions are not made with rose water, and the material of war is not obtainable in a manufactory of perfumes. All that science in modern times can effect is devoted to make war more destructive and terrible. It is certain, that in any future contest it will be found that a people, whatever area of the earth's surface it may inhabit, will employ all the weapons of offence within its grasp. Much was written of the desolation of the American settlements; there were no settlements on lake Champlain, or the northern Hudson, to desolate. The Indians accompanied the army as guides and scouts. Burgoyne in his proclamation threatened all who opposed him with their destructive vindictiveness. It was one of the blunders constantly committed by him throughout this campaign, and he thus placed in the hands of writers an argument to establish cruelty on his part, which only existed in his declamatory rhetoric. One proof of this fact lies in the admitted truth that no settlements were desolated. The one unfortunate incident was the murder of Jane McCrae, which I will hereafter relate.

Burgoyne, so that he himself might proceed to Crown point with Fraser's division, temporarily, gave over the command to

Riedesel, with orders to move forward the force as rapidly as possible. The lake was so rough on the 23rd that the troops, for safety, disembarked. The ascent was re-commenced on the 24th, and on the morning of the 26th Crown point was reached. The British division was landed on the western, the German brigade on the eastern shore; orders being given that they should each act independently.

It was known from prisoners and deserters that the garrison was about four thousand strong; they likewise reported that the congress authorities were cruelly treating the loyalists and had hanged six of them.

As Crown point had now become the base of Burgoyne's supplies, the transports having unloaded returned down the lake for fresh cargoes. The armed vessels advanced to Putnam river, while Fraser's brigade marched forward to Five Mile point, whence a reconnaissance was made of the fort which drew upon it the fire of the fort guns.

A detachment of two hundred men being left for the protection of Crown point, on the 1st of July, at five o'clock, the troops advanced in two columns, Phillips being on the west and Riedesel on the east shore of the lake. The Indians and Canadians were pushed forward to three-mile point. They were followed by Fraser's brigade, which took up a position on the road to the saw-mills. The main body of the British troops was established on the ground previously held by Fraser. The Brunswick troops encamped on the east side. A reconnaissance of the works was further made on the "Royal George." It was now positively known that the commander of the fort was general St. Clair, and that it was defended by twelve regiments, in four brigades, the whole amounting to between 4,000 and 5,000 men.

On the opposite bank, and at this point the lake narrows to the dimensions of a river, fort Independence had been constructed. The height is by no means insignificant, for it admitted of three lines of fortifications, one above the other. Four armed vessels were anchored between the two forts, over which a bridge had been placed. An exceedingly strong iron

chain had been drawn above the waterway to prevent the line being forced. Defensive works had been formed on the height above the saw-mills, to oppose any attack in this direction. Batteries had been thrown up from the fort to this intrenchment. Half of the force was at the fort, one brigade at fort Independence, and the fourth brigade was stationed to protect the left flank at the saw-mill.*

No shot was fired from the fort until the 2nd of July, when, towards noon, Fraser's force was cannonaded with heavy artillery. There was extraordinary activity perceptible on the part of the defenders, and it was believed that some portion of the intrenchments was being abandoned. Phillips accordingly, with his division, took possession of the saw-mills. The Indians also advanced towards the intrenchments, and were received with a heavy fire.

On the opposite shore, Riedesel advanced his left wing to join Breyman, who had been pushed forward. The cannonade on both forts was actively continued, but the casualties with the besieging force were slight. In Breyman's corps two men were wounded. Fraser lost two artillerymen killed. With the other British division, one officer and some men were wounded. The loss of the besieged was an officer and some twenty men.

On the 3rd, at mid-day, the raft with its heavy guns came into position. Great expectations had been formed of its destructive power, but, owing to its deep draught and difficulty of movement, it could not be brought within range. The heavy guns were therefore taken out and attached to the British brigade.

Opposite to fort Ticonderoga, on the southern side of the discharge from lake George into lake Champlain, is some very high ground known as Sugar hill. It commanded both fort Ticonderoga and fort Independence. It appears inexplicable that it had not been taken possession of and fortified. Its commanding position was at once understood, and Twiss the

* I beg leave to refer the reader to the map of Ticonderoga, Vol. IV., p. 162.

engineer, with Fraser's light brigade took possession of the ground. With great labour the heavy artillery was forced up the height, and the formation of batteries was commenced on the 5th of July.

Until mid-day a violent cannonade was persevered in from the fort. About five in the afternoon, volumes of smoke were perceptible from the intrenchments, as if caused by the burning of wood or by a bush fire. It was seen that the flames were being carried towards the camp of the defenders, and much confusion was visible in the garrison. Burgoyne ordered up the gun boats, and Riedesel placed his division in boats, as if for the purpose of attack. The garrison remained continually under arms, and the boats were persistently cannonaded until dark. At midnight, the firing of the heavy guns re-commenced.

Towards the morning of the 6th a fire was observed in one of the magazines in fort Independence, on the east of the lake, and on a reconnaissance being sent out it was discovered, to the astonishment of the British force, that both Ticonderoga and fort Independence had been abandoned during the night. The garrison of Ticonderoga had crossed to the eastern shore by the bridge of boats, and the works had been evacuated. General St. Clair had judged that, by the construction of the battery at Sugar Hill, the place was no longer tenable. Accordingly, he had called a council of war, when it was resolved to retreat without further delay. The provisions which could be taken away were placed upon *bateaux* and sent up the lake to Skenesborough. The movement was so successfully made that, before morning, the whole garrison had crossed to the eastern side. During the night, fires had been observed in Ticonderoga, by which an attempt had been made to destroy the provisions and stores. On the occupation of the place by the British troops, the flames were extinguished with little effort. Fraser took possession of Ticonderoga and Riedesel of fort Independence. The capture included 80 pieces of artillery, 5,000 tons of meal, 1,500 stand of arms, 2,000 oxen and a large quantity of other provisions

with munitions and tents ; and what was of great value, 200 boats for the navigation of lake George.

Thus, on the morning of the 6th of July, Ticonderoga had fallen into the possession of the British.

On the 30th of June, from the camp at Ticonderoga, Burgoyne had issued his proclamation.* It was long, and was neither well timed nor wise. It was bad in style, and contained the objectionable sentence, a threat of attack by the Indians. It was mercilessly criticized and parodied at the time. Such a proclamation cautiously written by an able man would have been different in all respects, and might have worked its influence in encouraging the many loyalists and restraining the persecution of them. It is surprising that one who had moved in the atmosphere of the house of commons, where some knowledge of public business is obtained by the most frivolous, could produce so objectionable a state paper. It remains on record, and presents in no exaggerated form the defects of Burgoyne's character.

Ticonderoga had been taken without any sacrifice of men or loss of time, and promised the most favourable consequence ; it was not † possible for the campaign to have opened with happier auspices. In the days succeeding the capture there were few officers in the army, British or German, who did not foretell a rapid and glorious end of the expedition. One feeling general in the ranks was that the congress troops

* The concluding sentences ran : "I have but to give stretch to the Indian forces under my direction, and they amount to thousands, to overtake the hardened enemies of Great Britain and America, and I consider them the same wherever they may lurk."

"If notwithstanding these endeavours [to re-establish loyal government] and sincere inclinations to effect them, the phrensy of hostility should remain, I trust I shall stand acquitted to the eyes of God and men in denouncing and executing the vengeance of the state against the wilful outcasts. The messengers of justice and of wrath await them in the field ; and devastation, famine and every concomitant horror that a reluctant but indispensable prosecution of military duty must occasion, will bar the way to their return." [de Fonblanque, p. 492.]

† The news reached London on the 22nd of August. Horace Walpole records the fact [Last Journals II., p. 131] with the remark, "The king on receiving the account . . . ran into the queen's room, crying, 'I have beat them ! beat all the Americans.'"

would not stand before them, or attempt to offer any resistance.* The fact had a material bearing on the conduct of the campaign, and had there been at any time a chance of success, it would have run the risk of being lost by the prevalence of this view.

Ticonderoga in his possession, Burgoyne gave orders for a further advance. Here commenced that series of mistakes which so directly affected the future of the campaign. His mind, in the early conception of the enterprise, had been impressed with the views expressed by Carleton, that the operations should be primarily directed against the country around the Connecticut river. Burgoyne still held to the desirability of the attempt; but, in view of the duty assigned him of descending the Hudson to Albany, any such departure from the course traced for his guidance became a misapplication of strength. The plan of campaign which remains in Burgoyne's writing appears to have been written subsequently to his interviews with Germain. In the memorandum of Carleton not a word is said of an attempt to get possession of Albany. Burgoyne's plan assumes that the sole purpose of the Canadian army is to effect a junction with general Howe. He then adds "that, supposing the royal forces in possession of Ticonderoga, it is highly worthy of consideration whether the occupation of the Connecticut was not the most important purpose," as he subsequently explained, "with the view of making a junction with the troops at Rhode Island." Before leaving London, Burgoyne had written to Howe generally of the expedition, and the position he should hold in carrying it out. From Quebec he wrote a second letter, in which he expressed the wish that latitude had been given him for a diversion to Connecticut, but his orders were precise to force a junction. The "idea resting in his mind" was to make a feint that his operations were directed to Connecticut. In a

* Captain Money's reply before the house of commons was very positive on this point. "He did not think after they had evacuated Ticonderoga they [the Congress troops] would make a stand anywhere." [State of the Expedition, p. 214.]

letter to Germain* he repeated his "perseverance in the idea of giving all possible jealousy on the side of Connecticut," with the assurance that he would make no movement to procrastinate the great object of a junction.

It was in accordance with this view that he gave Riedesel instructions to threaten Connecticut; it was, indeed, the object of detaching him to Castleton. While so acting, Burgoyne lost sight of the fact that all operations in this direction were totally distinct from the main duty he had to perform, and that they could only be carried out at a loss of valuable time, and would impair that strength he so much needed. Castleton lay entirely out of the line of his operations, and even if supplies could have been obtained there, he did not possess the power of moving them by land. The water communication, on the contrary, offered the only means of transport open to him. The naval force had enough strength to destroy all opposition on the narrow line of water which, in a strange way, to this day is still called lake Champlain. Without interference, he could demolish the bridge and remove the chain, as, indeed, actually took place. Burgoyne's duty was to have advanced with all possible rapidity. It was within his power, in a few days, to have been master of lake George, whatever the attempt to oppose him, as among the spoils were two hundred boats. The portage was a serious matter enough, but he had a strong force of men to overcome it, and in ten days he ought to have been in strength upon its waters, with his cannon and provisions.†

An order was given for the pursuit of that portion of the

* 19th of May. [State of the Expedition, p. 11.]

† We have an example of what was effected by de Lévis twenty years earlier, 1757, when Webb was besieged in William Henry. In nine working days 150 *bateaux* and 15 cannon were moved from lake Champlain to lake George. On the advance, de Lévis marched up the side of the lake with 3,000 men. Montcalm, with the other division of about the same number, in 250 boats, proceeded by water. They were three days in ascending the lake. On this occasion the French force, regulars and militia, was 6,000 in number, with 1,800 Indians. [Ante, Vol. IV., p. 48.] It is plain that a powerful detachment of the army could have been at the Hudson in a fortnight after the surrender. Burgoyne,

garrison which had retreated by land. The duty was intrusted to Fraser's light division. A road had been lately cut by the congress troops from the point opposite to Ticonderoga to Otter creek, to join the road which ran to Charlestown No. 9; at a distance of sixteen miles it met the road which led southerly to Castleton, whence a road diverged to Skenesborough, at the foot of lake Champlain.

Skenesborough was of importance, owing to the road from this place passing through fort Anne to fort Edward. The distance to fort Anne was twelve miles, whence the road continued northerly eleven miles, to join the road leading from fort Edward to fort George, being three miles distant from the former, and eleven from the lake.

Burgoyne's orders were that Fraser, with the grenadiers and light infantry, should pursue and attack the retreating congress troops, and that Riedesel's regiment should follow in support. A strong garrison was left at Ticonderoga. The remaining divisions of the army, with the gun-boats, were to ascend by water to Skenesborough, in pursuit of the force which had taken that direction.

Fraser's division, sent by land, was far from being equal to the duty imposed upon it. It was the continual fault of Burgoyne, throughout the short campaign, to apply insufficient means to the end to be gained. In this case a disaster was narrowly avoided. Burgoyne formed the opinion that there was little to be done; he wrote to Riedesel "that he considered the Ticonderoga army entirely annihilated, as it was wanting in all that was necessary for its sustenance as for its defence."*

It is inconceivable that this force did not keep together to retain its greatest strength. Fraser, however, started alone

when speaking of the ascent of lake George, continually described it as a retrograde movement. The expression is misleading and unwarrantable. From fort Ticonderoga to fort Edward, the natural and direct route, as it is to-day, is by lake George. Moreover, there was no object in so describing it, for Burgoyne's advance by fort Anne to fort Edward can be perfectly justified.

* Hülfsstruppen, Vol. I., p. 218.

with his division, the Brunswick troops requiring some short time to place themselves in readiness. Possibly, Fraser's orders would not allow him to delay; at least, such seems the only explanation. Riedesel, with a company of Jägers and eighty men of Breyman's corps, immediately followed; Riedesel having given orders for his own regiment and the remaining companies of Breyman to hasten forward. He had marched fourteen miles when he overtook Fraser with half of his corps. It was then agreed that Fraser should join the remainder of his division, three miles farther on; that Riedesel should bivouac where he was, and that the start on the morrow should be made at three. Should Fraser find the congress force in his front too strong for him, he was to delay the attack until Riedesel approached.

Riedesel started on his march, as agreed, at three in the morning. After he had proceeded four miles, captain McKay, a provincial officer, met him with a message that Fraser was waiting for him at Hubberton. Conceiving that this intimation was in accordance with what had been determined, he hastened onward with the advance guard. He had not marched above a quarter of an hour, when he heard a sharp fire of musketry; an announcement to him that Fraser was engaged. Sending back an order to Breyman to move rapidly up with the detachment, he himself pushed his men forward at an increased pace. A second officer came from Fraser, to announce that the troops in his front were in such force that unless reinforced he must retreat. Riedesel sent word that he was coming to his help as fast as he could. After a hurried march of a quarter of an hour, he reached a height from which he could observe the action. It was evident that the congress troops, who outnumbered Fraser's force, were taking ground to the right for the purpose of turning Fraser's left. Riedesel determined to attack this force from the rear. Sending the Jägers to the front, with the rest of his force he passed to the ground at the back of the advancing congress troops, and ordered the bugles to sound. As he was making the movement, he received another message from Fraser, that

he feared his left would be turned. Riedesel sent back word that he himself was on the point of assailing the enemy's left wing. The Jägers were received by a brisk fire from four hundred men, but they charged with the bayonet. The attack from the rear simultaneously taking place, the congress troops turned and broke. In twelve minutes all was over. Brigadier Francis, in command, was shot when leading the third attack. The affair was severe while it lasted.* There was great difficulty in taking the wounded to Ticonderoga. They all suffered greatly in the movement. The congress troops left 300 dead on the field; from 200 to 300

* The loss of the British force was 36 killed, of whom two were officers; 144 wounded, 13 being officers. Total, 180. [Can. Arch., Q. 13, p. 361.] The killed were major Grant and lieuts. Douglass and Haggart, one of the latter dying from his wounds. Among the wounded were lord Balcarras, captain Craig of the 47th, afterwards governor-general of Canada, and major Ackland, the husband of lady Harriet Ackland, whose name became subsequently so well known. The congress troops, as they were leaving their bivouac, had been immediately attacked by Fraser, notwithstanding his disparity of numbers. In Rogers' Haddon [p. 487] a letter is given in which this force is described as consisting of the regiments of Francis, Warner, Reed and Hale, and the writer states "as nearly as I could conjecture, we had odds of a thousand that attacked them [the British]!" Riedesel's service on the occasion was acknowledged by Burgoyne in general orders: to the effect that "Major Gen'l Riedesel with his advanced Guard consisting of the Chasseur Company and Eighty Grenadiers arrived in time to sustain B G'l Frazer and by his judicious orders and spirited execution of them, obtained a share for himself and his Troops in the glory of the Action."

This order, dated Skenesborough, 11th of July, is given in German by Von Eelking [Riedesel Leben und Wirken, II., p. 117] and in Lieut. Haddon's Journal [p. 92], edited by General Horatio Rogers of Rhode Island. As it is my first allusion to this work, I feel called upon to bear my humble testimony to the care and fidelity with which the notes added by the editor are written; and they are as voluminous as they are carefully considered and useful. Haddon's Journal, in the form in which it is published, may be regarded as a documentary text-book of Burgoyne's campaign. Although General Rogers distinctly declares his sympathy with "the patriot side during the American war," his grandfather with two grand-uncles having taken that side, he has, in his numerous explanatory notes, shewn no indication of this feeling. It is not possible to adduce a passage where it can be traced. It is for this reason the work is so valuable a contribution to history, it being apparent that the principal end is to attain the truth. General Rogers served with distinction in the war between the north and south, therefore, when describing military events, writes of that which he understands. At this date he is on the bench of the Supreme Court of his state at Providence.

were taken prisoners. A number of the wounded were said to have perished in the woods.

The troops engaged consisted of the rear division of the force, which had retreated from Ticonderoga by land. The main body had reached Castleton, and, contrary to the orders of St. Clair, the regiments attacked by Fraser had remained at Hubberton, six miles to the north. They were about 1,200 in number.* Fraser's force, consisting of the light infantry and some provincials, could not have exceeded 400 men. No explanation has been offered for Fraser's division having continued the march without waiting for Riedesel. Possibly, it was based on the belief, that it was only necessary for the column to appear, for the fugitives to surrender without resistance; and on this theory that the light infantry would make the march more quickly. The separation of the columns into two parts was at variance with sound judgment. Every man was of value to Burgoyne, and no unnecessary risk of any kind, by which loss was possible, should have been permitted. The opportune arrival of Riedesel alone saved Fraser from being driven back. Had the regiments marched forward in one column, no such contingency would have been possible, and, without loss, the duty would have been effected of scattering the congress troops, and of preventing interference with Burgoyne's operations at the head of the lake.

After the action of the 7th at Hubberton, the troops remained on the ground during that day. As agreed between Fraser and Riedesel, the latter marched to Skenesborough on the 8th. Fraser himself remained to see the wounded carried to Ticonderoga; on the 9th he followed Riedesel, and joined the main body.

* Hildreth, Vol. III., p. 198.

CHAPTER VII.

At Ticonderoga steps were taken to remove the impediments to the navigation to Skenesborough. The heavy chain, which had been placed to impede the navigation, was broken by cannon shot, and the vessels which had been sunk in the channel were removed, so there was no longer any obstruction in ascending the narrow waterway. Burgoyne, with his vessels, reached the head of the lake on the evening of the 6th and attacked the fort and vessels moored near it. Three of them were abandoned and burned, two were captured. The fort was evacuated, previous to which the retreating troops set fire to the works and the buildings, and retired to fort Anne, on the road to fort Edward.

After the defeat at Hubbardton, St. Clair's force became entirely broken and scattered. When Warner joined him after the action, there were but ninety men with him. St. Clair, in the first instance, retired to Rutland in Vermont, and for the time his position was unknown. Finally, he made his way to Schuyler. Schuyler had assembled 5,000 men at fort Edward, all that represented the northern army, a considerable portion of which consisted of militia. The force was entirely disorganized, and was poorly provided with arms, ammunition, and provisions.

It has been customary to dwell upon the difficulties which prevented the advance of Burgoyne to fort Edward. Schuyler, to some extent did cause trees to be felled in the road between fort Anne and fort Edward, and, as far as it was possible, caused impediments to be thrown into Wood's creek to interfere with its navigation.* But the effect of this attempt

* Wood's creek was generally navigable to fort Anne. In the present Whitehall canal, the artificially constructed channel of six miles with the lift locks from the level of lake Champlain, joins the natural creek at the guard lock, and the creek is

entailed nothing more than the labour of clearing the channel, and created no hindrance of any consequence. The evidence is positive that the advance of the army from Skenesborough to fort Edward was not impeded by such obstructions.* It is plain that the road to fort Anne must have been open on the 7th, for, on that day colonel Hill, in command of the 9th, reached the neighbourhood of the fort. His force consisted of some 500 men, and Burgoyne ought to have foreseen that in sending forward the relatively small body of men, he was subjecting the regiment, as described by himself in his general order of the 8th of July, to be "attacked by more than six times their number." He knew that there was a force at fort George, and a larger body of men at fort Edward that could be concentrated in a few hours. It was the limited number of men under Hill's command which suggested the attack.

Hill, without interference, reached fort Anne, twelve miles distant, with the design of occupying the position. The old timber fort was on the south side of a small tributary stream running into Wood's creek. It had been re-established by Abercrombie in 1758, and, since that period, being of no account, it had remained unoccupied, and was scarcely tenable.

followed to fort Anne, six miles. From this point a regularly constructed canal is continued to fort Edward. Until the introduction of railways, within the last forty years, the connection between New York and Montreal was maintained by canal boats on this route, equally for passengers as for freight; and, in a rough way, it was a pleasant trip. From Montreal the steamboat carried the passenger to Laprairie, when the railway was taken to Saint John's, thence by an excellent steamboat on lake Champlain to Whitehall, and by canal to Albany.

* The following were the question and answer on this subject before the house of commons by captain Money, quartermaster-general. [State of the Expedition, p. 39.] "How long was the army employed in making the roads practicable between Skenesborough and fort Edward?" "About six or seven days in making the road between Skenesborough and fort Anne, and fort Anne and fort Edward. I do not think the army was delayed an hour on that account. There was a very good road made by the rebels the year before between fort Anne and fort Edward, in which road the rebels had cut down some few trees, which took the provincials in our army some few hours to clear." This statement is borne out by the general orders issued on July 13th—"a working party is ordered out to clear the line to fort Anne." On July 22nd we read "that the roads are completed and the track cleared."

The ground to the south of fort Anne is rough and swampy, and it was at this spot Burgoyne subsequently constructed a road across the swamp, on logs, for a couple of miles, for the transport of his artillery. Colonel Hill, with the 9th regiment, marched on the 7th towards the fort, and established himself a short distance from it. He there heard of the large force in his front, and sent notice of the fact to Burgoyne. On the following morning, the quartermaster-general Money was despatched to his assistance, at the head of the Indians. No regiment was present but the 9th, and its strength could not have reached 450 bayonets. Against this body Schuyler could concentrate the whole force at fort Edward, and without interference march them along the line of road to fort Anne. It was what happened. On the morning of the 8th, about half-past ten, the congress troops in large force crossed the creek to the left of Hill's force, and fired on his left flank from a thick wood. On finding that little impression was made by this attack, the force re-crossed the creek with the evident design of attacking the British force in the rear. Hill accordingly took post upon a hill, where for two hours he received the attack, which was resolutely made. The regiment was severely pressed, when the Indian whoop was heard. It was answered by loud cheers on the part of the 9th, and, as the Indians came upon the field, under the command of captain Money, the attacking force gave way.*

The congress troops burned fort Anne and retreated to their position at fort Edward. There being no carts to move the wounded, they were carried in blankets to a "small hut" two miles to the rear of the spot where the action was fought.

* Evidence of major Forbes of the 9th, who was present at the affair and was wounded. According to sergeant Lamb, a man of some education, who acted on occasions as an assistant to the surgeon, and who was present, the 9th was falling short of ammunition. His narrative does not agree with that of major Forbes. He states that the Indians, on hearing the firing, refused to obey the orders of Money to hasten their advance, and that Money himself hurried forward, alone, and gave the war-whoop. United States writers explain the retreat of the congress force, by their ammunition having failed as the Indians came upon the field.

Lamb states that Burgoyne gave him a letter, in case he was assailed, to hand to the commanding officer of any attacking party, so that Burgoyne must have visited the ground. Lamb remained behind seven days, attending to the wounded.*

There was no attempt on Burgoyne's part to hold possession of this ground, which had been gained at a loss of men he could ill spare. The 9th were recalled to Skenesborough, where the troops detailed for the advance had been concentrated. It would have shewn more judgment to have delayed all operations until the roads had been cleared and Wood's creek made navigable, and then to have sent forth a force so constituted as to deter all attempt at interference with it. It was what was subsequently done. Burgoyne, however, throughout the campaign, acted as if he failed to conceive the impediments he must encounter, the succession of difficulties ever varying, and increasing in magnitude and complication. His conduct was that of a man guided by impulse, as if success were to be gained by a *coup de main*. Moreover, he habitually underrated the opposition he had to overcome. It must also be borne in mind, that, on his arrival in Canada the whole charge of the expedition had been given over to him, and it is to his own want of supervision that any deficiency must be attributed, as his staff was excellent.

There was no consideration more imperatively calling for attention than the means of transport. So long as the force remained in the neighbourhood of lake Champlain the *bateaux* could be used; but when the march forward was to be begun, the supplies had to be carried on wheeled vehicles. Twelve hundred horses had been contracted for in Canada for the expedition. Those for the use of the artillery, 400 in number, were kept apart from those for the transport service. Contracts had been made for the movement of

* There has been exaggeration as to the British losses in this affair. By the official return [Can. Arch., Q. 13, p. 361] the killed were 1 lieutenant, 1 sergeant, 11 privates; the wounded, 1 captain, 2 lieutenants, 19 privates. Total 35. Prisoners, 1 captain, 1 private, 1 surgeon. The prisoner was captain Montgomery, who, on the change of ground, was left behind with his servant and the surgeon. The three were taken on the advance of the congress troops.

stores, but, before the expedition left Canada, the duty was so imperfectly performed that on the 20th of May Burgoyne wrote to Carleton complaining of the desertion* of many of the Canadians who had taken service, and suggested that a larger number should be obtained than the ordinances of the council warranted. He asked for a *corvée* of 1,000 men, with a number of horses, and the men required to drive them. Carleton replied † that it was no more than he expected, and if the government depended upon such assistance, it was not from information received from him. Thus, at this early date the transport service broke down, and it might have been foreseen that the difficulties would increase, as roads had to be cleared, bridges to be constructed, and, the hardest duty of all, the supplies to be carried forward.

Many writers have blamed Carleton for having neglected, during the winter, to organize the supply of horses. Those who so write fail to bear in mind that an advance to the Hudson had never been contemplated by him. The operations he recommended were to establish himself at Ticonderoga, so he could act against the country on the Connecticut, where he would have found the horses necessary for his purpose. When the change of plan was made known and Burgoyne appeared to assume command, the duty of considering the requirements of the campaign was transferred from Carleton to Burgoyne. The notification reached Carleton only a short period before Burgoyne's arrival, and Carleton could not have exerted himself more to supply what was necessary than if he himself had remained the general-in-chief.

The troops left in Ticonderoga, to forward supplies and garrison the fort, amounted to 910 men; the losses at Hubberton and fort Anne, killed and *hors de combat*, to 200 additional, at the lowest estimate.

With this reduction of his force, Burgoyne applied to Carleton to despatch a detachment from Canada, to replace

* [Can. Arch., Q. 13, p. 212.]

† [Can. Arch., Q. 13, p. 222, 29th May.]

the garrison, which otherwise would have to be taken from Burgoyne's army, and, by so acting, increase the strength of the main body in the onward march. Carleton did not feel justified in complying with the request. Writers who narrate Carleton's refusal have given a colouring to his conduct, as if, at least, there was a want of generosity on his part, and in such an emergency, he might have more liberally construed his orders, and have sympathized with Burgoyne's difficulties and given the aid asked.

One strong point to be advanced in opposition to this view is that Carleton had then resigned. We have not the letter in which Carleton justifies his refusal of the request. But we have Burgoyne's reply,* when acknowledging it. Burgoyne there states that Carleton's orders were "too full and precise," for him to give further trouble on the subject. Indeed, Carleton had no alternative but to carry out his instructions, which were imperative as to the number of men he should retain to guard Canada. As a matter of generalship, it was necessary to anticipate attack from any point. The experience of 1775 had shewn where Canada was vulnerable. Any reverse, traceable to the non-observance of Carleton's orders, would have subjected him to the full operation of Germain's malignity. He must, moreover, have felt that he was not justified in cramping the hands of his successor, of whose appearance he was in expectation; and, doubtless from his own experience in 1775, he was impressed with the necessity of a strong garrison being maintained in the province, to prevent a recurrence of the calamitous events of that time. It is possible that Burgoyne, when making the request, knew of Carleton's resignation; he certainly did so a few days later, for he wrote to Germain that as he may be named his successor, he desires in advance to decline the appointment. He also asks leave to return in the winter, and evidently at the end of July thoroughly believed in his ultimate success.

* Carleton to Germain, 27th June, 1777. [Can. Arch., Q. 13, p. 297.]

† Burgoyne to Germain, fort Edward, 30th July, 1777. [Can. Arch., Q. 13, p. 390]

Burgoyne, with the theory of threatening Connecticut, determined upon the occupation of Castleton. It is true that the line of communication from Ticonderoga to Skenesborough passed through this place; otherwise, it was entirely without the circle of his operations. Any movement towards it could only be effected at the cost of great labour on the part of the men, and at the sacrifice of much time. The subsequent disaster at Bennington may be attributed, to some extent, to the attempt made in this direction.

Phillips was sent to Ticonderoga to organize the garrison, and was placed there on duty to reduce to system the transport of supplies to be despatched by lake George to the southern landing. It was not until the 27th of July that the lake was ascended; 26 gun-boats, with 100 men of the 62nd and captain Morin's company of Canadians, the whole under the command of colonel Austruther, constituted the expedition. They bivouacked at 14 mile island, where they killed a great many rattlesnakes.* They arrived at fort George about noon of the 28th. They found the front of the fort on the water side destroyed from the explosion of the magazine. Five vessels, including two on the stocks, had been burned. The congress troops, however, had carried away the flour and provisions and stores, having employed some fifty waggons to remove them. That they were able to carry all this off was owing to the attempt of Burgoyne with regard to the Connecticut country. If, after the action of the 7th at fort Anne, in place of sending Riedesel to Castleton he had established a strong force at the cross road leading to fort Edward and fort George, he would have taken fort George and have succeeded in gaining a large supply of provisions in the position he required it. Probably he would also have obtained horses and waggons, cattle and some prisoners. But

* In the stomach of one of them were found two whole ground-squirrels, on one of which the hair was quite perfect. It appeared to have been swallowed the preceding day, and the act must have been the work of some time, as the mouth of the snake appeared too small to receive the creature. This snake had six rattles. One was killed with thirteen rattles. [Hadden's Journal, p. 105.]

the course followed by Burgoyne gave time for the removal of what fort George contained, and it escaped him.

On the morning of the 12th Riedesel commenced the march to Castleton. The column consisted of Breyman's corps and the Riedesel regiment. They left in *bateaux* to ascend South bay to a small stream known as East creek, which they followed as far as it was navigable, and, marching a certain distance to a saw-mill, bivouacked. No horses accompanied the column; the consequence was that the tents, baggage and provisions were carried by the men over a bad hilly road. The march was attended with great hardship, both in the labour it called for and the privation it exacted. Some of the men, after carrying heavy loads, some for three, others for four days, were without tents; in addition, many were suffering from dysentery.

Riedesel, on his arrival, sent out parties to bring in horses and waggons for the transport of baggage and supplies. He also gave instructions to his officers, to obtain horses to carry their own baggage, independently of those belonging to the division.

On the 15th, Riedesel learned that colonel Warner, some miles distant to the south-east, with from 4,000 to 5,000 men, was endeavouring to strengthen his force. Riedesel desired to operate against him, but he was overborne by colonel Skene, who accompanied the expedition as a commissioner, who desired him to proceed to Castleton and make a list of the loyal inhabitants.

Many loyalists, feeling the protection of the force, came in from the adjoining country and took the oath of allegiance. They received a certificate, as it was considered, for their security. A great number were really loyalist in feeling; many of them, however, were merely spies. They attended for no other purpose than to learn who were not the partisans of congress, and returned to those who sent them to report their names. Many of this character lived in exposed positions. Warner sent out parties who plundered the dwellings of such as were accessible, drove off their cattle, and carried away many of

them as prisoners. Riedesel had pledged himself to protect them, and accordingly, he formed a plan for attacking Warner. With this view he sent his aide-de-camp, captain Willoe,* to Skenesborough, asking for Burgoyne's authority to attack Warner's force. Burgoyne, in a way, recognized the request; but did not grant it his countenance, on the ground that he was about to make a forward movement with the whole army. Riedesel, however, sent out detachments to Wells and Tinmouth. He himself went as far as Rutland. The first party returned with the information that Warner had marched to Manchester, and such of the inhabitants as were supporters of the cause of congress had abandoned their homes, taking with them their furniture and stock. Some cattle were, however, brought in, and also some carts and horses. The second detachment penetrated to within a mile and a half of Warner's camp. It returned with four prisoners and sixty head of cattle. Warner, on hearing of its appearance, immediately abandoned Manchester and retreated to Arlington.

A few days later, on the 24th, Riedesel received orders to rejoin headquarters at Skenesborough to commence the march to fort Edward. It occupied twelve days, during which the troops suffered great privation, and were moreover subjected to no ordinary labour in transporting without horses the tents, supplies and munitions of war. We may ask to what purpose Burgoyne did not dwell upon these operations in his narrative. They were dictated by the theory, which had seized his mind, of the necessity of threatening Connecticut. If any result was effected, it was that of loss and suffering to the loyalists, who, on Riedesel's promised protection, came in and took the oath of allegiance.

Either Vermont should in no way have been occupied, and the general opinion must be, that, in view of Burgoyne's situation, it is the course he should have followed, or, having occupied Castleton and encouraged the royalists to join him,

* Willoe, formerly captain of the 8th regiment, had been in Canada some years. He was sent by Carleton to Riedesel, on his application for the services of an officer with a knowledge of German. [Von Eelking : Riedesel, II., p. 69.]

he should have taken efficient means for their protection, by having made Warner powerless to injure them, as Riedesel proposed. The departure of Riedesel was the abandonment of the territory. His presence had made known those who had adhered to the mother country, and the unfortunate result of Burgoyne's attempt was, that their property was seized, many were carried off as prisoners, and ruin more or less fell upon them.

There has been much written about Burgoyne's want of judgment in advancing from Skenesborough by fort Anne, in place of confining his movement to lake George ; stress likewise has been laid upon the destruction of the road by Schuyler and the impediments thrown into Wood's creek. I have shewn the misconception regarding the latter view. Burgoyne, in justifying his march by fort Anne, on the ground that he did not deem it advisable to make a retrograde movement, has suggested this criticism. There were, in fact, two routes from Ticonderoga to fort Edward, one by lake George, the second by Skenesborough ; and there is really only two miles difference in the length of the road to be travelled. The water communication by lake George is some thirty-five miles ; by the narrows of lake Champlain to Skenesborough the water way is twenty-five miles. From lake George to fort Edward is fourteen miles. From Skenesborough to fort Edward, twenty-six miles. Burgoyne's adoption of the two routes was the one point of good generalship on his part to be commended ; evidently a matter of accident, for, in place of justifying it in his narrative, his tone is that of apology.

His movements had been sufficiently rapid after the abandonment of Ticonderoga, but they had been marred by the fault, committed by him throughout the campaign, of sending a force deficient in strength to undertake the duty imposed upon it. It was the cause of the losses at Hubberton and fort Anne ; it was more disastrously to be felt at Bennington. The occupation of Castleton cannot be blamed for want of activity ; but it was a waste of strength. This

energy should have been shewn in another direction. Had Burgoyne pushed on, and occupied a position to have made any attack at fort Anne impossible, and held the junction of the roads, the movement would have placed him in possession of the left bank of the Hudson.

It is necessary to explain that the road from fort Edward to fort George runs by the Hudson for three miles, to a place now known as Sandy Hill. At this point it is joined by the road from fort Anne, eleven miles distant; the distance to fort George is also eleven miles. There was no impediment to Burgoyne advancing these eleven miles. Holding Sandy Hill, Burgoyne would have equally threatened fort Edward and fort George. The former would have been abandoned, as it was the case when Fraser took possession of this point, twenty days later.

No argument is permissible that the condition of the roads made such advance impossible, for a force did reach fort Anne on the 7th, and the congress troops retreated by the road to the north on the 8th. The connections were then open, and it was Burgoyne's hesitation to advance in this direction which suggested the creation of obstacles to his march; and when the latter had to some extent been formed, they were removed in a few hours.

The force was ready to move from Skenesborough on the 23rd of July, when the advance guard, under Fraser, took possession of fort Anne. The baggage and provisions were placed in *bateaux*, with a sufficient guard, to ascend Wood's creek. The main body did not move until the 25th, when it reached fort Anne, and Fraser proceeded seven miles farther, to Jones' farm. A Canadian officer, lieut. Etherington, was left as provost-marshal at Skenesborough. On the 28th, Fraser moved up to the junction of the roads, and on the 29th advanced to fort Edward. The congress troops had evacuated the fort on the 23rd, as Fraser appeared at fort Anne. On the 31st Burgoyne was at fort Edward, and there dated his general orders.

Thus it will be seen that with all the impediments which

are so much dwelt upon as retarding Burgoyne's advance, the want of transport, the absence of horses and carts, on the twenty-third day after the surrender of Ticonderoga Burgoyne's force had reached the Hudson and was in possession of the country. Up to this date the losses in killed and wounded did not exceed two hundred of all ranks, a loss attributable to his own miscalculation as to the strength of the force to be engaged. But it must be added that, by good judgment and generalship, Burgoyne might have attained the position fifteen days earlier.

Nevertheless, with the full consideration of Burgoyne having failed to avail himself of the opportunities offered to him, he was in a position which, on commencing the campaign, he could not have hoped to reach. He had looked to find Ticonderoga vigorously defended, and he could not have anticipated that within a week from the period of appearing before the fort, it would have been evacuated.* He could not possibly have counted on the weak resistance he had experienced, and his most sanguine view could not have imagined a result more favourable than that within a month from the day he had commenced active operations on lake Champlain he should have swept away the force opposed to him, and with his army be encamped upon the bank of the stream which lay before him, as the Rubicon was of old looked upon by the greatest of Romans. For, once crossed, the Hudson had to be left behind in one continued career of success and triumph; if re-crossed, it could only be with danger, disaster and disgrace.

It was at this period that the murder of Miss Jane McCrae called forth the greatest indignation. Her fate was published throughout the continent as a record of Indian barbarity, and every exaggeration was employed regarding it, to awaken anger and indignation against the mother country. Burgoyne's unfortunate proclamation in which he had threatened

* In his letter of the 19th of May, from Montreal to Germain, Burgoyne states that he expects to find Ticonderoga strongly defended, likewise that armed galleys would be present on lake George.

"to give stretch to the Indian forces to overtake the hardened enemies of Great Britain and America" countenanced this view, and had even furnished ground for declamation in England. The death of this unfortunate young woman proved to be one of the incidents in this unhappy war, by which the passions of men were excited and their judgment bewildered. With all its melancholy features it was most favourable to the cause of congress, as it could be adduced by them to substantiate the assertion, that the Indians had accompanied Burgoyne in order to devastate the settlements.

The facts of the case, denuded of the romance which has been spread over them, are really very simple. They are narrated by Wilkinson in his memoirs; and he was near the spot at Stillwater a few weeks after the event, and, from his position as adjutant-general to Gates, had an opportunity of learning the truth.

Miss McCrae, described as "a country girl of an honest family in circumstances of mediocrity, without either beauty or accomplishment,"* living in the neighbourhood of fort Edward, remained behind at the evacuation of the place on the 23rd of July. Her own family were on the side of congress, for her brother was a surgeon's mate in the army. Miss McCrae herself was attached to a royalist officer named Jones, present in Burgoyne's army with a provincial corps, and her feeling was doubtless with her lover. By all account she was engaged to him. Probably her design, on the occupation of the fort by the British force, was to join, perhaps to marry him. It was subsequently said that the Indians had been sent by Jones to conduct her within the royalist lines. There appears to me really no ground for this story; for, had such been the case, she would by this means have possessed a certain protection. The more likely explanation is that given by Wilkinson, that, as the congress troops retreated, the advance guard of the Indians pressed forward to seize what they could lay their hands upon. Miss McCrae was taken prisoner by one of the three parties, and forced to accompany

* Memoirs I., p. 234.

her captors. The men stopped with their prisoner at a spring by the roadside, where a quarrel arose as to her possession. It may have been her personal possession. Miss McCrae's character, however, was unimpeachable. The details of the facts were never correctly known, but one of the Indians present, whether the number was two or more, whatever the impulse, in frenzy of fiendish passion, cleft her skull with a tomahawk.

The highly melodramatic incidents related in connection with her death, the harrowing features of which were introduced to establish the remorseless cruelty of Burgoyne in turning bands of Indians through the settlements to devastate them, arose from Gates' letter on the subject. Burgoyne had written, to remonstrate against the cruelties shewn to the wounded prisoners taken at Bennington. Gates answered by a fabulous narrative of Miss McCrae's death, so as to silence Burgoyne and awaken the sympathetic indignation of every supporter of congress.* But the truth is now established, and so related by historians of reliability that there is no ground for belief of the horrible incidents which have been connected with the unhappy girl's death.†

Previous to entering upon the further narrative of the campaign it is expedient to notice the charge brought by the followers of lord George Germain against Burgoyne, that he owed his defeat to having cumbered himself with an unneces-

* "After general Gates had written his letter to Burgoyne he called general Lincoln and myself into his apartment, read it to us, and requested our opinions, which we declined giving, but being pressed by him, we concurred in judgment that he had been too personal, to which the old gentleman replied with his characteristic bluntness, 'By God, I don't believe either of you can mend it,' and thus the consultation terminated." [Wilkinson, I., p. 271.]

† One of the statements published in United States biographies is that she was to be immediately married on reaching the camp, the Baroness Riedesel and lady Harriet Acland having "good-naturedly consented" to be present at the wedding. As lady Harriet did not join the camp until the beginning of August and Mme. Riedesel arrived only on the 14th of that month, Jane McCrae being killed on the 23rd of July, the story with these embellishments has not even the probability of being true. Her death was, in reality, one of those painful incidents of war which remain inexplicable, but, which, furnishing ground for romantic narrative, get distorted as the fancy of a writer may suggest.

sary amount of artillery, and that his movements were impeded by his guns. Indeed, writers have stated, that it was from the labour occasioned by their transport, that he failed in his attempt to reach Albany. The supposition is equally foolish and unjust. When Burgoyne started, it was his belief that he would have to besiege Ticonderoga, and it is absurd to suppose that such operations could be conducted without artillery. Those familiar with this history may bear in mind that it was at this spot in 1758 that Abercrombie failed in his attack on the French lines, from not being so provided.* His artillery was of use to Burgoyne, in every hour of his advance on the west bank of the Hudson. In his narrative he enters into elaborate explanations on the subject. There was an attempt in the committee of the house of commons to elicit testimony unfavourable to Burgoyne, but it entirely failed. Carleton, in answer to a question on the subject, said, "The artillery I had prepared for the campaign, on a supposition I was to go myself with it, in concert with general Phillips." The officers examined gave their evidence, without exception, as to its essential requirement. Lord Balcarras, captain Money, lord Harrington,† major Forbes and lieutenant-colonel Kingston, all bore testimony to the necessity of guns being taken with the army. Captain Bloomfield, of the artillery, justified the composition of the force in this respect. Indeed, no part of the expedition had been more carefully considered, and the attempt to bring discredit on Burgoyne on this account resulted strongly in his favour.

An extraordinary feature in this campaign was the want of secrecy attendant on its operations. Before Burgoyne arrived in the country, its details had been publicly discussed. Burgoyne himself wrote to general Hervey, complaining that a paper was published in Montreal setting forth "the whole design of the campaign almost as accurately as if it had been copied from the Secretary of State's letter." He

* Ante., Vol. IV., p. 158.

† He pithily remarked "that cannon always create a delay with which armies have been content to put up." [Statement, p. 58].

declared that his own caution had been extreme, and he was confident that Sir Guy Carleton had been equally discreet. The blame must accordingly lie with lord George Germain or his confidential assistants. As there is no ground for the belief that there was disloyalty on the part of the latter, the fact must be attributed to the indiscretion of Germain himself. There were still sympathizers with the revolutionary cause at Montreal and Quebec, many having returned to the province, and any facts, affecting the interests of congress, were certain immediately to be made known. The same want of prudence was observable in the field. Madame Riedesel who, as a young girl in the Seven Years' war, lived in military circles, remembered the secrecy with which everything had been conducted. The contrary was the case in Burgoyne's camp; she found that the officers' wives knew everything that was to happen. Such reports were rapidly transmitted to Gates' head-quarters. Thus, while Burgoyne had the greatest difficulty in obtaining intelligence of any character, his own movements, even his plans, were unfailingly communicated to those against whom he was acting.

CHAPTER VIII.

The month of August had now arrived, the hottest period of the year. The British army was encamped on the east bank of the Hudson, amid scenery which to this day preserves much of its charm. Then its sylvan character was in perfection. The forests along the banks were of the brightest green, and the one trace of civilization was the narrow, winding roads following each side of the stream, with the enclosure of fort Edward on the eastern bank, and some stray marks of settlement here and there. The river was fordable at fort Edward, an island lying in the centre. For six miles the Hudson descended with a somewhat accelerated current until the short stretch of rapids intervened at fort Miller for the reach to be gained, which, from its calm surface and freedom from movement, had obtained the name of Stillwater. On the 9th of August Fraser advanced with the light division to this spot. He was accompanied by Baum and the Brunswick dismounted dragoon regiment. Burgoyne remained at fort Edward. There was a building called the Red House which formed the head-quarters. A little society met at this spot, which, for a few weeks, made life very pleasant. It was certainly "the torrent's smoothness ere it dash below."

The baroness Riedesel writes that three happy weeks were passed here. Of the number was lady Harriet Acland, a daughter of the first lord Ilchester, who had married major Acland of the 20th. She had accompanied her husband so far in the march, when Burgoyne, whose good nature was the great charm of his character, suggested that madame Riedesel should be sent for. Captain Willoe accordingly went to Three Rivers, and brought her and her children to Ticonderoga. On the 14th she drove over in a *calèche* from the head of fort George to fort Edward. The other ladies were Mrs.

Harnage, the wife of a major of the 62nd, and Mrs. Reynal, the wife of a lieutenant. There was another lady, the wife of a commissary, if Madame Riedesel is to be accepted as an authority, whose relations with Burgoyne were those of extreme intimacy. Madame Riedesel had one room in the Red House, occupied by herself, her husband, and her children; the female servants slept in one of the entrance halls. "When it was fine weather," the baroness tells us, "we took our dinner under the trees, otherwise in a barn upon planks laid upon casks, which served for a table. It was here that for the first time I ate bear's meat, and found it excellent. Often we were in want of everything; nevertheless I was very happy, for I was with my children and beloved by those around us. If I recollect rightly there were four or five aides-de-camp with us. In the evening cards were played; during this time I put my children to bed." *

Up to this date Burgoyne had experienced no reverse, and had been even favoured by fortune; but events were now shaping themselves to cause anxiety as to what the future should prove. Great stress is laid by writers on the difficulty of moving provisions, as if an army in the field constantly finds it a perfectly simple matter to obtain supplies. If there is a truth taught in history, it is that one of the main considerations affecting an army is, how it is to be fed: how the men and horses are to be sustained in their strength. The support of the latter was one of Burgoyne's greatest difficulties. As the congress troops retired, the inhabitants were forced to leave with them; and what could not be taken away was destroyed. Consequently, hay and oats had to be brought forward from Canada for the horses. There was but indifferent pasturage to be obtained in the neighbourhood, and the animals were greatly dependent on this transported provender.†

* Berufs-Reise, p. 131.

† A tradition of those revolutionary days has been preserved in the nomenclature of those pests of agricultural life the so-called "Hessian fly" [*Cecidomyia destructor*] and the "Canada thistle" [*Cnicus arvensis*]. It has been asserted that

Stringent orders were given as to the load the carts should carry ; nevertheless, they were constantly breaking down. The limit of 800 lbs. was assigned as a maximum in provision, baggage and ammunition. The explanation of the failure in transport was, that the weight was greatly increased by additional personal baggage being improperly placed on the load. An order was issued that when such was found, it was to be taken out and burned. Severe punishment was threatened to all contravening the regulation, and no carts should be used but for the public stores. There is an extraordinary order of Phillips reprobating the use of thirty carts taken to convey Burgoyne's personal effects.*

they were unknown in the United States until this transportation of forage to sustain the German contingent in New York for the Hessians, and on the Upper Hudson for the army of Burgoyne : that the *puparia* and seeds were enclosed in the hay, and finding life in the place of deposit they rapidly spread throughout the country. There is a *consensus* of opinion that both were introduced from Europe.

Much has been written upon the subject. The "Hessian fly" appears to have first appeared to attract attention in Long Island in 1779, and the probability is, the name was given in connection with the Hessians, as a representative term of a pest. The tradition, however, that it was introduced by them, although not perfectly sustained, is at the same time not disproved. It must be borne in mind that the transports conveying these troops sailed, not from Germany, but from England. It is difficult to find any positive opinion on the subject more than that pernicious insect found its way from Europe.

The so-called "Canada Thistle" is in no way indigenous to this country, and, doubtless, was likewise introduced from Europe. There is nothing to guide us as to the manner in which it reached the northern part of this continent. As it advances southward it loses its power to produce seed, and is unknown in the extreme south. No inquiry has been made, so far as I can learn, as to its first appearance on this continent, and I cannot trace a single fact to connect its acclimation in the state of New York with Burgoyne's expedition. The tradition however exists, that it owes its origin to that occasion, and the term has become current in some parts of northern New York, and not, very wisely, has been accepted in the province of Ontario. Nevertheless, to call this troublesome weed by the name of "Canada Thistle" is simply a botanical calumny.

* Rogers' Hadden, p. 314. It is so remarkable that I deem it proper to include it here :

"August 19th, 1777. Major-general Phillips has heard with the utmost astonishment, that notwithstanding his most serious and positive Orders of the 16th Instant, that no Carts should be used for any purpose whatever, but the

It was this pressure in bringing forward provisions and forage that led Burgoyne to undertake the expedition to Bennington, which ended in disaster, and was the first step towards the unfortunate termination of the campaign. It is not an easy task to extract the truth from the contradictory statements which remain for our guidance. Burgoyne was most anxious to vindicate his character with regard to this expedition. He produced his elaborately written instructions to shew he had considered the most minute detail, and the passages are preserved which he added and changed. It was this passion for writing, and posing as a *littérateur*, which was one of the unfortunate defects of his character. He was always striving for effect. The proclamation issued by him on his entering on the campaign was deficient in judgment, and led only to severe criticism and ridicule, even on the part of his friends, while it failed to impress those it was designed to influence. In this case elaborate instructions were an incumbrance. What was required was the selection of a proper officer, who, placed in command of force sufficient to carry out the duty assigned him, was made clearly to understand the objects to be attained and the difficulties he had to encounter, the conduct of the expedition being left to his intelligence and courage. On the other hand, these long

Transport of Provisions, unless by particular Orders from the Commander-in-Chief, &c., &c., as expressed in the Order, there are this day about thirty Carts on the Road loaden with Baggage, said to be the Lieutenant General's.

"Major General Phillips being perfectly acquainted with his Excellency's Sentiments upon this subject, that he would on no account suffer his private conveniency to interfere with the public Transports of Provisions, to the great amount of it, if true, as it has been reported, is sure his Excellency will mark the strongest resentment at this very indecent disobedience of General Orders.

"The Major General orders the Commanding Officer at *Fort George* to make a most strict report how this could possibly have happened after the Orders had been given out, to send the Name or Names of Persons, who ordered these Carts to take Baggage, and unless it is an Order of some superior to the Commanding Officer at *Fort George*, he ought not to have suffered such a Transaction.

"The Report to be made immediately and these General Orders to be given out directly as a strong reproof to those who have been guilty of this shocking neglect to the public Service; and to mark that the General Officers of this Army do not mean to countenance such Conduct."

instructions have this advantage: any success gained can be affiliated to them, and, in case of failure, it can be shewn that the reverse was caused by their non-observance. It is not the first time that this alternative has been presented; it may be safely asserted it will not be the last.

Burgoyne's case is elaborately presented in his "State of the Expedition." There is much skill shewn in his defence. His endeavour is to establish that he was not responsible in the three prominent points: the plan of the expedition; the choice of its leader; the number and constitution of its force, and its conduct. We have in these pages all that can be presented in his favour. This volume was published in 1780, and found its way to New York, where Riedesel was at the time on service with the army, having then been exchanged. Consequent upon its receipt, and hearing from a German officer, captain Cleve, lately arrived from Germany, that there was doubt whether or not he was the actual author of the affair at Bennington, he considered it his duty to define his own position in relation to it. It may be proper here to remark that this explanation was accepted by duke Charles William of Brunswick, with the remark that, however valuable, it was unnecessary to Riedesel's justification, as the country had sufficiently exculpated him.*

Burgoyne assigned the cause of failure entirely to the manner in which his instructions were carried out. In a private letter to Germain, he complained that colonel Breyman, when sent to the relief, marched at the rate of two miles an hour, and he traced the suggestion of the expedition originally to Riedesel, and also the special employment of the officer selected. There was no doubt truth in the statement to this

* This document was not generally known until the publication of Von Eelking's "Riedesel's Leben und Wirken," 1856. It is to be found in appendix Vol. III., pp. 210, 211. It is known to English readers by Mr. Stone's translation. Albany, 1868, Vol. II., p. 259. The published documents connected with the affair are the instructions of Burgoyne to Baum; the reports of Baum and Breyman: the letters of Riedesel, with the report by the congress general Stark to the state of New Hampshire. They furnish the means of giving a narrative of the event.

extent, that Riedesel had recommended an expedition, but it was not of the same character. Riedesel, when at Skenesborough, after his return from Castleton, pointed out that, being dependent on the boats for provisions, when separated from them, one-half of a regiment was employed in carrying food for the other half, and the movement of the troops was slow and scattered. The army, consequently, was unable to profit by the panic into which the congress force had fallen, as shewn by their retreat. The loyalists dwelling upon the land, who, at present, were intimidated, could in a short time provide the army with its requirements, if it were possible to appear from time to time in different places, in sufficient strength. But as the army was incapacitated from advancing, the force opposed to them sent out detachments that ruined the good roads, and it was only with difficulty those which were bad could be travelled.

Riedesel recommended the use of pack-horses for the baggage and tents, to march on the flanks of the regiment, and do away with all vehicles, except for the provisions which could only be so carried, and the ammunition carts required by the artillery. By these means strong parties could be moved rapidly forward. It was his opinion, that in three or four weeks horses could be obtained within a circle of fifteen miles. There were no troops on the other side of the Connecticut, and that country was full of horses. There was scarcely an inhabitant who had not two or three. He recommended that the dragoon regiment, with Peters and Jessup's provincial corps, and thirty of the regular force, the whole under the command of a staff officer, should be sent to the Connecticut river to take the horses required, leaving a written acknowledgment for any horse so impressed: on its presentation, five or six guineas should be paid for the animal taken. The detachment could at the same time bring in waggons of provisions drawn by oxen. By these means the horses necessary to mount the dragoons and for the service of the officers could be obtained, the pack-horse animals being taken from the horses brought from Canada.

It was also Riedesel's view that Baum should march by Castleton, and he himself, watching the movement, would, by getting to the rear of any attacking force, be able to protect him. Burgoyne rejected the proposition, on the ground that the troops were greatly fatigued and, moreover, that he had determined, without delay, to march forward. When on the Hudson, Burgoyne learned that there was a large amount of provisions with many horses to be obtained at Bennington. This place had been made a deposit for flour and cattle, and, according to his information, was imperfectly guarded by militia only. He was also told that there was a strong loyalist feeling among the inhabitants, who would welcome the presence of a loyal force. Burgoyne's adviser was major Philip Skene, also called governor Skene, as he had been appointed in that position over a tract of country about Ticonderoga, extending to the Connecticut, and indefinitely westward. He had seen some service as a captain of the 27th Iniskillings, and had been present at Ticonderoga on Abercrombie's attack of July, 1758; the subsequent year he was with Amherst. At a later date, he directed the settlement at the south of lake Champlain, and had shewn enterprise and judgment. It was he who drew Burgoyne's attention to the opportunity offered of obtaining horses for the cavalry and a supply of forage and cattle. He had been appointed a commissioner to administer the oath of allegiance. When the expedition was determined upon, he was instructed to accompany Baum to aid him in distinguishing "good from bad subjects," and to procure intelligence; and the failure of the enterprise in the shifting of blame was to some extent subsequently attributed to him.

Bennington is situated at the forks of the Hoosic river, about twenty-four miles from the Hudson, to the south-east of Batten Kill,* the mouth of which was on the ground occupied by Fraser. The road from the Hudson to Bennington lay through thick woods and was, moreover, in bad condition.

* The Dutch word for Creek.

It was by this one line of approach that Burgoyne had determined to make the attack. The date of the first proposal of Riedesel, the 22nd of July, and that of Baum's advance, the 16th of August, must be remembered, there being nearly an interval of a month between them. At the former date, the feeling of depression caused by the loss of Ticonderoga and the affairs at Hubberton and fort Anne had not passed away. During the intervening period, great exertions had been made by congress to restore confidence. Reinforcements had been sent to the northern army; the militia of New Hampshire had been called out, and was in the field; and the national spirit had been powerfully appealed to.

On the 31st of July, Riedesel left fort Anne where his division was stationed, to proceed to fort Edward and pay his respects to Burgoyne. The latter, after thanking Riedesel for his memoir, added, that he had not immediately replied to it, for he then considered that the time had not arrived for carrying out the course suggested. Riedesel, with deference, pointed out, that although the circumstances were not the same, he still thought that Baum could be sent in the direction indicated, if another corps was despatched to operate against Warner at Manchester. Burgoyne objected to send Baum so far back. Warner, he had heard, had gone to Bennington, and Baum, by taking so long a route, could not return in time to take his place in the march forward, which could not be postponed. Riedesel then replied that it was necessary to decide whether Baum should be sent to collect horses and oxen or to fight the enemy; and that a detachment would certainly be sent against him from Albany, and perhaps prevent his attempt. If Baum was to assume the offensive against Warner, he had nothing to say against it. Burgoyne tapped Riedesel's shoulder in a friendly manner, and answered "With one blow I will kill two flies. I have news that St. Leger is before fort Stanwix, and is besieging it. As, from want of provisions, I cannot advance with the whole army, it is my opinion that Baum's march will create such uneasiness

with the enemy for his left wing, that it will prevent him sending any aid to fort Stanwix.”*

Riedesel joined the headquarters at fort Edward on the 2nd of August. When he waited upon Burgoyne, the latter verbally expressed his views of the manner in which Baum should carry out the expedition, and requested Riedesel to draw up the instructions in accordance with what had been said, and to send them to him for revisal. Riedesel placed in form these orders, as those of his superior officer. As he subsequently remarked, these instructions were described in the evidence of colonel Kingston in the house of commons as his original conception and as written by him,† though subsequently revised by Burgoyne; whereas he simply expressed the views of his commanding general. The paper was personally given to Burgoyne, who returned it to Riedesel with the amendments. So rectified, the instructions were drawn up, and translated; and the original was given to colonel Baum.

Some days elapsed before the expedition could be carried out. Unexpected hinderances arose. A detachment had been ordered from Fraser's corps; but it was found that it could not be given. The Indians were dissatisfied, and objected to march, and horses were not available for transport. With that tendency to do something which might be considered clever, Burgoyne on the 14th gave instructions for a bridge of rafts to be formed above Batten Kill, over which Fraser and his division passed to the western side. By Burgoyne's calculation it was a diversion which would prevent troops being sent against Baum. But the bridge was so hastily, or imperfectly constructed, that it was carried away; and Fraser

* “Der General Bourgoyne klopfte mich mit lächender Miene auf die Schulter und sagte “Mein Freund, ich will mit einer Klappe zwei Fliegen schlagen. Ich habe Nachricht, dass der Oberstlieutenant St. Leger vor Fort Stanwicks ist und dieses belagert. Da ich nun wegen Mangel an Lebensmitteln mit der ganzen Armee noch nicht vorrücken kann, so ist meine Idee; dass der Marsch des Oberstlieutenant Baum dem Feinde eine solche Jalousie auf dessen rechten Flügel gebe, damit er verhindert werde einen Succurs nach Fort Stanwicks zu schicken.” [Von Eelking III, pp. 212-13].

† “Dass es die Gedanken des General Riedesel wären und welche der General Burgoyne auf einen halbgebrochenen Bogen mit gegengesetzten Bemerkungen unter dem Titel: *his Amendments* in seiner Piece anführt.” [Von Eelking, III., p. 213.

had to repass the river in boats.* It was not until the 14th that Baum marched from the Hudson.†

* Lord Balcarras' evidence. State of Expedition, p. 9.

I deem it proper to give, in a brief form, the instructions as they were finally received by Baum.

The object of the expedition was stated to be "to try the affections of the country" to obtain a mount for the dragoons, to complete Peter's regiment of provincials, and obtain large supplies of cattle, horses, and carriages.

The troops were to take no tents, and officers' baggage was to be carried on their own bat-horses.

The detachment was to take post at Arlington, and wait there to be joined by Captain Sherwood's corps of provincials from the south, thence to proceed to Manchester; the Indians to be detached to Otter Creek. On receiving intelligence that no enemy was in force, to cross the mountains to Buckingham on the Connecticut river, the most distant limit to be reached; to remain there until the objects of the expedition were fulfilled, then descend the Connecticut to Brattlebury and march away.

The detachment to bring in horses to the number of 1,300, more if necessary, saddles and bridles, waggon, carriages, draft oxen, cattle fit for slaughter excepting milch cows, which were to be left for the use of the inhabitants. Receipts to be given for such cattle except when the property of "rebels." Regulations were laid down with regard to the property to be obtained, and for certain military precautions. Skene was "to assist with his advice to help to distinguish the good subjects from the bad" and to procure intelligence.

Baum was to represent that his corps was the advance guard of a body passing through Connecticut to Boston, to be joined at Springfield by a body of troops from Rhode island. It was left to his discretion to act, in case of attack, should the army first reach Albany; notice would be given of the direction to march, all persons in the service of congress to be made prisoners.

Such was the complicated duty entrusted to Baum, with a mere handful of men to carry it out.

These instructions are published with the sentences excised by Burgoyne printed in italic, and his additions similarly distinguished in a parallel column, conveying the idea that the original draft must be affiliated to Riedesel, whereas the whole conception of the expedition was that of Burgoyne himself.

† So far as the composition of the force can be made out, for there is no regular state to refer to, it was constituted as follows :

Brunswick troops, the Dragoon regiment, all ranks.....	234
Detachments from the Grenadiers, the Rhetz, Riedesel and Specht regiments.....	128
Hanau Artillery.....	12
Fraser's corps of sharpshooters.....	374
The regiment of Peters and Loyalists [about].....	61
Canadians.....	150
Indians, about.....	61
	100
Total.....	746

It is necessary to classify the dragoons as distinct from the other Brunswick corps, owing to their equipment, and when that is considered, the folly of selecting them for such an expedition will be better understood. Their uniforms consisted of long heavy jack boots with immense spurs; thick leather breeches; gauntlets; a huge hat which carried a large tuft of feathers; a heavy cavalry sword, the German "Pallasch;" and hanging down from the side, a short carbine. The immense pig-tail was not wanting to swing around the back. It is even an effort of imagination to suppose any one so accoutred, in the state of New York in August, the hottest month of the year, attempting a weary march through the woods. We read how this accoutrement was the good tempered jest of the army. The hat and sabre of the dragoon were looked upon as equal in weight to the arms and dress of a British infantry soldier; and it was considered that the worst marchers in the army would pass over two miles, before the dragoon could accomplish one. The selection of men so accoutred was enough to ruin any expedition, because it was their pace which would govern the whole.

It must also be remembered that each man had to carry his own rations.

As the detachment was about starting, Burgoyne rode to the spot and verbally changed the order he had given. He had become impressed with the idea that Bennington was the place to attack, as it was there that the provisions were stored, and he personally gave instructions for the march to be made direct to that spot. Crossing Batten Kill, Baum took the road through the wood to Bennington. On the 12th he came up with a party of congress troops; they were repulsed, and eight prisoners taken, and some provisions seized. He continued his advance, and on the following day, the 13th, he was informed that the magazines were defended by the militia, amounting to from 1,500 to 1,800 men, in a bad state of discipline, a large number among them devoted to the royal cause. He was further told that on his approach they would doubtless abandon the congress ranks and join the king's

troops. Baum accordingly sent a report to Burgoyne of his progress, adding that he was proceeding directly to Bennington. Burgoyne replied, approving of the course taken, and directed Baum to obtain reliable intelligence of the strength and position of the enemy, before determining upon any attack. Baum, accordingly, halted within four miles of his objective point.

At six o'clock on the morning of the 15th, Burgoyne received a report from Baum dated the 14th, to the effect that it had been his intention to march upon Bennington, but he had been attacked by a force of 700 men, whom he had driven off by a few cannon shot. He had had intelligence from prisoners and royalists that 1,800 men were in a fortified camp at Bennington, hourly expecting reinforcements, and consequently, he expected to be assailed by overwhelming numbers. This force, so reported, was the militia assembled under the command of Stark. Burgoyne immediately gave the order to Riedesel for Breyman's corps to march to Baum's support. The corps was at Douart's house, thirty miles from the position held by Baum.*

Before any assistance could reach him, on the morning of the 15th, a large number of persons approached Baum's camp. They were not in uniform, being mostly in their shirt sleeves, each with a long fowling-piece. Baum, who spoke English imperfectly, who knew nothing of the colonial character, and could not tell friend from foe, was informed by the provincials present that these men were royalists, having joined with a friendly intent. Major Skene, who was there to counsel him, gave the same assurance; consequently, a large number of these new comers, to all appearance carelessly established themselves on the grass without interference. They subsequently proved to be the company of colonel Nicholas, whom Stark in his report described as having been despatched by him with 280 men to get in rear of Baum's left wing, while colonel Henrick with 800 men had been

* This house was situate in the present village of fort Miller, 2½ miles above where the troops crossed the Hudson.

ordered to place themselves in his right rear. Of a sudden, an attack was made on Baum's force, which was repulsed without difficulty. Following it, on a given signal, a general attack was vigorously made from the front under Stark,* in which those who had gained the rear, and had been regarded as friends, for they had assumed the same distinctive mark on their hats as worn by the provincial royalists, actively participated. Owing to their having been allowed to take up their position without interference, they had managed to introduce themselves in large numbers between the German force and the few provincials, Canadians and Indians, posted in the neighbouring buildings. The surprise was so great that the latter sought safety in flight. For two hours, with the Brunswickers alone, Baum kept up this unequal fight, contending against continual attacks of overwhelming numbers. Twice his men attempted to force their way through the mass, but their

* There is an accepted narrative that Stark addressed his force before the action. "Come on, my lads; we shall either beat the British or Molly Stark will be a widow this night." Mr. de Fonblanque gravely records it in a note. [Life of Burgoyne, p. 273.] Unfortunately for the story, the lady's name was not Molly. It was Elizabeth. She was the daughter of Caleb Mills of Dunbarton, New Hampshire. The tradition was, however, too good to be lost, so a local poet, I have the pleasure of preserving his name, the Rev. J. P. Rodman, has commemorated it in his "Battle of Bennington."

"The morning came—there stood the foe;
 Stark eyed them as they stood;
 Few words he spoke—'twas not a time
 For moralizing mood:
 'See there the enemy, my boys—
 Now, strong in valor's might,
 Beat them, or *Betty Stark* will sleep
 In widowhood to-night.'"

[Notes, Queries and Answers, p. 15.] Edited by Dr. Webster of Norfolk, Virginia, published in Manchester, N.H., 1882.

Stark himself was from a north of Ireland family. His brother William, a loyalist, according to Sabine [p. 630], had served in the French wars, and was present at Louisbourg and Quebec. He obtained the rank of colonel in the British provincial service. He is represented as having been killed at Long island by a fall from his horse. He endeavoured to influence his brother to take the same side. His name appears among the proscribed of New Hampshire, and his property was confiscated.

ammunition failed them, and no further supply was obtainable. The dragoons now endeavoured to cut their way out with their swords, the infantry with the bayonet, but the attempt was in vain. Baum fell to the ground mortally wounded with a bullet in his body. The artillery lieutenant Back, and the British engineer officer Durnford, were both placed *hors de combat*. Hardly pressed, without leaders, with no ammunition, the small force was no longer capable of resistance. Those that remained of the 400 men were broken and dispersed. Those not killed were made prisoners; only nine of Baum's corps regained the British camp, and the remainder were included in the column "of whose fate there is no account," so given in the official return.*

When, on the receipt of Baum's letter, on the night of the 14th, Burgoyne sent his aide-de-camp, sir Francis Clarke, to Riedesel to despatch Breyman's corps to sustain Baum, Riedesel dwelt upon the danger of Baum's position, and counselled that he should receive orders to retire until he met Breyman's corps, and then, united with him, continue the advance and act according to circumstances. He sent captain Gerlach to Burgoyne, to receive his further orders and communicate them to Breyman; but the suggestion was not adopted. Burgoyne's reproach of Breyman's slowness of march and want of proper conduct, contained in his private letter to Germain, remains a portion of the history of that disastrous expedition.†

In his general orders of the 26th of August, Burgoyne declared that he had no reason to be dissatisfied with the personal spirit of the officers or troops. He describes the event as "a little success," which the enemy severely felt.‡

* "Anzahl derjenigen deren Schicksal man nicht kennt."

† The passage is still quoted in vindication of Burgoyne, "Had my instructions been followed, or could Mr. Breyman (who had been sent with the Brunswick chasseurs to support colonel Baum) have *marched at the rate of two miles an hour*, any given twelve hours out of the two and thirty, success would probably have ensued—misfortune would certainly have been avoided." De Fonblanque, p. 273. Private letter to Germain of the 28th of August.

‡ He attributed the failure to the department of intelligence, an evident allusion

Breyman received his orders at eight o'clock. His force consisted of 22 officers, 53 non-commissioned officers, and 567 privates, making a total of 692 of all ranks. At nine he commenced his march. He could not obtain sufficient horses for the guns he was taking with him, so he had to place two ammunition chests on the artillery waggon. No forage had been provided for the horses; the men carried their own provisions, with 40 rounds of ammunition.* It rained heavily. The march was commenced by wading through Batten Kill, as no bridge had been thrown over the creek. There were many hills; many stretches of the road were swampy, in which the artillery and the caissons sank to be immovable; so that the horses had to be unharnessed, and the guns forced through the swamp, and up the hills, by the men. Scarcely half a mile an hour could be made. An additional trouble, traceable to the insufficient preparations, presented itself, by the upsetting of the ammunition cart. We are in possession of Breyman's report, and can fairly judge the circumstances in which he was placed. Fraser, on hearing of Baum's position, proposed that his division should be sent to sustain Baum. Burgoyne objected, on the ground that he would not risk its loss. We may ask why Fraser's corps was not sent forward with that of Breyman's, in force sufficient to extricate Baum from his dangerous position. It suggests the question why so weak a force was sent in the first instance. Burgoyne was unmistakably told that resistance was to be looked for, but he had formed the opinion that the presence of Baum's force would be sufficient to call forth the loyalist spirit, and that any effort of resistance would be impotent. The selection of Baum as a leader, with

to Skene. He pointed out the want of supply of ammunition as a misfortune caused by providence. He ascribed the slow movements of Breyman to bad weather, bad roads, and tired horses, so that the succour arrived too late.

* Breyman's report is to be found in von Eelking's "Leben und Wirken; Riedesel," III., p. 194. It is given in Mr. Stone's translation, Vol. I., p. 256. The want of proper means of transportation is described by himself. "Ich brach deshalb um 9 Uhr auf und liess annoch, da kein anderes Fuhrwerk vorhanden war 2 Munitionskasten auf die Artilleriekarren legen, und setze mich in Marsch. Jeder Soldat hatte 40 Patronen in der Tasche."

the heavily accoutred dragoons, also shows the extent to which Burgoyne failed to understand the duty he was imposing upon the detachment.

Another unfortunate incident was that Breyman's guide lost his way; but it is not impossible that he intentionally led the detachment in a wrong direction. A second guide had to be found. The consequence was that on the evening of the 15th Breyman had marched only eleven miles, to within seven miles of Cambridge, towards Bennington. Breyman, accordingly, sent word to Baum by one of his subalterns, lieutenant Hanemann, to inform him of his position. Hanemann returned on the morning of the 16th. It must be remembered that Baum was not attacked until about nine of that day, and, had a properly constituted force been sent forward to have been followed by a reserve with the guns, it would easily have made the junction with him.

Early on the morning of the 16th, Breyman continued his march, but the artillery horses, being unfed, could scarcely draw the guns. Major von Barner was accordingly sent forward to impress fresh horses. He returned about twelve, when the march was continued. About two o'clock Breyman received a message from Skene to send an officer and twenty men to a place known as Saint Coyk mill, to take possession of it, as it seemed likely to be attacked. At a quarter past four, Breyman reached the mill. No sound of musketry or cannon had been heard by him. Learning that Baum was only two English miles distant, Breyman proposed pushing forward to join him. Skene coincided with this view, and Breyman received no notification that any attack had been made upon Baum. If Skene knew that it had taken place, he concealed the fact. Indeed, in view of the attack on Baum, it is difficult to explain Skene's presence at the mill, for he had been sent with Baum's expedition as an adviser.

Breyman had marched about 1,000 paces over a bridge in his front, when he observed in the bush a considerable number of persons in their shirt sleeves and waistcoats, all armed.

Breyman asked Skene who they were, and received for reply that they were royalists. Skene rode towards them and called out to them, when they commenced firing. Breyman detached von Barner to ascend the height, while he took ground to the right. The fight then commenced, and lasted until eight o'clock. A block-house held by the congress troops was attacked; they were driven out of it by the fire of the guns, and, although reinforced, were unable to regain it. Breyman continued the fight while his ammunition lasted, and kept the numbers against him at bay. As he had no means of longer holding his ground, he determined to retreat. The artillery horses being all dead or wounded, he was compelled to leave his guns behind. He carried off the wounded to the extent he was able, and, reached Cambridge at midnight, breaking down the bridge behind him, at which place he established himself. At daybreak of the following morning he started for the Hudson, which he reached with the remainder of his force. His loss of all ranks was 20 killed, 69 wounded and 142 missing. The latter fact is somewhat inexplicable, the number of killed and wounded being reported. It may be inferred, that the missing were cut off and unable to retreat with Breyman; although, subsequently, many found their way to the Hudson, the greater part must have become prisoners.

The congress troops obtained, with their prisoners, the arms and equipments of Baum's corps, 374 men of all ranks, and those which fell into their possession after Breyman's retreat. They also held as a trophy the four guns. Baggage there was none.*

* The precise amount of Breyman's loss is given in the state of the 16th of August, viz. 20 killed, 69 wounded, all of whom returned with the regiment, and 142 missing, five of whom were officers. Added to the missing of Baum, 365, including the killed of his division, the total number with the twenty killed of Breyman's corps would be 527 killed, missing and prisoners. Many of the missing, according to Burgoyne, found their way back to the camp. Possibly some few may have deserted. Stark's account of 200 killed, a large number of wounded and 700 prisoners, is certainly an exaggeration. The loss I consider may be set down at between 400 and 500 men; for in the affair at Bennington the casualties

I have given the narrative of this affair as fully as I am able to do from the documents at my disposal. There has been great misconception concerning it, for it has been magnified in the description given of it, as if it had been a sharply contested battle. In reality, both in the attack upon Baum and Breyman, it was an affair of militia without uniforms, who by false representation of their character, through the incapacity of Skene, obtained a favourable position in the woods, from which they were able to surprise their antagonists. Baum's force of 646 men and 100 Indians had reached a locality, of which the only knowledge possessed by him was what he looked upon. In this position he was surrounded by numbers skilled in the use of firearms, who fired from the forest to shoot down his men. He could only last while his guns could be served, and when his ammunition had been expended, all hope of his safety passed away. His force was in every respect badly supplied, for there was no reserve ammunition. The same remark applies to Breyman. Burgoyne should have detached 2,000 men at least, fully supplied, to have made opposition impossible. The expedition was a series of mistakes ; in the choice of a leader, the strength of the detachment, its constitution, the orders given, the object to be attained. Moreover, in the hour of difficulty Baum was sustained by the badly organised force of Breyman, weak in every element by which success could be secured.

But if the action in itself was only a skirmish in the woods, no event during the war was more productive of important results. The success, although but moderate in the advantages gained, obtained, from the description given of it, an impor-

were almost entirely with the Brunswickers ; certainly a serious reverse. It was the custom of the congress officers to overstate numbers, or to reduce them as it was favourable to them, for the purpose of influencing opinion. There is a letter from Washington to the congress general Clinton, in which, after stating that he had sent Morgan's corps of riflemen, he adds, "I should think it would be well even before their arrival to begin to circulate these ideas (their usefulness as a counterpoise to the Indians) with proper embellishments throughout the country and in the army, and to take pains to communicate them to the enemy ; it would not be amiss among other things *to magnify numbers*." Wilkinson Memoirs, I., p. 226.

tance it is scarcely possible to exaggerate. Its tendency was to raise the spirit of the people from despondency to the hope and expectation of triumph. It was a lesson learned, not to be forgotten; it taught the mode how Burgoyne's march could be opposed. Ticonderoga, Hubberton, the skirmish at fort Anne, the abandonment of fort Edward, were all forgotten. The people breathed a freer air. There now arose a feeling of confidence, the prospect of success. The troops, hitherto so much feared, were no longer dreaded as invincible. They had been defeated in the field, and there was the trophy of hundreds of prisoners, arms, dress, accoutrements and cannon, to shew those who were battling for the cause of congress what courage and determination could effect.


Two immediate consequences followed: the royalists, who, had there been a further reverse affecting the congress troops, would have been numerous in their self-assertion, were once more intimidated to silence. Many, under the depression they experienced, even changed sides; and Gates, in command at Van Schank's island, at the junction of the Mohawk with the Hudson, where Schuyler had fortified a position with the design of awaiting Burgoyne's attack, advanced up the Hudson and established himself at Behmus heights, within intrenchments, in a position to undertake offensive operations when expedient. Bennington was in every way a moral triumph, as it was a success upon the ground. It instilled courage and enterprise where there had been want of faith and hesitation of purpose. It was the first step in the failure of Burgoyne's expedition, a reverse attributable to his perverseness, his want of judgment, and the defect of not possessing the high qualities and genius of a great general.

CHAPTER IX.

The disaster at Ticonderoga, followed by the defeat at Hubberton, with the failure to oppose the advance of Burgoyne to fort Edward, had, with the supporters of congress, given rise to serious fears for their ultimate success. The reverses experienced the previous year in Canada and New York, the knowledge that Howe's army, attended by the fleet, was steering by cape May toward the Delaware, filled the country with dismay. It was a crisis in the history of the revolution which a man of genius, at the head of the councils of Great Britain, would have directed to the re-establishment of the unity of the empire. A continuance of these successes would have made the effort of congress impotent, and further recruiting of its force in the field impossible. It is true that no policy on the part of the imperial government would have changed the embittered feeling of the partisans of unconditional independence ; but the moderate party would have gained strength, and the loyalists, with the numerous class still devoted to connection with the mother country, would have received encouragement to act unmistakably as their sentiment suggested, and to throw their strength on the side of conciliation and peace. Unhappily, the ministers were North and Germain, the generals Howe and Burgoyne.

The reverses experienced by congress were attributed, especially by the extreme party, to the incapacity and want of courage of the officers in command. The New England leaders, in their virulence, ascribed the disasters to the worst influences. Their passions, ever active, found vent in groundless suspicions of treason, and Schuyler, a man of undoubted honour, was the particular object of their unjust whispered accusations. The first impulse of this excited feeling was to





*Skeleton Map
of part of the Upper Hudson to illustrate
attempt to mark Burgoyne's positions
and battle grounds from
13th September to his Surrender
on the 19th of October.
1777*

recall the northern generals, and to institute an inquiry into their conduct. This step was checked by Washington, who pointed out that if it were carried into execution, the whole northern army would be left without officers. He himself retained confidence in Schuyler, and with this sentiment took steps to reinforce the force under his command. Two brigades stationed in the Highlands to resist any advance on the part of Howe, now that his vessels were seen approaching Chesapeake bay, were ordered to join Lincoln's command, which was increased by Morgan's rifle corps. Arnold received orders to proceed to the north. Owing to Massachusetts influence, Lincoln with his force was moved to Albany. Congress called upon Washington to name the general to be placed in command of the whole; he, however, declined this responsibility, and congress, to a great extent influenced by New England feeling, selected Horatio Gates as general-in-chief.

Gates receives favourable mention neither from United States writers, nor from those of the land of his birth, England. Indeed, his name does not appear in modern British biographical dictionaries. Very little is known of his youth, although there is every probability it was passed in the mother country. His name came into prominence a few years back, owing to the publication of some additions to Horace Walpole's diary. In the debates of the house of lords on the 16th of February, 1778, a letter from general Gates to the earl of Thanet was read, which attracted Walpole's attention. He recorded in his diary, that the maid of Walpole's mother was the friend of the housekeeper of the second duke of Leeds, who took great notice of Walpole when a boy. The housekeeper, when advanced in life, had married a young husband, and Horatio Gates was the offspring. By these circumstances, before he was ten years of age, Walpole became Gates' god-father, hence his name of Horatio. There is nothing otherwise known of Gates' parentage.*

* "Journal of the reign of King George Third from the year 1771 to 1783. Edited by Dr. Doran." Vol. II., p. 200. Feb. 16th, 1778. Walpole was born

Gates was fairly educated. We first hear of him as aide-de-camp to Cornwallis in Nova Scotia in 1750.* He was then in his twenty-second year. We know he was in London in 1754 by Horace Walpole's diary.† He accompanied Braddock to Monongahela and was present in the action of the 9th of July, 1755; his name appears in the list of wounded as captain Gates of the independent company of New York, which position he held in 1757.‡

In the expedition against the West India islands, undertaken from New York in 1762, Gates, then major, served as an aide-de-camp to Monckton, and was present at the conquest of the islands of Martinique, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent. He afterwards proceeded to England, and for his services obtained substantive rank in the army, receiving a commission in the Royal Americans, the present 60th, as major. After the peace he left the army, and in 1772 emigrated to Virginia, where he purchased an estate in Berkeley county, beyond the Pine ridge.

It is asserted that he formed some intimacy with Washington on the Braddock expedition. Both were provincial officers and must have had much in common. Gates' own career, however, explains his acceptance of the colonial cause. Although he had served with the imperial force, he had been present as a provincial officer, and little personal to himself had happened to encourage any feeling of devotion to the mother country. He had passed many years in New York: it was in the American provinces that he had lived,

in 1717, this date sufficiently accords with his age of ten years at the time of Gates' birth, 1728. Gates died in 1806 at his place in New York, approximately the corner of 2nd avenue and 22nd street, then part of the turnpike road.

* Cornwallis to Lords of Trade, Halifax, 16th Sept., 1750. [Nova Scotia Arch., p. 627.] "There is a profit arising from the delivery of this [Rum and molasses] called Eighths . . . which I gave between Mr. Bulkely and Mr. Gates who acted as my Aides-de-camp for the severe fatigue I [they] underwent for six months having no Salary allotted to them."

† When the news of Washington's defeat at Great Meadows, in 1754, reached London [Ante, III., p. 455], Horace Walpole informs us, "The Duke of Newcastle summoned one Gates, a very young officer just returned from Nova Scotia."

‡ N.Y. doc., Vol. VIII., p. 244.

and there his early friendships had been formed. United States writers trace to the influence of Washington his presence in the colonial ranks. One of the main causes for the disfavour shewn to Gates in modern history is his defeat at Camden, in 1780, by Cornwallis, and the part taken by him in 1778, with Samuel Adams, Mifflin and others, in the attempt to have Washington displaced from the command ; a movement which signally failed. Although there is nothing to warrant the mention of Gates' name with very high laudation, at the same time there is no just reason for the exaggerated depreciation of his career and character, which is constantly to be met in United States biographies.

The letters of Burgoyne to Germain of the 20th of August, one official and one private, after the disaster at Bennington, shew that he failed to estimate the true character of that event. He was never far-seeing : he had neither the wisdom to profit by an unlooked-for success, nor the prescience to forecast the serious consequences which would follow an occurrence, apparently simple, but fraught with many possibilities. It was no light matter to him, that the cause of congress should arise from deep depression into hopefulness and resolution. As he was circumstanced, all that was in his power was to make the best of his failure. But with his opponents, it offered the means of appealing to the national spirit. The reverse at Bennington, bad enough with regard to Burgoyne in its best aspect, was magnified by those who had gained the day to a great victory. Indeed, we still hear of the "battle of Bennington," as if it had been a decisive action between two large armies. But with all its apparent insignificance, its importance was immense. It destroyed the theory in the invincibility of the British troops, a belief which had become general after the reverses of 1776 and the early months of 1777, and imparted a feeling of confidence and faith in the future which more or less prevailed during the contest.*

* Gates, in a letter to Washington of the 22nd August, after describing the condition of his force, writes, "Upon leaving Philadelphia, the prospect this way

The headquarters of the continental army had been stationed at Van Schank's island, opposite to the junction of the Mohawk with the Hudson, the "Half Moon" as it was called, nine miles north of Albany. The last few miles of the Mohawk run in a continuous rapid, and any passage of the river at this spot is impracticable. Schuyler, who was in command, had fortified the southern end of the island against an attack by boats ascending the river, and had erected strong fortifications to command the narrow passage between the high hills and the water. He was, however, superseded by Gates in the general orders of the 20th of August.

Gates, in view of the increased confidence now everywhere felt, determined upon an advance towards fort Edward. On the 8th of September he left his position for Stillwater, which he reached on the following day. The work of intrenchment was commenced. As the lines were being laid out, it was found that the ground was unfavourable, in parts open to attack, and liable to be enfiladed from a neighbouring height. The position was therefore abandoned, and one chosen between two and three miles in advance at a place known as Behmus heights.* It was taken possession of on the 12th, and the work of fortification and intrenchment immediately commenced, with very strong *abatis* thrown up in front. From the difficulty of bringing artillery against it through the heavy bush, the position was exceedingly strong. The defences were planned by Kosciusko, then a young man, who twenty years later obtained renown in the Polish cause. Had this movement not been made, the struggle would have taken place at the mouth of the Mohawk.

There is no trace in the subsequent writings of Burgoyne that he recognized the evil consequences of Baum's defeat. To the last he justified his conduct, maintaining that as a general in command he had been sent to carry out what was in itself an impossibility, and that his orders were so positive

appeared very gloomy, but the severe check the enemy have met with, at Bennington and Tyron County, have given a more pleasing view to public affairs."

* I follow the spelling of Hildreth.

he had no alternative but to obey them ; that no one in his position could have overcome the insuperable impediments to his advance. He claimed the highest merit for his generalship. To this day, from time to time, persistent efforts are made to redeem his memory.

If he failed to see all the perils which the destruction of his detachment had created to his detriment, his letters suggest that he felt the danger of his situation. He had heard nothing from Howe, with whom he was ordered to co-operate. He had sent messengers to communicate with him, and he believed that two had been hanged. In his despatch to Germain he reported the failure and death of Baum, with the loss of 500 men killed and taken, and Breyman's failure to relieve Baum in his difficulty. He dwelt upon the efforts necessary to bring forward his supplies, from the fact, that not more than one third of the horses contracted for had arrived. The heavy rains had told upon the roads, so that ten or twelve oxen were required to draw a single *bateau*. It had been this difficulty of moving his stores that had led him to make the attempt on Bennington.

In his private letter, all his anxieties came to the surface. He justifies the small number of Baum's detachment, by the necessity which would have arisen of opening out roads, had he despatched a larger force, and he throws on Riedesel the responsibility of advising the enterprise. He asks Germain to be his advocate with the king, and to the world, in the vindication of his plan.

For the first time, he wrote that the prospects of the campaign were less favourable than he had described them. He had doubt of sir John Johnson's expectations with regard to the rising of the loyalists. He had abandoned hopes of St. Leger's success. He now recognized that the great bulk of the people was with congress ; that their measures were executed with secrecy and despatch. Whenever the king's forces appeared, 3,000 or 4,000 militia were present to oppose them. These troops brought with them their subsistence, and when the emergency was passed they returned home. The

cattle and provisions were driven and carried away before him as he advanced, so that he would make no movement without portable magazines. He was in no communication with Howe; the one letter he had received from him was from Pennsylvania, telling him that when in Albany the movements of the enemy must guide his own; that Howe had expressed the hope that the enemy would be driven out of New York, before any operation would be undertaken in Connecticut. No movement had been made in Burgoyne's favour. The highlands had not even been threatened, so Putnam had been enabled to detach two brigades to Gates' army, who was in his front to oppose him.

"Had a latitude been left in my orders," continued Burgoyne, "I should think it my duty to wait in this position, or perhaps as far back as fort Edward, where my communication with lake George would be perfectly secure, till some events happened to assist my movement." He proceeded to say, that his orders did not permit him to remain inactive, and that so soon as he collected twenty-five days' provisions he would advance. After describing the critical nature of his undertaking, exposed to attack on all sides by hosts of enemies, his communication with Canada cut off, he pointed out that he had the resource left of fighting his way back to Ticonderoga. He had previously written confidently, because he never considered that he would have been left unaided, to work his way through such a tract of country, or that he would have been forced to garrison Ticonderoga.

There is something even touching in the letter of Burgoyne, when it is considered by the light of after events. No modern writer, in possession of the documentary evidence now available for reference, could more correctly or more forcibly describe the situation of the British force. Had Burgoyne possessed moral courage to the extent he was personally fearless and undaunted in danger, he would have recognized the pressure of the circumstances in which he was placed. He would have seen that the true policy was to hold the country he possessed, and not embark in the desperate venture of

going forward to almost certain destruction. But his mind was without the vigour to elevate him above the narrow view of duty, that his orders left him no discretion. The campaign establishes that as a leader and commander of men, Burgoyne could not rise above mediocrity. It was the extent of his mental capacity, apparent in all he undertook, in his so-called poetry, his *vers de société*, his prologues, his imperfect knowledge of French, and in the dramas which bear his name. With all the varnish attained by mixing in good society and taking part in public business, his character was commonplace, and his abilities of a narrow grasp. He started on the expedition with insufficient means. The preparations made by Carleton had been with the view of operating against Connecticut, not of descending the Hudson. The change in the plan of the campaign had been brought to Canada by Burgoyne himself. If not conceived by Germain, it had been advocated and enforced by him as a minister, and so communicated to the king, to become a dogma with that obstinate monarch. In London it had received Burgoyne's full support, and he had arrived as the general-in-chief to carry out the expedition. The previous arrangements of Carleton had to be considered under this new aspect of affairs. It was Burgoyne's duty to have examined into their character and extent, and to have clearly determined if they sufficed for the enterprise he had to carry out. Several weeks intervened before his departure, during which time he could have supplemented the requirements which remained unprovided.

The fact, however, is forced upon the student of the period, that Burgoyne was not one to remedy any deficiencies in an organization. What was of greater moment, owing to his vanity he was incapable of recognizing his own defects. His success in life had blinded him to his true qualities. He had reached the belief that, to use the French phrase, a dangerous situation could be overcome by some *tour de force*; and that a few epigrammatic sentences were potent to establish a reputation. Thus, the judgment he really possessed had become enslaved by his self-complacency, and he was led to reject

advice and to assert himself, often unwisely and often at the wrong period. What was a further disadvantage to him was that his good manners and commanding presence gave a dignity to his utterances, which intrinsically they did not possess.

Nevertheless, it is not possible to refuse our sympathy to Burgoyne, whatever the mediocrity of his character and his faults in the campaign. He felt that his whole future depended on his success, that lord George Germain's favour or disfavour would determine his future career; there was, therefore, every inducement to persevere in an undertaking that had the weight of Germain's advocacy. The venture might be desperate, but in the circumstances in which he was placed success was indispensable to him, in what form soever it could be attained, and however great the risk, he felt that he must persevere in the duty allotted to him.

In private life Burgoyne was an honourable man, with generous impulses allied to the vices of the fine gentleman of the time, then looked upon as a claim to social distinction. His courage was of the highest order. But with characters so constituted, everything ranges round self; it is the common failing of this class. Burgoyne, in the consideration of his own advancement, had no thought for the men under his command; they were mere pawns in the game, and with little qualm he could see them swept from the board, provided he remained the winner. The fact will become more plain as we witness the closing scenes of his disaster. Burgoyne felt the almost hopeless character of the duty he had to carry out; nevertheless, he determined to go onward, trusting to some fortunate chance to achieve a favourable result. Above all, he had special reliance on his own dauntless courage.

The precise date when Burgoyne heard of St. Leger's retreat cannot be established. In his letter of the 20th of August he had ceased to hope for any good effect from the expedition. St. Leger's report of his retreat is dated Oswego, the 27th of August; it is probable the news of his failure came to the Hudson early in September.

Burgoyne having, in his letter to Germain, pledged himself to advance as soon as the provisions could be obtained in sufficient quantity to last thirty days, completed his dispositions to effect this purpose. A corps of sharpshooters was formed under captain Fraser ; it consisted of sixteen men from each of the five British regiments. They were picked men, to act with the Indians. The artillery was moved up from fort George and encamped two miles in the rear. Additional *bateaux* were brought from lake George to fort Edward and placed in the stream, and then portaged over the short rapids at fort Miller to the lower navigable waters. Three hundred men arrived from Canada to join the several regiments, and they were daily drilled and practised in firing with ball cartridge. The troops were mustered by companies, and the condition of the men medically examined, to determine, in each case, the capacity to bear the fatigues to be endured. Those on the sick list were inspected, so that none really without health and strength should take part in the forward movement, while the convalescents were ordered to join the ranks.

These preliminaries having been gone through, the necessary quantity of supplies gathered, the *bateaux* placed on the lower waters to carry the *impedimenta* down the stream, Burgoyne recognized that the hour had come when the halt should cease, and orders were issued for the march to commence. He had remained at fort Edward, from the 31st of July to the 12th of September.

On Saturday, the 13th of September, at seven in the morning, the right wing crossed the bridge of boats, constructed about 1100 yards above Batten Kill. The other divisions followed on the succeeding day.* Madame Riedesel has related, that in the first instance it had been resolved that the ladies should be sent back to Canada, and it was only on their pressing solicitation, that they were allowed to accompany the expedition. They were often badly enough provided, but

* The force that crossed the Hudson consisted of :

British.—The 9th, 20th, 21st, 24th, 47th (6 companies), and 62nd Regiments ;

they were always satisfied with what fell to their lot, and that they were allowed to be present. They were sustained by the thought of certain victory, and that they were travelling to the promised land. Burgoyne shewed no sign of his anxieties as they crossed the Hudson, and, with his usual gaiety, heightened their courage by the exclamation "Englishmen never retreat." "So," the lady adds, "we were all in excellent spirits." *

The passage having been made, the troops encamped on

Grenadiers, 10 companies; Light Infantry, 10 companies; Royal Artillery, 257; Recruits for the southern army, 150; Fraser's sharpshooters, 50.

Brunswick force.—The Regiments of Rhetz, Specht, and Riedesel; Breyman's Grenadiers; Jägers, about 40; dismounted dragoons, 40.

The Regiment of Hesse Hanau. Pausch's battery of artillery.

The Provincial corps, consisting of about 200.

The Canadian corps, under captains de Boucherville and Morin.

The total amounting to 6,300.

To the above number must be added the non-combatants; sailors with the *bateaux*, Canadian drivers, artificers, about 300. Deducting the artillery, additional gunners, servants and batmen, the fighting force in the field of all ranks would amount to about 6,000 men.

The guns and ordnance consisted of—

2 light	24	pdrs.	} Brass.
4 medium	12	"	
18 light	6	"	
2 howitzers	8	in.	
4 "	5½	"	
6 light	3	pdrs.	
1 "	12	"	

Also 2 mortars	8	in.	} Brass.
4 "	5½	"	

—
Total, 37 on travelling carriages.

It is not pretended that these figures are precise; they may, however, be accepted as being generally correct.

[Rogers' Hadden's Journal, pp. 152–156]. There were several women who accompanied the expedition. The regulation established was, that the number should consist of three to a company. An attempt was made in the house of commons to shew that the order was departed from, but it failed in proof. The evidence was direct that it was not broken through, and that the presence of the women was not considered an impediment. If there were any above the number, they were supplied from the rations of the men. According to United States returns, the total number of rations supplied to the women who accompanied the expedition to Boston, officers wives included, was 297: being 215 to the English, 82 to the German troops.

* Und als wir den Hudsonsfluss passirten und der General Burgoyne sagte: "Die Engländer weichen nie zurück!" so wurden wir allen frohen Muths [p. 163].

the ground extending to the Fish Kill within two miles of the creek. Burgoyne established his headquarters at Schuyler's house, situate south of the creek, which, with the mills, barns and garden, occupied some extent of cleared ground. A detachment of 200 men was quartered in the out-buildings as a guard.

The following day, the 14th, fell on a Sunday, perhaps one of the reasons why no movement took place ; the small army remained stationary, and an examination was made as to its condition.

On Monday, the 15th, the bridge was broken away and all communication was cut off from lake George and Ticonderoga, and the march forward was commenced. An advance of three miles was made when Dovegot's farm was reached, and the force encamped at this spot in one line. The supplies were taken down the Hudson on *bateaux* guarded by the 47th and two regiments of Brunswick infantry. The artillery followed the main road, while Fraser's corps, with the right wing, took the route through the thick woods.

On the 16th the two armies were about five English miles apart, and the bugle calls of the troops in the congress camp could be distinctly heard. A reconnaissance was made in force to learn the strength of the position. All the generals were present. The column consisted of the half of Fraser's corps under major Acland, the second brigade of the left wing, with the 9th and 62nd under Anstruther, and the Specht and Hesse regiments under von Gall. Two corps of workmen, each 100 men strong, followed the division, provided with the necessary intrenchment tools. As the force approached one of the creeks, they found the bridge broken ; it was repaired. The road led to Dovegot's house. On crossing the bridge the force separated. The first division passed to the house ; the second followed the road, both being about two and a half miles from the English camp. About eight o'clock the force returned. No enemy had been seen. About ten o'clock the following morning, the 17th, some of the men, accompanied by women, went beyond the encampment to a potato field.

While engaged in foraging they were fired upon by a congress picket, when some were killed and some taken prisoners.

On the 17th, at ten o'clock, the army resumed its march, following the direction taken the preceding day. There was again no interruption, and at six o'clock the columns reached Sword's farm, which adjoined Dovegot's farm. The force was here intrenched, and it had reached a distance within three miles of the congress camp. A deserter came in, who gave the intelligence that the design had been formed of attacking the camp. The posts were accordingly strengthened, and a large body of men kept under arms until daybreak. The night, however, passed quietly away.

The bridges had been broken, and it was not possible to continue the march without replacing them. The main road by the Hudson had also been made partially impassable, and had to be re-established before it could be followed by the artillery ; consequently no advance was attempted. On the 18th Burgoyne ordered a way to be cut through the thick woods, and some works to be constructed for the protection of the force. During the day, some demonstration was made against the left wing, which, engaged in the reconstruction of the bridges, had somewhat advanced its position. Riedesel was in command, with the Brunswick regiments. The attack was not made in force, and was without any effect. On the right wing, orders had been given that no useless shot should be fired, and everything remained quiet. Towards four o'clock a large body of the congress troops became visible, some regiments having established themselves near a clearing at the corner of the wood.

Gates occupied the high land approaching the river known as "Behmus' heights," protected by intrenchments. His camp followed the contour of the high land for three-fourths of a mile to a knoll occupied by his left ; a deep ravine, closely wooded, ran almost parallel to his intrenchments. The extremities were defended by batteries. The intermediate distance was without works, but the approach was made difficult by *abatis* of logs and fallen trees. A battery was placed

at an opening in the centre. The ground to the left was level and to some extent cleared ; on the right flank, on the low ground near the river, were some fields imperfectly cultivated, on which any hostile movement was impeded by stumps and the fallen timbers. Freeman's farm was at this spot fronting on the road. The thick bush made it impossible for the position to be reconnoitred. When the march of Burgoyne's army was made on the 19th, it was directed towards the left of the congress camp. It would seem that this direction was followed accidentally, and not with the design of attacking the height to the left of the camp, on which the intrenchments were imperfect. It was subsequently known that had the artillery gained possession of it, the whole position could have been enfiladed.

The night of the 18th passed quietly ; the troops, however, had remained under arms prepared for any attack. On the morning of the 19th, as the pickets brought back the report that there was no appearance of any enemy in front, it was resolved to continue the advance. The point reached on this day was to prove the limit, beyond which Burgoyne was fated not to pass. Fraser's column was on the right, consisting of the grenadiers, the light infantry, and the 24th. He was followed by the Brunswick grenadiers and the light battalion under Breyman, and eight 6-pdrs. The centre column, under Hamilton, consisted of the 9th, 20th, 21st and 62nd, with six 6-pdrs. Burgoyne remained with this division. The left column, under Riedesel, moved along the road at a short distance from the river. His column consisted of the remaining Brunswick troops and the artillery. The 47th, with the few provincials, marched close by the water to protect the *bateaux*. Riedesel sent forward the Hesse Hanau regiment to occupy the heights by Sword's house, to cover the advance, with orders that when the troops had passed the spot, this detachment was to form the rear guard.

On a cannon shot being fired, the march was simultaneously commenced by the three columns. The left column, that of Riedesel, passed over the first of the newly constructed

bridges to what was known as Taylor's house, when a halt was made, in order to render a boggy place passable. While they were occupied at this work, about one o'clock, the report of firing was heard, evidently in the direction of the second division, shewing that it was engaged.

This column had reached a ravine with a run of water sufficient to turn the saw-mill erected there. The bridge which crossed it had not been destroyed, so the corps passed to the opposite side and gained the height. It being now twelve o'clock, a halt of an hour was made, and during this time several shots were exchanged by the advanced sentries.

The fact, that the British force had struck their tents and were on the march, was known at Gates' headquarters at eight o'clock. Morgan had consequently been ordered out with his regiment to harass the advance, and by this time he was in position beyond the ravine. On Burgoyne's march being resumed, his advance picket of 100 men came in contact with Morgan's regiment, and from being unable to withstand so preponderating a force, was driven back and major Forbes in command was wounded. The battalion of light infantry was sent forward from the right, and its support allowed the picket to retreat safely. The whole force was now halted, when firing commenced without orders from the British line, by which some of the picket were killed. About two o'clock the line had arrived opposite Freeman's house. As it was from this place that Forbes had been attacked, the guns were turned upon it. When it became plain that it was no longer occupied, the troops passed over a small bridge, and advanced to enter a woody spot beyond it. The wood was held by congress troops in great numbers, who made a vigorous attack on the British; this fusilade was continuous for three hours. Five companies of the 24th were sent towards the wood, but having failed to dislodge those holding it, an attack was made with the whole regiment, which succeeded in driving out the troops in possession. The efforts of the congress force were now concentrated against the 62nd regiment, and the guns attached to that corps. Of the 22artil-

lerymen serving them, 19 were killed by sharpshooters. Lieutenant Hadden, in command, applied for some infantry to continue to work them, when captain Jones of the artillery was ordered with his men to take the guns in charge.

During the whole time of the action, the congress troops received constant reinforcements. The scene of the contest was within so short a distance of Gates' camp, that fresh troops could immediately be marched to the ground to follow up the attack. In consequence the guns were silenced. Jones, in command, was mortally wounded, and was carried off the field. The 62nd again attempted to drive back the masses before them, but entirely failed ; and in the attempt lost several prisoners, who in the retreat had become separated from the main body. The loss of this regiment, out of about 350 men, was 187 killed and wounded, and 25 missing. Hadden, now in charge of the guns, was ordered to bring them off ; but the hill on which they were stationed, with the guns, had to be abandoned. At this crisis the 20th were pushed forward into the wood, and succeeded in repulsing the assailing force, thus saving the rear of the 62nd.

On the left, Riedesel, hearing that the firing became more lively, while he continued the work of repairing the road, brought up the Rhetz regiment to be available in case of emergency. He sent two companies to march by another route to the opposite side of the morass, to establish a better communication with the centre column. General Phillips, in command of the heavy artillery, had remained in the rear of Riedesel's division, and, as the heavy firing continued, he rode forward and joined Riedesel. After conferring with him, Phillips undertook himself to ride to the main body and learn the character and extent of the attack. The bridge being made passable, Riedesel sent intelligence of the fact to the centre, and he, with his division, advanced over it. He had not proceeded four hundred yards, when it was found necessary to re-establish a second bridge, and a halt was again made. The work was proceeding, when brigade-major Bloomfield came with a message from Phillips, that the Brunswick

light infantry, with the advance guard of the right wing, had been warmly engaged, and had retired in good order, and that a general action was expected to come on.

Bloomfield had, himself, been instructed to bring up some heavy artillery to protect the right wing. The fire of musketry still continuing, Riedesel sent Willoe to general Burgoyne for orders, and placed his troops in a position to be secure from attack. It appeared to him essential to hold the ground between the two bridges, as the safety of the army depended on this position, for it was the key to retaining possession of the artillery and the supply waggons. He accordingly occupied the ground near Taylor's house with the Riedesel regiment and two 6-pdrs.

The firing continued until four, when Willoe returned with the order, that Riedesel should secure his position at the river as best he could, and with the remaining troops fall upon the right wing of the congress troops. Riedesel, with his own regiment, two companies of the Rhetz regiment and two guns, passed over the bridges, leaving brigadier Specht in command, with instructions that in case of need he should be sustained by the 47th.

Riedesel, after marching a mile and a half, came to a height from which he could see the condition of the struggle. The attacking force was posted in a corner of the wood, its right protected by a trench by the side of a morass, with strong *abatis*. There was a cleared piece of ground before the wood, where the British line was formed; it was here that much of the previous struggle had taken place. The left flank of the right wing held it in possession, being sustained on the right by the corps of Fraser and Breyman. The 9th regiment remained in reserve.

The conflict was raging severely, for strong reinforcements had been brought up against the three English regiments, the 20th, 21st and 62nd. They had suffered greatly, the artillery accompanying them had been silenced. Riedesel immediately with two companies attacked the enemy on the right flank, with drums beating and a loud hurrah. Some of his force he

sent to the rear of the trench, who delivered so well directed a fire upon the column then preparing to attack the troops in front, that the consequence was, it paused, staggered back and retreated. The British troops, seeing this flank movement, pressed forward resolutely in front with the bayonet. Pausch at this time coming up with his two guns of the Hesse Hanau battery, opened fire, and then placed himself with the British line.

A bridge admitted communication with the rear of the British position, and Riedesel galloped towards it to put himself in communication with Burgoyne. From this point he sent orders to his detachment to cross the morass, and join the British line. With much effort the movement was gallantly made, and an effective flank fire delivered upon the assailing force. The British, now joined by the Brunswickers, with a loud cheer pushed forward with a charge, and drove back all that was before them in disorder. It was the close of the action. Some congress regiments endeavoured to outflank the right wing, but they were driven back by Breyman, and after some stray shots the whole retired.

It was now becoming dark, being about seven o'clock. After the action, one hundred dead were found upon the field; the wounded and many of the dead had been carried off.* According to German writers, Fraser's division, with

* Von Eelking, Riedesel II., p. 151; according to this statement, the loss of the congress troops, killed and wounded, may be estimated at 500. Wilkinson, in his memoirs, [p. 247] gives the loss as 65 killed, 218 wounded and 38 missing, of whom 15 were killed. Total 321. No attempt can be made to reconcile this difference. No detailed returns are given of the losses of the British on the 19th of September. We learn, however, by a letter of brigadier McLean to Carleton from Ticonderoga, 30th of September [Can. Arch. Q. 14, p. 192] that an express had arrived from Burgoyne reporting the action. The bearer, a Mr. Phillips, had stated that the action lasted from noon till dark, that only three British Regiments could be brought into action, and that the loss was 150 killed, among whom were 9 officers and 350 wounded. The 62nd had 160 dead and unfit for service, and the 20th and 21st had greatly suffered. This statement being official may be regarded as correct.

Colonel Kingston, in his evidence before the house of commons, described the total loss of killed, wounded and missing, rather more than less than 500. He specified the British loss at 76 killed, 240 wounded, 38 prisoners, making a total of 354.

Breyman's regiment, followed up the retreating congress troops, but was recalled by Burgoyne. The British force bivouacked on the ground, and from that circumstance claimed the victory. It was so dwelt upon in general orders, so reported to the commandant at Ticonderoga and to Carleton, and writers of the present day still speak of the affair as a victory. If we examine the consequence of the attack, it is not easy to find any warrant for it being so regarded. Burgoyne left his previous encampment with the design of moving forward another stage towards Albany; at a certain point in his march his further advance was impeded by the force in his front, and although his assailants, after a severe struggle, were finally repelled, Burgoyne's progress onwards was definitely stopped, for he never proceeded a rod beyond where the action was fought. The "Battle of Stillwater" is the high-sounding name given to it.

So serious an affair was entirely unexpected. Burgoyne anticipated opposition to his march by some flying columns, and his measures were taken to guard against such an attack; moreover, he knew that the intrenchment of the congress troops lay directly in his front. As the firing was heard at Gates' headquarters, additional troops had been rapidly sent forward to sustain the attack. Wilkinson describes the number present as 3,000. Whatever the strength in the field, the whole weight of the attack was borne by the 20th, 21st and 62nd, with 48 men of the artillery. The 9th, for the greater part of the time, was maintained in reserve. Riedesel came to the ground only about four o'clock, when the assault was made by him from the left flank. The right flank of the British force was only partially engaged, and took no decided part in the attack on the centre. It was stated by colonel Kingston before the house of commons, that the total number of those who bore the brunt of the action was 1,100, and it was against this force that the whole strength of the assailants was directed for three hours. It therefore followed that their losses were unusually severe.

The action was fought under the conditions sought by the congress troops, in the thick woods, where the musket, the only weapon they possessed, was most effective. On any advance of the British they retired, again to come forward to deliver their volleys, and they were in such force that their fire was most telling. If their tactics failed in effecting a decisive result, it was owing to the high discipline of the British line.

It ought to have been plain to Burgoyne's mind, that farther advance by his force, through the thickly wooded country, was not possible in the face of the opposition he was certain to meet. It was one of those crises which occur in the lives of men in prominent positions, when the future remains to be moulded by their own judgment and wisdom. Fortune to a great extent controls the fate of every man, from the condition of his birth to his last hour ; few however will deny that much, in the career of us all, depends upon our judgment, abnegation, constancy of purpose and rectitude of character. One of the misfortunes we often meet is, that many men assume duties of trust and importance, which in quiet and ordinary occasions they may creditably perform, but when the hour of tumult and trouble arises, they fail deplorably. It was the case with Burgoyne. He had received a lesson of unmistakeable teaching. He had in six days advanced some five miles ; his march had been withstood in a manner so resolute that it should have been plain to him he could not proceed farther, without the certain danger of being attacked at any hour with overwhelming odds ; he had already experienced a loss of 500 men *hors-de-combat* with 9 officers killed.* Three or four such lists of casualties and his strength would disappear. Moreover, he had supplies only for three weeks, and the truth was forced upon him, that, when that period had passed, he had no means of subsisting his force. He had

* The baroness Riedesel, and the other ladies, having followed the march of the regiment, were to some extent witnesses at least of the ill effects of the action, by the presence of the wounded. Among them was major Harnage, whose wife was of the party ; he was shot through the lower portion of the body and suffered greatly.

fairly tested if an advance was practicable. There could be no misunderstanding what the future solution of the problem would be.

At this date, even to within a few hours of his surrender, he would have met little opposition to his retreat. The distance to the ford at fort Edward, from Freeman's farm, was nineteen miles. It will be seen that the provincial company of McKay did pass over it to find its way safely to Ticonderoga. Lieutenant colonel Sutherland on his route to the ford was actually within three miles of it when recalled. Even in the greatest period of his distress, by leaving his baggage and guns behind, he could have made his march good to fort Edward.

His own explanation is insufficient to account for his non-acceptance of the situation. He could, but little harassed, have retreated across the Hudson. His pretence was, that he considered the news, received from Clinton of the proposed attack of the Hudson forts would have obliged Gates to detach several regiments for their defence, and he would have then been able to force his way to Albany, against the reduced numbers in his front. On the other hand, he argued that his retreat would have left Clinton, or Howe's army, exposed to the whole force of the congress troops. Further, that he expected to be joined by St. Leger's detachment from Ticonderoga, by which reinforcement he held that he would have strength to overcome all opposition.

If there be force in the argument, that it was Burgoyne's duty to remain within such a distance that when called upon he could co-operate with Howe, it does not affect the question, whether or not Burgoyne misjudged the spot where he should await the summons, and the mode in which he should meet this contingency. We have only to consider what it was possible for Burgoyne to have done, if he had possessed the prescience and judgment to have acted wisely. Had he recrossed the Hudson, and marched to fort Edward, he could have done so in perfect order with his baggage and guns, for Gates could not have seriously interfered with him. He was

rather prepared, to witness the departure of the British force from the west bank of the Hudson, as a desirable termination of the campaign. The discipline of the British would have assured their safe retreat. Burgoyne never pretended that there was difficulty in retracing his steps. In his letter to Germain, before alluded to, it is plain that it was a contingency that he had contemplated. Established at fort Edward, provisions could have been sent from Canada during the winter, and his army provided with warm clothing against the rigour of the season. The supplies, gathered in Canada for the next campaign, could have been delivered in fort Edward by the 15th of June. No impediment of any kind to their delivery presented itself. His army would have recovered strength and confidence, and from this central point he could have threatened equally Albany and Connecticut.

But Burgoyne, if he saw this course open to him, would not follow it. There was one sentence in his general orders of the 29th of June that doubtless remained on his memory, "This army must not retreat." To my mind it was the stumbling block in his path, for these high-sounding words were to prove mere bombast.* It was a remedy in his desperate position, which he could not contemplate. If at this crisis Burgoyne could have sacrificed his vanity, and brought his troops in safety from their dangerous position, and placed himself in force at fort Edward, he would stand in the pages of history as a consummate general, and he would have performed great service to the state. His position is not only to be considered, as he himself was affected. His unfortunate perseverance in an attempt, which, subsequently, he declared impossible of achievement, cost the lives of several of his best friends, and of the many brave men who fell fighting under his command. He saw them perish, a sacrifice to his delusion that success must attend the desperation of his attempt.

* The following is the sentence which was contained in the general orders before commencing the expedition. "During our progress, occasions may occur, in which no difficulty, nor labour, nor life are to be regarded; *this army must not retreat.*"

Those who survived those days of trial were marched prisoners to Massachusetts and Virginia, to undergo years of confinement, privation and sorrow. All this suffering must be placed to the account of Burgoyne, because he rejected the true means of disentanglement from the dangers which hourly became more threatening, until the only means of extrication from his formidable situation was the surrender of his army as prisoners of war.

CHAPTER X.

Burgoyne having formed the resolution under no circumstance "to retreat," acted to the last upon this determination. With the feeling, that it was his duty to persevere in the execution of his orders, to effect a junction with Howe's force, he resolved to take a position which could be fortified and made secure from attack, and at the same time would furnish a base for active operations, when it was expedient to recommence them. He resolved to occupy the extent of country from Freeman's farm across the woods to Taylor's house, and thence to the Hudson. A redoubt was constructed on the right wing at the corner of the woods, near which the action of the 19th had taken place. Fraser's corps, with Breyman in reserve, was on the right, Burgoyne's camp on the left, the headquarters being in its centre. Intrenchments were thrown up, ditches dug, and the place protected. The distance from the river to the western flank was something about two miles, rather more than less.

On the extreme left, occupied by the German troops, the *reveillé* and roll-calls of the opposing force were so distinctly heard, that it was surmised that the right of their position was not far distant. On the morning of the 20th orders were given to cut a road in the direction, so that a reconnaissance could be made. One hundred men were set to work, accompanied by a strong force as a guard. They were attacked by a party that had gained a height, and were unable to continue their work from the fire to which they were subjected. Owing to this alarm, the whole force was placed under arms.

The losses of the regiments of the line had been serious, so Burgoyne determined to incorporate into the six regiments 120 men of the provincial corps of Jessop, Peters, McAlpine and McKay, in proportion of twenty to each regiment,

"brave men of courage and fidelity." They were to be discharged on the succeeding 25th of September, then receiving a gratuity, and a bounty being likewise granted to them on joining the corps.* The service, therefore, was for one year.

On the day following the action a messenger arrived from Clinton with a letter to Burgoyne, giving notice of his projected expedition to attack the forts on the Highlands; but it contained no assurance of assistance by an advance up the Hudson. Clinton had neither orders to make the attempt, nor the force to undertake so hazardous a duty; for it would have exacted both a powerful land and naval force. For some distance below Albany the navigation is limited to vessels of light draught, and special craft would have been required for the service.

German writers describe Burgoyne as having given but limited information regarding this despatch. He, however, represented that it was Clinton's intention to attack fort Montgomery, and that, by his presence on the Hudson, Gates, from fear of being attacked in his rear, would be driven to detach a large force to oppose the expedition, and thus their operations would be greatly facilitated. It must have been belief in this hope that led to Burgoyne's operations on the 7th of October, for it is the only view which can be advanced in their justification. He had, on the 19th of September, been definitely stopped with the loss of 500 men, and he could have no expectation of success when, notoriously, Gates' force had been greatly reinforced.

Immediately after the receipt of Clinton's despatch, captain Scott,[†] of the 53rd, on the 27th, was sent with letters to

* General orders, 21st September. Supplement to the expedition, p. 24.

† We are indebted to Mr. de Fonblanque for the publication of Scott's journal [p. 287]. It calls for notice owing to the testimony it bears to the strong loyalist feeling which existed throughout the country, however arbitrarily it had been repressed. Scott left on the 28th and crossed by the bridge of boats, constructed opposite the camp. He made his way through the woods to the Hoosic river to find all the fords guarded. On the morning of the 29th, however, Scott succeeded in reaching the other side. After proceeding some few miles, his guide left him, recommending him to a German, at whose house Scott stayed; whence a second

Clinton, and on the 28th captain Campbell proceeded on a similar mission, duplicating the letters, of which Scott was the bearer.

Daily, Burgoyne's position was better secured against attack, and the same precautions were taken by Gates. The felling of timber in the congress camp was distinctly heard, especially on the night of the 23rd-24th; the sound even seemed to approach the British works. The following morning Burgoyne's left wing was again attacked; the assailants were beaten back, but they succeeded in carrying off some horses and oxen which were at pasture. The consequence was, that the advance post of the Hesse Hanau regiment was

guide took him through the woods to a friend of the British cause, from whom horses were obtained. By these means he reached Kinderbrook, 20 miles below Albany. Crossing the Hudson in a canoe he came to Coxsackie, where he obtained horses and went eight miles, when, by liberal payment, he induced a German to carry him down the Hudson, concealed in a canoe, to the other side of Esopus creek. He marched during the night and part of the following day, the 3rd of October, without any guide. On the 4th he stayed at the back of New Windsor, until the evening of the 5th, when a guide undertook to take him to New York. As he approached a place known as Smith's cove, this man brought him close to a guard of congress troops, Scott believed, with the desire of betraying him. Scott was fired at by two sentries at a few yards distance, he managed, however, to reach the bush, but a man with him, proceeding to New York to join the royal army, was taken prisoner. Scott, with the companion who had accompanied him from Saratoga, remained concealed in the woods until the 7th, constantly hearing the movement of those in search of them. Using the compass, they resolved to make for New Jersey. On the 8th they met an inhabitant, who told them that Clinton had taken fort Montgomery; he was much dejected and thought their cause in a bad way. On the 8th he found refuge in a house, the only one he had entered since the 5th. All that they had eaten in this period was a pound of bread and cheese. On the 9th, by ten o'clock, he reached fort Montgomery, where he delivered his despatch to Clinton. On the 10th, he prepared to return to Burgoyne. He sailed up the Hudson in an armed vessel under command of Sir James Wallace, but they went no further than 20 miles below Esopus, a total distance of 86 miles from Albany. Scott and his companion accordingly disembarked and marched all day, crossing Esopus creek in the night. On the 13th he obtained a waggon which drove him to Coxsackie. Here he was forced to remain until the 15th. The news that Burgoyne was surrounded had reached the place; and it became further known that he had capitulated. The consequence was, that those favourable to the British dared not harbour Scott, or in any way assist him. He, however, obtained a canoe, and succeeded in getting on board the British fleet at Livingston's Manor opposite the Catskills.

moved back, and the heavy trees and bush cleared away for some distance in front of the left wing. On the 25th, Gerlach was sent over the bridge of boats to the east bank of the Hudson with an escort, to examine if the road was practicable for artillery, and if the right of the congress camp could be attacked from that side. Gerlach reported that there was as little to be seen on the eastern as on the western bank. He had inferred, on the retreat being sounded, that the congress troops were encamped in two lines, the left being thrown back.

During the period that Burgoyne remained in his intrenchments, frequent attacks were made both on the right and left wing, shewing the active spirit of those opposed to him. Parties in search of water and forage constantly met with interference. Burgoyne had constructed batteries on his left flank, so any hostile approach to it was made with more caution. The troops were greatly harassed. In order to find out the strength against which he had to contend, Burgoyne sent out a strong patrol, with some Indians, to learn something of the situation on the left flank of his opponent, but he failed to gain any reliable information.

Burgoyne's situation became daily more critical. There were 800 men in the hospital, if the thin tents and rude huts in which they were placed could be so called. A number equally large, unfit for duty, was in the ranks. The supplies were disappearing day by day, and as there was no source whence they could be replaced, it became plain that in order to prolong the period for which they would suffice, the rations could not be issued as plentifully, as they had been hitherto served out. Independently of this threatened curtailment, the exigencies of the hour demanded continued watchfulness, the men being almost unceasingly under arms, or on fatigue. Forage could be obtained only from the east side of the Hudson over the bridge of boats, the foraging parties being accompanied by a strong detachment: a severe tax on the small force. Under these privations, desertions greatly increased. Two deserters had been shot in August near

Douart's house, one a Brunswicker, the other a soldier of the 9th; the latter had been taken with arms in his hand, after a skirmish.

On the 4th of October, after examination of the amount of provisions available, it was found that only sixteen days' supply remained. The rations were accordingly reduced from a pound and a half of bread and meat to one pound. The troops bore the curtailment unmurmuringly, as they cheerfully undertook the exacting fatigues and the heavy strain of continual duty. Burgoyne promised that every soldier should receive seven shillings a month in lieu of the ration not served out. To the discredit of the British government, the engagement was not kept.*

In spite of Burgoyne's affected confidence, all ranks, British and German, began to feel doubt and uneasiness as to their position. The very reduction of rations was suggestive of a diminution of resources. The season was advancing: the early days of October always tell us that autumn has arrived. Although the foliage still remains green, every day its tints darken and many leaves fall. Those that remain perceptibly gain the glowing tint, especially the red leaves of the maple, the sure prelude to the bare branches of winter, saving the sear, yellow leaf of the beech, and the evergreens. The nights now become cold, the temperature not unfrequently freezing, and the early hours of the morning strike a chill on those imperfectly clad. As the sun rises, its heat has still power, but it sets early, and the last hours of light are cold and dreary.

There was, fortunately, the means of burning large fires of logs, but Burgoyne's troops had no clothing for the change of season, which at this time began to make itself felt; and those on duty could not be insensible to it. There was not a man in the ranks who did not know, that there was a strong force in front, outnumbering them four-fold, possessing a knowledge of the country, prepared to attack them in the thick forest, when their strength in numbers, and their skill in

* "Es blieb aber nur bei dem Versprechen." [Hülfsruppen, I., p. 309.]

the use of firearms, could most efficiently be brought to bear: a force which had exacted respect for its courage and fighting powers. The news of Clinton's advance had passed through the camp, and the hopes of the army had been cheered by the certainty of his appearance. A fortnight had gone by since the report had been current in the camp; and, as the hope remained without realization, many began to consider it was a baseless expectation, not to come to pass. Several went so far as to say that there never had been ground for the belief.*

A council of the generals was held on the 4th, at which Burgoyne proposed to leave 800 men to defend the camp, and, with the whole force to march past the left flank of the congress troops and attack them in the rear. It was first decided to examine the British lines closely, to ascertain if the numbers left to defend them could hold out for three or four days. On the 5th the works were examined, Fraser being added to the consultation. Some changes were determined upon. In the afternoon the consideration of what should be attempted was resumed. The deliberation turned upon the proposition, that, if it were found not possible to advance upon the enemy and on the same day attack his lines, would it be

* One of the Brunswick officers, in his journal, describes it as a poetical fiction, "erdichtetes Märchen." There is a paragraph in von Eelking's "Die deutschen Hülfsstruppen," which I do not feel justified in suppressing. The statement is made on the authority of the journal kept by the Brunswick officers as a matter of duty, and by them brought to Germany on their return. "Unter diesen Umständen steigerte sich unter den Truppen die Unzufriedenheit gegen den commandirenden General mehr und mehr; sie machte sich sogar in lauten Ausdrücken Luft, wenn er sich vor der Fronte zeigte. Der Rückschlag war um so mächtiger, als man zu Anfang der Campagne grosses Vertrauen in die Fähigkeiten dieses Mannes gesetzt hatte. Die Abneigung gegen ihn wurde noch dadurch bestärkt, dass man allgemein glaubte, er sei dem Trunke ergeben."* [Vol. I., p. 306.]

* Under these circumstances discontent with the commanding general increased more and more. This feeling shewed itself in audible expression when he appeared in the front. A revulsion the more strong, as in the beginning of the campaign great confidence had been felt in the capacity of this man. The aversion to him was still further strengthened by the common belief that he was addicted to drinking.

expedient for the force to abandon its position, to cross the Hudson, and establish itself on the old ground between fort Edward and Batten Kill, there to await the movements of Clinton. This course was advocated by Riedesel. According to German writers Riedesel was sustained by the others present. United States writers say that Phillips gave no opinion. His silence may be regarded as an acceptance of the proposal. Burgoyne himself would entertain no thought of a retrograde movement. He strongly opposed it, and he declared that he would himself, on the 7th, make a reconnaissance of the congress camp and approach it as near as possible. It was thus the deliberation closed.*

On the 6th, a reconnaissance was made in force by the congress troops against the British left. Some 600 men drove in the pickets, but the provincials and Indians came rapidly on the ground. The affair lasted three hours, the attacking party retired, and were followed into the woods, when some huts were set on fire. The British advanced towards a single house, in which some of the congress superior officers were present, one of whom was wounded as he was making his retreat. Loss was sustained on both sides.

On that evening a ration of rum was served out to the troops; the second occasion when any such allowance was made.

On the morning of the 7th, Burgoyne carried out his purpose of attempting a reconnaissance with the fullest strength he could place in the field. Except the 47th, left to guard the provisions, the whole force fit for duty was present. The troops amounted to 1,500 men; four 6-pdrs. of the royal artillery accompanied the right flank. In the centre were two 12-pdrs. and two howitzers. Pausch's Hesse Hanau

* I follow the account of Von Eelking [Hülfsstruppen, I., p. 307]. He had the documents at his command on which his narrative was written. On this subject Mr. de Fonblanque in his life of Burgoyne has the unworthy remark "Among his own generals Riedesel was the only one who advised a retreat upon fort Edward; possibly his knowledge of the disheartened condition of the German levies may have influenced him in such counsel" [p. 291 *n.*]. The fact could not be established in England in 1779. Fraser was dead. Phillips a prisoner.

artillery of two 6-pdrs. were between the Brunswick regiment and the grenadiers. The three generals rode at the head of the expedition. The provincials, the Canadians, and the Indians, were placed on the right flank to cover it from attack from the woods. The march was continued some three-quarters of a mile towards the left flank of the congress troops, until about half-past twelve, when the column was formed upon a height ; here a halt for half an hour was made, when the movement was continued. About three o'clock, some troops were perceived near a house, which at first were supposed to be a patrol. But they increased to large masses, with the evident design of opposing further progress. It had been Burgoyne's intention to bivouac at the close of the day, and, if possible, avoid all contact with the enemy ; his one design was to make a reconnaissance of the congress intrenchments, with a view of positively establishing their character. He accordingly acted on the defensive, and his 12-pdrs. were brought against this advancing force, in the expectation that their fire would scatter the column. It was without effect. The numbers in Burgoyne's front increased. About four o'clock his left wing, consisting of the grenadiers, under major Ackland, was met by a heavy and rapidly repeated musketry discharge, continued with such force and resolution that the British line gave way. Many were killed and placed *hors de combat* ; Ackland himself was seriously wounded and left upon the field. The Brunswick regiment now had its flank exposed ; Speth, in command, formed his regiment *en potence* to meet the attack. In the meantime lord Balcarras, posted on his right, had been moved to another part of the field, where the force was heavily pressed. Thus the Brunswickers stood alone, and from the three sides the musketry fire was directed against them. Unable to sustain the contest from the great numbers in their front, they commenced to shew unsteadiness. Pausch's two guns in front had in the meantime kept up their fire, but as the Brunswickers were driven back, the guns were left without support, and were subjected to the continued musketry attack. Pausch

endeavoured to bring his two guns out of action; but he failed in his attempt, and they had to be abandoned. In this crisis, Fraser, on the right, with a detachment of grenadiers, the light infantry and the 24th, saw the full danger of the situation, and with his division rapidly made a movement in support of the Brunswick regiment. He had scarcely reached the spot when he was mortally wounded; he fell from his horse and was carried from the fight.

Major Forster now took command of the division. He was, however, without support, the centre was broken, he was from three sides exposed to a murderous fire, and the congress troops continued to press around in increased numbers. Burgoyne's position grew to be one of extreme danger; he was becoming exposed to be cut off from his base without supplies. Accordingly he gave the order for retreat; had it been longer delayed, the movement would not have been possible. In spite of the unfavourable aspect of the day it was made in good order. That it was so effected was owing to the resolute conduct of major Williams of the royal artillery, who continued to fire his pieces, until they were silenced, most of his men killed and wounded, and himself taken a prisoner.

The congress troops pressed forward on the retreating force to seize the British intrenchments. The redoubt on the left was vigorously attacked, but the assault failed. Simultaneously the redoubt on the right was assailed. It was defended by Breyman. He had not 200 men available for its defence, against an assault by a numerous enemy, which pressed forward on every side. Breyman was shot dead, the post was surrendered, the guns seized, and the defenders taken. The post between the two redoubts had been held by the provincials and Canadians. But the light infantry and the provincials had not yet reached the camp, as they had been detached at some distance to the right. No troops now occupied these defences. They consisted of two houses which had been crenelated, and made as defensible as possible. There was, accordingly, little opposition to the congress

troops taking possession of them. They had thus penetrated into the British intrenchments, but were withstood at this point to some extent by Speth; his defence, however, only resulted in loss of men and prisoners.

Darkness was rapidly coming on. The congress troops had broken through the British lines, of the right of which they held possession, and had mastered the centre. The defenders that remained had been engaged the whole day, and were worn out. Unaided, and unceasingly, they had borne the brunt of the fight. No reinforcements remained to be brought to their support; numerically they were unequal to the effort of regaining the intrenchments which had been lost. The key of the position had been gained, and had fresh congress troops been brought up, and the movement persevered in, the whole intrenchment must have been taken, and the depot of munitions and provisions have fallen into their possession. To the astonishment of all, in the full tide of success, as night came on they withdrew, as if ignorant of the advantages they had gained. Probably it was felt that it was enough for that day's work that Burgoyne had been so far defeated and driven back. They may have considered that fresh troops were in reserve to be brought against them. Their own men must have been equally worn out with the struggle of several hours. Moreover, the operations of the congress troops had not been carried out on any settled plan of action. They had become rather a series of distinct operations, the regiments pressing forward against the defeated enemy in independent attacks, as in each case was held expedient, to assail some objective point. Whatever the influence which operated upon them, as it became dark they withdrew; and breathing time was given to the British general to determine the step he would take in his desperate situation.

The wounded had been left behind, lying where they had fallen; the two 12-pdrs. and two howitzers, four 6-pdrs. of the royal artillery and two 6-pdrs. of Hesse Hanau artillery had been abandoned.* The scene of the action within a mile

* According to Digby's journal, p. 286, major Williams objected to the

from the camp had remained in full, undisputed possession of the congress troops.* The attempted advance of Burgoyne had ended in defeat.

During the night the troops remained under arms, expecting hourly to be attacked. No hostile movement was made. At midnight the tents were struck and the baggage carried away; the fires were left burning. At daybreak on the 8th the entire encampment was abandoned; Burgoyne established himself on some high ground a short distance farther north, his left close to the river, his right being somewhat more than half a mile removed. Two regiments, the 9th and 47th, were sent as far as Sword's house. Here the troops remained during the day. They were not interfered with. As night

employment of heavy guns in action, saying "once a 12-pounder is removed from the park of artillery in America [meaning the woods] it was gone."

* The British loss on the 7th of October was serious; it cannot, however, be positively stated. In the report of the killed and wounded included in the letter of Burgoyne to Germain, from Albany, the 20th of October, the following numbers are given; the return being dated the 12th of October, but they include those of the campaign:

<i>Killed</i> —1 brig. gen., 1 major, 2 captains, 15 lieutenants, 4 ensigns, 12 sergeants, 5 drummers, 313 rank and file	353
<i>Wounded</i> —2 lt. cols., 5 majors, 17 captains, 18 lieutenants, 4 ensigns, 1 adjutant, 38 sergeants, 4 drummers, 715 rank and file	804
<i>Prisoners</i> —2 majors, 2 captains, 3 lieutenants, 2 ensigns, 1 surgeon, 4 sergeants, 2 drummers, 43 rank and file	59
Total	1,216

We possess the precise numbers of the losses of the Brunswick troops, from the 19th of September to the 13th of October:

19th September—Killed	16
7th October—Killed, all ranks	22
Wounded	67
Prisoners	74
	163
From the 7th to the 13th, all ranks killed and wounded....	59

Total 238

If 600 be deducted for the British loss at Hubbleton, fort Anne and the 19th of September, the casualties on and after the 7th of October would exceed, in the British ranks alone, 600 killed and *hors de combat*. This estimate cannot be considered excessive.

came on, the bridge of boats was broken up and the retreat was commenced. Riedesel was in command of the advance guard, consisting of the Brunswick grenadiers and von Barner's light infantry. The Indians marched in front. At Sword's house Riedesel was joined by the 9th and 47th. The artillery and waggons followed. Burgoyne remained with the main body. The rear guard was under lord Balcarras ; general Phillips remained with this force. The sick and wounded, who numbered 800, from want of means of moving them, were left behind in the hospitals, a white flag being raised over them to shew that they were given over to the mercy of the foe.*

By two o'clock the advance guard had reached Dovecot's house. Riedesel, having heard that there was a fortified camp in his front, sent Mackay forward to reconnoitre. He met a party of the enemy, who withdrew when Mackay appeared. He found Saratoga heights were not fortified. Riedesel was urging the march forward, when at daybreak Burgoyne himself appeared and ordered a halt. It was a general belief that the halt had been made, with the design of drawing the troops together and bringing up stragglers. Saratoga was not in possession of the congress troops. This spot could

* The episode of lady Harriett Ackland attracted great attention at the time. Hearing her husband was seriously wounded and a prisoner, by the advice of Madame Riedesel, on the 9th of October, she applied to Burgoyne for his permission to pass to Gates' quarters, which, according to Madame Riedesel, was not granted without hesitation. In an open boat, with a letter from Burgoyne to Gates, accompanied by Mr. Brudenell, the chaplain, a female servant and Ackland's man, who had himself been wounded in the action of the 7th, she proceeded to carry out her purpose, and descended the Hudson the few miles to the congress camp. It rained heavily and unceasingly. According to Burgoyne, on reaching the outposts the congress guard would not allow her to land until daylight, for they suspected treachery. The fact has been contradicted as if it required to be explained away. There is no ground for reproach if such were the case, the officer of the guard having acted in the simple discharge of his duty, fearing treachery. Gates received her with great kindness. Madame Riedesel met lady Harriett afterwards in Albany. Ackland was then in a fair way of recovery, and both thanked her for the good counsel she had given. He was subsequently killed in a duel. Several writers have closed this chapter of romance by marrying lady Harriett to the chaplain, Mr. Brudenell, but there is no foundation for the fact. I have reason to believe that Mr. Brudenell ended his days in Nova Scotia.

have been reached at seven o'clock by the entire force, the bridge of boats could have been hastily formed, and the troops could have crossed the Hudson to their old camping ground.

All the facts of these trying days clearly establish that Burgoyne had resolved not to retreat. He felt that the step was a wound to his reputation which he could not survive. His gasconading sentence that "Britons never retreated" confronted him as a spectre, whenever the proposal was considered. The step would be a social death-blow to him. The prestige which had hitherto accompanied him would for ever pass away. His subsequent conduct shews, that his one endeavour was to establish that he had been commanded to perform a service, the execution of which was not possible, and in that sense that he had not failed. With this view, he resolved to sacrifice his army, so that his own reputation would remain preserved.

To the astonishment of everyone, Burgoyne gave the order for the troops to bivouac in two lines. As the day advanced the congress troops were seen in great activity, on the other side of the river, their numbers apparently increasing, from time to time firing upon the British force.

They had to some extent taken this position on the 8th. Fraser had died on the morning of that day, and had asked to be buried on a particular redoubt of the former camp near the river. The ceremony took place late in the afternoon, Burgoyne and the other generals attending, with many officers. Fraser's body was carried along a path leading to the height, on which it was buried with every solemnity. During the whole ceremony a cannonade was continued by the congress troops from the opposite shore. It was ineffectual, but as early as the afternoon of the 8th, these proceedings shewed that the opposite shore was being occupied, and to anyone capable of reading the lesson, it unmistakably taught, that not one hour was to be lost in gaining the old ground east of the river.

Except on the theory that Burgoyne had resolved to enter

into negotiations with Gates on the spot where he then stood, it is not possible to explain why no further movement was made on the 9th until four o'clock in the afternoon. The light troops under captains Fraser and Mackay were sent forward to Fish Kill to hold the ground. The rain had fallen heavily all day, the roads, from being bad, had now become almost impassable, and the half-fed horses could with difficulty drag the baggage waggons. Orders had been issued that the greatest effort should be made for them to be carried forward, with the additional order that they should not be permitted to delay the march. The waggons were accordingly abandoned, so the baggage fell into the possession of the congress troops. The march was continued through the night. It was dark as they passed Saratoga; Fish Kill was waded through by the troops, for no bridges could be thrown across it. A spot was chosen on the opposite bank, on a height some three-quarters of a mile above Schuyler's house, and there Burgoyne ordered a halt.

It was at this spot, on the evening of the 9th, that the scene of the supper given by Burgoyne recorded by Madame Riedesel took place. The fact does not rest only on the authority of the baroness; it is attested by the journals of the Brunswick officers.* No investigation arose concerning it at the time

* For Mde. Riedesel's statement, see Ante, p. 118. The following is the statement of Von Eelking in the *Die Hülfsstruppen*, I., p. 316. "Während die Armee fror und hungerte, und Jeder der nächsten Zukunft bang entgegensah tönte aus Schuylers hellerleuchtetem Hause Gesang, Gelächter und Gläsergeklirr. Burgoyne sass hier mit lustigen Cumpanen bei einem leckeren Souper, wobei der Champagner floss. Neben ihm sass die schöne Frau eines englischen Commissairs, seine Courtisane. Der leichtfertige Feldherr feierte in dieser Calamität noch seine Orgien. Manche meinten sogar; er habe nur deswegen den unverantwortlichen Halt machen lassen, um sich eine lustige Nacht zu machen. Riedesel hatte es für seine Pflicht gehalten, Burgoyne auf den gefährlichen Halt aufmerksam zu machen Letzterer hatte aber allerlei ausweichende Antworten gegeben." *

* While the army shivered with cold and was without food and every one looked dismayed to the coming future, song, laughter and the jingle of glasses resounded from Schuyler's well-lit house, Burgoyne, with a merry company was at a dainty supper at which the champagne was in plenty. Beside him sat the handsome wife of an English commissary, his mistress. The frivolous general, even in this calamity,

when the inquiry was held in the house of commons, for the circumstance was unknown. All the officers examined were friendly to Burgoyne, and would have felt it a disloyalty to their former general, to make any statement unfavourable to him. It remains a matter for history to record, and the evidence is uncontradicted. The halt is inexplicable, unless it be accepted as additional proof of Burgoyne's determination to surrender.

On the morning of the 10th the patrol reported that the congress troops were in possession of Batten Kill, on the east of the Hudson. Burgoyne accordingly gave orders that they should prepare to move from their position, with the design of crossing the Hudson at fort Edward. Colonel Sutherland was sent forward in command of two regiments and the Canadian corps, with Twiss of the engineers, to construct the bridge. Hamilton's brigade was ordered to remain south of the Fish Kill to protect the rear. About two o'clock, the congress troops appeared in force and Hamilton could not hold his ground, so his division waded through the Fish Kill to the opposite bank. Burgoyne, on their approach, gave orders for Schuyler's house and barn to be fired. Many writers have blamed this act, and have ascribed it to a pettiness of spirit, and the mere desire of inflicting injury on the property of a prominent congress general. I cannot so believe. Burgoyne's faults were not those of meanness and malignancy. His very vanity and love of applause would have suggested the opposite course. It is not possible, with justice, to reject Burgoyne's explanation that he gave the order to prevent the congress troops taking ground there, and, as the means of gaining time to secure his own retreat. Even with the admission that the act was not in itself necessary, it can be explained by the fact, that Burgoyne so considered it.

indulged in his orgies. Many even thought that he had ordered this unwarrantable halt in order to pass a merry night. Riedesel had felt it to be his duty to draw Burgoyne's attention to the danger of the halt; the latter gave all kinds of evasive replies.

The congress troops in possession of the Fish Kill, placed their cannon on the height, and attacked the new position which Burgoyne had taken. Their batteries were especially directed against the *bateaux*, as, owing to the rapid current, they could be only slowly moved up stream. They were accordingly unloaded, and the provisions were brought to land. Cannon had also been placed on the opposite bank, which were turned against the beleagured troops; the cannonade was continued the whole day. At daybreak on the morning of the 11th, two brigades of the congress troops crossed Fish Kill, and surprised a picket of an officer and forty men of the 62nd. The *bateaux* that had drifted down with the stream were taken in possession by the attacking force. This hostile movement was continued during the whole day; the outposts were constantly assailed with overwhelming numbers, and the troops engaged on this duty suffered severely.

At ten o'clock Sutherland was within three miles of fort Edward, then held by one hundred troops of congress only. It was still time for the British forces to have reached the opposite bank. Had Sutherland received the orders which the situation suggested, he would have pushed rapidly forward, and have taken possession of the ford. Twiss had already commenced the bridge. At this spot there is an island in the centre of the stream, and the river is fordable. The report of what had been done reached Burgoyne early in the daytime. The reader of modern times, as he peruses this fact, will conceive that it would have given heart and encouragement to Burgoyne, and that in this intelligence he saw the hope of extrication from ruin. But his mind appears to have been paralyzed; he had sunk into the condition of believing that there was no longer hope. In the place of profiting by this one opportunity of saving the remnant of his army, he sent to Sutherland the astounding order to return and join the main army. Sutherland's duty was obedience, and he turned his back on the only means of salvation which lay before them. He did not, however, recall Mackay. With the Canadians, the provincials, and the Indians, his

company remained at the bridge and the whole subsequently made their way safely to Ticonderoga.

The congress troops, in possession of the *bateaux* they had seized, could pass uninterruptedly to the opposite bank of the river. They were thus enabled to occupy a position favourable for attack, which, otherwise, it would not have been in their power to take. Their fire was continued for the whole day. There was no hospital or place for the wounded; in pain and distress the sufferers crawled to some sequestered spot, which at least gave them protection from the incessant musketry fire, to endure in silence the agony of their wounds, and if such their fate, to die in quietude. There was danger in obtaining water. The troops began to be affected by the suffering and privations they were experiencing. Discipline could be only imperfectly maintained. There was difficulty in securing the provisions and baggage. Indeed much of the latter had been burned in the destruction of Schuyler's house. Many horses had been killed, and those that remained were half starved, and could not draw their loads.

Madame Riedesel has left a painful picture of the scenes she witnessed. The cellar where she took refuge still remains. As one stands within its narrow limits, it is difficult to conceive, that all that she so vividly describes really happened. But the facts are undoubted, and the day passed in submissive, hopeless misery. It appeared as if there were no remedy but to await the end.*

* Madame Riedesel's book is well known in the United States, and to the Canadian student. It has been so frequently quoted by previous writers, that I have made but limited reference to it. It was translated a quarter of a century back, 1868, by Mr. William L. Stone, of Albany, and, although not generally read by the present generation of English readers, it is in every way worthy their attention. There is one passage pointing out the misery on this occasion which I feel it my duty to reproduce. I translate from the German [p. 177].

"On the 10th, at seven in the morning, to give me strength, I drank some tea, and we now hoped from one minute to the other that we would proceed onwards. General Burgoyne, in order to cover our retreat, had caused the fine house and mill of general Schuyler to be burned. An English officer brought some excellent broth which he shared with me; at his urgent request, I took some of it; we then continued our march, but it was only to another spot at no great distance.

The greatest misery and extreme confusion prevailed in the army. The commissaries had forgotten to distribute provisions among the troops. There were cattle enough, but none had been slaughtered. More than thirty officers came to me driven by extreme hunger [die es vor Hunger nicht länger aushalten konnten]. I caused tea and coffee to be made for them, and divided with them my provisions with which our kitchen was always filled; for we had a cook, although a great rascal, who always obtained supplies, and often by night made excursions to steal from the inhabitants mutton, poultry, and pork, for which he made us pay dearly; a fact we only learned at a future date. My provisions were at length exhausted, and, in despair that I could give no more help, with great earnestness, I called the attention of the General's aide-de-camp, Paterson, to the matter, [Mde. Riedesel evidently alludes to lord Petersham, afterwards earl of Harrington] who at this time came in my way, for I felt strongly regarding it. "Come and see the officers who have been wounded in the common cause, who now are in want of everything, because they have not received what they are entitled to. It is your duty to represent the matter to the general." He was much moved: the consequence was, that in a quarter of an hour afterwards general Burgoyne himself came to me, and with some emotion thanked me, that I had reminded him of his duty. He continued, that a general was much to be pitied when he was not duly served, and his orders were not carried out. I replied, that I must ask his forgiveness for mixing myself in such a matter, which I well knew did not appertain to a woman; but that it had been impossible for me to be silent, as I had seen so many brave men in want of every thing. He again thanked me, although I believe that in his heart he has never forgiven me this act, [streich]. He went from me to the officers and said to them, that what had happened caused him pain. He had now by his orders rectified every thing. Why had they not come to him, his kitchen was always at their service. They replied that British officers were not in the habit of visiting their general's kitchen, and that they had with pleasure accepted a mouthful from me, for they were convinced that I had given it to them with my whole heart. Upon this he gave express orders that the provisions should be duly served out. They sustained us for a time, but things around us went no better."

CHAPTER XI.

It was not until three o'clock of Sunday the 12th that Burgoyne summoned together generals Riedesel and Phillips; the two brigadiers, Hamilton and von Gall, were also present. Burgoyne briefly submitted for consideration the terrible position in which they were placed. Riedesel proposed, that they should leave behind the artillery and baggage, march forward without delay, cross the bridge at fort Edward, and make for lake George with all possible speed; and he pledged his life that he would carry the army through. The proposition was accepted. There was not an hour to lose. If the purpose was to be carried out, it had to be effected as rapidly as the troops could be brought to move. Rations were ordered to be served out, and it was agreed that the retreat should be commenced at ten o'clock. Riedesel gave his personal attention to the distribution of the food; at ten he announced to Burgoyne that all was ready. Riedesel was to be placed in command of the advance, Phillips of the rear guard. There was now hope of escaping from the desolation and suffering of the last hours: but it was not to be. As the hour for movement drew near, Burgoyne sent word it was too late, the army must remain where it was.

How is it possible to account for Burgoyne's infatuation? From what could it have arisen? Not from want of courage, few men have been more distinguished by personal bravery. He never shrank from danger, and in the severe struggle of the 19th of September and the 7th of October he had fearlessly exposed himself. In the hour of trial, he had patience and fortitude, it could not have been from any inability to endure fatigue. He was then fifty-five, and he lived an active life for fifteen years beyond this period. He was, indeed, luxurious, self-indulgent and sensual, in the mode of men of

his class, who held, like the heroes of *Gil Blas*, that profligacy was part of the character of a gentleman; but he would unshrinkingly have submitted to privation and want, when he held them to be unavoidable. But Burgoyne, like many men, wanted that sound sense, that well-balanced judgment, that high moral courage, which, in a crisis even worse than that in which he was placed, have led their possessor to achieve fame and honour. Burgoyne's campaign had been a series of mistakes, the first and principal being, that he entered upon it with the high sounding words "this army must not retreat." The fact that he was crossing the Hudson a defeated fugitive before his victors, would prove these words to be the mere hectoring of boastful incompetence. It was on this point that Burgoyne's vanity bewildered him. He had constantly pronounced against the expedience of a retreat, which even if necessary, he considered would bring disgrace upon them all. We may here trace the indecision of his conduct. Moreover, he felt strongly that the conception of the expedition having arisen with lord George Germain, its failure would be visited upon himself, the general in command, to the ruin of his future career. The king had buoyed himself up with all the expectation of success; the revulsion of his disappointment would be turned into resentment against the commander, by whom his hope had been shattered.

Burgoyne in his statement dwelt so earnestly upon the overpowering force brought around him, and he took such pains with Gates to establish the numbers of his force, that he appears to have believed that this fact would be accepted as his vindication. His effort was to make it apparent, that he had received positive orders to accomplish an impossible task. It is the explanation he himself offered; it is the modern argument of those who defend him. The facts suggest a very different conclusion.

If Burgoyne, on the 19th of September, saw the impossibility of continuing his onward march, and it is a misnomer to call the event of that day a victory, he ought to have accepted the teaching that his attempt was unwise, and

could only close in disaster. It must be recollected that the action of the 7th of October was fought proximately on the same ground as that of the 19th of September, and that the interval was passed in indulgence of the hope of being aided from New York. Any one of ordinary prudence would have seen that it was an anticipation never to be realized. The reason assigned by Burgoyne on the night of the 13th of October, that it was then too late for the troops to start on their march of eleven miles to fort Edward without baggage or guns, proved to be the actual fact in twenty-four hours. The congress troops had drawn a complete net around him, and there was no longer any hope of escape; 18,000 men had surrounded his force on the heights, on their flank, before them, behind them, on the opposite shore; on all sides artillery, and the British army almost without provisions.

On this day Burgoyne again called a council, at which the brigadiers and the colonels of regiments attended. Those present declared, that if the general saw a possibility of cutting their way through, they would willingly shed their blood in the attempt. If this could not be effected, the only thing to be done was to capitulate on the most honourable terms obtainable. First, however, a truce must be held. The conclusion arrived at was, that they could not continue in their present situation; and that success in an attempt to cut their way out was not to be hoped. In this interview, Burgoyne shewed his better nature; he declared that he alone was responsible for the position in which the army was placed; he had asked no counsel; he had counted only on obedience to his orders. In so doing, he correctly anticipated the judgment of posterity. In the name of those present, Riedesel thanked him for the declaration, and added that in case he should in any way be called to account, he trusted Burgoyne would testify as he then expressed himself.*

* I refer the reader to Von Eelking's Riedesel [II., p. 176] for the protocols of the councils of war of the 12th and 13th [p. 180]. To Burgoyne's letter to Germain, written from Albany on the 20th of October, after the convention [State of the Expedition, p. 47], likewise to the remarks of Riedesel upon Burgoyne's

On the 14th, major Kingston, the adjutant-general, proceeded to Gates' camp with the offer of entering into negotiation for surrender, proposing that an armistice should be declared until the preliminary articles were determined. Gates drew up six articles, Wilkinson tells us, which, on being handed to Kingston, he declared they were of a character he could not carry back ; when it was explained to him that no other messenger would be sent, he waived his objections. An armistice was declared until sunset, at which hour Gates expected a definite answer. The conditions which had awakened the feeling on Kingston's part were the first and last, "that the army should surrender as prisoners of war," and the troops should ground their arms in the intrenchments where they now stood, and then march off to their destinations. At noon Burgoyne called a council to consider them. Without exception, British and Germans declared that before accepting such ignominious terms, they would die with arms in their hands. At sunset Kingston returned with Burgoyne's answer that all negotiations must cease, unless these articles were withdrawn ; Burgoyne added, that the entire army were resolved to throw themselves with the greatest desperation on the enemy, rather than accept such conditions. Major Kingston at the same time placed Burgoyne's propositions in Gates' hand, which set forth, in addition, "that a capitulation could never be thought of under any conditions except those that were in the document."

The truce closed at sunset. On the morning of the 15th, the belief in the British ranks was, that all hope of negotiation had passed, and there must have been much painful and anxious consideration as to the course to be taken in their desperate condition. To the astonishment of the British generals, and of all to whom the fact was communicated, an aide-de-camp appeared, bearing the propositions of Burgoyne signed by Gates, with all the terms set forth having

narrative. In these documents we possess [Von Eelking, II., p. 203] ample means for correctly judging the events of the last days of this disaster.

The English reader is referred to Stone's translation [Vol. I., p. 203].

been agreed to: the addition only to them being, that the capitulation was to be signed at two o'clock in the afternoon, that at five the troops should leave their lines, and be prepared on the following day to start on the march to Boston.

The change in Gates' attitude seemed inexplicable to Burgoyne and he referred the communication to a council of war. It was resolved that Gates should be notified of the acceptance of the proposition. The articles, however, could only be considered as preliminary. Several points had to be definitely determined, before Burgoyne could sign the capitulation in the limited time; it was, therefore, proposed that staff officers should meet to arrange the details. Colonel Sutherland and captain Craig were appointed to act on the British side. Colonel Wilkinson, the adjutant-general, and brigadier Whipple represented general Gates.

The commissioners met near the ruins of Schuyler's house. The conference was prolonged until eleven at night. On the part of Burgoyne the British commissioners engaged that the treaty should be returned signed, the following morning. During the discussion Craig delivered a letter to Wilkinson, which ran "We have, sir, unguardedly called that a treaty of capitulation which the army means only as a treaty of convention." With the single alteration of this word, he undertook to be present at the stipulated time with a fair copy signed by Burgoyne. Wilkinson, by Gates' instruction, admitted the alteration. In the interval during the negotiations, every man in the British army, whatever his rank, received his pay in money up to that date.

We are in possession of the facts which led Gates so readily to grant the terms Burgoyne asked on the 14th of October. After the fight of the 19th of September, Burgoyne had sent a messenger to New York appealing to Clinton, saying that even a "menace of attack" up the Hudson would greatly aid him.

Clinton, accordingly, with 3,000 men with several ships of war under the command of commodore Hotham, on the 4th of October left New York and ascended the Hudson to Ver-

plank's point, forty miles above the city. Finding the place slightly defended he took possession of it. Putnam, in command of the congress troops, formed the opinion that Clinton designed to force his way through the Highlands to co-operate with Burgoyne; accordingly, he occupied the ground commanding the channel of the river to impede the advance, detaching a portion of the troops from fort Montgomery and fort Clinton. On the 6th of October, Clinton, without artillery, landed at Stoney point on the western bank of the Hudson, and proceeded on the dangerous and toilsome march of crossing Dunderberg mountain. He effected the passage without interference, and divided his force into two columns. Fort Montgomery was attacked by Campbell with the 52nd, while Clinton advanced against fort Clinton, the two forts being separated by a narrow stream. Fort Montgomery was carried with little loss, although the death of Campbell threw gloom on the success. The garrison, which consisted of 800 men, abandoned the works and escaped. Fort Clinton made greater resistance. Clinton's force consisted of the 63rd, the flank companies of the 7th and 26th, with the grenadiers of Anspach and Hesse. The column had to make its way through a strong *abatis* under a heavy fire of grape; an attack with the bayonet followed, which was resolutely met, but in vain. The place was stormed. It was one of the most gallant acts of those unhappy times. Clinton's loss was 140 killed and wounded; that of the congress troops was reported as 400 killed and wounded, and 300 prisoners. There was a boom across the river, extending from the mountain known as Saint Anthony's Nose. Fort Clinton was north of it, so its guns commanded the vessels which were above; two large vessels, two galleys, and an armed sloop. On seeing that fort Clinton had fallen, they slipped their cables and tried to escape, but finding it not possible to get up the river, their crews burned the ships. *

* It was on this occasion that Clinton obtained the knowledge of the geography of West point, mentioned in his published memoirs. [Lord Mahon's History, Vol. VII., Appendix, p. x.]

The passage is in allusion to the unfortunate expedition of André, "notwith-

In a few hours Hotham broke through the boom, and with his ships ascended the Hudson. Clinton demolished the forts. The munitions of war, and provisions which he could not remove, were destroyed. The guns, which he could not bring away, he threw into the Hudson. The ships ascended the river to the new settlement of Continental village; the barracks, lately constructed there for 1,500 men, were burned.

The troops returned to New York. But a light squadron was detailed from the fleet, which ascended the river and destroyed all the vessels that it met. It continued its ascent to Esopus creek, 66 miles from Albany, and burned the village there.

It was this news which Gates had heard, magnified to the importance that the Hudson had been forced and was open; and that Clinton was rapidly advancing to Albany. The dread of his appearance in force induced Gates' acceptance of Burgoyne's proposition.

Clinton's part in this proceeding is unmistakably stated by himself. As he was advancing up the river, he received the message sent by captain Campbell from Burgoyne, and

standing his imprudence in having possessed himself of the papers which they found on him, which, though they led to a discovery of the nature of the business that drew him to a conference with general Arnold, were not wanted (as they must have known) for any information. For they were not ignorant that I had myself been over every part of the ground on which the forts stood, and had, of course, made myself perfectly acquainted with every thing, necessary for facilitating an attack upon them."

West point is about five miles above the forts Montgomery and Clinton. At that date the site was occupied by an unfinished fort known as fort Putnam, while lower down on the opposite or eastern shore, the stone fort Constitution had been established. On the reduction of the two forts by Clinton, this place was abandoned, and destroyed by the congress troops without the stores and artillery being removed.

It was during these operations that Clinton formed his views of the locality which rendered the maps found in the possession of André unnecessary to him. Had they not been discovered on André's person, it is possible that he would have been allowed by his captors to proceed to New York, and there certainly would have been slight cause for his detention beyond mere suspicion.

Some United States writers, from Clinton's words, have conceived the improbable theory that he himself visited Arnold to obtain this information, attaching mystery to a matter in itself perfectly simple of explanation.

after the capture of fort Clinton, on board the vessel of commodore Hotham, on the 10th, the message by Scott. Nothing can be plainer than Clinton's own statement.

"Captain Campbell was desired by general Burgoyne to tell me that the general's whole army did not exceed 5,000 men, that the consequence of the battle on the 19th was the loss of between five and six hundred men; that the enemy was within a mile and a half of him; that he knew not their certain numbers, but believed them to be twelve or fourteen thousand men; that there was besides a considerable body in his rear; *that he wished to receive my orders whether he should attack or retreat to the lake*; that he had but provisions to the 20th of this month, and that he would not have given up his communication with Ticonderoga, had he not expected a co-operating army at Albany; that he wished to know my positive answer as soon as possible, whether I could open a communication with Albany, when I should be there, and when there, keep my communication with New York; that if he did not hear from me by the 15th instant he should retire. To which I returned the following answer by captain Campbell, viz., that not having received any instructions from the commander-in-chief respecting the northern army, and unacquainted even with his intentions respecting that army, except his wishes that they should get to Albany, sir H. Clinton cannot presume to give any order to general Burgoyne. General Burgoyne could not suppose sir H. Clinton had an idea of penetrating to Albany with the small force, he mentioned in his last letter. What he offered in that letter he has now undertaken: cannot by any means promise himself success, but hopes it will be at any rate serviceable to general Burgoyne, as general Burgoyne says in his letter, answering the offer [23rd Sept.] that even the menace of an attack would be of service." *

The report as it came to Gates also reached Burgoyne. A provincial entered his camp, telling him of Clinton's operations, and Burgoyne's sanguine nature saw in the fact, the

* Par. Report 1778, pp. 245, 247.

British in possession of Albany, and himself extricated from his surrender. He had received no despatch from Clinton ; no promise of his appearance ; there was no evidence that his ships were advancing. The proceedings taken by Burgoyne shew all the defects of his character. He determined to break the treaty, in which view he was sustained by some of the officers about him. He again called a council of war. The matter was submitted in accordance with the hope with which Burgoyne had accepted the report. The votes stood 14 to 8, that a treaty arranged by the officers with full power from the general, although unsigned by him, could not be broken, and that the intelligence, given by an unknown man, would not warrant that a treaty so advantageously obtained, in their position, should be broken ; that it would have been a different matter, if a message from Clinton had been received, or if even his force had been seen. On the question being submitted, if the men in the ranks had the courage to defend their position to the last man, the officers of the troops on the left wing replied in the affirmative. Those of the right wing qualified their assent, conditionally on the troops taking the offensive ; not in the defence of a position, which every man knew could not be held. It was, however, generally resolved to gain time, if possible, for circumstances to be developed.

Burgoyne adopted a course which reflected little honour on the national character. It was characterized by trickery and meanness. He endeavoured, in an indirect way, to gain time, if possible, to escape from the obligations he had accepted, and to evade the engagement that he had deliberately undertaken to fulfil. Even in the course followed there is an exhibition of weakness and folly. Burgoyne wrote to Gates, stating, that he had been informed by deserters, that during the negotiations, he had despatched a considerable portion of his force to Albany, an act which he regarded in contravention of the terms of the agreement. Consequently he could not sign the convention, until convinced that Gates' force exceeded his own four-fold. Surely, it was no point to be

raised by the British general, as to the disposition of the congress force. It was enough for him to know that his terms were granted; and it was even as unprecedented, as it was unwarrantable, for Burgoyne to ask, that an officer sent by him should satisfy himself of the strength of Gates' army.

Wilkinson relates that he went to the British camp, having been sent there to represent Gates. The consequences were nearly becoming serious. Authorized by Gates, he stated that the army was not diminished in strength. He gave Burgoyne to understand, that it would be he only, who would be responsible for any breach of the convention, and that any non-observance of it would prove serious. When Burgoyne had signed the convention, if he so desired, Gates would shew him his army. According to Wilkinson, Burgoyne hesitated, or affected to hesitate; but better counsels prevailed, and Burgoyne unwillingly affixed his signature to his surrender, for such it was, by whatsoever name he chose euphemistically to call it. It bears date the 16th of October, 1777.*

On the morning of the 17th Burgoyne's army left its intrenchment, and marched to the open ground on the north side of the Fish Kill. The troops grounded arms, and marched away from their piled musketry and their artillery to the spot where the hospitals had stood, and bivouacked for the night. The congress troops were drawn up on the south of the Fish Kill, and were not witnesses of the humiliation. Gates himself was on the ground in a carriage which he did not leave.

Gates gratified Burgoyne by permitting the troops in column to be counted. British officers were sent among them. Twiss, of the engineers, performed this duty. The number present south of the Fish Kill was 14,000. Gates subsequently gave the state of his whole force, including those south of the Hudson, and on advanced posts to the north, as amounting to 22,500. Gates throughout behaved with great dignity and forbearance.

* This document, together with those which were interchanged at the early period of the negotiations, is appended to this chapter.

Burgoyne, with the generals and his staff, crossed the bridge over the Fish Kill with Gates, who there presented them to his own staff and invited them to dinner. Burgoyne wore the full dress in which he attended court.* We have the account of the dinner in the journals of the Brunswick officers. The table consisted of planks laid on casks. There were four dishes: the beverage was rum and water, and cider. Burgoyne appeared with the agreeable manners which he could assume. He took a prominent part in the conversation, and was prodigal in his flattery of the congress troops. He even proposed, it is to be presumed, as is often said, with appropriate remarks, the health of Washington. It was followed by Gates and his officers drinking the health of king George the III. Burgoyne ate with an excellent appetite; his whole conduct on this occasion was the astonishment of all who witnessed it.

Gates' army remained upon parade during the repast. On several of the British staff present expressing the desire of inspecting the troops more closely, Gates not only gave his consent, but accompanied his guests, passing before the ranks of several of the regiments, many of whom marched, and to some extent manœuvred, before the British officers. We learn from writers of the day that this example of the officers so worked upon the congress troops, that they acted kindly and sympathisingly towards their prisoners, as they were best able; a good feeling on both sides was consequently called forth.†

On the 17th and 18th the troops crossed the Hudson on their way to Boston as prisoners of war.

Burgoyne's abandonment of the eastern bank of the Hudson when crossing the river on the 13th and 14th of September

* Wilkinson, [Vol. I., p. 324,] describes Burgoyne as wearing a rich royal uniform. Gates a plain blue frock coat.

† One of the officers of the day writes, "The English and American troops now live in the most sincere friendship with each other, and strongly regret that unhappy circumstances should have brought between two peoples such implacable hostility, for if they had remained bound in amity, without doubt, they could have dictated laws to the whole world. [Von Eelking I., p. 326.]

not only cut off his communication with lake George and Ticonderoga, but exposed the garrison and outposts to attack from Vermont and New Hampshire. From the success which accompanied the attempt, the probability is that it was suggested by loose discipline and want of caution. Brigadier Powell was then in command, having been sent there with the 53rd to allow Anstruther, with the 62nd, to join the troops in front.

Powell had thrown out detachments at the saw-mills, and at the post on Sugar hill, and also at an advanced block-house. A large force of congress troops having been assembled at Skenesborough and at Hubberton, an advance was made against Ticonderoga. That from Skenesborough crossed the hills skirting lake Champlain. A joint attack was made on the morning of the 18th, under colonel Brown. The posts at the saw-mill and on Sugar hill were so completely surprised that scarcely any defence was attempted, and four companies of the 53rd were made prisoners and marched to Vermont.* Moreover, several congress soldiers then in confinement were released. An armed vessel was also seized, and the cannon turned against the block-house. Lieutenant Lord, in command, was forced to surrender, but not before he had made a gallant defence.

The attacking force destroyed four gun-boats at the end of lake George, and some gun-boats and *bateaux* lying about the bridge. They killed many of the oxen, and carried away those they did not slaughter, with such horses as they could seize, and destroyed the carts.

The operations were now directed against the fort. Powell was summoned by Brown to surrender, afterwards by Warner; no answer being given, the operations were persevered in for four days. On the 22nd, some provision vessels arrived from Crown point. Their arrival was interpreted as a fact that

* The number of prisoners taken of the 53rd was 7 officers, 8 sergeants, 121 rank and file. The sick, consisting of a sergeant of the 62nd and 14 rank and file of the 53rd, were left behind, being sworn not to serve against congress. [Can. Arch., Q. 14, pp. 292, 174.]

strong reinforcements had arrived. Consequently, on the following day, the siege was abandoned.

A force proceeded up lake George in the boats which had been seized. On the 24th of September it arrived at Diamond island, about half way up the lake, where captain Aubrey was posted with two companies of the 53rd. Between five and six in the morning, the island was attacked, with a sloop, two gun-boats, and fourteen other boats. The force separated, eight of the boats passing to the westward. The remainder bore straight upon the island. The attempt lasted for an hour, when the congress troops retreated into a creek on the eastern shore, not far from the island. Captain Dunlop of the 53rd, under cover of a gun-boat and some armed *bateaux*, followed them and succeeded in retaking a gunboat, with a 12-pdr., which had been partially set on fire. The *bateaux* that had been seized at the lower end of the lake were burned. The attacking party, which consisted of 450 men, safely made their way over the mountain.

There is one point which cannot be left without notice. The conditions of the "convention" were, that the troops should be held prisoners of war, to proceed to Boston, thence to embark for England, and not to serve during the war.* This condition was deliberately repudiated by congress, and the troops were kept prisoners, first in the neighbourhood of Boston, afterwards in Virginia: the majority until the close of the war, some few only of the number having been exchanged. It was a breach of faith not to be explained away, and it must ever remain a stain upon the good fame of the present United States. After the sense of the danger threatened by Clinton's expedition had passed away, there arose a general feeling

* It is difficult to determine the precise number of Burgoyne's force included in the convention. Modern British writers, in a round way, describe it as 3,500 men, 1,600 of whom were Brunswick troops. United States writers mention it generally at 5,700. Stedman, the British author of the war, who wrote in 1794, described it as nearly 6,000 men, with 35 pieces of cannon. I believe, however, it is possible to establish the numbers by Burgoyne's reports, although he avoided stating the precise strength of his army at the period of his surrender.

On page xxvii. of the Appendix, Burgoyne describes the strength of his force

that the terms of the convention were unfavourable to the cause of congress, and that too much had been conceded. It was plain, that the troops on their return to England could perform garrison duty, and thus would admit of a number of equal strength being despatched on an offensive expedition to America. Moreover, they would have been available for service on the continent against France, the now openly declared ally of congress.

at the commencement of the campaign. In this part of the numeration I will deal with the British force alone.

Total rank and file, 1st July.....	3,724
Additional, joined between this date and 13th of October—	
Recruits under lieutenant Nutt.	154
Provincials, 1st October, no more than.....	456
In September, additional companies joined near fort	
Millar	300
	910
Total.....	4,634
Deduct the garrison left at Ticonderoga	462
	4,172
Deduct number given by return of killed, wounded and prisoners in the campaign:—	
All ranks—Killed	207
Wounded	549
Prisoners	449
	1,285
Approximate number present on the 17th of October	2,887
Total number of Brunswick troops reported fit for duty, in the State of the 13th October	
Officers.....	62
Sergeants	164
Drummers	76
Rank and file	1,594
	1,896
[Can. Arch., Q. 14, p. 435.]	
These figures would give the total number of troops who surrendered, including the whole detailed force..	4,783

There were some 148 Canadians named by Burgoyne as attached to his force. Those under Mackay undoubtedly reached Ticonderoga. The remainder are represented as having also succeeded in escaping. It is also stated that a great number of the provincials left, with their officers, through the woods, the night before the convention was signed. Therefore, in default of the publication of the regular returns, it may be affirmed that the number of Burgoyne's force which surrendered was something between 4,700 and 4,800 men.

Among other points raised, it was pretended that there had been a failure on the part of Burgoyne in not giving up the cartouche boxes. No charge could be more unjust.* The demand of Gates in the first instance, was that "all public stores, artillery, arms, ammunition, carriages, horses, &c., &c., must be delivered to commissioners appointed to receive them." The final conditions were, "that the troops were to march out of their camp with the honours of war, and the artillery of the intrenchments, to the verge of the river, where the old fort stood, where the arms and artillery are to be left. The arms to be piled by word of command from their own officers." How colours and cartouche boxes could be justly claimed under this condition, no argument has ever been presented. Nevertheless United States writers raise the question of the non-production of the colours as a sufficient reason for the breach of the terms of the convention. There is no record which shews that they were ever even demanded. At an early date congress referred to Gates the question what had become of the standards. Gates, in his reply, affirmed that "Burgoyne had assured him on his honour the colours had been left in Canada." Madame Riedesel in her memoirs relates, how the Brunswick colours were sewed up in a mattress, and afterwards taken back to Germany. Some stress has been laid upon the fact that the British colours were exposed on the walls after the taking of Ticonderoga. This flag

* The evidence of colonel Kingston before the house of commons throws some light on this point.

Q. "Was it by consent of general Gates that the soldiers of the convention retained their cartouche boxes?"

A. They retained their belts, and I really don't recollect whether their cartouche boxes were in general retained or not, but talking with Mr. Gates, when the king's troops marched by with their accoutrements on, Mr. Gates asked me (we had been old acquaintance formerly) whether it was not customary on field days for arms and accoutrements to go together? I told him there was nothing said in the convention that I had agreed to with him relating to the accoutrements, and that he could have no right to anything but what was stipulated in that treaty. He replied "you are perfectly right" and turned to some of the officers in their service by, and said, If we meant to have had them, we ought to have inserted them in the convention."

State of the Expedition, p. 91.

could not have been a regimental colour, and there is nothing to shew that it did not remain at Ticonderoga, and most likely it was the case. Attention has likewise been directed to the fact that colonel Hill saved the colours of the 9th, and presented them to the king on his return to England. All this is beside the question. The fact is simply, was it a condition of the convention, that the colours should be given up. The text is distinctly to the contrary. Wilkinson, Gates' adjutant-general, who negotiated the treaty, speaks unmistakably on the subject; he says, "Burgoyne made his own convention, and saved his accoutrements, military chest and colours, all of which were retained, notwithstanding general Gates' letter to congress."*

Another reason for the breach of faith is assigned to Burgoyne's letter to congress, in which he complained that there was insufficient accommodation furnished to the officers, and pointed out that by this neglect the convention was broken. The true motive in repudiating the treaty may be found in the frivolous and unworthy reply by congress, that this expression by a prisoner, although the commanding general, complaining of the treatment received, was a repudiation of the treaty by the officer who made it. It was accordingly resolved "to suspend the embarkation of the troops, until a distinct and explicit ratification of the convention of Saratoga shall be properly notified by the court of Great Britain."

There is no record found of any expostulation with Burgoyne for having failed to fulfil his engagement, the written conditions of which alone governed his conduct, and congress would have had little hesitation in reproaching him with the violation of the slightest duty, had it been possible to do so.

The repudiation of the terms of the convention was likewise justified by the precedent established by the British Government in refusing to carry out the terms of the convention of Clostern Severn, concluded by the duke of Cumberland with the duc de Richelieu in September, 1757, and at a later period set aside by George II. †

* [Wilkinson, I., p. 304.]

† [Ante, Vol. IV., pp. 101-2.]

The action taken by congress was based on that simple principle, which has led, and always will lead to wrong and injustice, whatever high sounding words we may use concerning civilization and religion: it was entirely attributable to self-interest. We here have the true cause of the failure to observe the terms of the convention. United States writers in vain strive to remove the stain which it leaves on their history. It is irremovable, and will ever be regarded as an abandonment of good faith and honour.

The effect in France of Burgoyne's surrender was immediate. Hitherto, the national feeling had been confined to the hope that Great Britain would be humiliated, and her power destroyed by the loss of her colonies. France had, therefore, given what assistance was possible, secretly and indirectly. The fear of war prevented any open act of hostility, owing to the exhausted condition of her finances, and the consequent difficulty of carrying on another contest with Great Britain. This hesitating policy had been affirmed by the successes which had attended the British arms in 1776 and 1777. Indeed, the probability of war with France had almost passed away, so far as regards that power taking an active, avowed, and direct part in the contest. It was known that the sympathies of the French were strongly with the revolted colonies, from the sentiment of welcoming any injury to Great Britain, and that the government was secretly aiding them. It was hoped, and believed in London, that the cause of congress would, in no long time, be regarded as desperate, and that this indirect support would cease. The news of Burgoyne's surrender occasioned a total change of opinion in France. It was now confidently considered that the British cause had received a blow, which would finally lay it prostrate in America, and that now was the time for French intervention to bring to their consequences the events which must follow from the disaster. The news reached Paris in the first week of December. On the 17th of the month, Vergennes informed the congress agents that the government was prepared to treat with

America, on the avowed condition of acknowledging and supporting the independence of the colonies, without any other benefits than those of attaining the political end of destroying their connection with Great Britain, and at the same time obtaining the fullest enjoyment of American commerce. One condition was exacted, that no peace with England should be made, which did not fully recognize the independence they claimed. Two treaties were signed in February at Paris, one of friendship and commerce: the second a defensive alliance in the event of Great Britain declaring war against France. When these treaties were officially made known in London in March, the British ambassador was recalled from Paris.

I have deemed it proper to relate at some length the events of Burgoyne's campaign. It is not only a portion of Canadian history, but its importance in its relation to the American war cannot be overrated. The success of the British arms during 1776 and 1777 had been uninterrupted. Washington's remarkable surprise of the Hessians in December, at Trenton, was the one exception. But with all the renown attached to it, it had been long understood that it was without influence on the issue involved. The British were in possession of Rhode Island, New York, and Philadelphia. The credit of congress had sank to the lowest ebb. On all sides there was depression and privation, and the councils of congress were divided. The loyalists, hitherto repressed, and, indeed, mostly subdued, were commencing to act with more boldness. France still kept aloof, although furnishing money surreptitiously, and giving all the aid she could contribute without compromising the state. There was then little confidence in the future effort of the colonies for independence. Even the supporters of what was called the "American cause" in the house of commons had lost much of their self-assertion. But Burgoyne's surrender changed the whole aspect of the question. It established the extreme difficulty that Great Britain experienced, in directing a force of

sufficient strength to operate any distance from the sea coast owing to the immense labour of carrying supplies; and that in an attack in the thick woods, large masses of men, accustomed to the use of firearms, could be brought against the troops, and by mere numbers, with the musket alone, could make all operations of disciplined troops futile. The consequence was that France threw its strength on the side of congress, and with its navy increased the area of the war immeasurably to extend its operations. Once engaged as the ally of the United States, recognized as a power, France had to furnish money and munitions. From the hour she embarked in the contest, it became in every way more formidable. It extended to Europe, and to wherever the two powers, Great Britain and France, could come in contact.

That such was the result may be attributed primarily to Burgoyne's defeat. Hence the northern campaign was the first step towards the loss of the old colonies. Whatever baneful influence was thus exercised by Burgoyne, there is a figure behind him as the evil genius, of which we so often read in old legends, to blast all it touched: lord George Germain. It was he who planned the campaign, who, on paper, traced out his plans, and who at the same time failed, not simply in prudence in the conception of his plans, but was culpably negligent of the most ordinary precautions for them to be efficiently carried out. Burgoyne distinctly understood that his advance was only to be undertaken, on an attack being simultaneously made by Howe up the Hudson. Germain never attempted even to vindicate his conduct against the accusation of having failed to give Howe the instructions, to carry out his part of the campaign. The favour of the king retained him in office, as one flattering the prejudices of royalty, and promising that the expectations formed by the king would be realized. No public man of the day played so mischievous a part. It was one of malignant incompetency. Every measure he advocated bore the character of his narrow, cold, mean intellect; and his whole career shews that he was the last

man in the empire who should have been intrusted with the duties which he had not the capacity to perform, and which, in idleness and wantonness of spirit, he neglected. He depressed all merit by his jealous, cowardly nature, and even descended to misrepresentation to strike such as, he felt, regarded him with no respect or favour. There is no character in the painful history of these days more responsible for the loss of the American colonies than lord George Germain. *

* A passage appears in the life of lord Shelburne, by lord G. Fitzmaurice, which has remained uncontradicted, explanatory of the deplorable fatuity of this man in not sending precise instructions to Howe for his co-operation with Burgoyne. The statement is made on the authority of lord Shelburne himself, who, in a memorandum, has left on record the neglect of duty by Germain which led to such disastrous consequences. "The inconsistent orders given to Generals Howe and Burgoyne could not be accounted for except in a way which it must be difficult for any person who is not conversant with the negligence of office to comprehend. It might appear incredible, if his own secretary and the most respectable persons in office had not assured me of the fact, and what corroborates it is that it can be accounted for in no other way. It requires as much experience in business to comprehend the very trifling causes which have produced the greatest events as it does strength of reason to develop the very deepest designs." The memorandum proceeds to state that Lord George "having among other peculiarities a particular aversion to be put out of his way on any occasion, had arranged to call at his office on his way to the country in order to sign the despatches; but as those addressed to Howe had not been 'fair copied' and he was not disposed to be balked of his projected visit into Kent, they were not signed then and were forgotten on his return to town."

MAJOR GENERAL GATES' PROPOSALS, WITH LIEUTENANT
GENERAL BURGOYNE'S ANSWERS.

1. General Burgoyne's army being exceedingly reduced by repeated defeats, by desertion, sickness &c. Their provisions exhausted, their military stores, tents and baggage, taken or destroyed ; their retreat cut off and their camp invested, they can only be allowed to surrender prisoners of war.

Lieutenant-gen'l Burgoyne's army, however reduced, will never admit that their retreat is cut off, while they have arms in their hands.
2. The officers and soldiers may keep the baggage belonging to them. The Generals of the United States never permit individuals to be pillaged.
3. The troops under his excellency General Burgoyne, will be conducted by the most convenient route to New England, marching by easy marches and sufficiently provided for by the way.

This article is answered by General Burgoyne's first proposal, which is hereto annexed.
4. The officers will be admitted on parole, may wear their side arms, and will be treated with the liberality customary in Europe, so long as they by proper behaviour continue to deserve it ; but those who are apprehended having broken their parole, (as some British officers have done) must expect to be close confined.

Their being no officer in this army under, or capable of being under, the description of breaking parole, this article needs no answer.
5. All public stores, artillery, arms, ammunition, carriages, horses &c. &c., must be delivered to commissaires appointed to receive them.

All public stores may be delivered, arms excepted.
6. These terms being agreed to, and signed, the troops under his excellency General Burgoyne's command may be drawn up in their encampment, when they will be ordered to ground their arms, and

This article inadmissible in any extremity ; sooner than this army will consent to ground their arms in their encampment, they will rush on the enemy, determined to take no quarter.

may thereupon be marched to the
river side, to be passed over in
their way towards Bennington.

7. A cessation of arms to continue
till sunset, to receive General Bur-
goyne's answer.

HORATIO GATES.

J. BURGoyNE.

Camp at Saratoga,
14th Oct. 1777.

Message from General Burgoyne to General Gates, delivered by Major Kingston, to Colonel Wilkinson. "If General Gates does not mean to recede from the first and sixth articles of his proposals, the treaty to end and hostilities immediately to commence.

October 14th, 1777.

[Wilkinson's Memoirs, I., pp. 304-5. These articles are also given in the State of the Expedition.]

GENERAL BURGOYNE'S PRELIMINARY ARTICLES, WITH
GENERAL GATES' ANSWERS.

The annexed answers being given to Major General Gates' proposals, it remains for Lieutenant-General Burgoyne, and the army under his command, to state the following preliminary articles on their part :

1st. The troops to march out of their camp with the honours of war, and the artillery of the intrenchments, which will be left as hereafter, may be regulated.

2nd. A free passage to be granted to this army to Great Britain upon condition of not serving again in North America during the present contest, and a proper port to be assigned for the entry of transports to receive the troops, whenever General Howe shall so order.

3rd. Should any cartel take place by which this army or any part of it may be exchanged, the foregoing article to be void as far as such exchange shall be made.

4th. All officers to retain their carriages, batt-horses and other cattle, and no baggage to be molested or searched, the Lieutenant-General giving his honour that there are no public stores secreted therein. Major-General Gates will of course take the necessary measures for the security of this article.

5th. Upon the march the officers are not to be separated from their men, and in quarters the officers are to be lodged according to rank, and are not to be hindered from assembling their men for roll callings and other necessary purposes of regularity.

1st. The troops to march out of their camp with the honours of war, and the artillery of the intrenchments to the verge of the river, where the old fort stood, where their arms and the artillery must be left.

2nd. Agreed to, for the port of Boston.

3rd. Agreed.

4th. Agreed.

5th. Agreed to as far as circumstances will admit.

- 6th. There are various corps in the army composed of sailors, batteaux-men, artificers, drivers, independent companies, and followers of the army, and it is expected that those persons, of whatever country, shall be included in the fullest sense and utmost extent of the above articles, and comprehended in every respect as British subjects.
- 6th. Agreed to in the fullest extent.
- 7th. All Canadians and persons belonging to the establishment in Canada to be permitted to return there.
- 7th. Agreed.
- 8th. Passports to be immediately granted for three officers, not exceeding the rank of Captain, who shall be appointed by General Burgoyne to carry despatches to Sir William Howe, Sir Guy Carleton, and to Great Britain by the way of New York, and the public faith to be engaged that these despatches are not to be opened.
- 8th. Agreed.
- 9th. The foregoing articles are to be considered only as preliminaries for framing a treaty, in the course of which others may arise to be considered by both parties, for which purpose it is proposed that two officers of each army shall meet and report their deliberations to their respective Generals.
- 9th. The capitulation to be finished by 2 o'clock this day, and the troops march from their encampment at five, and be in readiness to move towards Boston to-morrow morning.
- 10th. Lieutenant-general Burgoyne will send his deputy-adjutant-general to receive Major-General Gates' answer, to-morrow morning at 10 o'clock.
- 10th. Complied with.

(Signed) J. BURGOYNE.

H. GATES.

Saratoga, Oct. 14th, 1777.

Saratoga, Oct. 15th, 1777.

ARTICLES OF CONVENTION BETWEEN LIEUTENANT-GENERAL
BURGOYNE AND MAJOR-GENERAL GATES.

I.

The troops under Lieutenant-General Burgoyne, to march out of their camp with the honours of war, and the artillery of the intrenchments, to the verge of the river where the old fort stood, where the arms and artillery are to be left ; the arms to be piled by word of command from their own officers.

II.

A free passage to be granted to the army under Lieutenant-General Burgoyne to Great Britain, on condition of not serving again in North America during the present contest ; and the port of Boston is assigned for the entry of transports to receive the troops, whenever General Howe shall so order.

III.

Should any cartel take place, by which the army under General Burgoyne, or any part of it, may be exchanged, the foregoing article to be void as far as such exchange shall be made.

IV.

The army under Lieutenant-General Burgoyne, to march to Massachusetts Bay, by the easiest, most expeditious, and convenient route ; and to be quartered in, near, or as convenient as possible to Boston, that the march of the troops may not be delayed, when transports arrive to receive them.

V.

The troops to be supplied on their march, and during their being in quarters, with provisions, by General Gates's orders, at the same rate of rations as the troops of his own army ; and if possible the officers' horses and cattle are to be supplied with forage at the usual rates.

VI.

All officers to retain their carriages, batt-horses and other cattle, and no baggage to be molested or searched ; Lieutenant-General Burgoyne giving his honour that there are no public stores secreted therein. Major-General Gates will of course take the necessary measures for the due performance of this article. Should any carriages be wanted during the march for the transportation of officers' baggage, they are, if possible, to be supplied by the country at the usual rates.

VII.

Upon the march, and during the time the army shall remain in quarters in Massachusetts Bay the officers are not, as far as circumstances will admit, to be separated from their men. The officers are to be quartered according to rank, and are not to be hindered from assembling their men for roll-call, and other necessary purposes of regularity.

VIII.

All corps whatever, of General Burgoyne's army, whether composed of sailors, batteamen, artificers, drivers, independent companies, and followers of the army

of whatever country, shall be included in the fullest sense and utmost extent of the above articles, and comprehended in every respect as British subjects.

IX.

All Canadians, and persons belonging to the Canadian establishment, consisting of sailors, batteauxmen, artificers, drivers, independent companies, and many other followers of the army, who come under no particular description, are to be permitted to return there; they are to be conducted immediately by the shortest route to the first British post on Lake George, are to be supplied with provisions in the same manner as the other troops, and are to be bound by the same condition of not serving during the present contest in North America.

X.

Passports to be immediately granted for three officers, not exceeding the rank of captains, who shall be appointed by Lieutenant-General Burgoyne, to carry despatches to Sir William Howe, Sir Guy Carleton, and to Great Britain, by the way of New York, and major-general Gates engages the public faith, that these despatches shall not be opened. These officers are to set out immediately after receiving their despatches, and are to travel the shortest route and in the most expeditious manner.

XI.

During the stay of the troops in Massachusetts Bay, the officers are to be admitted on parole, and are to be allowed to wear their side arms.

XII.

Should the army under Lieutenant-general Burgoyne find it necessary to send for their clothing and other baggage in Canada, they are to be permitted to do it in the most convenient manner, and the necessary passports granted for that purpose.

XIII.

These articles are to be unitedly signed and exchanged to-morrow morning at 9 o'clock, and the troops under Lieutenant-general Burgoyne are to march out of their entrenchments at three o'clock in the afternoon.

(signed) J. BURGOYNE, Lieutenant-general.

(signed) HORATIO GATES, Major-general.

Saratoga, Oct. 16th, 1777.

To prevent any doubts that might arise from Lieutenant-general Burgoyne's name not being mentioned in the above treaty, Major-general Gates hereby declares that he is understood to be comprehended in it, as fully as if his name had been specifically mentioned.

HORATIO GATES.

[Wilkinson, *Memoirs*, pp. 317 320.]

ARNOLD.

Both United States and British writers describe Arnold as the hero of the 7th of October. There is, however, no specification of the service he performed, and the opportunity he had of distinguishing himself is not even named. There is one fact only to be recorded, that Arnold was present on the field and was wounded. I am not called upon to enter into the quarrel between Gates and Arnold after the 19th of September. The correspondence is given by Wilkinson in his memoirs [I., pp. 253, 264]. Arnold not very wisely asked for a pass to join Washington at headquarters, which was readily granted. But Arnold either himself saw, or was advised, that to leave the army in the face of an enemy would be most compromising to his character, and he remained at the camp without any command, in a false position ; for he would not recede from the ground taken by him, or in any way conciliate Gates.

Wilkinson has related the event of the action of the 7th of October. Morgan early in the day was sent to gain the heights from which he could assail Burgoyne's right, while the attack by the New Hampshire and New York regiments was made on the grenadiers at the left. As has been related in the text, the grenadiers were driven back ; the light infantry, likewise assailed by masses of troops brought forward to the attack, could not hold their ground. The action, according to Wilkinson, lasted fifty-two minutes. The last attack of Tenbroeck's brigade, 3,000 strong, carried the day. The scene of the action was within a mile of Burgoyne's camp, and on the retreat of Burgoyne's force, made in good order, it was followed to its intrenchments. Two brigades advanced against the redoubt defended by Breyman on the right. Breyman being shot dead, resistance was no longer continued. The centre was likewise forced. These successes were gained by large bodies of troops. The right of the position was mastered by force of numbers, and it is difficult even to conceive what brilliant service any person, without an assigned command, could have performed. Wilkinson, who was present in the action, thus describes Arnold's behaviour : "It was remarked that in the progress of the engagement, he rode about the camp betraying great agitation and wrath, and it was said that he was observed to drink freely ; at length he was found in the field of battle exercising command, but not by the order or permission of General Gates. His conduct was exceedingly rash and intemperate, and he exposed himself with great folly and temerity at the time we were engaged front to front with the Germans, and whilst he was flourishing his sword and encouraging the troops he, in a state of furious distraction, struck an officer on the head and wounded him. The first impulse of the officer was to shoot him, for which purpose he raised his fusée, but recollecting himself, he was about to remonstrate when the general darted off to another part of the field. Soon after this incident, finding himself on our right, he dashed to the left through the fire of the two lines and escaped unhurt ; he then turned [to] the right of the enemy, as I was informed by that most excellent officer Colonel Butler, and collecting 15 or 20 riflemen, threw himself with his party into the rear of the enemy just as they gave way, where his leg was broke and his horse killed under him ; but whether by our fire or that of the enemy as they fled from us has never been ascertained. It is certain that he neither rendered service nor deserved credit on that day, and

the wound he received alone saved him from being overwhelmed by the torrent of General Gates' good fortune and popularity." [p. 273].

One of the causes that Arnold's name has gained this prestige may be attributed to his having led the overland expedition against Quebec, and his skill in escaping from Amherst in the naval action of the 11th of October, 1776. His name was, therefore, well known, and was constantly brought into prominence. He is described by Burgoyne himself as being in command with Gates. In Maclean's report to Carleton of the action of the 19th of September, 1777, [Can. Arch., Q. 14, p. 192] Arnold was mentioned as being in command, when he was not even on the ground. Walpole has many such allusions. He describes Arnold as having parodied Burgoyne's manifestos [Last Journals II., p. 159]. He reproduces an epigram from the Public Advertiser of 5th Decr., 1777, in a way to suggest it was written by himself.

A CABINET REPORTEE.

"To North the *Lean* said George the Wise
Here's with *one* Arnold much ado ;
The drowsy Premier starting cries
'Tis well my liege there are not *two*."

The news of Burgoyne's defeat arrived on the 2nd of December, in "an express from Carleton" "that he had learnt by deserters and believed that the Provincials had taken Burgoyne and his whole army prisoners." On the 15th the news was confirmed by captain Craig, as Walpole describes it, "after great slaughter and desertion of the Germans." At the end of the month Walpole published a ballad, one stanza of which runs—

"What honours we're gaining by taking their forts
Destroying bateaux and blocking up ports ;
Burgoyne would have worked them but for a mishap,
By Gates and one Arnold, he's caught in a trap."
Sing Tartara we're all. [II., p. 187.]

Arnold's crowning act of treason in 1780 brought his name into further prominence, and at this time his bravery and great ability were generally dwelt upon.

I am indebted to Mr. Walter Shanly, late M.P. for Grenville, for the following facts connected with Arnold's family and his subsequent career. Many of them apply to Canada ; they are unknown, and we owe them to Mr. Shanly's research. I append them with the conviction that they will be read with much interest.

THE CANADIAN BRANCH.

By his marriage with Margaret Stansfield, in 1769, Arnold had three sons, Benedict, Richard and Henry, and at least one daughter, Hannah. Benedict appears in the army list 1794-1800 as lieutenant on the half-pay of the 101st Regiment of the Line, his commission dating back to 1783. It is quite clear that he had seen no active service, for when the war came to a close in 1782, he could not have been more than 12 years of age. It would seem to be hardly open to doubt, that he was placed on the half-pay establishment, as an easy means of providing for the eldest son of his father. General Arnold, it is well known, was

not by any means delicate in pressing his claims upon the king. In addition to the yearly pension thus bestowed upon young Benedict, the antedating of his commission would have brought him a round sum of ready money, for back-dating meant back-pay also. It was far from uncommon at the period we are speaking of, to use the half-pay roll of the army in the manner it seems to have been applied in young Arnold's case. Sabine states that Benedict junior died in the West Indies : probably in the year 1800, when he disappears from the army list.

At the close of the war General Arnold went to St. John, New Brunswick. It was from this place, some years later, when the eastern district of Upper Canada had been surveyed and thrown open for settlement, that his sons Richard and Henry came to the county of Grenville, where, as sons of a loyalist, the usual grants of land were assigned to them. Richard resided, until his death, on a farm a mile or two west of the present village of Maitland. The writer remembers to have heard him spoken of by old men in the country, as quite a distinguished man among the early settlers or "Refugees," as they were called. The late Mr. Dunham Jones of Maitland described him as a "very gentlemanly man." In the pioneer days of Upper Canada every settler, whatever his social position, was supposed to be able, and generally had, to "help himself," but the writer was told by Mr. Jones that it was a common remark in the settlement that "Mr. Arnold never learned how to set the harness properly on a horse." Henry Arnold, the writer believes, died near Kemptville, Grenville county, as certainly his sister Hannah did. She lived to a very advanced age and was unmarried. The only descendants in the main line of the Canadian Arnolds, as far as known to the writer, are to be found at Westport, on the Rideau (county of Leeds), but whether tracing from Richard or Henry he is unable to say. The wife of the late Sheriff McEwan, of Essex, Ontario, was a daughter of Richard Arnold.

THE ENGLISH BRANCH.

General Arnold married, for his second wife, Margaret, daughter of Chief Justice Shippen of Pennsylvania, of which marriage there were four sons, all of whom saw military service in the British army. Two died in India : the eldest son, James Robertson Arnold, a distinguished officer of the Royal Engineers, attained to the rank of lieutenant-general, and in 1835 was appointed aide-de-camp to the king. The fourth son, William Fitch, captain 9th Lancers, became possessed of the estate of Little Missenden Abbey, Herts. He left two sons, Edward Gladwin and William Trail.

The former, in holy orders and now of Little Missenden Abbey, married, in 1852, Lady Charlotte Cholmondeley, daughter of the Marquis of Cholmondeley. His brother William Trail Arnold, captain 4th Royal Regiment, "died for England," falling in the front at the battle of Alma.

In the generations that have come and gone since the marriage with Margaret Shippen, in Philadelphia, on the 8th April, 1779, the females of the family have been many. All seem to have married well, and the Benedict Arnold blood may to-day be traced through numerous English families of good social position, a reflux current from New England to Old England.

BOOK XXI.

THE AMERICAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.

[1777-1782.]

CHAPTER I.

Although Washington's defeat in the attack upon Germantown had placed Howe, for the time, in undisputed possession of Philadelphia, he had still to contend with the extreme difficulty of subsisting his force. Had he entertained the counsel of Clifton, and in place of the expedition to Rhode island, directed the fleet to the Delaware when he was engaged in the advance across the Jerseys, there can be little doubt that the ascent of the river would have been accomplished. Philadelphia would then have fallen into Howe's possession. Occupied by a powerful force, and the navigation of the river unimpeded, the city could have received the required supplies with the facility experienced at New York. Its possession by the British under these conditions would have exercised an important influence upon the armed resistance of the central provinces ; and would have gone far to subdue all organized operations in the field in this portion of the territory. The rebellion would then have been confined to Massachusetts and the southern provinces of Virginia and the Carolinas.

Situated as Howe was in his occupation of Philadelphia, he was dependent upon the fleet for his provisions. After the battle of Brandywine, the war-ships had ascended the river, but their progress had been stopped by the fortifications which had been thrown up at the confluence of the Schuylkill and Delaware, on a low sand-bank, fort Mifflin. Opposite, on the eastern bank of the river, fort Mercer had been constructed, furnished with heavy artillery. Three miles lower down the stream, works had been established at Billingsport. At this spot the navigation had been closed by several ranges of impediments, with armed galleys and floating batteries to protect the works.

The operations of the British fleet against Billingsport were successful. The encumbrances were removed and batteries were then constructed against the forts, Mercer and Mifflin, at the mouth of the Schuylkill. The attempt by the congress naval force to impede the completion of these works ended in failure. The frigate "Delaware" was lost and the flotilla failed of its purpose. Nevertheless, it was determined to defend the congress forts with desperation, for they were all that remained of the impediments to the navigation of the Delaware.

As it was of imperative importance to Howe that the river should be open for the ascent of his supplies, he determined to attack Reed Bank, fort Mercer, by land, and he selected for the attempt count von Donop, with a detachment of Hessian troops. When the British force entered the city, colonel Sterling had pointed out to Howe, that this fort was imperfectly garrisoned and incapable of offering resistance, and suggested that possession should be taken of it, but Howe would not listen to the proposition. The fort at this time presented such an impediment to the ascent of the river, that it became necessary to silence it.

When von Donop understood the nature of the duty he had to perform, he asked that his force might be strengthened by artillery. Howe, with a sneer, sent word that if von Donop felt his men were unequal to the task, he would assign the duty to British regiments. On receiving this reply through an aide-de-camp, von Donop replied, "you can tell the general that Germans are not wanting in courage to go forward to death." *

On the 21st of October von Donop, with his force, left Philadelphia, crossing the river in flat-bottomed boats at Cooper's ferry. He bivouacked for the night, and started at four the next morning. The distance he had to march was ten miles, but as he had no means of passing the Timber and Newton rivers, he was forced to make a long *détour* before

* "Sagen Sie Ihrem General, dass es den Deutschen nicht an Muth fehlt dem Tode entgegen zu gehen." [Deutschen Hülfsstruppen, I., p. 219.]

reaching the fort. On examining the position of the place he found that it could be attacked on three sides. It was a star fort surrounded by high earth intrenchments, with the additional defence of a heavy *abatis*, thirty feet on the glacis. The outer works were somewhat extended. Von Donop formed his force in three columns. At four o'clock he sent major Stewart, a British officer accompanying the detachment, with a drum to summon the garrison. The commandant replied that he would defend the place to the last man. As few troops only were seen on the occasion, the opinion was formed that the garrison was weak ; it was therefore resolved to storm the place without delay.

The staff officers dismounted, drew their swords, and placed themselves at the head of their regiments. The advance was gallantly made, but it was stayed by the *abatis*. While the assailants were exposed to a sharp musketry fire in front, a masked battery was turned against their left ; on their right, the guns of two ships in the river were opened against them. The ditches were, however, filled with the fascines, and the troops pressed forward, when, at this crisis, von Donop was struck down by a musket shot ; the second in command, von Minnigerode, and other officers also fell wounded. The loss of von Donop greatly affected the troops, for he was much beloved, but von Linsingen, who assumed the command, still led the men forward. The defence was too powerful to be overcome : the attacking force was beaten back, and even in their retreat they experienced loss. Seeing further attack to be hopeless, von Linsingen gathered the remains of his force together, and at two in the morning marched back to Philadelphia, where he arrived at five the following day, having left behind him his wounded to the mercy of the garrison. The attack failed ; not from want of gallantry or determination on the part of the troops, but from the reckless incapacity of Howe, in despatching to this dangerous duty a gallant band of men, unprovided with the proper means of carrying out the duty assigned them. They required heavy guns and storm ladders ; they had neither. A work ill-defended had lately

been taken, and Howe had formed the opinion that the same imperfect resistance would be experienced at this attack. He ought to have seen, that the whole effort of the congress troops would be given to resist desperately the passage of the fleet up the Delaware, as Howe's army depended for supplies on its presence, the fort he was attacking being one of the main impediments to the ascent of the ships. He had taken no means to learn the true strength of the place. Had he sent a properly constituted force, it could not have withstood the cannonade.

The defenders of the fort buried 180 dead ; 100 were left on the field *hors de combat* ; of the above numbers 26 were officers. Many of the wounded managed to reach Philadelphia. The total loss of the rank and file was 397, out of 650 men, of which the expedition consisted ; 43 of those left on the field died in the congress camp. The loss of the defenders was 32. Von Donop had been struck by a musket ball in the upper part of the right thigh. His wound was pronounced to be mortal, and he was carefully attended by a young French officer of engineers, Duplessis, who had planned the defence, and by whose advice the outer works had been abandoned, so that the defence could be concentrated to the citadel. Von Donop asked to be buried with military honours.* He died on the 29th of October ; great respect was paid to his remains, and the whole of the congress troops attended them to the grave.

The collapse of Howe's ill-conceived project awoke him to

* An expression has been attributed to von Donop which modern German writers refuse to accept, as appearing in no contemporary account and only mentioned in modern times. He is reported to have said "Ich sterbe als ein Opfer meines Ehrgeizes und der Habsucht meines Souverains." [I die the victim of my ambition and of the greed of my sovereign.] I consider that this statement is entirely to be rejected. What von Donop did say to Duplessis, on being told that his body would receive military honours was, "It was an early end to a career so full of promise" [eine schöne Laufbahn.] He was thirty-seven years of age. His death made a great sensation. British writers pass it over without comment, for it can only be mentioned to the great discredit of Howe. A stone was placed over von Donop's grave, with the words of Horace, that he died lamented by many. "Multis flebilis occidit."

a sense of the duty he should never have departed from. He sent for reinforcements from New York. On the 5th of November, forty transports were assembled at Staten island with 4,000 men, convoyed by the "Experiment 64" and the "Bristol 50." On the 10th the vessels commenced the ascent of the Delaware. At Newcastle and Chester, the transports joined Howe's fleet. On the morning of the 13th Mud island and fort Mifflin were cannonaded. The bombardment was continued until the 15th. During three days the congress troops gallantly defended their intrenchments against this overpowering force, when they abandoned the place in ruins on the night of the 15th and 16th and retreated to Reed Bank. The British fleet experienced the loss of two ships; the "Augusta 64" ran aground, and while in this situation caught fire and blew up, some of the crew being on board. The "Merlin" frigate was equally unfortunate; it being found impossible to remove her, she was burned; it may be added, with little wisdom, for in a few hours the British were in possession of the river.

On the 28th, Cornwallis, with a strong force fully supplied with artillery, landed unopposed to take Reed Bank by storm. What a comment on the attempt of von Donop! All the preparations were ready for the assault when, on the night of the 29th, a burst of flame, followed by a loud explosion and volumes of smoke, told that the fort had been mined and fired. The ships in the river also burst into sheets of flame, to prevent them falling into the hands of the royal troops. When the fire was extinguished, what remained of the fort was levelled to the ground. One consequence resulted from Cornwallis' expedition: he sent out foraging parties to bring in all the cattle he could find.

The Delaware was now open to the British fleet, and Howe was able to subsist his army on the supplies obtainable by the river, or from New York. He was in the position which he might have occupied the preceding year, and have avoided the reverse of Trenton and the discredit of abandoning the Jerseys. There would have been no call for the action at

Brandywine; his fleet with a strong force might have ascended the Hudson, and as Clinton succeeded in forcing his way, he could have so distracted Gates' attention, that Burgoyne would only have been opposed by a force which he could have swept before him. Judging Howe by what he did not attempt, there was never a general who more misunderstood his duty, or, more incapably performed what he conceived that duty to be. He was now established in Philadelphia in communication with the fleet. Remembering the lesson he had received at Germantown, he fortified by a series of redoubts, the ground he occupied between the Schuylkill and the Delaware, his position extending to the junction of the two rivers below the city.

One expedition Howe undertook. On the 3rd of December he left Philadelphia with 12,000 men, Cornwallis being in command of the advance guard. On reaching Germantown, where Washington had again established a strong outlying force, the congress troops were driven out with the bayonet and some prisoners made. At daybreak of the 5th, Howe followed up this success by advancing to Chestnut hill, in view of the right wing of Washington's force assembled at Whitemarsh. The troops remained under arms until the 6th. On the 7th, a movement was made against the outposts under general Grey. Grey was himself vigorously attacked by 600 Pennsylvanian militia, under general Irvine. His assailants were driven back, and Irvine himself, wounded, was taken prisoner. The position was now reconnoitred, and as Howe formed the opinion that the intrenchment was more difficult to approach than he had been given to understand, he marched back to Philadelphia. His trophies were 100 prisoners, two pieces of artillery, and a large supply of cattle. Some foraging expeditions followed, but the troops went into winter quarters at the end of December. •

Washington had selected for his winter quarters Valley Forge, a rough and difficult country for military manœuvres, situate on the south side of the Schuylkill, twenty miles from Philadelphia. His force was reduced to eleven thousand men

quartered in log-huts which he caused to be built. As there was an unlimited supply of fuel in this respect, they endured no more hardship than is experienced by the ordinary shantymen.* Whatever their privations in other respects, and they were great, suffering from cold was not among them.

Washington's main deficiencies were clothing and food, and his soldiers wanted shoes. In this emergency, he was driven to make seizures of corn and cattle to prevent his men from starving. At the same time, he detached parties to prevent the inhabitants from furnishing Philadelphia with supplies, which, as a rule, were willingly sold to the British commissaries. Washington's letters detailing his miserable situation are a portion of United States history. It was at this period that a clique of politicians, generally those who had created the trouble, sustained by a few ambitious, dissatisfied generals inexperienced in war, endeavoured to displace Washington from the command. Fortunately for the cause of the United States, the contemptible intrigue recoiled upon its authors.

The condition of the United States troops at Valley Forge was known in Philadelphia; nevertheless, Howe made no effort to attack them. No reply can be found to the query why Howe left them unassailed. Was it that he was immersed in the pleasures of the city, or, having sympathy with the American cause in relation to English politics, that he believed its collapse would aid the king in his effort to establish personal government? Or that, having determined to resign his position, he had resolved to leave to his successor the duty

* The word shanty, now accepted in our language, has its etymology from the French word "*chantier*," the original meaning of which is a timber-ground, a building where work is carried on; it has also many subsidiary applications. In Canada the word denotes the log-hut built by men engaged in lumbering operations; in towns, it applies to any mean, squalid, petty building. The "shanty" of the lumberer, or, as the gangs of workmen are also called, "shantymen," is constructed with tiers of berths on the four sides. In the centre is a raised platform of earth contained within hard-wood bunks, which furnishes a site for the fire "built" with logs; the smoke escaping by the opening in the roof of the size of the platform. The fire being regulated according to the weather, the shanty is always comfortable. It is by this fire that the cooking is carried on.

of future enterprise? Whatever the cause, Howe frittered away his time and strength at Philadelphia.

The congress troops alone shewed that they remembered that a state of war prevailed, by the continual attack of the outposts. A serious effort was made against a detachment of the Ansbach troops. It failed, the assailants being beaten back with loss.

No explanation can be given for Howe's letter of resignation, which was written ten days after the action at Germantown. The reason assigned was that he had not the good fortune to enjoy the necessary confidence and support of his superiors.* The fact is certain that his discontent could not have been occasioned by failure to send the reinforcements asked. The correspondence between Germain and Howe has never been published. Should it ever see the light, we may learn some explanation of Howe's conduct. If we judge its character by that which took place with Carleton, we can easily conceive that it was coloured by the same insolence, the same dictatorial tone of instruction, the same interference with Howe's movements, which proved the bane of Burgoyne's expedition. It is scarcely possible to believe that Germain was responsible for Howe's expedition by the Chesapeake, in view of the instructions given by him to Burgoyne, to descend the Hudson and make a junction with Howe at Albany. It is not an unwarrantable surmise that Howe had been irritated by some offensive criticism on the part of Germain, secretly entertaining for him the contemptuous opinion which must be Germain's historical epitaph. It is a passage of history yet to be unriddled. The official correspondence, however, suggests that Howe was not constrained in his movements, and

* "From the little attention, my Lord, given to my recommendations since the commencement of my command, I am led to hope that I may be relieved from this very painful service, wherein I have not the good fortune to enjoy the necessary confidence and support of my superiors, but which I conclude will be extended to Sir Henry Clinton, my presumptive successor, or to such other servant as the king may be pleased to appoint. By the return, therefore, of the packet, I humbly request I may have His Majesty's permission to resign the command." [Lord Mahon, Vol. VI., p. 219.]

that the operations of the campaign were left to his judgment, he and his friends receiving in every way full support. Indeed, the volume published by Howe in his defence is mainly based on the statement that his plans were communicated to Germain, and not having been opposed by him, could not now be called in question. Nothing can be weaker than the attempted justification of his inactivity and neglect of his opportunities, than the assertion by him of his desire not to sacrifice his men unduly.*

No one was more committed to the war than Germain ; it was his strong point with the king to express his untiring enmity to congress, and to advocate unflinching hostility. Howe had asked for 19,000 men. Germain sent out 31,476 to carry on the operations : on that point there could be no dissatisfaction. But whatever Howe's success in the field, his career had been politically one of failure, and it is easy to conceive that he was desirous of leaving a position that had brought him little satisfaction.

Howe's command at Philadelphia furnishes a most discreditable page of British history. There never was a period when laxity of conduct in a large British force was more prevalent ; in itself, not only an outrage on morality, but which set aside every precept of political prudence. There was a strong royalist feeling in the city, which a man of judgment and capacity would have turned to profit. Many, without strong convictions on either side, saw little to justify the war, and looked upon its great burdens and exactions as not justified by the objects to be obtained. Those who entertained these opinions might, with little effort, have been led to throw their weight against the hard hand of congress. Howe could only see, in the associations into which he was thrown, the opportunity for amusement. It was above all things necessary on the part of the army of occupation, to respect the feelings of the inhabitants of the city, many of them staid in

* "On the other hand the most essential duty I had to observe was, not wantonly to commit his majesty's troops where the object was inadequate." Narrative, p. 5.

their habits, and in some cases not even tolerant of harmless gaiety. The religious feeling prevalent with many of the population was of a character which no prudent general would have outraged ; yet the dissoluteness of the garrison was a continued shock to a great number entertaining this feeling ; in itself a confirmation of the representations of the extreme supporters of congress, that no decency of rule could be looked for under the British. No effort was made to conciliate public opinion. The feelings of the inhabitants were in no way considered. Their houses in many instances were occupied as barracks without payment ; officers were billeted on families. It is asserted that many in these private houses openly received the visits of their mistresses. Howe's own faults in this respect were notorious. What was most peculiarly reprehensible was the passion for play, which became general. One Hessian officer publicly "dealt pharo." Many young officers, carried away by the torrent of folly, were ruined by their losses, and had to sell their commissions to meet their debts, and thus sacrifice their future prospects. It was the pernicious consequences of the idleness in which the troops were kept. Gambling in those days was the fashion in London. It was a mark of *haut ton* to stake large sums, and any pretender to social rank considered his distinction enhanced by "punting" at the gaming table. Life in Philadelphia was a counterfeit of the vice and folly too prevalent at the metropolis, and too much aided by the *laissez aller* example of Howe himself.

The whole winter was thus dawdled away. It was afterwards asserted that Washington's position was too strong to be attacked. But some enterprise might have been shewn. Had Washington been harassed from time to time, his ill-fed, ill-provided men would have lost heart. It is not possible to estimate the effect on the congress troops which active operations might have created. The force might have melted away, and a striking reverse might have restrained the spirit of revolt, and have raised the courage of the royalists. Had Howe taken the field, he would have given animation to the British army, and have kept them from the enervating pur-

suits in which they indulged. Supplies would have plentifully reached the city, especially fuel, of which there was great need.

Howe did nothing but seek amusement. Above all, he exercised no discretion as to the persons whom he permitted to remain in the city. Many were Washington's spies; the consequence was that when any foraging expedition started out, its movements were more or less known, and its operations interfered with. It was Howe's duty to have so acted, that, with the majority of the inhabitants of the provinces, a strong feeling should have been called forth, to look upon peace with the mother country as a blessing to be sought by every sacrifice and effort. His conduct, unhappily, gave rise to the contrary sentiment.

An event occurred in Philadelphia during May, shewing the want of discipline maintained by Howe. Some prisoners confined in the building in which the Hessians had been placed, on the night of the 16th and 17th, escaped, to the number of 114 men, 49 of whom were officers. They were not retaken. It was effected by the neglect of the guard and the drunkenness of the sentries.

Early in 1778, a bill had been brought into parliament, and carried without opposition, although not without criticism, to appoint commissioners to proceed to the revolted provinces, with the design of making concessions and terminating the quarrel. Their powers were really unlimited. They could treat with any one who offered, proclaim the cessation of hostilities, grant pardons, and suspend the operations of any act of parliament passed since 1763. The commissioners were to ask for a contribution to the general defence of the empire, but not to insist upon it. It was, however, to be made known, that if this proposal remained without recognition, complaint could not hereafter be made, should the colonies in an emergency receive no assistance from the mother country. It appeared, indeed, as if any terms would be accepted, which in some theoretical form recognized the supremacy of the mother country. The proposals of the

commissioners really amounted to an abandonment of every parliamentary right, previously so ostentatiously advocated.

Five commissioners were appointed by the act. Lord Howe the admiral and the general were named ; the three others were Eden, afterwards lord Auckland, Johnstone, who had been a naval officer, and hitherto an opponent of lord North, and lord Carlisle, then known only as a young nobleman, bent on pleasure and amusement.

On the 22nd of April, Clinton arrived at Philadelphia to take the command. In the interval of Howe's operations, he had remained at New York with 6,000 men to hold the city. The summer months, however, had not been confined to mere garrison duty. His outposts had been thrown out to King's bridge. Paulus Hook, the modern New Jersey, was occupied by a regiment ; Long island by a corps of provincials. The 52nd, with the Bayreuth and Waldeck regiments and some companies of provincials, was quartered at Staten island under the command of brigadier Campbell.

The latter were attacked by Sullivan with a corps of 2,000 men on the 22nd of August, at three in the morning. Sullivan's force made the passage by night, unobserved ; a strange comment on the watchfulness of the force. After plundering the dwellings of some loyalists, Sullivan directed his attack against the intrenchments of the provincial companies, and his overpowering force enabled him to seize and carry off two officers and thirty men. On the alarm being given, the other regiments were moved to the front. The congress troops were driven back, and in the confusion which arose in taking to the boats to regain the New Jersey shore, many were drowned : 250 dead and wounded were left on the island, and 386 prisoners taken, 26 of whom were officers. The loss of the British independently of the prisoners, who were embarked in boats, and carried away at the beginning of the action, was 50 killed and wounded ; the greatest loss fell upon the provincials who had to sustain the first attack.

In September Clinton made an incursion into New Jersey in force ; his object was to retaliate for the attempt on Staten

island, and obtain some cattle. Having crossed to Elizabethtown, he came upon Putnam's corps; a running fight took place, which ended in the retreat of the congress troops. After having given his men some rest at Newark, Clinton continued his march until sunset, when he was assailed in a defile by a body of men concealed in a corn-field. The attack was repulsed, and Clinton continued his march to the second river, in the neighbourhood of which a considerable force had been assembled. Clinton's design was more to forage than to conduct any serious operation, and having collected 500 head of cattle, he returned to New York.

In October Clinton carried out the expedition already described, undertaken with the view of offering relief to Burgoyne, against forts Montgomery and Clinton on the river Hudson.*

The first effect of the intervention of France was the advice given by Amherst to abandon Philadelphia. In the operations of this miserably managed war, there is always a difficulty in assigning the true influence by which any policy was determined, whoever the official councillor may appear to be. The instructions sent to Clinton, dated the 23rd of March, reached him in May, a few days after he had assumed command. I have related that commissioners had been sent to America in hope of agreeing upon some conditions of peace. One would suppose that persons engaged on a matter of such importance would have received the fullest assistance, and that they would have been informed of every proceeding affecting their mission, however apparently trifling. It can scarcely be credited, that no intelligence of this contemplated movement was given to them. They landed a few days after the order had been received, to find the city in confusion preparing for the departure of the troops. No one in modern times can express surprise that the commission proved an entire failure. The three commissioners reached America under circumstances most unfavourable to any negotiation. Not only was the abandonment of Philadelphia a

* Ante, p. 271.

declaration of weakness on the part of the home government, but the treaty with France gave assurance of a positive promise of assistance in men and money, and of both the provinces stood desperately in need. Whatever courtesies were shewn in answer to the private letters written to prominent members of congress, of which the commissioners were the bearers, the official character of the parties themselves was entirely ignored. Washington refused a passport to the secretary, Dr. Adam Ferguson, in spite of his high character, referring the matter to congress. That body, under the influence of the extreme party, declined to have any communication with the commission, until the fleet and army were withdrawn, and the independence of the provinces recognized.

Had the occupation of Philadelphia been maintained, Howe being no longer in command, and Clinton holding that position to shew that the days of indolence and dalliance were passed, the commissioners would at least have been received with respect, and their propositions listened to. The whole population was impressed with the difficulty of carrying on the war; the people were weary of it; there was no affection for French intervention; no desire to see French influence become predominant in the new political life, even if independence were achieved by French aid. It is true that the loyalist spirit had been firmly crushed by persecution, but it was not annihilated. The huge mistake of Burgoyne's expedition and its failure had worked their effect. His troops were still kept prisoners, in opposition to the terms of the convention, and the mother country set at defiance in the matter of this breach of faith. The proceeding itself was, on the part of congress, an assertion of its strength. Although, in the aggregate, there was a strong feeling that some arrangement should be entered into with the commissioners, it was scattered, disorganized, and powerless from its want of concentration and absence of direction. In congress the men committed to the revolution found their only safety in going forward, and in acting unceasingly

with a spirit and an energy, which could only have been controlled by the sabre of the conqueror. It was the one argument to which they would have submitted.

Even if the propositions of the commissioners had been accepted, the terms proposed left the seeds of future difficulty; not the least of which was, that no military force should be maintained without the consent of the general assembly of the provinces, or of the particular province affected. As in the commencement of the troubles, the absence of troops had allowed what was in itself an insignificant tumult, to increase to a revolutionary movement, so, in the future there would have arisen a repetition of the complications, by means of which agitators would have been enabled to excite popular commotion. In cities of any magnitude, there is always to be found a class of unscrupulous individuals ready to climb into prominence by any desperate expedient which opportunity may offer. There is no more fertile nursery for discontent than a misrepresented political grievance, by which class susceptibilities can be appealed to. In modern times, the system of compulsory education will go far to destroy the trade of the agitator. Nevertheless, all classes have a jealous sentiment regarding their interests and rights, and do not closely examine all that is loudly proclaimed regarding the danger with which they are threatened. The intelligence of the wage-earning population must prove the salvation of society. A century ago there was no general ground for faith in their capacity and judgment. There was much ignorance. The weakness of administrative power furnished the temptation to assail it, and the cause of law and order was without this indispensable support.

In other respects, the offers of the commissioners included great concessions. The debts of the provinces were to be paid; the paper money placed on a satisfactory basis; the accredited agents of the provinces sent to England were to have seats in parliament; the representatives of the mother country in the provinces were similarly to have seats in the

legislatures. The question of revenue and internal government was to be given over to the legislatures of the provinces entirely uncontrolled.

Congress determined that no reply should be given to the offer ; indeed, so great were the concessions offered by the commissioners that the only treatment possible was that which was given, the refusal of all recognition of their presence. Johnstone, one of the commissioners, the chief feature of whose character was reckless courage, with little prudence and judgment, had taken upon himself to write to some members of congress, and dwell upon the distinction and reward attainable by any public men who would aid this project of reconciliation. These letters, although private, were laid before congress, as if some strong incentive to further enmity had become indispensable. Their contents were made the means of calling forth increased resentment. One ridiculous incident in this passage of history was the challenge sent by LaFayette to lord Carlisle, when that young enthusiast took exception to some remarks of the commissioners made regarding France in one of their letters.

As nothing could be effected, the commissioners returned to England. Previous to leaving, they issued an appeal against the decision of congress, offering to the provinces, as a whole, or singly, peace on the terms they proposed ; one passage was justly reprehended. It was a threat of desolation, if it had any meaning at all. The passage set forth that hitherto, in hopes of reunion, war had been carried on with moderation. The character of the contest was no longer the same. If the provinces were to be added to the power of France, it would be the duty of Great Britain to make them of as little avail as possible. It was one of those rhetorical flourishes, which, often written without reflection, are not the less mischievous.*

* The following is the text of the proclamation, dated New York, 3rd October, 1778 : " The policy as well as the benevolence of Great Britain have thus far checked the extremes of war, where they tended to distress a people still considered as our fellow-subjects, and to desolate a country shortly to become a source

Howe's proposed departure from Philadelphia was the cause of a continued series of gaieties. His manners were polished and agreeable, and the months of winter in Philadelphia had been passed more pleasurably for the officers than for the furtherance of the objects of the campaign. The field officers, accordingly, resolved to give a *fête* of unusual brilliancy to Howe and his brother on leaving the city. This entertainment bore the Italian name of "*Mischianza*," a medley. It commenced with a tournament of knights attended by squires, who tilted in honour of the several beauties of Philadelphia, followed by a regatta, a banquet, a ball and fireworks. It took place in May, 1778. The greater part of Philadelphia society were present.* It is difficult to allude to it without a feeling of contempt. It was uncalled for, misplaced, and an outrage, in the circumstances under which the troops were in the city. It tended little to the spirit of discipline and activity so necessary in the situation, and was a misdirection of the energy and ability which were called for in a different field. It would be well for Howe's reputation, if in place of this revelling and extravagance, a different record could be given of his judgment, enterprise and activity, exercised to effect a termination of the unfortunate quarrel the opportunity of which had been extended to him, had he possessed the genius to profit by it.

It must be remembered that during these months Washington was hovering in the neighbourhood to repeat the surprise of Germantown, and, like Mahomet, was prepared to go to the mountain, if the mountain would not go to him. He even contemplated attacking Philadelphia on the occasion of the *fête*. Fortunately, the proceeding had been considered pos-

of mutual advantage. But when that country professes the unnatural design, not only of estranging herself from us, but of mortgaging herself and her resources to our enemies, the whole contest is changed; and the question is how far Great Britain may, by every means in her power, destroy or render useless a connection contrived for her ruin and for the aggrandisement of France."

* The device chosen at this entertainment in honour of Howe was not prophetic of his place in history: "*Luceo descens; aucto splendore resurgam.*"

[*"I shine as I depart; I will rise again with increased splendour."*]

sible, so the guards and pickets had been doubled. Washington did detach LaFayette's corps, which advanced towards the city. On the morning of the 19th, on the movement being known, the grenadiers and light infantry were despatched to check the attempt, and LaFayette immediately retired. A large British force followed in support, but no enemy was to be met, so the column returned.

Under a salute of cannon on the 24th of May, Howe embarked on a frigate to return to England. An event happened, when the proposed abandonment of Philadelphia was known, which reflects strangely on Howe's character. Naturally, the possibility of this movement created great consternation with the loyalist population, especially with such as had been avowed supporters of the British side. Howe, accordingly, was waited upon by Galloway, on the part of the magistracy, and requested his advice as to the course he would propose for them to take. He gave the astounding reply, that the best thing they could do would be to go over and make their peace with Washington, and that, as he was leaving the army, they should apply to his successor for a flag of truce, to pass to the American camp for that purpose.*

* This was Galloway's positive evidence before the house of Commons. Howe's explanation must go for what it is worth. He says in a note to his narrative: "Mr. Joseph Galloway in his evidence to the committee of the House of commons positively asserts that I advised him and the other magistrates to go over to Washington and make their peace. The truth is, as soon as it was known that orders were arrived for the evacuation of Philadelphia, Mr. Galloway came to me on behalf of himself, and the other magistrates, and requested my advice and assistance concerning the measures to be adopted for their welfare. I assured him, that if they chose to go with the king's army, they should be taken all possible care of; but if they rather chose to stay behind with their property and families, I could have no objection to their enquiring previously, whether Washington and the congress would grant them protection and security." [p. 33.]

Even accepting Howe's version of what happened, was it fit language to be used to men who had risked their lives and fortunes in support of continuance of the connection with the mother country, at a time when those who adhered to the cause of which Howe was the chief representative saw little before them but the loss of all they possessed, accompanied by the unrelenting persecution which was unflinching meted out to such as had acted upon the sentiment they professed.

Clinton's surprise can be conceived. He declined to grant a flag for any such purpose. He added that the cause was not lost, the game was not over, and the war would still be prosecuted vigorously, and no such thought of passing to the enemy should be in any way entertained. He added some personal assurance of kindness to those he addressed, and exerted himself to quiet their anxieties. The feeling was genuine and sincere, for Clinton, throughout his career, shewed strong sympathy with all, with whom he came in contact, who entertained feelings of devotion to the mother country.

CHAPTER II.

A movement was made by Washington, on the 20th of May, which may be regarded as having been dictated by the knowledge of the proposed evacuation of Philadelphia, and as a preliminary to following the line of march of the British and harassing their columns. He detached LaFayette with a corps of 3,000 men to a place known as Barren hill, seven miles in advance of Valley Forge, on the eastern side of the Schuylkill. Clinton, informed of the position taken by LaFayette, despatched a selected force of 5,000 men, under the command of general Grant, to attack him. A route was followed along the river to give ground for belief of a totally different enterprise, when suddenly the detachment wheeled to the right, and followed the road leading to Mason's ford, across the Schuylkill. By this movement Grant placed himself between LaFayette and Washington. LaFayette, on learning the approach of Grant, abandoned Barren hill, and in a disorderly march crossed the low ground, on a diagonal line, in an endeavour to reach the ford. As Grant approached the road he was nearer to the ford than the congress troops were, and it was in his power to have reached the river before it was gained by LaFayette, the only line by which he could retreat. Grant could not have failed to observe LaFayette's movement to place the Schuylkill between his own corps and the British. Nevertheless, he affected to regard it as a feint, and, in spite of the strong remonstrance of Sir William Erskine, persisted in marching by the road direct to Barren hill. Consequently, on his arrival he found that LaFayette had abandoned the ground and had made good his retreat. In his hurry to cross the Schuylkill, LaFayette left his guns to the east of the river, but finding that no advance was being made by the direct road, he detached a strong party to bring them across.

In order to facilitate his attempt, he sent forward a force to delay the arrival of the British column then following the diagonal line he had himself taken. The guns were carried across in safety, but his detachment was overtaken by Grant's cavalry, who sabred, or took prisoners about forty. Grant, observing that LaFayette had posted his force advantageously on the opposite bank of the river, with his guns commanding the approaches would not attack him. The expedition was rendered nugatory by Grant's incapacity. Had he acted as Erskine suggested, the destruction of LaFayette's force would have been certain. The loss would have been so serious to Washington's small army, that it is possible he would have found himself so threatened, as to make a retreat on his part necessary; a movement of great importance in the situation in which Clinton was placed, being forced to march across the Jerseys from Philadelphia to New York.

There is a remarkable letter on the events of this date written at the close of 1777 by M. Du Portail,* then a brigadier in the congress army, who afterwards became minister of war in 1792 in the French constituent assembly. The letter, addressed to the French minister of war, was written from Washington's camp at Whitemarsh, four leagues from Philadelphia.

An attempt was to be made, wrote Du Portail, to blockade Howe in Philadelphia, so that his force would die from hunger; but, he added, to speak the truth, without any hope of success. He predicted what followed; that the posts, by which the ascent of the river was impeded, would be taken and Howe brought in connection with the ships. The congress troops were not in a bad condition, considering that they had been twice beaten; but the fact was attributable to the want of cavalry by the English, and the woods and obstacles with which the country abounded. The question now to be considered was, would the Americans succeed? In France the affirmative was believed; in America there

* This letter is given in French in Stedman's *American War*, I., p. 386, with a bad translation.

was no such opinion. The campaign had terminated as it had done, not by the good conduct of the Americans but by the fault of the British. After condemning the campaign of Burgoyne, which might have appeared a fine thing in London, he pointed out that if in place of this fruitless attempt, Washington had been attacked with ten or twenty thousand men, he could not have answered for the result. For if even the congress troops had doubled the number in the field, they would not have doubled their strength, but have trebled their embarrassments. *

Du Portail pointed out that Howe had neglected to profit by the advantages he had gained in not following up Washington after the battle of Brandywine. Had he done so, Washington's army must have disappeared. Howe's operations had since been marked by extraordinary procrastination and timidity. It was his own belief that with 30,000 troops well commanded the country could be reduced. The congress troops were in want of everything. They had neither cloth, linen, salt, nor sugar. Previous to the war, the Americans had lived in comfort, if not in luxury. They passed a great deal of their time in drinking tea and spirituous liquors. The tax upon their strength, created by the war, caused many to prefer the yoke of the English to liberty, purchased at the expense of their ease. The people were indolent, † without energy, without vigour, without passion for the cause, only sustaining it from the impulse which had been given to it. There was a hundred-fold more enthusiasm regarding it in a *café* at Paris, than in the whole of the provinces. It was therefore essential, if France desired to see the revolution succeed, to aid it with what was necessary. It would cost some millions, but England, despoiled of her colonies, without commerce, without ships, would lose her greatness, and France would then be without a rival.

Du Portail discussed the probability of France regaining possession of Canada. He pronounced strongly against such

* "Il ne seroit plus question de l'armée du général Washington."

† De Portail uses the French word "mou."

an attempt. It was the true policy of France to own islands, easily retained in her domination. He foretold, that if America failed to obtain her independence on this occasion, she would certainly do so at the end of one hundred years. His theory was, that, if France would not directly aid America, she should follow such a line of policy that the British army in the country should never be under the strength of 25,000 men.

In accordance with his instructions from home, Clinton took steps to abandon Philadelphia, the possession of which had been effected with such a cost of time, treasure, and of loss of life in the field. There was not shipping enough to carry away the baggage with the troops, and the loyalist families who had taken up the cause of the mother country; and to leave them behind was to expose them to the unsleeping vengeance and merciless persecution of the extreme supporters of independence. Loading the vessels to the fullest limit of their capacity, placing in them the loyalists who preferred to sacrifice their all and accompany the army, than to remain subjected to the tyranny of congress, Clinton resolved, with what baggage he could not ship, to march across the Jerseys.

On the 18th of June the British troops abandoned Philadelphia. On the same day a detachment of the congress troops entered and Arnold was placed in command with orders from Washington to restrain in every form persecution of those who remained behind. The sick and wounded could not be carried off, and Clinton, by a letter, left them to Washington's consideration. All the boats which had been used for the transport to the Jersey shore were destroyed. In the advance, Cornwallis' brigade took the lead, in anticipation of opposition in front. After a few days' march, Knyphausen's division, to which the baggage had been entrusted, was changed to the front. It was a duty of great difficulty; German writers describe the march as extending over fourteen miles. There was an immense amount of superfluous baggage which had found its way to Philadelphia with "coaches,

and horses, together with servants, mistresses and other useless frippery concerning which no idea can be formed."*

From this date, the column escorting the baggage was first on the line of march. It was subjected to a series of attacks which were invariably beaten back. But the duty entailed upon the division was most severe, exacting constant vigilance, day and night. During the whole time the heat was intense. It was in the last weeks of June. Frequently the sun has great power at this date : such was the case in this year. The men suffered from thirst and want of rest, to an unusual degree ; the whole march indeed was one of the most extraordinary events of the war. It commenced on the 18th of June ; Sandy Hook was reached only on the 5th of July. Clinton's force consisted of 13,000 fighting men, subjected to the attack of the whole force which Washington could bring into the field. The battle of Monmouth Court-house was fought by him with but half his strength, against the entire weight of Washington's army.

One result of the march was the loss of 500 deserters and stragglers, the greater part from the Hessian troops. Great privation and suffering were entailed on all. Many were suffocated by the heat, many stupefied. Some of the men had formed relations in Pennsylvania, the attachment to which was stronger than a sense of duty. The principal reason may, however, be assigned to the unceasing hardships, loss of sleep, and danger experienced on the march, to escape which, many in desperation abandoned their colours.

It was a legacy of Howe's generalship and Burgoyne's collapse ; the consequence of the movements which owed their origin to the directions sent from England, in connection with the incompetence of the generals, to whom the war had been intrusted. No more painful chapter in our history can be read. It is to be hoped, that as a nation we will profit by it.

* Von Eelking II., p. 13. "Die reichen britischen Officiere schleppten eine Menge Bagage, Kutschen und Pferde, sammt Bedienung, Maitressen und andern unnützen Tand mit sich, wovon man heutigen Tages keinen Begriff mehr hat."

With the exception of these continual harassing attacks, Clinton did not experience serious opposition in the sense that his advance was disputed by a force in his front. At length he reached the point, when he had to decide whether he would proceed to South Amboy opposite Staten island, or to Sandy Hook some miles to the south. The former was his most direct route, but it involved the passage of the river Raritan, and the news had reached Clinton that Gates was hurrying forward to effect a junction with Washington. Clinton decided to march for Sandy Hook. On the 27th of June he reached Freehold Court-house, in the county of Monmouth, and encamped on some high ground.

Lee was in command of Washington's advance force of 5,000 men, and occupied English-town a few miles from Clinton's position. Washington's main body was three miles to the rear. A corps of 600 men hovered on Clinton's right wing, while his left was threatened by a division of 800. Washington had resolved to risk a general action, and early on the morning of the 28th of June, he sent orders to Lee to commence the attack, giving him assurance of the support of the main corps.

From the movements which had been made, Clinton formed the opinion that the attack could not be delayed, and he considered that it would be directed against the weakest division of his army, the one in charge of the baggage, which has been described of extraordinary quantity, the column occupying a line of march of 12 miles. Accordingly he ordered the division of Knyphausen, intrusted with this duty, to proceed onward, while Cornwallis for a time would remain stationary, prepared to protect it. Knyphausen, with the baggage, marched at daybreak; the second division remained on the ground until eight.

As it left the height on which it had been encamped, Clinton observed Lee's force descending upon the plain. Clinton felt that his only safety lay in moving against this body of men, before strengthened by Washington's whole army. Accordingly he made his disposition to begin the action.

Perceiving Clinton's intention, Lee took ground upon a height ; nevertheless Clinton pressed his men forward. Lee's first line was broken and gave way : the second made little resistance. His whole corps fell into disorder, and it was only the presence of Washington's force which saved them from being routed. The heat of the day was dreadful : the suffering from fatigue and thirst extreme. It is said that three sergeants and 56 men perished on the field, without a wound. As Washington's force came upon the ground, a formation was made by Clinton to withstand it, but Clinton, seeing from the difficulties of the ground that Washington's front could not be attacked, his own men being ready to sink from fatigue, drew back his forces, taking up the advantageous position, whence his first attack had been made. Washington did not feel warranted in making any further attempt against Clinton. Clinton allowed his men to rest until ten at night, when he resumed his march and, unmolested, joined Knyphausen's division. The latter had beaten off every attempt at interference with his march. The loss of the British killed, wounded and missing was 358, including 20 officers ; that of the congress troops 361, including officers. Among the killed on the British side was lieutenant-colonel Monckton. Such was the affection of his men for him, that, under a cannonade, so as not to leave his body exposed to their opponents, in relief parties, they dug a grave for him with their bayonets, and scraped the earth over his body with their hands.

An attempt has been made to claim the action as a victory for Washington. Modern United States writers of repute describe its true condition as indecisive. The real advantage, however, lay with Clinton, who, undisturbed, continued his march to Sandy Hook, where his troops were embarked for New York. Washington, on the other hand, abandoned interference with Clinton's progress ; the object he had in view in taking his position at Freehold Court-house. Clinton, for some days, remained in camp, in a position some miles from

the coast, prior to his embarkation, prepared to give battle, but Washington directed his route to the North river.*

In May, 1778, the French fleet, commanded by d'Estaing, sailed from Toulon to take an active part in the American contest. It consisted of twelve ships of the line and six frigates. D'Estaing reached the coast of Virginia on the 5th of July, the day Clinton's force, after the march across the Jerseys, had embarked at Sandy Hook. Informed of the abandonment of Philadelphia, d'Estaing sailed for New York. On the 11th of July he reached the harbour, but he found lord Howe's ships, although inferior in number, placed with such judgment, that he withdrew from the attack. Howe's fleet consisted of six ships of the line, four of 50 guns, with some frigates and smaller vessels. After remaining eleven days before the city, d'Estaing sailed for Rhode island, with the design of attacking the British garrison in possession of Newport. A land force, under Sullivan, was despatched to sustain the naval operations. Sir Robert Pigott was in command. Learning that preparations to aid in this joint attack were being made at Providence, he sent expeditions against Bristol and the Hickamuck river, in the course of which many armed sloops and galleys were burned, and much shipbuilding material destroyed.

The operations against Rhode island were without any consequence, more than the burning of five ships of war, of 32 guns, one of 18, and one of 16, to prevent them falling into

* It was owing to this action that general Charles Lee was dismissed the service of congress. Dissatisfied with Washington's publicly expressed reproof, Lee addressed a remonstrance to him, written in no measured terms, and on Washington's reply, Lee wrote a second and more objectionable letter. The consequence was, he was placed under arrest and brought before a court-martial for having made an unnecessary, shameful and disorderly retreat; and for disrespect to the commander-in-chief. Lee pleaded that having been attacked by an unexpectedly large force, with a morass in his rear, he had to change his position, otherwise further movement of his troops would not have been possible. He was acquitted of the main charge, but being found guilty on the other points, his sentence was, that he should be suspended from his command for one year. Subsequently he addressed an ill-judged letter to congress, and although he afterwards apologized and withdrew his letter, he was dismissed from the army.

the hands of the French. Owing to the position taken by d'Estaing, these vessels could neither put to sea nor reach Newport harbour. On news being sent to New York of the threatened attack, the British sailed out to relieve the place. The fleets manœuvred within sight of each other for two days, when Howe formed the resolution of risking an action. He was prevented in his design by a violent storm bursting forth, which scattered both armaments. The dispersion of the ships led to some single encounters, and in each case, although the force of the French vessel was the greater, the advantage lay with the British. When the storm had passed over, Howe gathered his vessels at Sandy Hook, and again sailed, with the design of engaging the French, but d'Estaing's ships had so suffered by the storm that he abandoned the position before Rhode island and sailed for Boston, which port he entered, to refit.

Operations on shore had been begun by Sullivan against the intrenched camp at Newport, in which Pigott had concentrated his force. The retirement of the French fleet so affected the spirit of Sullivan's force that a large number deserted. Sullivan consequently abandoned his position, sending away his baggage previously to his retreat. Pigott now became the assailant, and followed the congress troops to the works which had been constructed by Sullivan to the north of the island, in anticipation of some such emergency. An action took place before the intrenchment. The result was so unfavourable to Sullivan, that he withdrew from the ground. On Pigott making preparations to renew the combat the following day, and attack the intrenchments, it was found that Sullivan had embarked his force and successfully retreated. The day after his embarkation Sir Henry Clinton arrived with 4,000 men for the relief of the garrison, having been detained some days by contrary winds and rough weather.

The abandonment of the position before Rhode island by the French fleet gave rise to great dissatisfaction throughout the provinces. The failure of the attack on Newport was

traced to this movement, and in all directions, the disappointment, that had succeeded the expectation of success in no way realized, created even an unfriendly feeling towards their new allies. The one result of the joint expedition had been Sullivan's forced retreat, with the consequent loss of prestige and the retention by the British of the post. Such was the feeling against the French seamen, that riots took place at Boston and Charleston, in which lives on both sides were lost. There was at this time little sympathy with the French as a people, however great the political advantage looked for from their alliance.

What more particularly awoke the susceptibility of congress was d'Estaing's proclamation to the Canadians. It created distrust by the appeal made to French nationality and feeling, while it subordinated the principles, which the provincial leaders of the movement for independence constantly dwelt upon, as the incentive to continued resistance. The proclamation was actively distributed throughout Canada and placed on the church doors of every parish. There probably was not a household in the province where it was unknown. It appealed to a different tone of feeling from that evoked on Montgomery's invasion. Those views had ceased to be entertained. They had, in the first instance, arisen with the English-speaking inhabitants, discontented with the Quebec Act for the recognition given to French Canadian institutions. The French Canadians who had joined in the movement had included no persons of prominence. The many who had countenanced the invasion had been led by the desire of obtaining a title to their lands, freed from the weight of seigneurial obligations. There was no ground for discontent on their part with the newly implanted British institutions. Some writers, however, have endeavoured to make it appear that the inhabitants of Canada were subjected to an act of tyranny, which called out the population in defence of their lands under the militia law. It was simply a measure indispensable in the emergency. Some few may have been cajoled into the promise of enlarged liberty, which they

imperfectly understood. If there was any feeling of dissatisfaction on the part of the French Canadians, it was from the belief that there was a design to absorb them in the British relationship: a sentiment easily awakened, which exists to this day, to furnish a convenient topic for political declamation. Since the peace of Versailles there has never been a desire on the part of the French Canadians to return to French rule. Their political sentiment at that time, as it is now, has been to preserve distinct characteristics as a community, and every auxiliary influence has been enlisted to keep this feeling at its full strength. Indeed, there has always been the reverse of any aspiration for the old *régime* of the arbitrary government of France, which, from the freer institutions under which they live, they have learned to estimate correctly.

But on the appearance of d'Estaing's proclamation, a vague, strong feeling of discontent was perceptible, traceable to this appeal. The great majority of the population was strongly affected by it. It appeared to them, the time had come for France to regain possession of her ancient colony and re-establish the relationship of former days. There was no love for congress or for the cause so unceasingly paraded as being battled for. The hope that prevailed was the re-establishment of the traditional language, religion, and laws in their full predominance, uncontrolled by British rule and unaffected by British institutions. Many of the clergy were carried away by this sentiment. They no longer gave the hearty support to government shewn by them when the province was overrun by the forces of congress; so that those in authority felt that on a second invasion by a French force, the Canadians would throw their strength on that side, and that all feeling of loyalty to Great Britain had passed away.

There is a strange coincidence in the appearance of the French fleet in American waters and the publication in Montreal of the first journal which appeared there, and it suggests that this relationship was not entirely accidental. The printer, Mr. Fleury Mesplet, had no relation with Canada.

He is known to have put in type at Philadelphia the proclamation disseminated in Canada in 1775. He is generally considered to have introduced printing into Montreal by the two books dated in 1776, the first* known to have been published in that city. We do not hear of Mesplet until the appearance of his newspaper in 1778. Mesplet undoubtedly had been sent to Canada in 1775 to influence French Canadian feeling, and I cannot consider it an exaggerated view to regard this publication, as started with the design of hereafter advocating the repossession of Canada by the French. If such were the fact, the design was carefully concealed. Mesplet contented himself with continuing his relations with the men unfriendly to the government, and leaving his columns at their disposal. He was subsequently imprisoned by Haldimand.

France, in the treaty entered into with the United States, the independence of which she then recognized, bound herself to obtain no national advantage from the contest. Some writers have expressed the belief that no design was entertained by the French of regaining possession of Canada. The perusal of d'Estaing's proclamation does not encourage this opinion. However carefully written, it is not easy to recognize that it was entirely in the interest of congress that an appeal was made to the sentiment of ancient French Canadian nationality, and to the reminiscences it was intended to awaken.

Its general intention was looked upon with suspicion by the abler men of the revolution. Undoubtedly, it gave offence to many and in no way added to the cordiality of feeling between the French and the provincials.

* *Règlement de la Confrérie de l'adoration Perpétuelle du Saint Sacrement et de la Bonne Mort*, chez F. Mesplet et C. Beyer 1776. Three copies of this book are known. The second book is of greater rarity. Although the bibliophile is familiar with its title, I never heard but of two copies being preserved, one of which is in the possession of Abbé Verreault. It is not possible to determine which volume has priority of date. "*Jonathas et David, ou le Triomphe de l'amitié.*" *Tragedie en Trois Actes, représentée par les Ecoliers de Montréal à Montréal*, chez Fleury Mesplet et C. Berger, Imprimeurs & Libraires, 1776.

The opening lines told the Canadians that they were born French, and would never cease to be French, and that the successes of the war had been owing to the brave Americans, now fighting against their common enemy, who had even wrested from them the name of their country. The calamities of war had been restrained by a monarch, the French king, who for their own happiness reclaimed their former attachment. If hostilities were carried into Canada, they would have nothing to fear from devastation. He pointed out to the men who were born as he was, that there was but one august house under which Frenchmen could be happy, the descendants of Henry IV. He appealed to the companions of Montcalm and de Lévis. Could they fight against their former leaders and their kinsmen?

The priests were promised consideration and power. After pointing out that a vast monarchy, with the same language, religion and manners, where they would find kinsmen, old friends and brethren, must be an inexhaustible source of commerce and wealth, he urged, by a transition of thought, that the prosperity would be better acquired by a union with powerful neighbours than with strangers of another hemisphere governed by a despotic sovereign.

The proclamation was dated from the "Languedoc" harbour at Boston, 28th of October, 1778.*

There were at that date two distinct opinions current in France with regard to Canada. One was represented by those who regarded its possession as in no way desirable; on the other hand, there were many who still considered that the province would prove a source of national wealth. The proclamation of d'Estaing suggests that he must be included with the latter, and that he desired to awaken all the susceptibilities of national feeling, so that in the future, if expedient, his utterances could be advanced as evidence of the strength of his own convictions. Officers, in command of fleets and armies, have not invariably been remarkable for the wisdom

* I consider the proclamation of sufficient importance to warrant its publication. It is to be found in French, at the end of this chapter.

of their utterances ; indeed many have often said foolish things. It is not an easy matter, however, to suppose that such a proclamation was issued without the approbation of the French ministry. One of its consequences was the proposition of LaFayette for an invasion of Canada under French auspices. So introduced, it was accepted by the majority of congress. It was Washington's influence which mainly led to its being set aside. It was plain to him, that if Canada were reconquered by the arms of the king of France, it would not be an impossibility that its retention might be claimed as a part payment for French aid. Even early in the relationship, it was seen that one of the sources of peril in the future was the contingency, that the United States might fall too much under the influence of France, and the very thought was extremely repugnant to the general feeling with which the French alliance had been sought.

It is not possible to refuse the impression that Washington viewed the situation correctly, and that the French under the command of d'Estaing were not indisposed to embark in the conquest of Canada, leaving the future possession of the province to be determined by expediency. Had the attempt been made, the probability is that it would have succeeded. The question may surely be asked, would the French holding Canada, with the passive attitude of the French Canadians, and the strong sentiment of national feeling awakened in the reconquest of the territory by their arms, have been content to cede the province to their new allies. Many grounds for holding it might have been advanced ; the money obligations under which the United States lay to France ; the necessity for protecting the French fisheries ; the consideration of their navy. The event shews the remarkable judgment and prescience displayed by Washington on this occasion, and the extent to which he saved his country from complications and difficulties, that his sagacity made impossible.

Clinton remained in New York, powerless to conduct any expedition of importance. He had received instructions to detach 5,000 of his force against the island of Saint Lucia,

and his strength had further been diminished by orders to send 700 men to Halifax and 300 to Bermuda. Nevertheless towards the close of the year 1778, he took measures to carry out a project which had been submitted by him to the home ministry, and for which authority had been obtained: an attack upon Savannah. It was the season when operations in the south can be safely carried on. Accordingly, on the 27th of November, 1778, 3,500 men embarked at Sandy Hook. This force, under the command of lieutenant-colonel Campbell of the 41st, an officer of ability and much beloved, consisted of the 41st regiment, two Hessian regiments, a battalion of light infantry and of grenadiers, some light cavalry, four battalions raised in North and South Carolina, and a division of British artillery. The fleet was under the command of commodore Parker. On the 29th of December the expedition landed four miles above the city of Savannah. The congress troops garrisoning the place were commanded by general Robert Howe.

An attempt was made to interrupt Campbell's landing, but the force brought against him was too weak to be of avail. When scouts were sent to reconnoitre, intelligence was brought that the congress troops were being formed a mile from the city. Although Campbell's troops had not all been landed, he determined to attack the defending force, before Howe had made the complete disposition of his troops. Howe's formation suggested to Campbell's practised eye that he looked for the attack on his left, which was his weakest side. A negro offered to guide Campbell across the morass, which was regarded as being impassable, and through the woods to the rear of Howe's right. His position had been strengthened by the occupation of some houses with riflemen. Campbell's attack however proved successful at all points, and Savannah was taken in possession. The congress troops surrendered themselves as prisoners of war: 38 officers, 415 rank and file, 1 standard, 48 cannon, 23 mortars, and 10 ships in the harbour with a supply of provisions, arms and ammunition.

The fall of Savannah determined the fate of Georgia. Shortly after Campell's success, Prevost arrived from East Florida and assumed command. Many of the population came forward, and professed allegiance to the mother country. A force was detached to take possession of Augusta, and parties of mounted infantry were sent through the country, to strengthen the loyal feeling.

Lincoln was now placed in command of the congress troops, and, as considerable reinforcements were sent forward to strengthen his force, it was considered necessary to withdraw the garrison from Augusta. Lincoln sent one of his generals, Ashe, to cut off a British detachment, but he was outmanœuvred by Prevost, who dispersed his force and took many prisoners. Lincoln retired with his main body, but on being again strengthened, he advanced towards the Savannah. Prevost, with the view of retarding his march and directing his attention elsewhere, threatened Charleston, South Carolina. This city had trusted entirely to its defences against an attack from the sea, and the land side was much exposed, for no effort had been then made for its protection.

On the march of Prevost becoming known, the inhabitants, with the aid of the negroes, actively engaged in the construction of intrenchments. On the 10th of May Prevost appeared before Charleston; his force consisted of 2,400 men. The city was now defended by 3,300 regular troops and militia. The place was summoned by Prevost, but it could hardly have been with any hope of success, for Lincoln, hearing of the strait in which the city was placed, was rapidly advancing to its relief. The fact being known, the authorities were desirous of prolonging the negotiations. Prevost brought them summarily to a close, and the citizens looked forward to the place being taken by storm. But Prevost considered his force was too weak for any such attack, and, in spite of his threat, felt it prudent to retire. The proceeding did not add lustre to the British arms.

Prescott retired southwardly, following the sea coast, and established himself on Saint John's island to await a supply

of ammunition from New York. On the 4th of July, Lincoln appeared in a threatening attitude, but retired without making any demonstration. Prevost, nevertheless, determined on abandoning his position, and left with the greater part of the force, taking with him the vessels which had formed the bridge over Stone river to the mainland. Maitland, who was left in charge to complete the embarkation, found himself in a difficult position, having many sick and wounded, with only 500 effective men, consisting of a weak battalion of the 71st, part of a Hessian regiment, and of the provincial regiments of North and South Carolina. The weakened condition of the garrison led Lincoln again to appear with 5,000 men, composed of the two brigades of continental troops, a corps of light infantry, several regiments of North and South Carolina militia, and a company of artillery with eight guns. The attack was made in the morning. Two companies of the 71st were sent against it ; they had to sustain the onslaught of the whole left wing. So obstinately was the ground disputed, that all the officers were killed or *hors de combat*, and only eleven of the column returned uninjured. The remaining congress troops were at this time brought into action, but so vigorous was the defence against this immense superiority of numbers that they were compelled to retreat. The British loss was three officers and 23 rank and file killed, 10 officers and 93 wounded, every fourth man furnishing a casualty. No account was ever made known of the loss on the side of congress, more than that 26 officers were killed or wounded. It was estimated to have been upwards of 300.

The ill success of Lincoln's attempt so depressed the militia that the majority returned to their homes ; and, as it was now the hot season, no further operations were attempted.

While these events were taking place in the south, Clinton determined upon the destruction of those seaports which had become the rendezvous of the privateers, and whence ships, strongly manned, sailed to prey upon the British commerce, on vessels incapable of resistance. This duty was entrusted to general Grey, and most efficiently performed by him. The

attack was first directed against Massachusetts. On the 5th of September, at Acushnet river, Grey destroyed eight large vessels, six armed ships of from 10 to 16 guns, about seventy sloops and schooners, twenty-six store-houses with an immense quantity of various manufactures and articles of trade, and also two large rope-walks. The operations were directed against those ports, the vessels of which had proved the most pernicious to the interests of commerce during the war. At Martha's Vineyard and Falmouth ten vessels were seized or destroyed, some salt-works burned, and 388 stand of arms, 300 oxen and 10,000 sheep, taken in possession.

Another expedition was directed against Little Egg harbour, which, from its position, was likewise much frequented by the privateers, who carried on their trade with Philadelphia. The object was the destruction of the vessels lying there. In connection with this design, two brigades were sent up on each side of the river, accompanied by a fleet of boats, so that communication could be maintained between the two columns. It was in this expedition that colonel Baylor's congress regiment of horse was surprised at "Old Tappen," when the whole were killed or made prisoners. The expedition against Little Egg harbour was as successful as the northern attempt. The vessels ascended twenty miles up the river, took possession of the place, destroyed the houses and batteries, and burned ten large prize ships which, having been scuttled, could not be brought off. It was proposed to penetrate to within thirty-five miles of Philadelphia, to the "Forks," a great depot of prize goods; but the news came that the country was thoroughly awakened, and that a large force was advancing with artillery. It was accordingly not thought prudent to attempt the design. As the detachment descended the river, the troops were twice landed, and destroyed salt works, with some houses and stores, belonging to noted owners of privateers. After they reached the harbour, while detained by contrary winds, news was received that Pulaski's force was exposed to attack. A strong party was detailed for the service, and a part of the corps was surrounded by captain Ferguson and cut to pieces.

The naval operations of Great Britain during 1778 had been extremely unfortunate. The fleet under admiral Byron had sailed in June, with the design of checking the operations of d'Estaing. On the 3rd of July a storm of unusual violence arose, by which the ships were dispersed, never again to reassemble. Some few reached New York singly ; six ships of the line which had managed to keep together joined admiral Parker there. Byron himself, after having been drifted over the ocean, came in sight of twelve ships of the French fleet, and to escape this force, bore away for Halifax. He there found the "Culloden." After having been refitted, the two vessels put to sea for New York, which they reached on the 18th of October. On that day, the squadron started to intercept d'Estaing, but another storm drove them out to sea, and some vessels of the fleet were subsequently forced to put into Rhode island to refit. Owing to these circumstances, on the 3rd of November d'Estaing, without interference, was enabled to sail out of Boston harbour for the West Indies.

It is not possible to ignore the countenance given in England to the cause of the revolution. Every measure shewing the least activity to sustain the operations of the war was, by a large party in the house of commons, adduced as a covert design against the liberty of the subject at home, and subversive of the personal freedom, which is the living principle of the British constitution. Many even argued that the war itself was a violation of the guarantees of constitutional right. It was feared that success in the military operations in America would be the forerunner of certain despotism at home. The error of that day was to confound the disturbances in the American provinces with George the Third's desire to govern arbitrarily, and his employment of willing instruments to aid him in his endeavour. Compliance with this attempt by the aristocratic party went far to make all government dependent on the royal will ; support rendered by men in prominence, so that they could retain power and place. It was sustained, at the same time, by the subservience

of the church, which assured the dignity and pretensions of her ministers. Whatever the motive which led to the support of the royal policy, it ought to have been seen, that the king's theories of government had no relationship with the efforts which were being made to retain the colonies within the ample dominion of the empire. Unfortunately, it was not so understood ; and hence the countenance given in England to the cause of the revolution by men of the first rank in political life. Many believed that the triumph of the crown in America would re-establish in the mother country the worst days of the Stuarts, and lead to the most ignoble national bondage. With these sentiments, many of the liberal leaders invariably placed their own country in the wrong ; and the extraordinary praise lavished on the revolutionary leaders during the struggle in America, as if they were possessed of superhuman powers, has been continued to this date. It is scarcely possible, even in modern literature, to find any correct narrative of the events of this time as they happened, or to meet a calm, judicial estimate of the actors who took part in them. Burke never parted with the hope of reconciliation. Fox described any advantage gained by British arms as a national disaster. He could only see the most honourable conduct in Montgomery's career ; he deplored the success at Long island, and he publicly expressed the hope that America would never be at the feet of England. When war was declared by Spain, he looked upon the proceeding as just and wise, and he considered that country to be perfectly warranted in actively intervening to aid colonial independence. This identification of imperial politics with the revolutionary cause exercised a paralyzing influence on all engaged in the war. But, admitting its influence in this respect to have been limited, it gave the fullest encouragement to the revolution, and, during the whole period of the struggle, caused discontent at home by warping the judgment through the creation of a false issue, and destroying that earnest, unrestrained desire for success which so often leads to its being attained.

On d'Estaing's return from the West Indies, from the representations made to him of the necessity of driving the British from Savannah, he sailed southward to undertake, in common with the congress troops, the siege of that place. He arrived in the beginning of September, 1779. His fleet consisted of twenty-two ships of the line, two of 50 guns, and fourteen frigates, having on board a considerable land force. His appearance at the mouth of the Savannah was so unexpected, that he was enabled to take two store ships under the convoy of the "Experiment, 50," and the "Ariel, 24," off Charleston.

Prevost, hearing of the proposed attack, gathered all his available force within the place, and energetically perfected his fortifications. The ships of war on their side prepared to join in the defence. On the approach of the French fleet, the British vessels moved up to the city; ships were sunk across the channel to render it impassable, and their crews were landed to take part in the defence. Before the arrival of the congress troops, d'Estaing landed his force and summoned the place to surrender. Prevost, expecting the immediate arrival of Maitland, asked for twenty-four hours to consider the proposal, and to specify the terms on which a capitulation could be made. The answer led d'Estaing to look for an immediate capitulation, but within the period Maitland appeared with 800 men. The consequence was the reply, that the town would be defended to the last extremity.

On the arrival of the congress troops the batteries were begun, and the work so pushed forward that they were opened against the town on the 4th of October. Prevost's force did not exceed 2,500 men; regulars, provincials and militia. The French troops landed amounted to 5,000; the force of Lincoln was estimated at an equal number. As the batteries opened against the city, Prevost preferred the request, that the women and children might be permitted to embark on the ships, but the request was contemptuously rejected. The bombardment continued from the 4th to the 9th, with but little damage. Every one present in the town

took part in the defence. When the French troops landed, not ten pieces were on the walls ; but before the close of the siege one hundred were in position. As the defence was vigorously maintained, and the effect of the bombardment was not such as had been looked for, d'Estaing formed the opinion that the only means of taking the place was by storm. The presence of his fleet in these southern waters influenced this determination. He was afraid that by a tempest his ships might be driven out to sea, and he would be left on shore without their co-operation. Moreover, the strength of their crews had been weakened by the presence of his troops on shore, and there was the additional risk of his ships, thus weakened, being attacked by the British fleet from the West Indies.

The attack took place on the 9th of October with 4,450 men, in two columns, the one led by d'Estaing and Lincoln, the second under the command of count Dillon. It was composed of 3,500 French troops, 600 congress regulars, and 350 militia of the city of Charleston. Dillon got entangled in the swamp, and having lost his way became exposed to the fire of the garrison and could not get into action. The second column advanced, and battled gallantly to obtain possession of the redoubt against which its operations were directed. For some time the contest remained in suspense, until Maitland ordered a charge of the 60th grenadiers and some marines, when the attacking column was broken and retreated, leaving 637 of the French troops and 264 of the congress force dead on the field. There was little good accord between the French and the provincial forces, and d'Estaing threw on his allies the odium of the refusal to allow the women and children to depart. The French resolved to abandon the siege, and their vessels sailed away. The congress troops retreated to South Carolina.

The siege, a memorable event of the war, furnishes in the defence a rare exception to the involuntary feeling of humiliation frequently forced upon us by the perusal of the incompetence and folly of the British generals. One cause

of gloom succeeded ; the death through malignant fever of the second in command, lieutenant-colonel Maitland, one of the most distinguished officers of the time, and of the greatest promise.

Sir George Collier was now the admiral in command in succession to Gambier. He had shewn considerable ability and enterprise, when, as senior officer at Nova Scotia, he had driven away the Massachusetts troops in their attack on fort Cumberland at the head of the bay of Fundy. He had also taken the "Hancock 34," with 290 men, the largest of the privateers fitted out to prey on the commerce of Nova Scotia. At a later period the congress troops had made a descent near the river Saint John, and Collier dispersed them and caused them to abandon the attempt. One of the most important services he performed was the destruction of the magazines at Machias bay, in the present state of Maine, filled with provisions, clothing and military stores, provided for the conquest of Nova Scotia, a design long cherished by Massachusetts. Collier kept the whole of New England in constant alarm by his cruisers, taking their privateers on blue water and ascending their rivers, threatening bombardment, as a reprisal for the injuries they were preparing to inflict on the British provinces. All these prizes, with the vessels retaken, were carried into Halifax. He thoroughly protected the trade of the province, and the fisheries of the Gut of Canso, and his effective services received the thanks of the assembly.

Clinton's desire was to attempt, as far as he was able by his small force, to check the exports of tobacco from the Chesapeake, by which the credit of congress was to a great extent sustained. Moreover, it was from this spot that a large supply of salted provisions, the produce of Virginia and North Carolina, was despatched to the troops in the northern states. A force of 1,800 men was sent to undertake the performance of this duty. It consisted of the guards, and the grenadiers and light infantry, the 42nd, a regiment of Hessians, and the royal volunteers of Ireland, with a detachment of artillery. Briga-

dier Mathew was in command. The fleet consisted of the "Raisonnable 64," with the "Rainbow," "Otter," "Diligent," and some sloops, galleys and privateers. On the 8th of May, the ships entered the Chesapeake waters, between cape Charles and cape Henry. As the draft of the "Raisonnable" prevented her sailing up the river Elizabeth, which passed by Norfolk, she remained anchored at Hampton roads; but on the 13th of October the remaining vessels entered the Elizabeth river. At a point between the two branches of this stream the legislature of Virginia had established a dockyard, and collected a large supply of timber for ship-building. For its protection, a fort had been constructed on the river below, formed of two tiers of crib work, 14 ft. in height and 15 ft. thick, the space between being filled with gravel. The troops landed without opposition, and on preparations being made to storm the fort from the land side, it was abandoned with the ammunition, baggage and stores. So rapidly was the evacuation made that the congress flag was left flying. No resistance was made. A large quantity of naval and military stores, merchandize and provisions, with the vessels in the Elizabeth river, was taken or destroyed. All opposition being now removed, the vessels ascended the Chesapeake, and seized several prizes. The fort was razed to the ground, the navy yard destroyed, and the timber and stores, which could not be carried away, given to the flames. The congress troops themselves burned a ship of war of 28 guns, ready for launching, and two French merchantmen; one with a valuable cargo, the second with 1,000 hogshead of tobacco. Eight vessels on the stocks, and several merchantmen were also destroyed. The total number of vessels taken and burned was 137.

So rapidly was the service performed that twenty-four days only elapsed, between the date of the departure of the expedition from New York and its return to that city.

DECLARATION

adressée

AU NOM DU ROI

à tous les anciens François de l'Amérique Septentrionale

Je soussigné autorisé par Sa Majesté & revêtu par là du plus beau des titres ; de celui qui efface tous les autres ; chargé au nom du Père de la patrie & du protecteur bienfaisant de ses sujets, d'offrir un appui à ceux qui étoient nés pour goûter les douceurs de son gouvernement, à tous ses compatriotes de l'Amérique septentrionale.

Vous êtes nés François, vous n'avez pû cesser de l'être, une guerre qui ne nous avoit été annoncée que par l'enlèvement de presque tous nos matelots & dont nos ennemis communs n'ont dû les principaux succès qu'au courage, au talent & au nombre des braves Américains qui les combattent aujourd'hui, vous a arraché ce qui est le plus cher à tous les hommes jusqu'au nom de votre patrie ; vous forcer à porter malgré vous des mains parricides contre elle, seroit le comble des malheurs, vous en êtes menacés, une nouvelle guerre doit vous faire redouter qu'on ne vous oblige à subir cette loi la plus révoltante de l'esclavage. Cette guerre a commencé comme la précédente, par les dépradations de la partie la plus intéressante de notre commerce. Les prisons de l'Amérique contiennent depuis trop longtems un grand nombre de François infortunés, vous entendez leurs gémissements. Cette guerre a été déclarée par le message du mois de Mars dernier, par l'acte le plus authentique de la souveraineté Angloise, annonçant à tous les Ordres de l'Etat, que commercer sans cependant interdire le même droit à personne, c'étoit l'offenser ; que le lui dire avec franchise, c'étoit la braver, qu'elle s'en vengeroit, & qu'elle se réservoir de le faire, quand elle le pourroit à son avantage, et de surprendre alors plus légalement que dans la dernière guerre ; car elle déclaroit en avoir le droit, la volonté, le pouvoir, et en demandoit les moyens.

Le fléau de la guerre actuelle ainsi proclamée a été restreint & retardé, autant qu'il a été possible par un Monarque dont les vues pacifiques & désintéressées ne réclament des marques de votre ancien attachement que pour votre bonheur ; contraint de repousser la force par la force & des hostilités multipliées par des représailles qu'il a enfin ordonné ; si la nécessité porte ses armes ou celle de ses alliés dans un pays qui lui est toujours cher, vous n'aurez point à craindre les embrasements ni les dévastations ; & si la reconnaissance, si la vue d'un Pavillon, toujours révérend par ceux qui l'ont suivi rappelle sous les drapeaux de la France, ou des Etats-Unis, des Indiens qui nous aimoient, & qui étoient comblés des présents de celui qu'ils appeloient aussi leur père ; jamais, non jamais ils n'emploieront contre vous leurs trop cruelles coutumes de faire la guerre : ils y renonceront, ou ils cesseront d'être nos amis.

Ce ne sera point par des menaces faites à nos compatriotes que nous tâcherons d'éviter de les combattre : ce ne sera point non plus par des injures proférées contre une grande & brave nation, que nous savons respecter & que nous espérons de vaincre, que cette déclaration sera affaiblie.

Je ne dirai point en qualité de gentilhomme François à ceux d'entre vous qui le sont nés comme moi, qu'il n'est qu'une auguste maison dans l'univers, sous laquelle le François puisse être heureux & servir avec délices, parce que son chef,

et ceux qui lui tiennent le plus près par les liens du sang se sont plû depuis une longue suite de Monarques, dans tous les temps, & se plaisent plus que jamais aujourd'hui à porter ce même titre que Henri IV regardoit comme le premier des siens. Je ne ferai point regretter ces qualifications, ces marques, ces décorations, trésors précieux, à une façon de penser commune à nous tous actuellement fermés, par notre malheur comme pour des François Américains qui savoient si bien s'en rendre dignes. Leur zèle j'ose l'espérer et le promettre, les fera reprendre bientôt sur eux: ils le mériteront lorsque'ils oseront devenir les amis de nos alliés.

Je ne demanderai point aux compagnons d'armes de M. le Marquis de Lévis; à ceux qui ont partagé sa gloire, qui ont admiré ses talents, son tact militaire, qui ont chéri sa cordialité & sa franchise, caractère principal de notre noblesse, s'il est d'autres noms chez d'autres peuples auprès desquels ils aiment mieux voir placer les leurs. Les Canadiens qui ont vu tomber pour leur défense le brave Monsieur de Montcalm pourroient-ils être les ennemis de ses neveux, combattre contre leurs anciens chefs & s'armer contre leurs parents? A leur nom seul, les armes leur tomberaient des mains!

Je n'observerai point aux Ministres des autels que leurs efforts évangéliques auront besoin d'un protection particulière de la providence, pour que l'exemple ne diminue point la croyance; pour que l'intérêt temporel ne l'emporte pas; pour que les ménagements politiques des Souverains que la force leur a donnés ne s'affoiblissent point à proportion de ce qu'ils auront moins à craindre; qu'il est nécessaire pour la religion que ceux qui la prêchent forment un corps dans l'Etat & qu'il n'y auroit point de Corps plus considéré, ni qui eût plus de pouvoir de faire le bien que celui des Prêtres du Canada prenant part au gouvernement parce que leur conduite respectable leur a mérité la confiance du peuple.

Je ne ferai point remarquer à ce peuple, à tous mes compatriotes en général, qu'une vaste monarchie ayant la même Religion, les mêmes mœurs, la même langue, où l'on trouve des parens, des anciens amis, et des frères, est une source intarrissable de Commerce, et de Richesse, plus facile à acquérir par une réunion avec des voisins puissants, & plus sûre qu'avec des Etrangers d'un autre hémisphère chez qui tout est dissemblable, que tôt ou tard, souverains jaloux & despotes les traiteroient comme des vaincus, & plus mal sans doute que leurs ci-devant Compatriotes qui les avoient fait vaincre. Je ne ferai point sentir à tout un peuple, car tout un peuple quand il acquière le droit de penser et d'agir, connoit son intérêt; que se lier avec les Etats-Unis c'est s'assurer son bonheur; mais je déclarerai comme je le déclare formellement au nom de sa Majesté qui n'y a autorisé & qui m'a ordonné de le faire, que tous ses anciens sujets de l'Amérique septentrionale qui ne reconnaîtront plus la suprématie de l'Angleterre peuvent compter sur sa protection, & sur son appui.

Fait à Bord du Vaisseau de sa Majesté le Languedoc en Rade de Boston ce vingt-huit Octobre mil sept cent soixante dix-huit.

ESTAING.

BIGREL DE GRANDCLOS,
Secrétaire nommé par le Roi
à la suite de l'Escadre
commandée par
M. le Comte d'Estaing.

[Can. Arch., Q. 16.1, p. 297.]

FEELING IN FRANCE WITH REGARD TO CANADA.

Mr. Marmette, assistant archivist, has been good enough to draw my attention to some MS. papers obtained by him when in Paris, which throw light on the feeling in France with regard to the repossession of Canada. The writer of these documents was one Cebet, who represents himself to have been present at the siege of Quebec and to have made the two last campaigns in Canada. Having married in the province, he had maintained his relations with the country. The first letter is dated 12th January, 1777, evidently addressed to Vergennes, although no name is given. It is an application for employment in Canada under the French government. Cebet's language shews that the acquisition of the province was at that date a matter of speculation; he says, "les circonstances actuelles offrent l'espoir de voir le Canada sous la domination de France c'est le vœu des colons, qui habitent ce vaste pays c'est celui des bons français." What Cebet, however, principally desired was some employment by which he could exist, "qui me fasse vivre."

His second letter contains an historical and political sketch of Canada addressed to the national convention, dated "le 10 Pluviose l'an 3" (29th Jany, 1794). Although written in the inflated style of that time, it is of value, as shewing that the design of repossessing Canada was not so uncommon in France as has been represented. The convention is informed that the aged Canadians who had taken refuge in France after the conquest had heard the report of the victories of the children of liberty. In consequence, their attention had been turned to the powerful colony which had been their cradle, but which had been in servitude for 35 years. They were now cheered by the consoling hope of returning to their native country At the time of the revolution of the United States of America, a gleam of hope arose to encourage the Canadians who remained faithful to France. It was then discussed whether the possession of Canada would prove a benefit or a burden. Had the matter been left with the maritime provinces the question would soon have been solved, but the prejudice of a thoughtless court prevailed over the consideration of those advantages, which would have increased the national prosperity. No benefit resulted from the superiority of the French navy, and Canada remained in forgetfulness.

The national convention, Cebet believed, would act in a different spirit, and Canada could not fail to attract its penetrating observation.

The memoir furnished by this writer gives a *couleur de rose* picture of the province previous to the conquest. An idea may be formed of his statements when he magnifies the 60,000 of population [Ante, Vol. IV., p. 413] to 92,000. He states, however, that in 1757 and the following year he saw 45 French merchant vessels at Quebec. They left France with cargoes of woollens, cloths, silks, hosiery, drapery, soaps, fruits, spices, drugs, wines, cognac, and *articles de luxe*. They took cargoes of wood of all kinds, fish-oil, dried-cod, &c., to Saint Domingo and the West Indies, where they received colonial produce for Europe.

Cebet recommended the union of Canada with France; if necessary, to be effected by force of arms. He was himself able to detail the force necessary to effect the conquest. From the relations which he had maintained with the family of his Canadian wife, citizen Cebet had not the slightest doubt of the sentiments

of the Canadians. He was also acquainted with the strength of the English force in the colony, and he could give his views on these subjects if required.

As Buffon tells us, "*Le style c'est l'homme,*" I will give the text of some sentences of this appeal. "La convention nationale portera ses regards paternels sur cette vaste contrée du Canada, dont on vient de donner une faible esquisse. Elle murira dans sa sagesse les avantages d'une propriété usurpée à la France ; puissent ses soins et sa vigilance rendre les Canadiens à leur patrie chérie. Ils ne respirent qu'après le moment heureux qui les réunirait à la République Française ; avec quelle *alégresse* (sic) ils revoleraient dans leur pays, la nature sera peut être pour la première fois d'accord avec la politique, le frère volerait dans les bras de son frère, et leurs cris de joye seraient un hymne et de bonheur, et de reconnaissance pour les libérateurs à jamais célèbres, dont l'importante attitude aurait brisé leurs fers et le génie réparé leurs désastres."

CHAPTER III.

My duty does not entail upon me a narrative of the dispute between Keppel and Palliser, relative to the indecisive action with the French off Ushant on the 27th of July, 1779. It remains a part of English history; an example of the unfortunate virulence of the political feeling of the time. Unlike the campaign of Howe and Burgoyne, the event happened on the British coast, and could not be misrepresented or suppressed. The facts briefly stated are, that admiral Keppel was in chief command; he was, in parliament, an opponent of the ministry. The second in rank, sir Hugh Palliser, was also one of the lords of the admiralty. Keppel sailed from Spithead, and met two French Frigates, one of which, the "Licorne," he captured; "la Belle Poule" he drove upon the rocks. In place of continuing his cruise, he returned to Portsmouth. Much dissatisfaction was created by this proceeding. Keppel urged in his justification, that by the papers of the captured vessel he learned that the French fleet at Brest consisted of 31 ships of the line, whereas he had but twenty.

Keppel, having been reinforced, sailed again in July, and on the 27th the French and English fleets met off Ushant. The battle lasted some hours, when the combatants were separated by a storm. Keppel asserted that he made signals for Palliser to advance and renew the contest, which Palliser failed to obey. The result was, that the French admiral d'Orvilliers sailed back to Brest and the English fleet returned to Portsmouth.

In the cry of indignation which arose in England, Keppel and Palliser cast blame one upon the other, and in this recrimination the keenest spirit of partizanship was aroused. Finally, Palliser brought against Keppel the charge of

misconduct and incapacity during the recent action. After thirty-two days' session, the court-martial pronounced the charge malicious and ill-founded. On the acquittal of Keppel London was illuminated, and to some extent became the scene of riot. In consequence of this decision Palliser resigned his appointments and his seat in parliament, and also demanded a court-martial. He too was acquitted. Such was the condition to which the British navy had been reduced by the system of George III. Keppel declined again to serve, and was replaced by sir Charles Hardy.

On the 16th of June, Spain was added to the enemies of Great Britain. The Spanish government, having completed her preparations so that hostilities might be commenced, sent instructions to her ambassador to return to Spain without taking leave. Previous to his departure, he placed a manifesto in the hands of lord Weymouth ; virtually a declaration of war. Thus, Great Britain was not only engaged in the war in America with the colonies, but had to meet on the sea the fleets of France and Spain, with the addition of the land forces of the former despatched to America to take an active part in the field operations.

The French and Spanish fleets united amounted to sixty-six ships of the line, with frigates and smaller vessels. The strength of the British fleet was twenty-eight. Many of the enemies' ships had been manned, without regard to their condition, and proved unseaworthy, so that their operations were hampered. What rendered this formidable force of no account was a dispute between the admirals. The Spaniards desired, without delay, to land a force for the invasion of England. The French considered that it was necessary first to defeat the fleet at sea. The condition of his ships, and the appearance of disease among his crews, finally led the Spanish admiral to inform his French allies that it was a necessity for him to return to port, to recruit the health of his men and to refit his ships. He consequently sailed southward. The French admiral, not feeling it prudent to attempt to cope singly with the British fleet, returned to Brest.

The Spaniards had been principally induced to take part in the contest, in the hope of regaining Gibraltar. The causes assigned for their intervention in the quarrel furnish proof sufficient that no real ground of dissatisfaction could be advanced. Early in 1779, a squadron had been sent out to intercept the supplies to be delivered at Gibraltar, and a camp had been formed at San Roque for a land attack. The following year Rodney, who had been named to the chief naval command on the West Indies, was ordered, previously to his crossing the Atlantic, to carry some relief to the fortress. In the Bay of Biscay, in the month of January, he captured a rich Spanish convoy, and on the 16th he encountered the Spanish fleet off cape Saint Vincent: his victory was complete. The ship of Langera of 80 guns, and three ships of the line were taken, four others were sunk and blown up, or driven ashore, and of the whole fleet four only reached Cadiz. After reaching Gibraltar with the cheering news, and also relieving port Mahon in the island of Minorca, he sailed for the West Indies.

Rodney, whose services thus came into prominence at this time, cannot be passed over with the mere mention of his name, for he was one of those admirals who raised the British navy to its present renown, and whose services were of such a character that they can be recorded on the pages which are inscribed with the names of Blake, of Nelson, and of our greatest admirals. He was at that time sixty years of age. Educated at Harrow, at fourteen he entered the navy, and was a post captain at twenty-four. He had been bred among the men whom Chatham brought to the front, and was present with Hawke in his victory off Ushant on the 14th of October, 1747. He has some connection with the history of this continent, having been for a short period governor of Newfoundland. In 1758 he was present with Boscawen at the taking of Louisbourg. Unfortunately Rodney's passion for play worked the general effect of that pernicious habit. His fortunes were so ruined by its indulgence, that in 1774 he was forced to take up his residence in Paris. On his appointment

as admiral of the White in 1778, he was in that city in circumstances so desperate, that from want of means he could not proceed to England. In this dilemma he was relieved by the generosity of marshal Biron, who furnished him with money, and Rodney was able to take his position afloat, in command of the fleet. He was enabled to perform the important service to his country of prominently aiding in re-establishing the prestige of the navy, and in contributing towards the establishment of peace. It is a pleasing duty to record, that the debt to marshal Biron was repaid by Rodney, and that the memory of the obligation remained. When in the French revolution of 1793, Biron's daughters, as *émigrées*, were in destitute circumstances, the British government granted them a small pension, as it were, in acknowledgment of their father's act.

The French and Spanish fleets, the former under comte de Guichen, the latter under admiral Solano, although combined, avoided every attempt of Rodney to bring them to action. Finding that there was no probability of meeting them upon the ocean, Rodney sailed for the North American coast. In spite of this alliance, England, during the year, preserved her old supremacy at sea. Several French captures were made. One serious loss however fell upon the commercial world. The united fleets of West and East Indiamen, under the convoy of two ships of war, with most valuable cargoes, were intercepted by the Spanish fleet, consisting of every ship that Florida Blanca, the minister, could bring together. Resistance was impossible; the sixty British merchant vessels were taken prizes into Cadiz. The men of war escaped.

In 1778 an attack had been made on Wyoming, a settlement on the Susquehanna. The expedition was organized at Niagara, and will be narrated in the events of that date in the history proper of the province. In November of the same year, Cherry valley, south of the Mohawk, was surprised and the country around Schoharie on that river ravaged. In these expeditions the Six Nations had been actively engaged. The prominent part taken by them will be described in another

place. Allusion has been made to these events, as they are mentioned by United States writers, to explain the expedition of Sullivan in 1779 against the Six Nations. There was a desire on the part of congress to chastise these tribes for their adherence to the royal cause. But strong as was the feeling of resentment entertained, owing to their having been present on these occasions, the main object was, to render them powerless to take the field hereafter. The consequence was the organization of a force to be despatched to the Indian country, to extirpate those inhabiting it, and destroy their villages with the crops, and all means of future subsistence.

Sullivan's force consisted of 5,000 men, congress troops, and 1,000 New York militia. He started from the Susquehanna by the Chemung river, and, marching to the east, his operations were designed to include the country between lake Cayuga and the Genessee. He experienced little resistance. On August the 29th, an attempt was made by Butler to intercept the march at the spot then known as Newtown, the modern Elmira, to which event the high-sounding term of the "Battle of Newtown" has been given. Butler, with a party of Indians numbering between 500 and 600, with about 200 loyalists and 14 British regulars, had placed his detachment in ambush to impede the march and to cut off the provisions. Sullivan, on discovering this force in his front, sent Poor with artillery to attack its rear, while he advanced against its flank. Butler was unable to withstand the numbers against him, and retreated unmolested, carrying off his wounded. The congress troops had four killed and thirty-two wounded. Of Butler's force, eleven Indians were left dead on the ground. Two prisoners were taken, a white man and a negro.

From time to time, as the march proceeded, there were attempts at resistance, which caused some casualties, but were without importance; and Sullivan, unopposed, effected his purpose. He devastated eighteen villages, thoroughly destroying them, with the fields of corn, the fruit trees, and

all the provisions collected. The country was reduced to a wilderness.*

Similar operations had been previously directed against the country of the Onondagas with equal success; a strong force had been also despatched from fort Pitt to assail the villages of the Senecas on the upper waters of the Alleghany.

On hearing of the organization against them, the Indians of the Six Nations appealed to Canada for assistance, and Butler's effort to impede the march was the consequence. But it was not possible to send a force of such magnitude as would have conferred the protection asked. Thus the allegiance of these tribes to Britain ended, for the time, in their lands being ravaged and their families rendered homeless. Contrary to expectation, the Indians did not sue for peace; in the place of any such feeling, a fierce spirit of revenge was aroused. On the side of congress, the results of the expedition were generally regarded as being in no way commensurate with its cost. The general sentiment was one of dissatisfaction. An expectation had been formed that Niagara, held by a British garrison, would have been taken; but the locality had not been even approached. Congress loudly expressed its displeasure, and the language of Washington to Sullivan caused him to resign his commission, and retire from the army.

In May, 1779, Clinton determined to obtain possession of Stoney point and Verplank's point, on the Hudson river, which commanded the passage at King's ferry. These positions were of importance, from the circumstance that, when in possession of the British, the congress troops when desiring to cross the river would be forced to make a circuit of sixty miles in distance.

The naval force was under Sir George Collier, escorting a

* Diary Lieut. Thomas Blake: "General John Sullivan's Indian expedition, 1779, published by authority of the Legislature of New York, 1887," [p. 7]. We learn from Blake the summary way in which the proceedings were conducted, "Sept. 14th. Chinasee [Genesee] castle, &c. . . . In this town were 180 houses and an exceeding large field of corn, which took the army until the middle of the afternoon next day to destroy."

detachment under general Vaughan. These troops disembarked seven miles below fort La Fayette, on Verplank's point. Clinton continued his ascent of the river within three miles of Stoney point. As the British came before Stoney point, they found the place abandoned. Without delay the heavy artillery was dragged up the hill, placed in position, and directed against fort La Fayette. In the meantime the fort had been surrounded by the land force, and, no escape being open by water, the garrison unconditionally surrendered, on the promise of good usage. Garrisons were left at the two forts; the fortifications at Stoney point were completed and extended, and Clinton, having carried out these dispositions, returned to New York.

Connecticut was the next object of attack by an expedition under Tryon. It was from the sea-board of this province that numerous privateers were despatched to seize trading vessels incapable of resistance. Newhaven was first assailed. As during the attack the inhabitants fired from their windows on the British, and sentries were wounded on their post, when the place was taken the fort was demolished, and the inhabitants were warned by proclamation, that any further opposition would be summarily visited upon them. The fleet sailed to Fairfield. Great resistance was experienced, but without avail, and the place, with the stores and vessels in the harbour, was burned. Norwalk and Greenfield met the same fate; both were burned. Tryon now proceeded to Huntingdon bay, to the east of Long island, to organize an expedition against New London, one of the principal haunts of the privateers. As serious opposition was anticipated, it was considered necessary to obtain additional reinforcements and ammunition. While so engaged, the force was recalled to New York, owing to intelligence having been received that Stoney point had been retaken by Wayne.

With a force of about 1,500 men, the place had been surprised at one in the morning of the 16th of July. The loss of this post led to the officer in command, lieutenant-colonel Johnson of the 17th, being severely censured. The garrison

of 600 men consisted of the grenadier company of the 71st, the 17th regiment, and a company of provincials, with artillery. A gallant defence was, however, made ; the loss of the attacking force was 100 men killed and wounded, while that of the defenders was 152. The remainder of the garrison, with Johnson, surrendered as prisoners. Fort LaFayette was immediately assailed.

Clinton threw every project aside, to repair this disaster. Brigadier Sterling was sent up the river to sustain Webster in command of fort LaFayette, while Clinton himself followed, in the hope that Washington would descend to try his fortune in a general action. But on hearing of Clinton's advance, Washington ordered the evacuation of Stoney point. The place was again occupied, the works partially destroyed by Wayne were restored, and a larger garrison left for its defence.

Collier, at this period, with his ships, was called from New York by the necessity of protecting Penobscot bay, in the present state of Maine. Sir Francis Maclean, in command of Nova Scotia, had determined to form a settlement at this spot, with the view of obtaining ship timber for the navy yard at Halifax, and at the same time to establish a post which might form some protection against the continual incursions from New England. Massachusetts took immediate steps to prevent the design. An expedition was fitted out, consisting of nineteen armed vessels, carrying from 32 to 10 guns, and twenty-seven transports. The immediate surrender of the post was anticipated. Maclean heard of the threatened attack only four days before the appearance of the fleet before the place on the 21st of July, and he made the best preparation he was able for defence. On the 28th, a landing on the opposite shore was effected by the Massachusetts troops. The entrance to these waters was guarded by three sloops of war, under commander Mowat, so the eastern side remained inaccessible. In forty-eight hours a battery was constructed against the half-finished works. The attack continued until the 12th of August, when intelligence reached the defenders,

that it had been determined to storm the fort. To their surprise, on the 14th, the works of the attacking force were discovered to be abandoned. The mystery was explained by the arrival of sir George Collier with the British fleet. The New England vessels made no attempt at resistance, but sought safety in flight. Some of them managed to enter the mouth of the Penobscot river, while others endeavoured to get to sea. The ships in many cases were abandoned, and the crews landed on the then inhospitable coast. In the running fight which took place many were killed, and great numbers perished miserably in the woods. A few only reached the outer settlements, exhausted by hunger and suffering.*

Unfortunately for the public service, Collier, on his arrival at New York, found that admiral Arbuthnot had arrived with a fleet and reinforcements. Collier, being superseded in his command, returned to England.

In August of this year, Paulus Hook, the modern Jersey City on the Hudson, was surprised by the congress troops. Major Sutherland, in command of the post, having detached a considerable force to the neighbourhood, major Lee, learning the weakness of the garrison, led a force against the place. At the gate, his party was mistaken for the force the return of which was expected, and before the alarm was given he had seized a block-house and two redoubts. The commanding officer took possession of a redoubt, and with sixty Hessians turned upon the invaders the guns which were placed there. They served them with such vigour that the assailants made a precipitate retreat. The attempt was remarkably bold and nearly achieved success.

Clinton having determined to carry on operations in the

* Of the New England fleet, the "Warren," 32, "Monmouth," 24, "Vengeance," 24, "Putnam," 22, "Sally," 22, "Hector," 20, "Black Prince," 18, "Sky Rocket," 16, were blown up. The "Hampden," 20, the "Hunter," 18, were taken. The brigs, "Active," 16, "Defence," 16, "Hazard," 16, "Diligence," 14, "Tyrannical," 14, were blown up. The sloops "Providence," 14, "Spring," 12, blown up and burned. "Navy," 16, "River," 10, taken. The twenty-four transport vessels were all burned. The loss of the garrison of killed, wounded and missing was 70; of the fleet, 15 were killed and wounded.

southern provinces, at the close of 1779 embarked 5,000 men at New York ; the fleet was under admiral Arbuthnot. Knyphausen remained in the city in command ; his force being limited to the number sufficient to hold the position. The weather was extremely stormy, so that Clinton was seven weeks on the voyage, and had the misfortune to lose some of his transports by shipwreck, and, owing to the dispersion of the fleet, some of the vessels by capture. His most serious loss was that of nearly all his horses. He first landed at Savannah, where he was joined by some additional troops, bringing up his number to 7,000 men. On his vessels being refitted, he sailed northwards to Saint John's island, which he reached in February.

Charleston, under the command of Lincoln, was defended by 7,500 troops, consisting of 2,300 congress troops, 1,000 North Carolina militia, 4,000 militia of the city, and 200 from the adjoining county. Four congress vessels, two French frigates, and some smaller vessels, were in the harbour. The fortifications had been considerably extended by the French engineer, Du Portail.

The communications with the northern country were kept open at Monk's corner, thirty miles from Charleston, by two regiments of congress horse. Clinton, having succeeded in mounting his cavalry, despatched Tarleton against them, who entirely destroyed them. A fortnight afterwards fort Moultrie surrendered ; and on land, a second cavalry detachment was defeated. Charleston became completely invested. Every means of defence having failed, Lincoln proposed terms of surrender, which Carleton rejected, stating the terms he would grant. As they were not accepted, preparations were made for an assault. Lincoln, hopeless of relief, accepted Carleton's conditions. The congress troops were to march out, their colours cased, to lay down their arms, and become prisoners of war ; the militia to return to their homes on parole, engaging to take no further part in the war, being secured in their persons and property, so long as the parole was observed.

The possession of Charleston became virtually the conquest of South Carolina. Clinton, the very opposite to the incapable Howe, immediately sent off three expeditions; one northward, to intercept Buford's regiment of Virginia troops on its march to reinforce the Charleston garrison. It was on this occasion that Tarleton made the extraordinary march of 105 miles in fifty-four hours. Although his men were greatly harassed, the attack was immediately made. Buford's force was thoroughly defeated. United States writers charge Carleton with having refused quarter after surrender had been made. The explanation given is that a portion of the troops only so surrendered, and that resistance having been persevered in by the remaining portion, there was no general acceptance of submission. Buford himself escaped with a few men; 113 were killed, and 200 prisoners taken, the majority of whom were wounded: a proof in itself that quarter was not refused.

A second expedition was sent to Augusta in Georgia; a third to Camden and the upper district. An address by Carleton was disseminated, by which all who were attached to the mother country were called upon to aid in re-establishing the old authority. It was attended by a proclamation threatening severe treatment, and the confiscation of property, of all those who appeared in arms against the king's government. An additional proclamation offered a general pardon to such as would return to their allegiance, except to the persons who "under mock forms of justice have polluted themselves with the blood of their loyal fellow subjects."

No resistance was offered to British authority; on all sides submission was made, and the loyal took the oath of allegiance. In other cases a personal parole to abstain from hostility was accepted.

News had now reached America of the expected arrival of several regiments on board the large fleet which had sailed from France. Clinton accordingly felt it his duty to return to New York. Early in June he re-embarked, leaving lord Cornwallis in command with about 4,000 men. The first of the

duties imposed on Cornwallis was to safeguard the possession of Charleston, and generally to hold South Carolina. Some discretion was allowed him, if he judged it practicable to operate in North Carolina, to make a "solid move," and he received to some extent an independent command, but necessarily subject to the general plan of the campaign.

Cornwallis was born in 1738, and was now in his forty-second year. From Eton at eighteen, as lord Brome, he had passed to the grenadier guards, and under the charge of a Prussian officer had studied at Turin. On hearing the news of the breaking out of the war, by his own impulse he made his way to the headquarters of Prince Ferdinand of Prussia, where he was appointed aide-de-camp to the marquis of Granby. His success in public life was rapid, and he was a captain at twenty-one. The following year he was elected to the house of commons for Eye, in Suffolk, and was scarcely twenty-three when he became colonel of the 12th. The same year he took his seat in the house of lords as the second earl of Cornwallis.

In 1776 Cornwallis accompanied Howe as a general of division, and for a time was in command in New Jersey, having left for New York a short time before Rall was surprised at Trenton. He played a prominent part in Howe's operations at the Chesapeake and during the time that Philadelphia was held in possession. Towards the end of 1777, he left the army on leave, and reached England on the 18th of January, 1778. After remaining some weeks at home, he sailed for America on the 21st of April. Under the unfortunate influence of Germain, Cornwallis undertook to correspond with him on the operations of the campaign: one of the most dangerous of proceedings for a subordinate, inclined to be discontented with his position. The consideration which Cornwallis received from Germain was also not to his advantage, and gave him a sense of importance, which, at all times, can only be kept in proper subjection by clear judgment and a strong sense of right. Cornwallis was not deficient in high principle, and he had many noble qualities ;

but he considered himself to be equal to the highest position, and he never had a doubt as to his own capacity and ability : a tone of thought to some extent attributable to his rank, by no means at that day an uncommon sentiment. The quiet sense of self-assertion, to some extent perhaps inseparable from high birth, but with men of true ability kept in subordination, was, with Cornwallis, made stronger by the extraordinary powers which he carried back with him unknown to Clinton. It would appear that they conferred on him the position of general-in-chief, in case of any unforeseen accident to Clinton.

In spite of the consideration he had received, Cornwallis was displeased with his subordinate position, and in June he applied for permission to return home. He received for reply that his services were too valuable for the request to be granted. Later in the year, hearing of the dangerous illness of lady Cornwallis, he obtained leave to sail for England, where he arrived in December, 1778. In July, 1779, he rejoined the army at New York, and accompanied the force to the south, taking part in the operations which ended in the possession of Charleston.

For the succeeding fifteen months Cornwallis was the most prominent figure in the war. During this period his campaign in North and South Carolina took place, ending in his surrender at Yorktown, Virginia. It has been a moot question as to the circumstances under which he established himself in that position. Cornwallis affirmed that he acted according to positive orders ; Clinton on the other hand asserted that his instructions gave full discretionary power to his lieutenant. One point is clear, that Cornwallis never hesitated to act independently, as he considered advisable. The events of the campaign clearly establish the fact that Clinton was not in favour of the operations in Virginia as they were conducted by Cornwallis. The fact is proved, not simply by Clinton's express statement, but by a letter from Germain to Clinton, saying that he was glad to see that Cornwallis' opinion agreed with his, in pushing war on the side of Virginia. *

* Stevens : Clinton-Cornwallis correspondence, II., p. 13.

The difficulty on the part of Cornwallis was that he only regarded the war from the standing point of his own operations. He saw before him the force in the field he had, or might have, to oppose, and his main view was, how it could be best assailed, and the loyal cause promoted. Cornwallis had physical and moral courage; he shrank neither from personal danger nor personal responsibility; he had full confidence in his troops, and he possessed great self-reliance. It is moreover a safe remark, that the possibility of being assailed by the French fleet, and left to their mercy, appeared to him a simple impossibility. The existence of this feeling is an important consideration in the estimate of Cornwallis' conduct.

I proceed to describe the events leading to the final catastrophe, for it is only by following them with attention that Cornwallis' position can be understood.

The success of Clinton in South Carolina exercised a depressing influence on the cause of congress. Before the surrender of Charleston, de Kalb had been detached with some regiments from Delaware and Maryland, for service in the Carolinas. These troops had been sent to the front with no provision for their sustenance, and they had to obtain supplies by impressment. In the month of July, de Kalb had been superseded by Gates, who now was in command. The appearance of the congress troops in South Carolina led many who had declared their allegiance to the mother country to change sides. The most flagrant act of such treachery was on the part of one colonel Lisle, who formed a regiment for the king's service, took the oath, and received a commission. He obtained clothes, arms, and ammunition for his battalion, and, when so prepared, marched them to join Hunter, who had placed himself at the head of a hostile movement north and west of Camden. The British had thrown out a line of fortified posts extending from the Pedee river to the village of "Ninety-six," on the north-west of Camden. Hunter attacked two of their posts, but was repulsed, in each case, with loss. Marion also formed a force of irregulars, and,

when opportunity offered, harassed the British posts. Lord Rawdon, then in command of this district, judging from these attacks that the feeling with a large part of the population was again becoming unfriendly, drew in his detachments and centred them at Camden. Here he caused his men to build huts, and they established themselves in some comfort.

Cornwallis, hearing of the presence of Gates' force and of its march southward, immediately left Charleston, and joined the force in the neighbourhood of Camden, where he assumed command.

Gates had now 6,000 men. He had received an accession to his force by the junction of Caswell and Stevens with a brigade of Virginia militia, when some 400 men were sent to join Sumter, who was directed to harass the British rear.

Cornwallis was in a difficult position, his force did not exceed 2,200 men, and his retreat would have been the abandonment of the country; he had, moreover, 800 sick in his hospitals, and they must have been left to the mercy of his enemy. He felt that he had most to gain by anticipating Gates' attack, and, accordingly, he resolved to become the assailant. There was also the possibility of surprising Gates and taking him unawares. With this view he commenced his operations by a night march, so as to come upon Gates unprepared.

Gates on his part, trusting to his superiority of numbers and to the many unfavourable influences operating against Cornwallis, had determined, without delay, to act against him, and if possible, force him to an action. Gates accordingly took the route to Camden, and, by a rare coincidence, on the day of Cornwallis' advance Gates himself had moved forward in a night march. The consequence was, that on the morning of the 16th of August the two advance guards came into conflict. Support on both sides was immediately sent forward; the concentration of force followed, and at dawn the dispositions were made for a general action.

Cornwallis, so soon as the formation permitted, attacked Gates' centre and left with the bayonet. Composed of

militia, Gates' men could not withstand the assault. For the most part they threw away their arms, and took to flight without attempt at resistance. The congress troops under de Kalb on the right acted with more courage, but the defection of the other portions of the line admitted of their being taken in flank. Unable to keep their ground, they likewise broke and fled, de Kalb himself being left on the ground mortally wounded, to die a prisoner the following day.

The whole army was dispersed ; upwards of 900 were left dead on the field ; nearly 1,000 were taken prisoners ; all the artillery and stores fell into the possession of the British. Carleton's cavalry pursued the fugitives for 20 miles, and the road for the whole distance was strewn with the killed and wounded in the pursuit ; arms, knapsacks, dead horses, and broken waggons lying in all directions.

The defeat of Camden was not the only misfortune experienced by congress. Sumter, with his force increased by the 400 men sent by Gates, had turned southward to the rear of the British. With his wonted activity he had surprised a convoy advancing to join Cornwallis, and had taken 200 prisoners. On hearing of Gates' defeat he rapidly retreated by the west of the Wateree, and encamped at the Catawba ford, considering himself in no way exposed to attack. Impressed with the security of his position there, Sumter acted with great want of caution, and failed to protect his position, so that Tarleton, after an extraordinary march, was enabled to take him entirely by surprise, and thoroughly to defeat him. In the attack 150 congress troops were killed and 300 made prisoners. One important consequence was, that the British troops whom Sumter had made prisoners regained their liberty, and the captured stores and supplies were again taken in possession. It was with difficulty that Sumter himself escaped.

The examination of the prisoners taken at Camden led to the discreditable revelation, that many of them had given their parole not to serve in the war. Several even had British protections on their person. Some few of the most

prominent, convicted of this breach of faith, were hanged ; an act of severity dictated to some extent by resentment at the disgraceful conduct of Lisle. Unfortunately, many such examples were found in Charleston. There were instances of several persons of superior rank who, after having given their parole, were discovered to be actively engaged in a correspondence with the congress troops, giving information, with the hope of causing a reverse to the loyalists. Several of those so detected were sent prisoners to St. Augustine, Florida.

Cornwallis' victory may be regarded as the first step towards his subsequent surrender at Yorktown.* Until this date, Germain, with whom he was corresponding, had hesitated to accept his views, and had generally supported the plan of campaign submitted by Clinton. After that date Germain fell into the views of Cornwallis, and approved the course taken by him. Clinton was opposed to all operations in Virginia, before the Carolinas were absolutely restored. He even thought the movement into North Carolina premature. The victory at Camden, if Cornwallis' subsequent movements can be taken as indicative of his opinions, must have suggested to him that there was no fear of further resistance in South Carolina ; for, weak as his force was numerically, he advanced to Charlotte, in North Carolina, with a view of commencing operations in that province.

His design was to move with his main force to the southeastern countries, while Tarleton was to operate with the cavalry and light troops on the Catawba, and major Ferguson, who had been placed in command of a body of loyalist militia, was ordered to march westward.

* The strength of Cornwallis at the battle of Camden is reported as—

Officers and non-com. officers...	289
Rank and file.....	1,944

2,233

His loss was—

Killed—Officers, 2 ; non-com. officers, rank and file, 66....	68
Wounded— “ 18 ; “ “ “ “ 227....	245
Missing— “ “ “ “ 11....	11

324

At this time the congress officer, colonel Clarke, attacked Augusta ; Cruger, in command at "Ninety-six," came to the relief of colonel Browne, by whom the place was defended. Clarke was beaten off with the loss of one-sixth of his force, upon which, Cruger attempted to cut off Clarke and entirely destroy him, and gave notice of his intention to Ferguson, who concurred in the project. Cruger, finding that the pursuit was taking him too far from "Ninety-six," abandoned the attempt and returned to his post. Ferguson, however, continued on his march, when in September he heard that Clarke had been joined by Sumter, with a swarm of backwoodsmen threatening his destruction. Ferguson sent word of his situation to Cornwallis asking for support, and retreated towards the Catawba. In order to cut off Ferguson's retreat 1,600 men were selected. They were all mounted, armed with rifles, and carried their provisions on their backs. Finding himself hardly pressed, Ferguson took up a position of some strength, a short distance west of the Catawba, with the determination of resolutely defending it.

The attack was begun on the afternoon of the 7th of October by volleys of musketry. It was answered with spirit by Ferguson's force in the attempt to disperse his assailants. The backwoodsmen were repeatedly driven back. Indeed, they did not wait to receive the charge, but gave way to return and discharge their rifles. Ferguson, however, persevered in his defence until he fell dead ; 150 of his men had fallen, 150 were wounded. Ferguson's death caused great depression, for his men had full confidence in him, and there was no one to take his place. Their severe losses had also greatly discouraged them, and they were without hope of being sustained by any reinforcement. The fire from the rifles of the backwoodsmen continued to be poured into the intrenchment, and nearly every shot told. The survivors were now greatly outnumbered and without a leader ; there appeared no course open to them but to surrender. Such was the result, and 800 of Ferguson's force became unconditional prisoners of war.

The victors acted with extraordinary brutality. Ten of the prisoners taken, who were men of influence and position, were immediately hanged; the remainder were most harshly dealt with.

This skirmish is called in United States histories the "battle of King's Mountain." The limited numbers imperfectly represent its importance. It led to no further operations, for those who bore the brunt of the fight immediately dispersed to their homes. Its influence lay in the direction of raising the spirit of the people, and lifting them from the dejection into which they had fallen, owing to the reverses they had experienced continuously from the loss of Charleston. As with the other events of those days, the affair was greatly magnified, so that it operated powerfully on the public mind, at the time greatly depressed by constant defeat. It was the first success achieved in the south, and was made to bear the impress of a great victory. Thus it raised the desponding spirits of the supporters of congress, and gave them hope and resolution to continue the contest.

In this view Ferguson's defeat exercised great influence upon the events in the Carolinas, for, while it gave confidence and courage to the supporters of congress, it depressed and alarmed the loyalist population, and led them, not only to hesitate in joining the force of Cornwallis, but caused them to abstain from so acting.*

* Major Patrick Ferguson of Pitfours belonged to the 71st and was a most promising officer. Tarleton, in his memoir, gives Ferguson's letter to Cornwallis asking for support, adding that it was not until the 10th of the month he received orders to sustain Ferguson. On reaching Smith's ford, he heard of Ferguson's disaster; accordingly he returned to headquarters. Cornwallis, with some temper, disputed Tarleton's statement; he wrote from Calcutta, 12th December, 1787. "Tarleton's is a most malicious and false attack: he knew and approved the reasons for several of the measures which he now blames; my not sending relief to colonel Ferguson although he was positively ordered to retire was entirely owing to Tarleton himself: he pleaded weakness from the means of a fever, and refused to make the attempt although I used the most earnest entreaties. I mention this as a proof amongst many others of his want of candour."

One of the officers hanged in cold blood after the surrender was colonel Mills, commanding a regiment of Carolina militia.

CHAPTER IV.

The cruelties which characterized the war in the southern provinces began in 1779. They cannot, however, be considered a new feature in the contest. At the commencement of the revolt, when it took the form of armed resistance, and even previously, the public men known for their devotion to the mother country were systematically persecuted by the adherents of the advance party advocating independence. The destruction of Hutchinson's house and property was the result of popular passion. As the quarrel continued, those distinguished as loyalists were outraged in every form, the operation of tarring and feathering being a popular mode of expressing patriotic displeasure ; indeed, in some communities it was not possible for any one known to entertain unfriendly feelings to the efforts of congress to escape outrage. They were subjected to constant oppression, and it is reported that in cases many were hanged. This extreme rigour was not, however, of constant occurrence. In the southern war, a spirit of ferocity was introduced which was not known in the north. Early in the year, a party of seven hundred loyalists were proceeding from North Carolina to Georgia ; they were met by a large detachment of militia under colonel Pickens. The loyalist commander being killed, the force was dispersed ; three hundred found their way to arrive at Augusta, several were killed, many taken prisoners. Of the latter, seventy were immediately tried for treason, and five of them, selected as the most distinguished, were hanged. Colonel Browne, from North Carolina, in command at Augusta, immediately retaliated by hanging some congress prisoners.

Cornwallis, on hearing of the destruction of Ferguson's force on the 14th of October, retreated to Winnsborough in South Carolina. The defeat of Ferguson led to a change in his

movements. Leslie had been despatched from New York with 3,000 men as a reinforcement to Cornwallis. Entering Chesapeake bay he had established himself at Portsmouth on the Elizabeth river, as the point from which his operations could be carried on, to place himself in touch with Cornwallis. The news of Ferguson's disaster led him to abandon his position, and he sailed to Charleston, whence he marched to place himself under Cornwallis' command. The defeat of Ferguson so reinvigorated the cause of congress that Clinton subsequently described it as the Bennington of Cornwallis; and its influence was equally effective.*

In the east Marion collected a tolerably strong force, and shewed great activity in harassing the communications between Charleston and Camden. Tarleton was, however, sent in pursuit of him, and Marion, knowing with whom he had to deal, retreated to the swamps and woods, where he could not be followed.

About the same time Sumter again took the field, and from his reputation was enabled to bring under his command a large body of men. His design was to unite with the congress troops and attack the British garrisons. An unsuccessful attempt was made to surprise him in his camp. Owing to the premature movements of the officer in command, major Weymiss, he himself being wounded, his force experienced a loss of twenty killed and wounded. Cornwallis accordingly sent Tarleton forward to check Sumter's enterprises. Tarleton with a force of 250 men pressed forward to intercept him before he could cross the Tyger river. On the 4th of November he found Sumter with a body of men, double in number to his own detachment, advantageously posted on Blackstock's hill. Tarleton, with his usual confidence, although present with only a portion of his force, without waiting the arrival of the infantry, immediately attacked. He was driven back with loss, and Sumter crossed the river; but he was himself so seriously wounded that he could not keep the field, and his followers in consequence disbanded.

* Campaign in Virginia. An exact reprint of six rare pamphlets. Stevens, London, 1880, p. 103.

It was now December, and the season of the year, in connection with the events which have been described, led Cornwallis to postpone further attempts on North Carolina. Indeed, his position in South Carolina had been seriously threatened, and it should have been plain to him, that no true permanent occupation of the province had been effected ; that every garrison was threatened ; that it was only by his troops he could hold the posts he occupied ; and that the royalists were too depressed to make any demonstration unless efficiently supported by a force of irresistible strength.

The operations of the north had been limited by the strength of both sides having been directed to the campaign in the south. Intelligence, however, having been received at New York that great discontent was felt in New Jersey, both in the army and among the inhabitants, many of whom, weary of the yoke of congress, were desirous of establishing British authority, in the month of June, 1780, Knyphausen sent a considerable force under brigadiers Mathews and Sterling to New Jersey, in the expectation that their presence would give strength to the movement. The troops landed at Elizabethtown to find that there was little ground for the belief. The inhabitants had been irritated by the conduct of the soldiers, who, being unprovided with regular rations, and distressed for provisions, had collected them from the farms in the neighbourhood. The mutiny in the army had been caused by the neglect to supply the troops with ordinary necessities, and was not attributable to any intention of abandoning the cause of congress. During the march from Elizabethtown the British were continually harassed by the militia, who they expected would welcome them as friends. On reaching Springfield the British found a force drawn up to dispute their further advance ; the same force which had been represented to be in a state of mutiny. It being seen that the object of the expedition was unattainable, the column returned to Elizabethtown.

Although no hope was entertained of effecting any change in New Jersey, it was determined that in order to save the

credit of the British arms the detachment would remain some days at Elizabethtown. While in this situation Clinton returned from South Carolina. Greene's force had by this time been reinforced, and as he continued to hold the position at Springfield, it was resolved to drive him from it.

At the break of the morning of the 23rd of June, the force under Clinton arrived at Springfield, Greene endeavoured to oppose the progress of the British advance at two different points of the river. Although there was some resistance, his men were driven back with loss and were compelled to retreat to the heights in the rear. The town was burned. The same day the British marched back to Elizabethtown, and passed over to Staten island by a bridge of boats.

A movement, at the same time, was made to lead to the belief that the expedition was intended against West Point, on the Hudson. Washington, accepting the indication as shewing Clinton's intention to ascend the river, marched from his camp at Morristown, fifteen miles towards the North river, when he heard of the advance towards Springfield. It is probable that the intention of Clinton had been to assail the magazines at Morristown, but the difficult character of the country, with the many passes to overcome, and the certainty that it was occupied by a strong force to dispute his passage, led him to judge that a further advance was impracticable, and he did not persevere in it.

Moreover, it was not his policy at that time to engage in a northern campaign. The defeat of Greene and the dispersion of his force would have effected no result. The more serious attempt against Morristown he felt to be beyond his strength. He was likewise desirous of giving rest to the troops, who had returned from the south. Finding that he could do so with safety, he established them on Staten island.

In July the French army of 6,000 troops, under the comte de Rochambeau, arrived at Rhode Island with a fleet of seven sail of the line under the command of the chevalier de Ternay. Admiral Arbuthnot was now the senior officer of the British fleet, and his force had been strengthened by six ships of the

line under admiral Graves. With this addition to his strength he would have been enabled to blockade the French fleet in Newport. Clinton saw the chance of striking a blow against the French, which would have been followed by important consequences. It is not an improbable supposition, that the French fleet might have been annihilated and the whole force driven to unconditional surrender. The want of enterprise of admiral Arbuthnot prevented this project being carried out. A remarkable letter* of Clinton to Germain shews the true character of this event. It was only on the 18th of July that Clinton heard of de Rochambeau's arrival at Newport on the preceding 10th; he immediately addressed Arbuthnot with the design of organizing a well-directed attack against the French. In expectation of the arrival of the French auxiliary force, Clinton had requested that transports for 6,000 men might be kept in readiness for their immediate embarkation. Had Arbuthnot been a naval officer of the character of Collier, whose services I have recorded, the news of de Rochambeau's arrival would have been at once made known to Clinton, and in a few hours the troops would have been on their way to attack the French as they disembarked. Arbuthnot was a man of a different character. He appears in history as one of the many to whose memory must be attached the stigma of having unhappily aided in the dismemberment of the empire. Clinton's plan was to have proceeded against de Rochambeau before joined by the congress troops; holding his force in hand in the event of any attempts against New York, so that he could immediately have returned to defend the city.

In spite of the representations on the part of Clinton, and his endeavour to obtain the transports for his troops, they were not gathered at Frog's Neck until the 27th. The regiments were embarked and kept on ship-board for the succeeding four days, to the 31st. While in this position, we may read between the lines of Carleton's despatch the earnest represen-

* This letter is given by lord Mahon in his history, vol. vii., app. p. iv., dated New York, August 25th, 1780.

tations made by him to the admiral, to obtain his co-operation. But the latter took the ground that the French had been landed a fortnight, that they had strengthened their position by new works, and had been joined by the congress force of the district. Finding no help would be given by the navy, and deeming it inexpedient, without this aid, to make an attempt with the land force alone, the troops were disembarked and the transports lay "ready to receive them again if necessary." *

Hearing of the arrival of the French, Washington increased his force to 12,000 men, and leaving his position on the highlands and rough country of New Jersey, crossed the Hudson on the 2nd of August and advanced to the Croton river.

The inactivity of the French force blockaded by the British fleet was a source of great disappointment to the leaders of congress, and consequently a meeting was held between Washington and de Rochambeau, to concert some means by which the campaign could be carried on.

* Carleton's own words are, "I found no encouragement to my hope of effecting anything with the troops solely." He proceeds to remark [lord Mahon, VII., appendix, p. v.], "At this new epoch in the war, when a foreign force has already landed, and an addition to it is expected, I owe to my country, and I must in justice to my own fame declare to your Lordship, that I become every day more sensible of the utter impossibility of prosecuting the war in this country without reinforcements. And I must add, that with every succour I require—unless I have the good fortune to meet in the commander of the fleet, a gentleman whose views with respect to the conduct of the war are similar to my own, and whose co-operation with me, as Commander-in-Chief and Commissioner, is cordial, uniform, and animated,—the powers with which the King may, in his most gracious confidence, entrust me, any more than my own exertions, cannot have their fair trial or their full efficacy "Arrived at that stage of success, a glance upon the Returns of the army divided into garrisons and reduced by casualties on the one part, with the consideration of the task yet before us on the other, would, I fear, renew the too just reflection, that we are by some thousands too weak to subdue this formidable rebellion."

I am sensible, my Lord, that men reason with partiality towards themselves; but there is in my breast so full a conviction of the rectitude of my intentions, and of the candour and fairness of my proceedings with the Admiral, that, with the strictest scrutiny into my conduct, I can trace the difficulties and clogs the service suffers from want of his cordial, uniform, and animated co-operation, to no cause in which I can impute blame to myself."

It was on his return to West point that Washington learned the treachery of Arnold on September the 24th. No incident of the American revolution is better known ; the narrative of the event, however, does not fall within my scope. The design was to surrender to a British force the important post of West point, fifty miles from New York. The arrest of major André led to its discovery. British writers, as a rule, cast reproach upon Washington for the 'execution of André as a spy. If the laws of war are to prevail, it is difficult to regard him in any other light ; and the fate of a spy has, by general military acceptance, long been pre-determined. Clinton's statement of his instructions to André shews his own view of the mission to Arnold. He instructed André not to change his dress on any account, or possess himself of writings by which the nature of his embassy might be made known.

André, with a lamentable want of prudence, departed from both these instructions. In the trying position in which he was placed he shewed no presence of mind. Had he produced his pass from Arnold to the cowboys at Tarrytown who stopped him, they probably would have taken him to the British headquarters, claiming a reward for delivering up a spy, but the declaration that although in plain clothes he was a British officer and his offer of money for his release, all created suspicion against him, and led to his being sent to the congress force within the lines. The flight of Arnold, André's own admission, the written papers, established the case against the unfortunate young officer. There could only be one finding of the court of inquiry, such as it gave ; and in the desperate circumstances of the revolutionary cause at that date, we must recognize the shock given to the general confidence by Arnold's treason. It is not possible, with justice, to reproach Washington that he felt it his duty to enforce the sentence. No one for a moment can doubt that it was only with great pain he came to this determination. Indeed, it is not an exaggerated view that in ordering the sentence of death to be carried out, it was an effort on his part of stern moral courage.

Nothing of importance passed in the winter. The so-called lord Sterling, in the month of January, crossed over the ice and made an attack on Staten island. He surprised a small post and made some prisoners, but he was beaten back with the loss of some men.

It is proper to refer to the troops included in the convention of Burgoyne in October, 1777. Burgoyne had himself obtained leave to return to England on parole, where he arrived in May, 1778. Previous to his departure from America, as it became plain to him that the embarkation of the troops could more readily be made from Rhode island than from Boston, Burgoyne officially applied to congress to make the change he suggested, and permit the troops under certain conditions to proceed to Rhode island and there embark on the transports. Instead of complying with this reasonable request, congress passed a resolution that the troops should not be embarked from any port whatever "until a distinct and explicit ratification of the convention at Saratoga should be properly notified by the court of Great Britain to congress." Many members of congress admitted that it was not in accordance with the convention, but they justified it by expressing the suspicion, that the troops would not embark, and that many would desert and join the army in New York.

Subordinate points, equally fallacious, were raised. Burgoyne wrote to Gates, complaining that officers were not quartered according to rank, and that the public faith was broken. These words were taken as a proof, that Burgoyne did not consider himself bound by the terms of agreement. On hearing of this pretension, Burgoyne declared that he had no such meaning, and undertook that he and the officers would sign any paper affirmative of their engagement. A complaint was made that no list of the non-commissioned officers and private men had been furnished, although there was no condition that it should be given. The question of the cartouche boxes was also brought up, and as a fit close to these subterfuges, congress declared that it had not refused, but only delayed the opportunity of departure.

No justification can be offered for the deliberate breach of the convention. All that can be urged is, that those so voting looked upon themselves as absolved from the obligations enforced by military honour, owing to the desperate position in which they were placed; and that a sense of danger had blunted the conscience of congress with regard to that which is just and right.

Towards the end of 1780 war was declared by Great Britain against Holland. There had been a smouldering feeling of discontent towards the Dutch republic, from the sympathy shewn with the revolted colonies. Privateers had been permitted to bring prizes openly into Dutch harbours. So long as the house of Orange directed the policy of the country, Holland had remained the ally of England, but the republican party, under the guidance of van Berkel, the grand pensionary of Amsterdam, had been prompted by feelings of friendship to France, and the policy of that government became the model for Dutch diplomacy. Negotiations accordingly were begun for entering into a commercial treaty with the new nationality of the United States. The capture by a British frigate of Laurens, on his way to Holland, brought matters to a crisis. At his capture, Laurens was observed to throw his papers overboard, but a sailor jumped after them and rescued them. They contained the correspondence with the Amsterdam magistrates. Great Britain, acting upon this information, by her ambassador, Sir Joseph Yorke, demanded from the states-general a disavowal of the propositions made, and at the same time the punishment of van Berkel and the leaders of this inimical policy. The states-general had gone too far to recede, and they gave so evasive a reply that Great Britain, hurried on by the passions of George III., declared war on the 20th of December. Thus, at the commencement of 1781, Great Britain was not only engaged in the attempt to subdue the revolted colonies, but was at war with France, Spain and Holland.

Rodney's fleet was at New York, when the news of the declaration of war reached him. Conceiving that the fact

was not known in the West Indies, having embarked a force under general Vaughan, he sailed for the small Dutch island of St. Eustatius. Having an excellent harbour, with a free port, it had become the centre from which British manufactured goods found their way to the revolted provinces. There was no resistance in taking possession of the island. All the property that was on it was seized by the fleet as prizes of war. The merchandize thus taken was valued at four millions sterling; it was said at the time that it was generally the property of British subjects and American refugees. One hundred and fifty richly laden merchantmen in the bay were seized as prizes, with six ships of war. A convoy which had left shortly before was followed by Rodney's ships and brought back. The islands of Saba and St. Martin's also submitted, with the colonies of Essequibo, Demerara and Berbice. This act of Rodney became the matter of virulent discussion in the house of commons, and of subsequent litigation. The loss to the states-general, however, was immense.

Nearer home there was not equal good fortune, although Gibraltar was relieved by admiral Darby, who landed his stores and reinforcements and sailed back to the channel. He was there opposed to the French and Spanish fleets, which numbered 49 sail of the line. The English fleet consisted of 21 ships, so Darby took refuge in Torbay. The French admiral, de Guichen, was desirous of following him, if possible to destroy his vessels; the Spanish admiral, on the contrary, desired to remain at sea, and intercept the rich merchantmen. The French finally accepted this policy, but owing to the gales, which tested the seaworthiness of the ships and the capacity of the crews as seamen, it was considered advisable by the fleets to seek the safety of their ports.

The naval action of the Dutch on August the 5th was of a different character. Admiral Hyde Parker, when convoying the Baltic fleet, came in contact with the Dutch fleet off the Dogger Bank, under admiral Touttman, with his squadron in charge of another convoy. The action was fought with such determination that both fleets became disabled. The loss on

both sides was great. The result of the action was that the Dutch admiral sailed for the Texel, and that the British fleet was not in a condition to sail after him.

For the English coast to be threatened was fortunately a rare event in the history of the country, and the greatest feeling of indignation, not unmixed with alarm, was called forth. On the news that the hostile fleets had put back to port, the national spirit revived, and with it the determination to persevere in the war, with the spirit in which it had been commenced. With a large number, the feeling towards the American provinces became greatly embittered, from the knowledge that the enmity of the European powers towards Great Britain had been called forth by their revolt.

The reward of Arnold's treason to the cause of congress was the payment of the sum of £10,000 for the so-called sacrifices he had made. It is now established, that at West point he was encumbered with debt, incurred by his love of display, his personal extravagance, and his desperate ventures in privateering and speculation. The latter had proved unfortunate. He had been accused by the Pennsylvania council of abuse of his authority, and he had been tried by a court martial on charges preferred against him. Although acquitted of the serious accusations, he had been sentenced to be reprimanded, and it was under these conditions he had commenced his correspondence with Clinton under an assumed name. His flight on discovery of his treason had relieved him of the importunity of his creditors, not, however, by the ordinary mode of payment.

The tradition has come down to modern times of Arnold's extraordinary ability as a general. I have endeavoured to examine this question in a previous volume.* At the time his reputation led to his appointment as a brigadier-general in the British service. It is a question if his presence in that position was looked upon in New York as a welcome accession to military society. Modesty was never the characteristic of his conduct. He had issued an "address to the inhabitants

* Ante, Vol. V., pp. 412-4.

of America," in which he made a lame apology for his conduct, mingled with abuse of congress, and a strong denunciation of the alliance with the French. It was followed by a proclamation "to the officers and soldiers of the continental army," in which they were incited to follow his example and to desert to the British cause. These addresses had so little influence that they are to-day but indifferently remembered.

Towards the close of 1780 Clinton despatched 1,600 men to carry on operations in the neighbourhood of the waters of the Chesapeake. Arnold was placed in command, with instructions to confer on all occasions with colonels Dundas and Simcoe, who were sent with him. Arnold ascended the James river and destroyed the public stores and tobacco magazines, with the public buildings, and finally took post at Portsmouth, on the Elizabeth river.

One great disappointment experienced by the supporters of congress was the defeat of the French fleet in the neighbourhood of the Chesapeake. At Washington's earnest demand the vessels had left Newport, on the blockading British fleet having established its winter quarters at the east end of Long island. On hearing of its departure, the British ships started immediately in pursuit. A naval engagement followed. The French so suffered that the ships returned to Newport. The British fleet did not attempt further to interfere with them, and entered the Chesapeake. With an admiral of the character of those by whom the traditions of the British navy have been formed, in place of this indecisive action the French fleet would have experienced a different fate.

To the north, Steuben had collected a force, and, waiting to be reinforced by 1,200 men under LaFayette, he did not feel in a position to take offensive operations. The principal duty given to Steuben was to obtain possession of Arnold's person. It cannot be mentioned to Washington's honour that he lent himself to a plan of making him a prisoner. Even admitting that it was entertained in the heat of passion, it must be pronounced as discreditable in the extreme.

Washington countenanced the proposition, and furnished the money to aid the plan that a congress soldier, as a deserter, should join the British camp, make himself known to Arnold, and, under the plea of personal devotion, obtain admission to his household. At the first opportunity he was to seize Arnold, gag him, and carry him to the American lines, where, as a consequence, he would have been hanged. One condition Washington enforced, that Arnold should not be assassinated. Arnold knew perfectly well all that he had to expect in such circumstances; and probably the last person he would have trusted was one of his own countrymen. All we know of the plot is, that it was entertained.

Arnold's principal duty, while keeping open the communication between Cornwallis' force and the sea, was to destroy all provisions, and thus to take away the means of subsistence of the congress troops in the north. Steuben, however, made an attempt to impede Arnold's operations, but he failed in his purpose and was defeated, leaving his guns behind him.

General Philipps, who had accompanied Burgoyne's expedition, and after the departure of the latter for England became the officer in command of the convention troops, had a short time previously been exchanged for Lincoln, who had surrendered at Charleston. He arrived from New York in April, with reinforcements of about 2,000 men, and being the senior officer took chief command. Unfortunately he died the following month from fever at Petersburg. Arnold did not remain in Virginia; he had carried on a correspondence with Germain, in which he had expressed the opinion that after a few days' attack West point could be taken. Germain had sent the letter to Clinton, and Arnold was ordered to return to New York to consult upon the project. No attempt was made to carry out Arnold's proposition. Indeed, Clinton's force admitted of no expedition. He looked forward to be attacked by a combined force of the French and congress troops; and West point under the command of Heath was strongly garrisoned by fourteen regiments.

Arnold's only service was an attack upon New London,

the rendezvous of the privateers, the enterprise of which had become one of the most popular features of the war. The place was taken and burned, with the vessels lying in the harbour, and a large amount of stores and property; the two forts, Trumbull and Griswold, having been previously stormed. They had been obstinately defended, and great loss was experienced by the assailants. The defenders also suffered severely.

CHAPTER V.

On the 2nd of January, 1781, Cornwallis began the campaign which was to prove so disastrous to him. He had learned that Greene had assumed command in North Carolina; accordingly he resolved to push forward and occupy a position between Greene and Morgan, before any junction could be made by them. On leaving his camp at Winnsborough he marched northward to the east of the Catawba; when, being informed that Morgan with about 1,000 men was to his west, he detached Tarleton with the cavalry and light troops to disperse this force. Morgan had placed himself at the ford of the small river, the Pacolet. Tarleton, however, crossed the river six miles above Morgan's position, upon which Morgan immediately retired, with the design of crossing Broad river, but knowing Tarleton's rapid movement, he held it better not to run the risk of being attacked on the march. He therefore determined to make a stand at a spot called the "Cowpens," three miles within the boundary of South Carolina. Tarleton came up to Morgan's force on the 17th of January, and though his men were tired and worn out by the long march, he gave orders for an immediate attack. He broke through the first line of South Carolina militia of Pickens, the men taking to flight. Morgan, conceiving that this abandonment of their ground exposed the flank of his second line, which consisted of congress troops, deemed it expedient to change their position, and in the formation they made a movement which was mistaken by Tarleton for a retreat.

Regarding it as a continuance of their success, the troops rushed forward in confusion; when suddenly the congress troops faced round, delivered a deadly volley within thirty yards, and immediately charged the British line, fallen into

confusion by its own impetuosity. It was completely broken. Tarleton's cavalry was absent, having followed in pursuit of the militia. At this crisis Morgan's cavalry was brought against the scattered infantry with no force to oppose them. The infantry was completely overwhelmed. Tarleton, with the cavalry, escaped to join Cornwallis. The British loss in killed and prisoners was 500 men, with their entire baggage and artillery. The victory was complete, and with but trifling loss to the victors.

The loss of his light infantry, one-fourth of Cornwallis' army, although seriously felt by him, was somewhat repaired by the appearance on the following day of Leslie, with the reinforcements he had brought from New York. Cornwallis now determined to convert his whole force into a light infantry. He commanded that all excessive baggage should be burned, sacrificing his own as a proof of the exigency of the situation. The waggons retained by him, four in number, were only those necessary to move the hospital stores, ammunition and salt, with stores for the sick and wounded. His march thus lightened, he proceeded in pursuit of Morgan, if possible to regain the prisoners lost in the action of "Cowpens" by defeating him. Morgan, immediately after the action of the 17th of January, leaving behind his sick and wounded under a flag of truce, hastened to cross the Catawba, to effect a junction with Greene.

Greene, with a small force, had himself advanced to meet Morgan, and had assumed command previous to the arrival of the main body of his army, and he called out the militia to guard the fords to impede Cornwallis' advance.

Cornwallis' passage of the Catawba was not effected without opposition. Lieut.-colonel Webster was sent to make a feint on what was known as Beattie's ford to the north, while the passage was really to be attempted below. It was guarded by general Davidson and 300 militia. The stream was five hundred yards wide and general O'Hara led forward the brigade of guards. It was found that the water reached to the middle of the men. The march was made in platoons,

to afford support against the current. As the sentry on the bank heard the movement, he challenged, and receiving no reply discharged his musket. On the alarm being given, the congress troops turned out, and fired in the direction of the force. At the first shot the guide fled; his desertion, however, proved to be an advantage, for the troops continued to march on the line they had taken to the opposite bank; whereas the ordinary passage of the ford deflected to the south, over an outcrop of rock covered by shallow water. The fire of the defenders of the position was turned towards the ford generally followed, while the troops were marching in a direction in no way subjected to it. Davidson hurried forward with all his men to the ordinary landing place only to find Cornwallis' force had left the water, and that a position had been taken up by the companies which had landed. Davidson's force was quickly dispersed, with forty killed and wounded, among the latter Davidson himself, mortally.

Cornwallis' force being now to the west of the Catawba, Greene hurried back to cross the Peedee, or, as its upper waters are called, the Yadkin. Greene succeeded in passing over his army, but several of his waggons fell into Cornwallis' hands, and Greene's rear-guard was defeated in the skirmish. Greene's force did not now exceed 3,000 men, and he judged that he was not in a condition to meet the British force in the field. Presuming that it was the intention of Cornwallis to cut him off from Virginia, whence only he could look for supplies and reinforcements, Greene abandoned North Carolina and crossed into Virginia, leaving his light troops to harass the British force as they were best able. Morgan, owing to illness, had retired from his command, and his corps had been placed under the orders of colonel Williams.

North Carolina, by Greene's movement, was left to the possession of the British. Cornwallis accordingly took possession of Hillsborough, and issued a proclamation by which he invited all loyal subjects to join his force. But the loyalists in North Carolina were at the time without organization. They had been cowed by the remorseless cruelty

with which they had been treated by the congress troops when in possession of the territory. The policy of congress had been that of terror, and the leaders judged that by visiting with death those who shewed loyalist tendencies, they would deter any large body of the inhabitants holding these opinions from acting according to their convictions.

The congress authorities claiming to direct the policy of North Carolina fled from Hillsborough to Newbern and gathered together some militia, but a detachment from Wilmington defeated them and took possession of the place, burned the shipping in the harbour, and destroyed all the supplies which had been collected there, with the rum, sugar and salt.

As the loyalists were shewing signs of joining Cornwallis, Greene, fearing the influence would extend to Virginia, crossed the province line to North Carolina, and harassed Cornwallis' force to the extent he was able. While on one of these expeditions colonel Henry Lee, of Greene's command, came upon a party of 200 loyalists on their way to join the British. They looked for no opposition in their march, wearing on their hats a patch of red, the distinguishing sign of their opinions. Considering Lee's force to be one of Cornwallis' detachments, they were proceeding with careless security. Lee had, however, no misunderstanding as to their character. He met the loyalists in a long, narrow roadway near the Haw, and immediately attacked them. He gave no quarter; they were killed to the last man, it may be said, without resistance. The object was to spread terror among the loyalists, and this act of merciless cruelty, unequalled in the war, was not without its influence.

Cornwallis now crossed the Haw, his design being to bring Greene into such a position that he had to fight or disband his army. Greene's force had been increased by reinforcements of militia from Maryland and Virginia; he had likewise 1,600 regular congress troops, with a large body of volunteers for short service from Virginia. The whole number amounted to 5,000 men. Cornwallis' force did not exceed 1,600 regular

troops, but he was in a position where effort was necessary. He had a large force in his front, which hesitation on his part would increase, while such of the population as were really on his side were doubtful of their safety, should they cast their fortunes with him. He was, moreover, suffering from want of supplies, and he felt that retreat was not practicable.

Greene, feeling the superiority of his force, and guided by the fear that it was not possible to keep together the men who had joined him, was equally impressed with the necessity of engaging Cornwallis. He determined, therefore, to march towards him and act aggressively. On the evening of the 14th of March he sent his heavy baggage to the rear, and under an escort and at dawn of the following morning he put in motion his whole force towards Guilford court-house. The advance guards met four miles from the court-house; after a smart skirmish Greene's force was driven back. Greene had by this time formed his army in three lines on a height. The first line consisted of North Carolina militia; a charge of the British entirely dispersed them. More resistance was experienced from the second line, but generally it gave way. Greene's superior numbers had necessitated the extension of the British line, consequently it became divided, and during the action somewhat suffered, for when driven back the congress troops reformed, and again attacked, but the spirit and discipline of the British soldier finally prevailed. Greene's force was entirely routed and the battle-field remained occupied by the British. The number of the British actually engaged in the action, according to Cornwallis' statement, was 1,560.*

* [Cornwallis to Clinton, 10th April, 1781.] "I have, however, the satisfaction of informing you that our military operations were uniformly successful; and the Victory of Guilford altho' one of the bloodiest of the war was very complete. The Enemy gave themselves out for nine or ten & undoubtedly had seven thousand Men in the field, upwards of two thousand of which were eighteen months men, or continentals."

"Our force was 1,360 Infantry and about 200 cavalry. General Greene retreated, the night of the Action, to the iron works on Troublesome Creek eighteen miles from Guilford, leaving us four six-pounders, being all the cannon he had on the field."

Cornwallis' loss was 93 killed, 413 wounded, and 26 missing; among the killed were five officers, and 23 wounded. The loss of the congress troops was not made known; Cornwallis reported it between 200 and 300 killed, left on the field. The number of missing was very great. Greene had entered upon the action with 4,243 infantry and 200 cavalry. There was likewise an irregular force of backwoodsmen, about 2,500 in number; so he brought into the action nearly 7,000 men.

Cornwallis with one-third of his force killed and *hors de combat*, straitened for provisions, was in no position to follow up his victory. He had undertaken a forward movement with a force totally inadequate to the occupation of the large tract of territory the scene of his operations, with no organized system of supplies, and no assurance of reinforcements. He was committed by his letters to Germain to the attempt on North Carolina, and it only remained for him to follow out that design with all the enterprise which circumstances permitted. Cornwallis correctly enough estimated the weakness of his force, his deficiency in supplies, and the distance from his base at Charleston; the thought, however, did not intervene to prevent the execution of his plans. One element in his chance of success he certainly imperfectly understood: the little encouragement his presence, with his unsupported weakness of force, would give to the loyalists. Many writers to this day throw blame upon the loyalists, that they did not rise *en masse* to join the British force, accusing them of want of courage and determination. Those who so write set out of view how impossible it was for the loyalists to act with decision, without the certain protection of an army of occupation, as an assurance that they would not be abandoned. They were without organization, they lived apart, and were subjected to the fullest terrorism of persecution. When Cornwallis moved forward, the loyalists who did not accompany him were exposed singly, or in small numbers, to be assailed by the congress forces constantly and actively moving about through the province; and when unopposed

oppressing all, whom they did not number as supporters. Cornwallis himself, always ready to act with vigour, failed to sympathise with the danger of their situation. He expected from them that which was impossible. He wrote after Guilford, "Many of the inhabitants rode into camp, shook me by the hand, said they were glad to see us and to hear we had beat Greene, and then rode home again." Clinton made the comment upon this remark "no doubt with aching hearts from the melancholy scene his lordship's camp, encumbered with a long train of sick and wounded, exhibited to their view." Clinton contended that the weakness of Cornwallis should have led him to cease all attempt on North Carolina, and that his operations should have been confined to South Carolina, so that the royal possession of that province and of Georgia should have been undisputed.

Cornwallis' want of supplies caused him to fall back to a village near Cross creek in North Carolina, now known as Fayetteville, in the expectation that provisions would be sent to him from Wilmington by cape Fear. His necessities, however, led him to continue his retreat. He was followed by Greene, who thus re-appeared as an assailant ; but Greene advanced with caution, sustained by the hope that the opportunity of inflicting an injury on the British column would present itself.

Cornwallis' force now consisted of scarcely 1,500 men. His position was one of danger, and he hesitated as to the course he should follow; whether to return to South Carolina and support Rawdon, or to march northwards to Virginia, the force, of which Phillips was in command, being at Petersburg in that province. It was a movement which would transfer the war to the Chesapeake ; it was the course he resolved to follow. Without opposition he carried out his design, and reached Petersburg on the 20th of May. The first news he heard was the death of Phillips. Cornwallis now assumed the command, and was at the head of 7,000 men.

Greene, after his defeat at Guilford, deserted by the militia and volunteers, could count on no more than 2,000

men. He had now learned that he had little chance of successfully operating against Cornwallis. On the other hand, there was a field for enterprise against Rawdon, stationed at Camden as his headquarters with only 900 men. His outposts extended west and south to "Ninety-six" and Augusta, and on the southeast towards Charleston. Greene detached Henry Lee with the cavalry to join Marion, and destroy all communication with Charleston. Marion, with the men he had collected, had been for some time engaged in harassing the outposts, and had succeeded in some cases in cutting off stragglers; but he had failed to make any impression on Rawdon's communications.

As Greene approached the British lines he took ground within two miles of Rawdon's camp. He soon formed the opinion that he was not strong enough to storm the position, so, after some changes of ground, he finally established himself at Hobkirk's hill, within a mile of Camden.

Rawdon had received the information that a part of Greene's force had been detached to bring up his guns and heavy baggage; it was moreover known that Lee and Marion had not yet joined him. Rawdon, considering that no more favourable opportunity would offer, determined himself to make the attack. On the 25th of April, at nine in the morning, he left his position. By taking a circuit through the woods by the side of a swamp he came upon the left of Greene's force undiscovered; the most assailable point, for at this spot the ascent of the eminence was easiest. Greene had trusted to the swamp as a protection against any attack in that quarter. The first alarm was given by the pickets. Rawdon's force advanced to the attack with the 63rd and Volunteers of Ireland on the right, the King's Americans with Robertson's detachment on the left, and the New York Volunteers in the centre. The South Carolina regiment with the squadron of dragoons were in the rear as reserve.

Although Greene was surprised, his formation was rapidly made. His first line was formed of provincials, the Virginians being on the right, the Marylanders on the left. The

artillery came up as the action began and was posted in the centre. The second line was formed of the militia. Greene's attempt was to attack Rawdon in flank, and he made a movement to effect this result, but Rawdon extended his line, and, charging in front, drove the congress troops up the hill and silenced the guns, which were at once driven away out of the action. There were some attempts made to rally the congress troops, but they were driven back and broken. During the action colonel Washington with his cavalry succeeded in gaining the rear of the British line. All, however, that he was able to effect was to seize some stragglers, and to exact a parole from some wounded officers lying upon the field.

Although the congress troops had been driven from their position, Rawdon, from his inferiority in cavalry, was unable to follow up the advantage he had gained. He continued a running fight for three miles and then abandoned the pursuit. Greene only halted at Rugeley Mills, twelve miles distant. Accident saved his guns ; as they were being taken from the field, they had fallen down a height among some brushwood, and escaped observation. They were afterwards carried off by Washington's cavalry. The loss of Greene in killed, wounded and prisoners was upwards of 400; that of Rawdon, 258, the number of killed being 38.

Lee and Marion had been constant in their attacks on the land communication between Camden and Charleston, inciting and even forcing the inhabitants to join them. Thus the whole country between the Peedee and Santee was again in arms against the British. Two days before the action at Hobkirk's hill, fort Watson on the Santee had been forced to surrender. Owing to the communication being broken, colonel Watson, who with 500 men had been despatched to reinforce Rawdon, found it advisable to cross the Santee low down and ascend the western bank. He succeeded in joining Rawdon. Greene had taken another strong position in which he maintained himself, Rawdon not being strong enough to attack it. Moreover, doubtful of his strength to hold Camden he retreated to Monks corner. Some of the smaller posts

were taken, fort Motte and fort Granby, after which Lee, gathering the militia of South Carolina favourable to congress, went southward, crossed the Savannah and attacked Augusta. The place was forced to capitulate on the 5th of June, to Greene and Pickens. The commandant, colonel Browne, gallantly defended his post, and no impression could be made upon the intrenchments. Consequently works were constructed of sufficient height to command the interior of the fort, upon which riflemen were posted to shoot down the artillerymen at the guns, or any one who exposed himself. Browne, unable to contend against this mode of attack, was driven to surrender.

Lee now marched northwards and joined Greene, when an attempt was made on "Ninety-six." Hearing that Rawdon was coming to the relief of the place, Lee resolved upon an assault. The assailants were repulsed with great loss, so Greene abandoned the attack and retreated, avoiding every effort to bring him to an action.

The month of June with its excessive heat had arrived, and Rawdon, with his small force, seeing it impossible to defend the great extent of territory of South Carolina, abandoned "Ninety-six." He took post at Orangeburg. Greene was equally powerless to be an assailant; he depended on the activity of Marion, Sumter and Lee against the smaller posts, and on the terrorism and persecution he exercised on the loyalist population. He unhesitatingly shot any one he took prisoner who he considered had ever been identified with the cause of congress; and dread of this cruelty, committed systematically against the loyalists, caused them in crowds to accompany Rawdon on his abandonment of the post. Rawdon deemed it a point of honour to afford them the protection they sought.

A great deal of false sentiment has been displayed with regard to the hanging of one colonel Hayne at Charleston. The facts are simple: Hayne had given his parole not to serve; he was taken a prisoner in arms; he was tried by a court-martial and sentenced to be hanged. Greene, who had

acted similarly in what he himself determined to be a parallel case, tried to save Hayne. The ladies of Charleston saw fit to intervene, and great efforts were made in his behalf, as he had been a man of some position in the city. But the sentence was carried out in accordance with the practice of the time. United States writers, with some honourable exceptions, continue to relate the fact in a way to embitter the feelings against the mother country. They are forgetful of the slaughter and cruelty committed by the partisans of congress against unoffending loyalist families, and the utter remorselessness with which they hanged, shot and cut down the supporters of the British side.

Greene retreated to the hills of the Santee; the British army was encamped on the Congaree. The distance between the two positions was fifteen miles, but from the impassable nature of the undrained land between them, a circuit of seventy miles would have had to be made before either force could reach the opposing camp.

Owing to the illness of Rawdon, he resigned his command, which, by seniority, was transferred to colonel Stuart. The latter had remained encamped near the junction of the Congaree with the Wateree. Greene, on being reinforced by a brigade from North Carolina, resolved on driving Stuart from this position. With this view he descended from the high lands he occupied to the Congaree, and was there joined by a force of militia under Pickens and some state troops of South Carolina.

Stuart, hearing of Greene's movements and expecting a convoy from Charleston, advanced to meet it, and afterwards established himself at Eutaw springs. Greene followed him by slow marches to admit of his being joined by Marion, who reached him about seven miles from Eutaw. At four of the following morning Greene left his camp to attack Stuart. Two deserters came into the British camp at six, who gave the information of Greene's advance, but they were discredited and arrested. Treating the intelligence as entirely untrustworthy, a fatigue party of 400 was sent out, with a covering

guard, along the road by which Greene was arriving. The consequence was, that the unarmed body marched into the ranks of the congress troops to be made prisoners. Fortunately, a few mounted men escaped to bear testimony to the truth of the neglected statement.

The contest was obstinately fought. The victory was claimed by both sides ; Greene even received honours from congress for his success, and for many years the battle of Eutaw springs was recorded as a triumph. Nevertheless, it was one of those indecisive actions where victory can be assigned to neither side. One fact, however, cannot be disputed : the congress troops were compelled eventually to retire, while the British commander remained in possession of the ground on the night of the action.

The attack was begun by the congress troops with great vigour, and in a movement against the British guns placed on the road, the Buffs, the 3rd, sent forward in support, gave way. An attack of the 63rd and 64th restored the fortunes of the day. These regiments were in turn so briskly attacked by superior numbers that they also retreated to another part of the field ; the cavalry charge under colonel Washington was so successfully resisted that Washington himself, severely wounded, was taken prisoner with many of his men. At this crisis, a flank movement was made, by which possession of the ground in rear of Greene's force was obtained. The fire from this position caused great confusion among the congress troops. By this time the New York volunteers had seized a stone house and there established themselves, from which they poured constant well-directed volleys, to constitute the house as a barrier which could not be passed. Some artillery directed against the building could not be continued in action, for the men who attempted to serve it were killed or placed *hors de combat* by the fire from the windows. This success gave the left wing time to recover ; it was now reformed, and by a final charge forced the congress troops to retreat. No pursuit could be attempted, for Stuart was without cavalry.

The congress troops left 139 dead upon the field ; their

wounded, possibly treble the number were carried off. Greene's losses were so severe that he retired to his former ground, and was unable for some time to make any further attempt in the field. It was the last battle fought in South Carolina, undoubtedly, well contested and bloody. The loss of the British was 85 killed, in the number three officers; and 351 wounded, of whom were 29 officers.*

Cornwallis was now in Virginia, an expedition undertaken not according to the views of his commanding general,† but a project in which he was sustained by the home ministry through Germain. The latter had sent orders to Clinton to support Cornwallis in his operations. The attempt to hold North Carolina had, the preceding year, failed from want of the requisites to sustain it. Nevertheless, no preparation for so important an undertaking had been made. There was an absence of sufficient stores and supplies, and little thought had been given to the excessive heat of the season in its influence upon the health of the troops. A great number of

* Tarleton in his "History of the Campaign of 1780 and 1781 in the Southern Provinces of North America, 1787," gives the despatches both of Stewart and Greene, in which both claim the victory. Pages 508-517, Stewart writes to Cornwallis, 9th Sept., 1781, the day after the action: "After an obstinate engagement, which lasted over two hours, I totally defeated him [General Greene] and took two six-pounders."

Greene writes, the 11th September, at Marter's Tavern, near Ferguson's Swamp: "A terrible cannonade and shower of bullets overturned all they presented and the enemy was put to the rout. . . . We continued to pursue the enemy, after having broken them, until we gained their camp. I think I owe the victory which I have gained to the brisk use the Virginians and Marylanders, and part of the infantry, made of the bayonet."

† We have Clinton's express declaration on the subject: "I will frankly own that I ever disapproved of an attempt to conquer Virginia before the Carolinas were absolutely restored. However, when I saw that Lord Cornwallis had forced himself upon me in that province, I left him at liberty to act there as he judged best."

On the subject of Cornwallis' pretence that the occupation of Yorktown and Gloucester was a peremptory order that he could not disobey, Clinton distinctly tells us: "Lord Cornwallis' discretionary powers were unlimited from the first moment of his taking charge of a separate command, and it will, I believe, be admitted, that his Lordship acted in most cases, as if he considered them as such." [Stevens: the Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy.]

sick was the consequence. The action at Camden of the 16th of August, 1780, left its trace in many being wounded; Cornwallis, however, had no doubts as to his own ultimate success, if his letter to Germain, a few days after the action, represents his feelings.* The extent to which Ferguson's disaster crippled Cornwallis has been narrated; he not only abandoned his position in North Carolina, but he remained some weeks at Winnsborough. The defeat of Tarleton at Cowpens, with the loss of the light infantry who were made prisoners, proved equally destructive of Cornwallis' plans. Fortunately he was joined by Leslie, a reinforcement which enabled him to assume the offensive in order to prevent, if possible, the junction of Morgan with Greene. The battle of Guilford courthouse had freed him from the opposition of any enemy in his front, and he had been enabled, without interference, to reach Virginia. By this movement he entirely abandoned both North and South Carolina, and not only changed the scene of the war, but the conditions under which it would hereafter be conducted.

In Virginia he found LaFayette's force of 3,000 men in his front. Of this number 2,000 were militia. Owing to La Fayette's want of strength Richmond had been abandoned. Among the sufferers by these movements were the troops of Burgoyne, whose retention as prisoners by congress forms so discreditable a page in United States history. They had established themselves as comfortably as it was possible in the circumstances. They had built huts and cultivated gardens; they had reared poultry and kept pigs. For greater security they were hastily marched away across the mountains from their little property; all they possessed having been left behind.

Wayne had been sent forward with about 1,000 men to

* Cornwallis to Germain, 21st August, 1780. "On morning of 17th I dispatched proper people into North Carolina with directions to our friends there to take arms and assemble immediately, and to seize the most violent people, and all military stores and magazines belonging to the rebels, and to intercept all stragglers of the routed army, and I have promised to march without loss of time to their support." [Cornwallis' Correspondence.]

effect a junction with LaFayette. Cornwallis had despatched a force in pursuit of LaFayette, but finding that the junction would not be prevented, he ceased the pursuit. A light infantry force was, however, ordered out to destroy the armory at the junction of the Rivanna with James river, sixty miles above Richmond. The duty was carried out by Simcoe. Little defence was attempted, the new arms and those under repair were rendered valueless. All the stores were destroyed. A forced march under Tarleton was also made to Charlottesville, the seat of the Virginian assembly, in the hope of capturing Jefferson. Coming upon twelve waggons of clothing and stores destined for Greene's army, Tarleton took and burned them. At Charlottesville, Jefferson had barely time to escape, but several of the inhabitants were seized, among them seven members of the assembly. Simcoe and Tarleton, having joined their forces, descended the James river, one on either bank, both destroying all the stores and supplies they could find.

LaFayette, having been strengthened by Wayne, occupied a strong position north of Charlottesville for the protection of the stores which had been removed there. Fortunately for LaFayette, at this juncture Cornwallis received qualified instructions from Clinton, which he read as orders, to send back to New York a strong detachment. Had Cornwallis advanced against LaFayette he could only have been saved by a rapid retreat. Cornwallis' force was much in excess of that of LaFayette, for, after being joined by Steuben, it did not exceed 4,000 men. Cornwallis was particularly well equipped in cavalry, having obtained horses in the country where he was. LaFayette, finding Cornwallis was retiring to Williamsburg, to which place he was proceeding to direct the embarkation of the troops, advanced with caution, following Cornwallis in his southern march.

Arrived at Williamsburgh, Cornwallis commenced to place his troops on shipboard, when he received instructions countermanding the embarkation. Accordingly, he marched towards the James river, with the design of crossing it to

reach Portsmouth. Although LaFayette felt that the weakness of his force in no way permitted him to interfere with the movement, he formed the design of inflicting some injury on Cornwallis' rear-guard during the passage of the stream, bringing his whole force upon it. Cornwallis, informed of the march of LaFayette, penetrated his design, and so veiled his movement, that, when the latter made his attack, he found that it was not simply the rear-guard he had to encounter, but a considerable body of the British force. LaFayette was defeated with the loss of 200 killed and wounded and of two guns, and had difficulty in retreating from his dangerous position. Cornwallis, continuing his march, reached Portsmouth, on the Elizabeth river, where he established himself during the month of July.

The demand upon Cornwallis, to send the detachment to New York, had been occasioned by the position in which Clinton conceived himself to be placed. He had looked forward to be attacked by the united force of the congress and the French armies, now of some strength. An intercepted letter of Washington's to Rochambeau had informed him of the design. This communication further gave him the more important information, that it was the last year when the revolted provinces could look for troops or ships from France, as her own exigencies would place it out of her power to furnish them. Carleton's policy, therefore, was to act upon the defensive. Only for the turn of affairs in the south, which ended in the surrender of Cornwallis' force, in the desperate circumstances of the congress cause unaided by France, the probability is that a few months would have seen changes, which at this date are regarded as having been impossible.

One of the misfortunes which weighed down the British cause was the want of energetic action on the part of the fleet. Admiral Arbuthnot had been recalled on Clinton's representation, and Graves had been appointed in his place. He was the same admiral whose conduct I have narrated, that, in answer to Carleton's application for troops, refused to send ships from Boston to Quebec in the month of October,

on account of the extreme danger of the voyage.* Once more, unfortunately for his country, he was the admiral in command.

During July an addition had been made to Clinton's force in New York by the arrival of 1,113 troops, which had constituted the garrison of Pensacola. On the capitulation of that place on the 9th of May, 1781, they had surrendered on parole, not to serve again against Spain. There was no condition attached with regard to the United States; and as no alliance had been entered into between the two countries, these troops were free to act against the congress force in the field. Their arrival led to the order countermanding the detachment asked from Cornwallis, so his force remained in no way weakened. Clinton was the more enabled not to interfere with Cornwallis' army owing to reinforcements having arrived from Germany on the 11th of August; they consisted of additional troops from Hesse Cassel and Anspach, and numbered 2,988 men of all ranks.

It must ever remain one of the problems of history, that the French fleet, under comte de Grasse, was permitted to appear on the American coast in support of the cause of congress, with so powerful a preponderance as to impress the events which followed its appearance. Owing to its having rendered nugatory every effort of the British fleet to interfere with it, the war was brought to a conclusion.

At the end of March, de Grasse had left Brest with 25 ships of the line and a fleet of transports containing 6,000 men; at the same time convoying upwards of 200 merchant vessels. Detaching a few ships to reinforce the East India fleet, de Grasse sailed for Martinique, which he reached in April. Rodney was at St. Eustatius. In place of sailing out with his whole fleet and encountering the French, he despatched Sir Samuel Hood with seventeen ships to prevent de Grasse entering Martinique. Hood endeavoured to bring on an action, but it was declined by de Grasse, who carried his convoy safely into the harbour. As Hood's vessels had suffered from the weather, he proceeded to Antigua, to refit.

* Ante, Vol. V., p. 432.

On leaving Martinique, de Grasse after taking Tobago sailed for Saint Domingo, where he was reinforced by five ships of the line. Early in August, de Grasse convoyed out of the harbour an unusually large merchant fleet, and sailed with these vessels, as if with the design of accompanying them to France. He did not, however, remain with them longer than to protect them sufficiently against the British West Indian fleet, when he changed his course and proceeded to carry out his original purpose by sailing for North America.

During this time Rodney remained at Saint Eustatius, busied in the sale of the plunder obtained by his attack. He appears to have considered, that by reinforcing the North American fleet with fourteen ships of the line he was giving strength sufficient to the North American squadron. The French vessels, only, called for his consideration. All the armed vessels of congress had been taken or destroyed. The number of privateers had been also greatly reduced; the places where they were fitted out and supplied with stores and the ships in harbour had been burned. In Massachusetts, the destruction of its fleet by Collier in Penobscot bay had exercised a most paralyzing effect. The sole reliance of congress for any operations at sea was now on the French fleet.

Any anxious feeling that may have been entertained at New York had not been called for by the anticipation of any inferiority of naval force. The winter had been stormy rather than excessively cold. In January a hurricane had raged with unusual violence; it was moreover accompanied with slight shocks of earthquake. Clinton's force had been greatly reduced by the detachments he had sent to South Carolina; and the weakness of his force, in connection with the weather, had deterred him from undertaking any enterprise of importance. After the action at Guilford court-house and Cornwallis' march into Virginia, according to Riedesel,* Clinton

* Schreiben des Generals Riedesel an den Herzog Ferdinand. Brooklyn den 26 Juni, 1781. "Sir Henry Clinton, der wie ich glaube, selbst Lust hatte mit nach Virginien zu gehen." . . [Von Eelking, II., p. 248.]

had a strong desire himself to proceed to the south and control the operations. He, however, remained at New York and contented himself with sending forward reinforcements, the 17th and 43rd, and the regiment of Anspach, which joined Cornwallis' force on the 24th of May.*

* In January an attempt had been made to seize the person of Clinton. He lived in a house apart on the bank of the North river. A large flat-boat, with a crew of forty men and six 4-pdrs., flying British colours, boldly entered the harbour and approached the house. The sentry, belonging to a Scotch regiment, hearing the noise gave the alarm. The whole of the adventurous crew were made prisoners by the guard.

CHAPTER VI.

Early in June a frigate arrived, sent by de Grasse, with the information that he would soon arrive in America with a powerful fleet. Washington, on receiving this communication, replied by asking that additional troops should likewise be despatched, in which request he was sustained by Rochambeau. In the same month, the French army left Newport and joined Washington, in a camp formed twelve miles north of King's bridge, a movement which Carleton regarded as directed against New York.

The presence in this position of these united forces was accepted by Clinton as an indication that the long threatened attack would no longer be delayed. Washington always regarded the possession of New York by the British as conferring great prestige, and as exercising a disastrous influence upon the revolutionary cause. United States writers assert that he made the proposal to Rochambeau that the city should be vigorously assailed, but that the French general considered their united strength unequal to the attempt. Undoubtedly, many serious considerations presented themselves, and Rochambeau declined to accept the responsibility of co-operating in the movement. If the design was ever really entertained, it was soon abandoned; nevertheless, the movements of the allied armies caused Clinton much anxiety.

On the 3rd of July Clinton's outposts were attacked; subsequent events suggest with the design of detaining a large force in New York, by leading to the belief that the city was really threatened. The movement calls for no mention, except for the gallantry with which it was repelled by an inferior force. On the 7th, accompanied by the French *état majeur*, a reconnaissance was made in force. On the 24th the congress force again appeared, but immediately retired to White

Plains. By this period the resolution had been taken that the united armies should co-operate against Cornwallis in Virginia, and this false movement had been undertaken to lead Clinton to believe that he was the object of attack.

The arrival of a second frigate in August, with the information that de Grasse with his fleet and transports was making his way to the Chesapeake, had decided the course of Washington; he determined to march, with all the troops he could concentrate, to the south. LaFayette was instructed to place himself between Cornwallis and North Carolina. Had Cornwallis foreseen the combinations against him, LaFayette's operations would have had little influence on the campaign, and had Cornwallis felt the necessity of retreating, his march could not have been prevented by LaFayette. Washington's main requirement was to keep Clinton ignorant of his movement. In August, the united force crossed the Hudson at King's ferry, and marching through New Jersey reached Philadelphia, whence the united armies continued their route to Virginia.

What must now be regarded with astonishment was the want of knowledge by the English authorities of the strength of the French fleet. Had Germain performed his duty, a frigate would have been despatched to Saint Eustatius with precise information as to the number of de Grasse's ships. Rodney, apart from being busied with the property gathered at St. Eustatius, knew nothing of the strength of de Grasse, and hence the insufficient force he sent by Hood against him. Hood, himself, was so ignorant of de Grasse's force, that writing to Clinton on the 25th of August he declared his own strength to be sufficient to prevent any interference on the part of the French fleet, whatever the number of vessels de Grasse might bring to reinforce Du Barras.* Rodney's

* "I have the honour to send you my line of battle by which you will see the number and force of his Majesty's squadron under my command, and I trust that you will think it fully equal to defeat any designs of the enemy; let de Grasse bring, or send what ships he may, in aid of those under Du Barras."

[Hood to Clinton, 25th August 1781. Stevens, Vol. II., p. 141]. It was not until the 19th and 23rd of September, a month before Cornwallis' capitulation, that Clinton "knew otherwise."

conduct appeared inexplicable in New York, and his non-arrival with a sufficient number of ships of war caused great dissatisfaction. Riedesel, in June, wrote to the duke of Brunswick, that Rodney appeared to be infatuated with the riches of St. Eustatius, and, in company with general Vaughan, still continued to make the place his headquarters.*

When Hood reached the Chesapeake, de Grasse had not arrived, and there was no sign of the French fleet. Accordingly, his orders being to join Graves' command, he sailed for New York. On the day of his arrival, it was known that Du Barras, lately placed in command of that division of the French fleet at Newport, had sailed with the intention of making a junction with de Grasse; the English fleet accordingly put to sea, with the design of engaging one or the other before their junction. The British fleet now consisted of 19 ships of the line.

On de Grasse's arrival six days previously, he had, in accordance with a communication from LaFayette, and at his request, sent four ships of the line and several frigates to blockade James and York rivers. He thus cut off Cornwallis from all communication with the sea; at the same time he landed 3,000 French troops who joined LaFayette.

The British fleet, under Graves, arrived on the 5th of September at the Chesapeake, where he found de Grasse with 24 ships of the line.

It is difficult, in the extreme, to give any account of the naval action. On notice being given by his frigates of the presence of de Grasse's fleet, Graves sailed forward to offer battle. The French admiral, in the presence of the English vessels, ordered his ships to slip their cables, and to form the line of battle, as they were able. Both fleets steered to get clear of the capes. The British fleet bearing down upon the enemy, an action commenced at four in the afternoon of the

* "Der admiral Rodney scheint sich ganz in die Reichthümer von St. Eustace verliebt zu haben, und hat in Gessellschaft des Generals Vaughan noch immer sein Hauptquartier daselbst." [Die deutsche Hülfsstruppen II., p. 250].

5th of September, in which the van and centre of the fleets were engaged, and it was continued until night-fall. Graves justified his non-renewal of the fight on the following day by the report of his captains that several of the ships were disabled. For five days the fleets manœuvred, often being near to each other. The French admiral, having in view the operations against Cornwallis, would not renew the contest; indeed, even with his superiority of force, he avoided doing so. Graves, on his part, made no attempt to force him to an action. Finally, de Grasse, without interference, returned to Chesapeake bay; he there found that Du Barras had safely entered while the fleets were at sea, having convoyed fourteen transports that had on board artillery, stores, and siege material. The loss of the British was 90 killed and 246 wounded. The "Terrible" proved to be leaking, and it was considered necessary to remove her crew, stores, and provisions, and burn her. The French reported their loss at 220 killed and 18 wounded.

The French fleet immediately took up a position to blockade the entrance of the Chesapeake. Graves called a council of war of his captains. According to the decision arrived at, the British fleet returned to New York.

Such was the service of admiral Graves in this critical situation.

The British ships having sailed away, and there being no longer danger of interference from them, there was a meeting of Washington and Rochambeau with de Grasse, and the plan of operations was determined. Transports were sent to the head of the Elk, and troops were brought down to form with the French troops an united army of 18,000 men. The movement of Washington could not long escape Clinton's penetration, and with the hope that he could lead him to detach some of his force to protect Connecticut, on the 7th of September he sent under Arnold the expedition of which mention has been made, and destroyed New London. But Washington, committed to his more important project, allowed events in Connecticut to take their course.

It remains an historical question, who was responsible for

the position in which Cornwallis had placed himself; for it must be admitted that he ought not to have occupied it, or, having occupied it, to have been in a better condition to defend it. Had he held it but a week longer, relief would have been attempted. Clinton tells us that notwithstanding the superiority of the French fleet it could not have prevented the passage of the British ships by the York river, much less have impeded both passages by the Chesapeake. Clinton having placed on shore, on the Gloucester side, a powerful force, the attempt would have been made to effect a junction with Cornwallis' corps. If put on shore on James river, the troops under Clinton's command might have effected a diversion, to save the greater part of Cornwallis' army.

The point arises, did Cornwallis select the spot or was it forced upon him by the orders of his commanding general? It must be remembered that Cornwallis' march from North Carolina to Virginia was entirely his own act. Clinton was opposed to the operation, and it was only by the express order of Germain that Clinton countenanced it.* A month later he received further instructions† to direct to Virginia all the force that could be spared. Clinton tells us that he did not receive this letter till he was invested by Washington at New York, or he would have quitted the command immediately. Cornwallis had formed extraordinary opinions

* Germain to Clinton, 2nd May, 1781. "Your ideas therefore of the Importance of recovering that Province appearing to be so different from mine, I thought it proper to ask the Advice of his Majesty's other Servants upon the Subject, and their Opinion concurring entirely with mine, it has been submitted to the King, and I am commanded by His Majesty to acquaint you that the Recovery of the Southern Provinces and the Prosecution of the War by pushing Our Conquests from South to North is to be considered as the Chief and principal Object for the Employment of all the Forces under your Command which can be spared from the defence of the Places in His Majesty's Possessions until it is accomplished." [Stevens. The Clinton-Cornwallis controversy, 1781. Vol. I., p. 465.]

† Germain to Clinton, 6th June. "I am well pleased to find Lord Cornwallis' Opinion entirely coincides with mine of the great importance of pushing the war on the side of Virginia with all the Force that can be spared until that Province is reduced." [Stevens II., p. 13.]

as to the war in the southern provinces. He had even advocated the abandonment of New York, recommending that the Chesapeake should be made the seat of war. This opinion Clinton earnestly combatted.*

When the presence of Cornwallis on the Chesapeake had committed his force to operations in Virginia, Clinton, on the 11th and 15th of June, sent instructions recommending the choice of a healthy and defensive station. Williamsburg and Yorktown were named. It was on this occasion he called upon Cornwallis, after keeping the troops required for ample defence and desultory warfare by water, to send to New York such a proportion of them as he could spare. Cornwallis construed this communication into positive orders to detach from his force 3,000 men. As has been stated, this despatch of troops was countermanded.

In July, Clinton recommended old point Comfort, at the head of James' river, as the place to be selected. Cornwallis, at the end of July, replied that in the opinion of the officers of the navy and engineers it was a post not answering the purpose desired, and that he would secure Yorktown and Gloucester. Clinton, supposing that Cornwallis thoroughly approved the site, did not oppose the choice.†

The fact remains uncontradicted, and it places the responsibility of the selection on Cornwallis himself, that on no one occasion did he represent the position to be defective in any of the requisites for defence. It is equally essential to bear

* Clinton to Germain, 23rd April, 1781. "I have ever been sensible of the very great Importance of Operations in Chesapeake, tho' I am aware that they are attended with great Risk, unless we are sure of a permanent Superiority at Sea I cannot agree to the Opinion given me by Lord Cornwallis in his last letter, that the Chesapeake should become the Seat of War even (if necessary) at the Expense of abandoning New York ; as I must ever regard this Post as to be of the utmost Consequence, whilst it is thought necessary to hold Canada, with which and the Northern Indians it is so materially connected. We should moreover by such a Measure leave to the Mercy of the Enemy nearly 25,000 Inhabitants of a very valuable and extensive District which is in general supposed to be loyal ; and relinquish the only Winter Port the King's Ships have to the Northward." [Stevens I., p. 458.]

† Clinton to Cornwallis, 10th December, 1781.

in mind the time which Cornwallis had at his disposal to construct the necessary works to make the place secure from assault ; certainly to the extent of holding it for some weeks, even if compelled eventually to succumb. The fire of the united armies was not opened until the 10th of October. Clinton estimated that seven weeks and three days had been available to Cornwallis for the construction of his defences. In his letter to Clinton of the 20th of October, reporting his capitulation, Cornwallis stated, "I never saw this post in a favourable light, but when I found I was to be attacked in it in so unprepared a state, by so powerful an army and artillery, nothing but the hope of relief would have induced me to attempt the defence."

Clinton took exception to this language. He pointed out that he never gave any assurance of relief until the 24th of September, which Cornwallis received on the 29th. What Clinton then stated was, "there is every reason to hope that the fleet will be ready to start on the 5th of October." The truth is, that Cornwallis trusted to the superiority of the British fleet being maintained, and he took no immediate steps for his own protection, as it was his duty to do. It was only when he learned the strength of the French fleet that he commenced the construction of the works for the maintenance of his position. The insufficiency of his defences can be best understood, when it is known that the active operations of the siege lasted only a week, from the 10th to the 17th of October. Cornwallis, during this period, gallantly defended his post. He has been blamed, however, for not holding the outworks which he abandoned, and it has been contended that he might have held that position until Clinton's arrival. The fact is also of importance that Cornwallis' position had become so untenable that he sent propositions for surrender before he had been summoned.

The position occupied by Cornwallis, the small village of Yorktown, about twelve miles from Williamsburg, was on a high bank of the York river, situate on the peninsula, eight miles broad, between York and James rivers. York river is

a mile or so wide, and opposite to Yorktown was the village of Gloucester, also held by the British. So long as the British fleet possessed the superiority at sea the position was sufficiently good; and it is due to Cornwallis to remember that it had been accepted by him in the belief that he would receive full support from the ships of war.

As the force gathered round Cornwallis, he saw that his position was only defensible for a limited time, and that the presence of the French fleet threatened him in the extreme; he wrote accordingly to Clinton, on the 16th of September, that under the conditions of attack the place was not defensible, and if not soon relieved the worst might be expected.

On the 28th of September the allied armies of France and of congress, amounting to 18,000 men, took up their position before Yorktown. On the following day he received the letter from Clinton that steps were being taken to relieve him; that the fleet of 23 sail of the line, with 5,000 troops, would co-operate; and that "there was every reason to hope" the start would be made on the 5th.*

Although the united armies were assembled round Yorktown on the 28th of September, some days elapsed before the bombardment began. Their first effort was limited to enclosing Cornwallis in the net from which he was doomed not to escape, and in forming the lines of circumvallation around him. The besieging force was provided with heavy artillery, siege guns, and with full material of attack. Before, however, the works had been commenced, de Grasse had considered the expedience of putting to sea in search of the British fleet.

* The historical importance of this document leads me to give in full the extract which promised the co-operation of Clinton. [Mahon, Vol. VII., p. 116.] "At a meeting of the General and Flag Officers, held this day, it is determined that above 5,000 men, rank and file, shall be embarked on board the King's ships, and the joint exertions of the navy and army made in a few days to relieve you, and afterwards co-operate with you. The fleet consists of twenty-three sail of the line, three of which are three-deckers. There is every reason to hope we start from hence, the 5th of October."

It is proper to bear in mind that it was the first promise of support made, and only given to Cornwallis when his desperate situation had, for the first time, been made known at New York.

The fact is known by a letter of Washington to de Grasse, in which he protested against this course being taken, and called upon the French admiral to persevere in the attempt in which they were engaged, as it gave promise of certain success. He pointed out that the absence of the fleet would permit the retreat of Cornwallis, and earnestly entreated de Grasse to abandon the intention. The sincerity of de Grasse in the proposition may be doubted, for, if desirous of engaging the British admiral, he had every opportunity of so doing during the five days that Graves remained at the Chesapeake capes. On this occasion de Grasse had avoided every attempt to bring on a general action, confining himself to the defence of the operations of the expedition. Whatever influence prevailed, de Grasse's fleet remained to take part in the siege.*

Cornwallis has stated that from the expectation of receiving the assistance promised him, he withdrew his troops from the outer fortifications and narrowed his defence to the town. He considered that if the British fleet with the reinforcements was to leave New York on the 5th he might hope to see its sails upon the horizon on the 10th of October; the day it must be added, when the fire of the besiegers was opened.

Clinton exerted himself with his accustomed energy to keep the conditional promise he had made, and hasten the departure of the fleet. "Each succeeding day," to use his words, "produced some naval obstruction or other to protract our departure." The ships did not leave New York until the 19th. It was the day of Cornwallis' surrender. The fleet sailed with the firm determination, if possible, of saving Cornwallis. The naval authorities had formed the opinion that the superiority of the French fleet, from the position of the ships, would not prove an insuperable impediment. It

* The letter is given in Stevens, II., p. 165. It is dated the 26th of September. It contains the following important sentence: "In the present situation of matters Lord Cornwallis might evacuate the place with the loss of his artillery, baggage, and a few men. Sacrifices which would be highly justifiable from the desire of saving the body of his army."

was Clinton's intention to have landed his force either at the York or James river, as circumstances rendered expedient, and that the attack should be made on the besieging force jointly by Cornwallis from Yorktown and by Clinton with the newly landed forces. The time lost in preparing for sea rendered all these dispositions of no account, for on the fleet approaching Chesapeake capes the news was brought of Cornwallis' surrender a few days previously. There was accordingly no duty to perform, and the ships sailed back to New York.*

The united armies having completed their lines by the 9th of October opened their fire on the 10th. The bombardment lasted seven days. Heavy guns had been brought up from the ships, and, with mortars, placed in position. For the first two days the fire was incessant. Cornwallis' force, at the same time, suffered from an epidemic prostrating fever, so that at the close of the siege 2,000 were on the sick list and 4,000 only could be counted for duty. The war ship "Charon 44" and three transports were set on fire in the harbour. On the 14th two redoubts were taken by storm, and the second parallel completed. On the 16th a sally was attempted, and, although attended with success, had no effect on the fortunes of the besieged.

Seven days had passed since the commencement of the bombardment. A week had gone by when Cornwallis looked for support. He had ceased to expect aid, and he was beleaguered by a numerous well equipped army, four fold in

* There is a passage in Haldimand's diary [p. 213] which throws some light on this delay. Its meaning is somewhat obscure; it, however, suggests that the naval authorities refused to accept the services of any men except those engaged by themselves. The passage runs, "Monday, the 20th of April, 1781. Our fleet, which was at New York, required immediate repair in order to set sail to protect Lord Cornwallis; there were not enough of workmen in the yard. Robertson [Is this the general subsequently in temporary command? V., p. 409.] proposed to collect all the carpenters and put them in charge of Mr. Low, who found a great many of them. But those in the yard would not receive them, so that the fleet lost a fortnight by the delay, which was partly the cause of Cornwallis' misfortune. This anecdote is little known. This same Mr. Low engaged about 300 or 400 men in the admiral's fleet when it set sail."

number of what remained to defend his hastily constructed and imperfect defences, consequently he sent proposals on the 17th for surrender.

The garrison was granted the same conditions as those given to Lincoln on the surrender of Charlestown.

During the siege, upwards of 500 of the defenders were killed and wounded. The total number of troops, British and German, who surrendered was 6,000; they became prisoners of congress; the seamen, about 1,000 in number, with the ships taken, were assigned to the French. The troops, as prisoners of war, were marched across the mountains to Winchester; a part of them were subsequently sent to Lancaster, in Pennsylvania.

Washington introduced a clause for the restoration of the slaves to their original owners. No doubt, he shrank from so saying in precise language; it was, however, clearly covered by the technical phrase, "it is understood that any property obviously belonging to the inhabitants of these states in possession of the garrison shall be subject to be reclaimed."

Cornwallis, while endeavouring to protect the loyalists in his army, was not fortunate in his language. In the tenth article he laid down the principle that no one "was to be punished on account of having joined the British army." The loyalists of New York exclaimed against these words, as indirectly admitting that the supporters of the British cause had been guilty of a crime in adhering to it. The clause was rejected by Washington; but he clearly saw that any cruelty of treatment regarding them would cause bitter reprisals in the future. Moreover, Washington was not cruel, and had no desire to be a party to such outrages as had been practised in South Carolina. It was accordingly agreed that the sloop "Bonetta" was to sail for New York, carrying despatches to Clinton, with such soldiers as Cornwallis saw fit to send, unsearched, with the provision that the vessel was to be returned, and the soldiers leaving in her to be accounted for in the ordinary exchange as prisoners of war. By these means the loyalist portion of the garrison obtained security.

No passage in Washington's life confers higher honour upon him. It may be added, that the presence of the French at the capitulation must have greatly aided to prevent any ruthless retaliation against this portion of Cornwallis' army.

Cornwallis himself arrived in New York on the 19th of November. The meeting between himself and Clinton turned on the events of the campaign, when Clinton took exception to the tone of his letter of the 20th of October, and subsequently placed on record the answer to his statements in full, to which letter I have referred in this narrative.* Cornwallis sailed for England on the 15th of December, and arrived in London on the 20th of January, 1782.†

Clinton felt it necessary to publish in New York the correspondence between himself and Cornwallis. Copies were sent to England. On their becoming known, Cornwallis moved in the house of lords for a general inquiry into the event of the surrender.

The consequence of Cornwallis' surrender was that Clinton ceased to hold the position of commander-in-chief in America. I have difficulty in determining whether he resigned or was superseded. On Germain's resignation of his position in the ministry, Welbore Ellis was appointed secretary for American affairs. The nomination of Carleton as commander-in-chief followed. Carleton arrived in New York on the 5th of May, 1782. Clinton left on the 19th, and arrived in London on the 14th of June. He had retired previously from the command, and had temporarily called on lieutenant-general Robertson to act in that position, until Carleton should assume the position.

* New York, 10th December, 1781.

† Horace Walpole [Last Journals, II., p. 492] thus relates the fact [20th January, 1782]: "Lord Cornwallis and the noted renegade General Arnold arrived. The former offered to go to court, but such personal severity had been used towards General Burgoyne in the same circumstances that, favourite as Lord Cornwallis had been, at least till he had become useless, it was not held proper to be partial to him at so untoward a moment. But to Arnold, a character of far blacker dye, no countenance was denied by the king or ministers. The public, more equitable, despised him."

On his arrival in England, Cornwallis resigned his office as constable of the tower, but he was re-appointed to the post in November, 1784. In 1782, even when a prisoner on parole, he was offered the governorship of India, but he declined the appointment. In 1785 he was despatched on a mission to Frederick the Great. In February, 1786, he accepted the position of governor-general of India.

A few words may be given to Clinton's subsequent career. Owing to a quarrel with his cousin, the duke of Newcastle, he failed to be elected for Newark in 1784. In 1794 he was again in the house of commons, as member for Launceston. He had been promoted in 1779 to the colonelcy of the 7th Light Dragoons, but remained without notice until 1793, when he became a general in the army, it may be assumed, by seniority. In 1793 he was appointed governor of Gibraltar, and died there the following year, in 1795, at the early age of fifty-seven.

The career of Cornwallis, on the contrary, was that of extreme prominence. He had the support of the court. Germain, identified with his policy which he had either suggested or accepted, was interested in his defence and advancement. To this day Cornwallis is held to be free from blame. His after career may have vindicated his character owing to the high consideration it can justly claim from his performance of other duties. But, it is an act of extreme injustice, to hold Clinton responsible for the want of judgment and prescience displayed by Cornwallis in Virginia. I have given the facts as they strike my mind, I consider, correctly and impartially. I am not conscious of any feeling or prejudice in one direction or the other, and those who study the facts, and I will venture the remark they must be held to be unassailable, can judge how wrongfully the conduct of Clinton has been reprobated. *

* Those who may desire to examine into this matter critically will perhaps permit me to refer them to a work which deals with it exhaustively. The contents possibly might have been better arranged, for there are many cross references, but all information has been laboriously collected, and the book is a valuable addition to this passage of history. The title is "Campaign in

The contrasts presented by the subsequent career of the two men cannot escape attention. For myself, I trust that the remark will not be held ill-judged, when I add that when engaged on the narrative of these events the impression upon my mind has been, that Clinton stands out prominently in the history of the time as the one man in high position during the war, the exception, who gave evidence of the qualities of a general and statesman. His personal gallantry was not exceeded by the coolest, steadiest soldier in the ranks, who, trusting to his bayonet, abandoned no inch of ground, or by the most dashing trooper who followed Tarleton in his memorable charges, having faith in his spur, to some extent the true weapon of a dragoon. From his appearance at Bunker Hill on the 15th of June, 1775,* when he led the bayonet charge up the hill, before which the provincials retreated, till the close of his service, especially at the two forts, Clinton and Montgomery, on the Hudson, he unfailingly shewed that serenity and readiness of resource which accompany true courage. He never hesitated to expose himself, but he never so acted from any love of display. He never scrupled to fight when he held it expedient to do so, and in all cases handled his men with skill and boldness. He acted from the conviction that a profitless victory, whatever the gallantry displayed, had little true influence on the result. He was present in the provinces to attain peace ; to re-establish the old relationship. His policy was to destroy the supplies, to harass the congress troops, to cut off their means of subsistence, to inflict privation to the greatest

Virginia, 1781. An exact Reprint of six rare Pamphlets on the Clinton-Cornwallis controversy with very numerous important unpublished Manuscript notes, by Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. And the omitted and hitherto Unpublished portions of the letters in these appendices added from the original Manuscript, with a Supplement containing Extracts from the Journals of the House of Lords. A French translation of papers laid before the House. And a Catalogue of the Additional Correspondence of Clinton and Cornwallis in 1780-81, about 3,456 papers relating to the controversy or bearing on affairs in America, in Two Volumes, compiled, collated and edited (with biographical notices in a copious index) by Benjamin Franklin Stevens. London, 1888."

* Ante, Vol. IV., p. 395.

possible extent, so that there would be difficulty in recruiting the armies, in finding men to fight, and feeding them when in the field. The general population was tired of the war, and it was only some extraordinary, successful achievement that could restore the prestige of those desirous of continuing it. That prestige was re-established by the surrender of Cornwallis. As to the cause of such surrender, I conceive no other verdict can be given, than that it must be attributed to the mischievous incapacity of Germain, and the miscalculation by Cornwallis as to the force that could be brought against him ; a miscalculation that guided his conduct in the campaign. The superiority of the French fleet determined the result. This, however, may be said, that the surrender of Cornwallis before the arrival of the British fleet, Clinton's determination being to fight at all odds, leaves it to some extent an open question, what that superiority would have proved and what it would have effected.

The capitulation of Cornwallis, from the influence it exercised upon home politics, virtually proved to be the closing act of the war. I will hereafter relate what may call for attention when the peace of 1783 has to be described.

I have felt it incumbent upon me to introduce into this work the narrative of these years from their bearing upon Canadian history ; for the events which happened in our own province cannot be understood without a knowledge of them. Moreover, it is in every way desirable that we possess a dispassionately written record of that unhappy contest, so far as we can trace it in its causes and progress. I have endeavoured to supply this want, temperately and honestly.

There is an impression encouraged by many writers, that Great Britain was exhausted at the close of the contest, and was forced by her poverty of resource to abandon the struggle. I cannot entertain that opinion. If there was any exhaustion, it was on the side of congress. Its resources were rapidly diminishing, the men in the field were becoming fewer, and those who were bearing the brunt of the contest were neglected, and left destitute of food and clothing by the

politicians who had created the quarrel. There was no money to pay the troops or to provide clothing and food for them. The privations of the war had given birth to a strong feeling of the worthlessness of the objects to be gained. There was a powerful party desirous of reconciliation; on the other hand, those who had promoted the war still urged it forward by every art they could exercise.

In the houses of parliament there was continual declamation on the part of those opposed to the court that the conquest of British America was an impossibility. Those who so argued, the most prominent among them being Chatham, had accepted the belief that there was one general universal desire throughout the country to throw off British connection. Had such been the fact, the conquest undoubtedly would have been impossible. I cannot consider that the men who entertained this sentiment were ever more than an active minority, organized, acting with vigour, and who, early in the contest, exercised over the disunited loyalists the terrorism which took so fearful and infamous a form in North and South Carolina and southern Virginia. The wonder may even be expressed that the revolt was not subdued; and I venture to say that the causes of its success may be traced with fair accuracy.

The strong party in England which in the first instance supported the cause of the revolution was completely deceived by the declaration that the active promoters of the quarrel desired only justice and good government, and were firmly attached to the empire. Those who were opposed to the unconstitutional and arbitrary attempt of the king to rule by his own will and to be the source of all honour, to control the policy of the country according to his theories, to have ministers who were simply the exponents of his sentiment and feeling, and no more, looked upon the discontent of the colonist as identified with their own cause. Government by parliament threatened to become a mockery. The king found money for the elections, and bought his support in the house of commons by honours, place, contracts, and where necessary with bank notes. It was by these means that the

monarch obtained the votes which enabled him to carry out his system, and he found no want of pliant men of ability to aid him in his purpose. The knowledge of the existence of this condition, recognized in modern days to have prevailed, gave a strength to the revolutionary cause which it could not have gained in the reign of his grand-daughter, her present majesty, distinguished by all the qualities wanting in her ancestor.

This desire to rule led the monarch to interfere in military details which he was as fit to direct as to drive a modern locomotive. He had a compliant minister in the person of Germain, who, to the natural meanness of his nature added a strange incapacity to take a broad view of any situation, while his servile compliance with the wishes of the monarch was counterpoised by a rare insolence of character and a self-assertion that dictated interference with the direction of a campaign the operation of which he had not the ability to conceive. He was moreover destitute of the modesty of mind which leads men of capacity to listen to the suggestions of able subordinates. With Germain to direct the operations from London, there was with the exception of Clinton and Carleton, not a general of true ability in the field. I fear that I cannot except Cornwallis in the higher sense, although he possessed capacity and courage; but his conduct never rose higher than a dashing general of division. His expedition to North and South Carolina, removed hundreds of miles from his supports, without supplies, partakes more of desperation than generalship. Twice he was on the verge of destruction at Camden and Guilford court-house. His choice of Yorktown can only be condoned on the theory that the British would retain possession of the sea. It is true that the French navy, the preceding year, had remained idly at Newport. The very fact might have suggested that greater efforts would be made to carry out the purpose for which the alliance had been entered into: the humiliation of Great Britain.

There is a sure test of the merit of a general in a campaign: the extent that the record of its events becomes the text-book

of the military student, from which principles may be deduced as a guide for the future. With this consideration, can Cornwallis' movements, from the time that Clinton left him in command until his surrender, ever be referred to? Indeed, are they even moderately known? His defence was gallant and determined, but in respect to personal courage no one of the British generals shewed any deficiency. The question to be considered is, ought Cornwallis ever to have placed himself in the position when these qualities had to be exercised in the form they were? His situation was finally reduced to this: that his safety depended upon the labours of the ship carpenters at New York. Could he have held his position for a week longer, the British fleet would have been in the Chesapeake. The secondary question follows: what could the fleet and the land forces have effected at Yorktown if they had appeared on the scene?

Those who have read the narrative of the war can judge the conduct of the generals who figured in it. Gage at Boston succeeded by Howe, Howe's conduct of his campaign, Burgoyne by his want of judgment and moral courage, with the admirals Arbuthnot and Graves, whose failure to act paralyzed better men, all aided to the dismemberment of the empire. The abandonment of Boston was the first mistake, after Gage's ill-judged inactivity had permitted the revolt to reach the height it did. The abandonment of Philadelphia gave a shock to loyalist feeling, which, in the central provinces, it never perfectly recovered. The admiral, Sir George Collier, appears for a few months, a bright contrast to this incapacity. The occupation of Newport by Howe was simply an utter perversion of strength, for it left a large force in unprofitable idleness for three years.

The one name which stands out is that of Clinton. His career is one of continued good service, his zeal was untiring, his judgment never at fault; the one failure was his fruitless attack of Charleston in 1776. The remark I am about to make may with a class of readers call forth a cry of wonder, but the impression has been forced upon me while engaged in this narrative, that Clinton was the one man whom

Washington feared; the one general whose presence gave him anxiety. The feeling could not have been diminished by Arnold's treachery. The fact is certainly plain that Washington, himself a southerner, left the conduct of the war in the Carolinas first to Gates, and afterwards to Greene, and remained in the Highlands to watch Clinton at New York.

A second name, so illustrious that it is painful to write it, that of Rodney, cannot be mentioned without reprobation. His brilliant service in the following year in the defeat of comte de Grasse has thrown out of view his loitering at Saint Eustatius, in place of following the fleet to the Chesapeake. He detached an excellent officer, Sir Samuel Hood, but he failed to grasp the true situation, and the strength of the ships sent as a reinforcement was insufficient. Thus the predominating force of the French fleet was the cause of Cornwallis' disaster, and Rodney cannot be absolved from blame that such was the case. The fortunes of congress were at this date at the lowest ebb. Vergennes had lost confidence in their ultimate success, and this year's effort was to be the last which France would make on behalf of the provinces. The American John Adams told Vergennes plainly, that if congress remained unaided the country would be driven to make peace with England on the best terms possible. France, in these desperate circumstances, gave a loan of four millions to take up the bills which had been drawn in France, presented the congress government with six millions as a gift, and guaranteed a loan of six millions in Holland.

It was this assistance in money by the French, with the presence of the land force before Yorktown, which turned the scale to obtain the independence of the United States.

The news of Cornwallis' capitulation having been brought to London led to the resignation of lord North; the general feeling of the country was unmistakeably declared for peace. The discredited ministry, in which Germain had played so unfortunate a part, passed away, and at the end of March the government of lord Rockingham was formed: the first step towards bringing the war to a conclusion, by recognizing the United States as an independent nationality.

THE SUPPORT GIVEN BY FRANCE TO THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION.

The campaign, which ended with the surrender of Cornwallis, was the one occasion when the alliance of France aided the cause of congress in the field. Washington early entertained strong suspicions of the ultimate designs of d'Estaing upon Canada ; therefore, he would countenance no invasion of the northern province, in which the French would take part. At Savannah the French participated in the common failure of the attack. Their fleet was blockaded at Newport, and no benefit was derived from its presence. A succession of unlooked-for events led to the final success ; the superiority of the French fleet, Cornwallis' situation, beleaguered in an imperfectly fortified position, the strength of the two armies before Yorktown, concurrently furnished the opportunity by which Washington had the genius to profit. Unsustained by the commanding strength of the French fleet, Washington would not have advanced from the Hudson to the Chesapeake, and it was its presence in those waters that alone permitted the great and crowning operations which virtually ended the war. The assault of Yorktown constitutes the one service rendered by France in the field ; and it was of a magnitude which lifted the provinces from the desperate position in which they were placed, to that of confidence and strength. Moreover, it exercised so depressing an influence on public opinion in the mother country that it was followed by peace, with the recognition of colonial independence.

The aid furnished by France, which enabled the provinces to carry on the war was that of money and the material of war, the intermediary, in the first instance, having been that extraordinary man Beaumarchais. It was by his efforts the assistance was obtained through the commercial company formed by him, which was largely subsidized by the French government. Without this help, the cause must have collapsed from the want of power to sustain it. The treatment Beaumarchais received, for his devotion to the cause of the United States, cannot form a pleasant national retrospect in the thought of a high-minded, truly patriotic United States citizen.

Beaumarchais is now generally remembered as the author of *Le Barbier de Seville* and *Le Mariage de Figaro* ; the part he played in the American revolution is more or less forgotten.

In the first days of the struggle, the opinion of the French ministers, and the one generally prevailing in France, was, that the difficulties between Great Britain and her colonies would be immediately settled ; if not amicably, that any resort to force by the provinces would be at once repressed. Beaumarchais was among those who saw that the dispute furnished the means of inflicting injury on Great Britain, both in her material strength and in her prestige ; that by aiding in effecting the independence of the provinces, France would gain the strength which Great Britain would lose, as she became relatively weaker and less able to counteract in Europe the policy of France.

Beaumarchais was in London, in 1775, in good society, the friend of lord Rochfort, whom he had known at Madrid. Becoming intimate with Wilkes, the then lord mayor who had embraced the revolutionary cause, Beaumarchais met at his house many leading persons from the American provinces. In September,

1775, he sent a memoir on the subject to the French king, and the consequence was, that he was called back to Paris to meet Vergennes and de Sartines. Beaumarchais had, at this date, formed the opinion that the colonies were lost to England; likewise that the king's crown was endangered, it being impossible in England to escape civil war. He related how a subscription had been raised in England to assist the provincials. The purport of his argument was, that it was necessary to aid the Americans; for, if they failed in the struggle they would join England against France. His view was that France, at that time not being in a condition to commence war, it was her policy that, while abstaining from open hostility, she would secretly send succour to America.

In February, 1776, he wrote a second memoir to the king reporting his conversations with Arthur Lee, whom he had met in London, and recommending that steps should be taken to obtain the removal of lord Stormont, the ambassador at Paris, whose active sagacity he dreaded; and further suggesting that the French ambassador de Guines whom he represented to be a mere *homme d'esprit et de plaisir* should be recalled. In consequence, Garnier was sent as the *chargé d'affaires*. Even in April, 1776, Vergennes was not certain that peace could be preserved.

Beaumarchais remained in London, nominally engaged in the purchase of Spanish dollars for the French colonies. He now asked to be assisted by government in sending three millions of money to the provinces, in such a form that the transaction should have the character of the speculation of a private firm. Vergennes engaged to give a million, Spain was to furnish a second million; arms were to be obtained from the arsenals, to be replaced, or paid for. Beaumarchais was to keep the account of profit and loss, by which the government would be guided in the renewal of further subsidy. In June, one million was sent to the provinces, followed a month later by a second million.

The Arthur Lee* mentioned was a Virginian, then studying law in London; subsequently he formed one of a deputation to France with Silas Greene and Franklin. At the time he wrote to congress, that Vergennes had sent a confidential agent to confer with him and that France would, in encouragement of the revolt, clandestinely contribute five million *livres*. All that had really taken place was his conversations with Beaumarchais. The determination of the French minister to aid the American provinces had also led him to instruct several merchants to intervene; and, it is believed, he also subsidized them.

In 1776 Silas Deane arrived in Paris; he had been furnished by Franklin with a letter to Dubourg, a well known botanist, active in the cause of congress. In order to carry on the negotiations with the American provinces, and to make it apparent that the aid furnished was entirely independent of the government, Beaumarchais established the firm, Rodérique, Hortalez et compagnie.

On the 17th of July, 1776, Deane secretly presented to Vergennes a memorial

* Arthur Lee's biographer claims that it was his ability which effected this alliance between the provinces and France. French writers say of him, "Qu'il joua réellement auprès de lui (le gouvernement français) le rôle de la mouche du coche (the fly on the wheel)." [de Loménie, II., p. 115.] It is said by them also "*à tort ou à raison*" that he was suspected of secret relations with the British cabinet.

setting forth the condition of the colonies. He there declared that the paper money was expended, the colonists were without arms and munitions, the troops without clothing. Deane concluded by asking to be furnished with 200 pieces of cannon, and munitions and accoutrements for 20,000 men. Vergennes refused compliance, but suggested an application to Beaumarchais. Beaumarchais' knowledge of English was confined to the so-called national expletive in *Le Mariage de Figaro*.^{*} Deane knew no French; it was therefore necessary to await the arrival of Arthur Lee to act as interpreter. Beaumarchais' letter is dated the 18th of July; he agreed to furnish supplies to congress as a commercial speculation. There was no mention of any donation on the part of the French government. Deane, on the 20th of July, promised repayment by tobacco. Beaumarchais' letter was submitted to Gérard, the first clerk of the foreign office, afterwards the first minister to the United States, who read it without comment. Beaumarchais thus became drawn into intimate relations with Deane, and conducted the greater part of his negotiations with him. The proceeding was mortifying to Lee. He endeavoured to create a quarrel between the two, and wrote to Philadelphia that they had joined in a conspiracy to defraud congress in representing the money sent as a commercial transaction, when it was a donation, gratuitously made, and so regarded by the French minister.

Beaumarchais undertook to obtain from the French arsenals 200 cannon of all kinds, 25,000 muskets, 2,000 cwt. of powder, with uniforms and accoutrements for 25,000 men, and to ship them without awakening the attention of the British. He enrolled fifty officers of artillery and engineers, among whom were the marquis de la Rouërie, le comte de Conway, Pulaski and Steuben. Beaumarchais' vessels escaped the British cruisers and arrived at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in 1777. In acknowledgment, Beaumarchais not only received no tobacco, but his letters remained unanswered. Franklin arrived in Paris in December, 1776. Lee returned on the 3rd of January, 1777. One of Lee's first letters to congress contained the assertion, that nothing was due to Beaumarchais. Franklin remained silent, and he declined to interfere in the arrangement between Deane and Beaumarchais.

By September, 1777, Beaumarchais' firm had delivered goods and munitions to the value of five millions of *francs*. No answers were written to any of his letters. The members of congress had taken the position of regarding him as a man of straw. In his embarrassment Beaumarchais applied to the minister, and Vergennes advanced on the 31st of May 400,000 *livres*; the 16th of June, 200,000; 31st of July, 474,496 *livres*. During the year "*l'Amphitrite*" arrived in France from America, with a cargo of rice and indigo of the value of 150,000 *livres*. Characteristically, Franklin and Lee endeavoured to claim it. On the protest of Beaumarchais, their pretensions were abandoned. During 1777, the government gave

^{*} Act III. "Diable! C'est une belle langue que l'Anglais il en faut peu pour aller loin. Avec God-dam (sic) en Angleterre on ne manque de rien nulle part. Voulez-vous tâter d'un bon poulet gras? entrez dans une taverne et faites seulement ce geste au garçon (il tourne sa broche) God-dam! On vous apporte un pied de bœuf salé sans pain . . . il est bien aisé de voir que God-dam est le fond de la langue."

large sums directly to the agents of congress, amounting on the whole to about two millions of *livres*.* The money was devoted, to some extent, to the support of the agents and sub-agents of congress, and to the purchase of munitions for the United States.

Every inducement was brought forward by Franklin and Deane to induce the French government to declare war. Their endeavour was to awaken the national susceptibility on the right of search, then enforced by Great Britain; but without effect. Beaumarchais wrote memoir after memoir with the same design, but fruitlessly. It was only on Burgoyne's surrender that France acknowledged the independence of the United States, and sent Gérard as minister to Philadelphia to represent France.

Beaumarchais, during the whole period, continued his supplies to the United States, then recognized by France as an independent power. War followed between Great Britain and France, and Beaumarchais' vessels were often taken. In the fight of the 12th of July, 1778, between d'Estaing and Byron off Grenada, ten of his ships were lost. During two years and a half, congress sent Beaumarchais no remittance in any form, but on the 15th of January, 1779, John Jay, then president of congress, assured him that measures would be taken to liquidate the debt due him.

The treaty of Versailles between France and the United States was signed on the 6th of February, 1778. Shortly afterwards, Silas Deane was recalled to meet the charges preferred against him by Arthur Lee of conspiring to defraud the United States. Belief in the charge would have absolved congress from every sentiment of gratitude towards Beaumarchais, who had rendered such remarkable services, for he was regarded as a fellow conspirator. The feeling in France was in Deane's favour. Louis XVI. gave him his portrait; Vergennes wrote to him with extreme kindness; Gérard shewed great esteem for him. Arthur Lee himself was recalled apparently through the influence of Gérard;† but the court opposed the removal of Franklin.

Deane was exonerated from all blame, but no mention was made of his services. His allowance when in Paris had been limited to £500 a year. As it was considered necessary that he should return to France to assist in explaining his accounts, the allowance was continued, but he undertook the duty without any special title.

Beaumarchais' agent, Francy, now declared that nothing more would be sent until the account against the United States had been arranged, and some guarantee for future payment given. Another contract was, however, passed on the 6th of April, 1778, which was ratified in Paris. The agents of the United States addressed the French government, stating that Beaumarchais had claimed five millions, and asking information regarding the demand. Vergennes replied that

* "On ne donnait plus d'argent à Beaumarchais, mais on donnoit des millions à Franklin et à Silas Deane." De Loménie II., p. 159.

† Gérard wrote to Vergennes, "Souffrez, monsieur, que je me félicite de vous avoir débarrasser de ce fardeau. . . . Je me suis expliqué graduellement et à l'instant même où cela était indispensable pour empêcher que ce dangereux et méchant homme (Arthur Lee) ne remplacât M. Franklin, et ne fût en même temps chargé avec la negociation avec l'Espagne." [de Loménie.]

the king had furnished nothing to congress,* and that Beaumarchais had been permitted on his own account, to obtain what he required from the arsenals.

Congress had sent bills of exchange, at three years date, to the amount of 2,544,000 *livres* for negotiation, so that money could be obtained. Two years later, Robert Morris endeavoured to avoid payment of them; but he was informed by Franklin that they had been placed in circulation, and that they could not be set aside.

On the application of the United States to France, in 1783, for a loan of six millions, it was agreed that the financial relations with France should be specified, and the money received by the United States, whether as loan or gifts, should be scheduled.

Under the head of sums lent—

The amount set forth was.....	18,000,000 <i>livres</i> .
Loan by Holland, guaranteed by France....	10,000,000 “
Loan of 1783	6,000,000 “

Total..... 34,000,000 *livres*.

This amount the United States undertook to repay. The second item was the amount given by France for which no payment was demanded.

Previous to the treaty of alliance of February—

1778.....	3,000,000 <i>livres</i> .
1781.....	6,000,000 “

Total..... 9,000,000 *livres*.

Franklin, in 1786, conceived some explanation was required relative to the item of 3,000,000 *livres*, he, himself, having received only 2,000,000. In 1777 the *fermiers généraux* had advanced 1,000,000 *livres* towards the liquidation of the debt; 153,229 *livres* had been paid in tobacco. Franklin reasoned, that, if the million had been reimbursed by the crown, the debt had been cancelled, and consequently the amount received for tobacco should be refunded. The question was referred to Vergennes, who replied that the king had nothing to do with the money advanced by the *fermiers généraux*. Consequently, the sum paid from the royal treasury on June the 10th, 1776, was the amount received by Beaumarchais.

It is not necessary to enter at length into the consequence of Vergennes' declaration. Briefly, it may be said, that it was accepted as an argument that the United States were in no way indebted to Beaumarchais; he had received the money from the French government, and he had only been the intermediary in disbursing it. No one who reads the history of these transactions can accept this view. The records, on the contrary, justify the opinion that it had never been the intention of the French government to make Beaumarchais responsible to the United States for this amount. The French distinctly so declared, and Durival, who wrote in the name of Vergennes on the 16th of September, 1786, positively stated that the matter had nothing in common with the affairs of the

* “Le roi ne lui a rien fourni.”

United States. The payment, consequently, can only be looked upon as a subvention to Beaumarchais to aid the colonies in their struggle, concerning which the United States had no right to inquire.

In spite, however, of the statement of the French government, congress persevered in the view, that the amount had to be deducted from Beaumarchais' debt, and voted that nothing should be paid until the matter was explained; Beaumarchais, himself, was never called upon to make this explanation. In vain, he asked for the matter to be submitted to arbitration. The United States took the ground, that congress would not order payment of his accounts until the amount was determined. Remaining undetermined, the account could not be paid. It is true that Beaumarchais not only received this million in question from the French government, but likewise received a million from Spain, and a third million in three instalments from the French treasury. The receipt of these sums forms no consideration in the estimate of the obligations of the United States towards Beaumarchais; but with that government they were made the ground of argument on which the refusal to consider his claim was based.

Deane, in his examination of Beaumarchais' demand, had established the amount at 3,600,000 *livres*. After the peace in 1783, Barclay arrived in Paris as consul. During the negotiations on the subject of the claim, Beaumarchais refused to re-open his account to another examination, upon which Barclay informed him, that the United States would pay nothing. In his desperate circumstances, Beaumarchais eventually agreed to take the reduced sum established by Barclay; but this amount still remained unpaid.

In 1787 Beaumarchais renewed his claim with some acrimony. The fact barely appears possible, but Arthur Lee was deputed to examine the claim. He brought in Beaumarchais a debtor to the amount of 18,000,000 *livres*. In 1793 the matter was referred to Arthur Hamilton, who reported Beaumarchais to be a creditor of the United States in the sum of 2,224,000 *livres*, independently of the question of the million in dispute. In 1794 Gouverneur Morris asked further explanations from Buchot,* but the same statement was repeated.

Every succeeding government in France, and every ambassador tried to obtain a settlement; but all was in vain. The United States government met the claim by declaring, that the interest of the million received from France had absorbed the debt. Every modern French minister, from Talleyrand to the duc de Richelieu, officially declared to the United States government that the million granted had no connection with Beaumarchais' claim against the United States. It was a subvention of the French government to him. Thus, if interest was payable it was due to France, not to the United States, and it was an unwarrantable pre-

* Philibert Buchot, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, was born in 1748, and died in 1812. After his retirement from this high position, he became so poor that those employed in the foreign office subscribed a small sum to keep him from want. Finally, he accepted a petty situation, the duties being to receive coal, the emoluments of which did not exceed 600 *francs* a year [£24]. Napoleon, on becoming consul, was so struck by Buchot's conduct, that he gave him a pension of 6,000 *francs* [£240].

tension, for mention to be made of the amount in any form by any power but that of France.

Beaumarchais, now old and a refugee at Hamburg in distress, addressed various memoirs to the United States government ; he died on the 18th of May, 1799, the debt due to him by the United States unrecognized.

The obligation was only paid in 1835. The possibility of never again having a chance of settlement led Beaumarchais' descendants to accept 800,000 *francs*, in full of payment. This amount was all that the government of the United States arbitrarily determined to offer them.

Such was the treatment meted out by the United States to the man who, possibly more than any single individual, contributed to their success in obtaining an independent national existence.

FLORIDA.

I do not feel myself justified in omitting all notice of the final operations in Florida, by which that province ceased to be a British possession; otherwise the narrative I have endeavoured to give of the revolutionary war would be incomplete. We can, in the narrative, trace the mischievous intervention of Germain, characterized by the want of judgment and the absence of correct information traceable in every record of his official life. His letter * to Haldimand is extant, in which he sets forth that in consequence of the hostility of the Spanish court the general commanding in Florida had been ordered to attack New Orleans. At the same time, he directed Haldimand to cause the Indians to be collected at the upper posts, and to embody as many loyalists as possible to join the expedition. An order, given at the time when the Indians of the West, affected by d'Estaing's proclamation, were refusing to take sides with the British in the territory near to themselves; and when the royalist corps of Johnson, and the "Royal Emigrants" were incomplete, and could not be filled up.

At this date there were few troops in Pensacola, for the operations of the American war had not extended south of Georgia. Spain, on the other hand, prepared to throw off the mask, and join France in her support of the United States, had gathered a large force at New Orleans with the design of sweeping the British garrisons from Louisiana and Florida. The British troops in that province were so few in number as to be without power for any aggressive movement. Nevertheless, this was the period which Germain selected for an attack on the southern city, where a large body of men had been assembled with the Spanish fleet, ready to co-operate with it.

In pursuance of this view, towards the end of 1778 Germain sent orders to Clinton at New York, to detach 1,200 men to Florida. It was at a time when Clinton himself was asking for reinforcements, and Haldimand in Canada, in letter after letter, was stating how incapable the province was of resisting any well directed invasion; when he was sending full reports of the number of his men and their distribution, and asking for more troops. At this critical period Germain reduced the strength of Clinton, and turned a deaf ear to Haldimand's requirements, in order to despatch a force to Florida, too weak in numbers to undertake any important expedition, and, as the result shewed, without strength to defend the place held by them.

The regiments selected from the New York garrison for the service were the regiment of Waldeck, and two weak corps of provincial royalists, from Pennsylvania and Maryland. Major general John Campbell was in command. These regiments left New York at the end of October. Owing to adverse winds and stormy weather, they arrived in Pensacola only on the 29th of January, 1779.

Pensacola was an irregularly built place of 200 wooden houses, the one exception being the magazine, constructed of stone by the Spaniards. The forts on the sea side were formed of sand and pickets, and on the land side there was a picketed fort. The place was surrounded by an extent of level sandy soil, with woods of oak and pine, which abounded with wild animals and game. In the

* [Can. Arch., Q. 16., p. 50, 19th June, 1779].

neighbourhood many Indians were established. The tribes, strong in numbers, were devoted to the British. Some idea of the condition of Florida can be formed, when it is stated that there was but one English clergyman throughout its extent, and he resided at Mobile.

Don Bernardo de Galvez was the Spanish governor of Louisiana. Having received orders to that effect, on the 19th of August, 1779, he proclaimed at New Orleans, by beat of drum, the independence of the United States. Immediately afterward, with 2,000 men, he took the field against the British, the commandant at Pensacola being at the time ignorant of the movement.

Colonel Dickson, who commanded on the western boundary of Florida, at Baton Rouge, was the first to experience the effect of this activity in the attack upon his posts by the Spanish force, the quadruple of his own. Judging that he would be unable to sustain himself with the force scattered throughout his command, he applied to Campbell for reinforcements. Some Waldeck companies were sent to support him. On learning of Galvez's movements, he left a small garrison at fort Bute, and concentrated his force at Baton Rouge. Galvez experienced no difficulty in his operations against the former place; but it was not captured without a gallant defence, and honourable terms were granted on its surrender. Galvez followed up his success by an attack of Baton Rouge. On the first assault, he was driven back with a loss of 400 killed and wounded. On the following day he repeated the attempt, when he left behind 150 of his men. Dickson's losses had not amounted to fifty; but looking upon himself as completely overpowered by numbers, with no chance of being relieved, and with the prospect of being subjected to a series of attacks, he capitulated. The conditions granted were, that he should march out of the garrison, with beat of drum, 500 paces and stack arms, the officers retaining their swords and private property being respected. The garrison engaged not to serve against Spain and her allies for eighteen months, and were to be transported to a British post in Spanish vessels.

Although the event occurred in August, it was not until October that the report reached Pensacola. The fact was for some time doubted, but the intelligence assumed so positive a character that it could no longer be disbelieved. Every effort was now made to place Pensacola in a condition to resist attack. On the first receipt of the news from Baton Rouge, the report was regarded as a device of the Spaniards to lead Campbell to attempt relief of the garrison, so that the garrison of Pensacola would be so weakened that the place could more easily be assailed. At one time Campbell seriously contemplated sending a detachment to Dickson's aid, but, finally convinced that the news of his capitulation was true, he began in earnest to think of the necessity of defending himself.

Mobile was the next place against which Galvez's operations were directed. Fort Charlotte was held by captain Durnford; Campbell felt it a duty to endeavour to relieve the garrison, when he heard that it was hard pressed. On the 5th of March he despatched a column composed of some companies of the 60th, the Pennsylvania regiment and some artillery. The distance, 120 miles, lay through a wilderness. The march was accompanied by peculiar hardships. It rained the whole time; the men sank ankle deep in the sand, and had continually to wade through deep puddles. The rivers were overflowed, and could only be crossed, man by man, over the trunks of trees felled so as to lie across the waterway. At

night the camp was surrounded by howling wolves. As the column was approaching its destination, the news came of Durnford's capitulation, the detachment accordingly returned to Pensacola.

On the 27th of March, 1780, the Spanish fleet appeared before Pensacola, when the garrison looked for an immediate attack. It is probable that the ships had sailed for Pensacola in connection with some proposed movement of Galvez. But the news from the north led the Spanish commander to hesitate in undertaking the expedition. The British were before Charleston; their fleet was in command of the waters. Doubtless Galvez had learned that Charleston would fall, as it did surrender in May, and he held it advisable for the time to postpone further action. The Spanish fleet accordingly sailed away, to the great relief of the garrison.

On the 9th of March, 1781, 38 Spanish ships, under admiral Solana, appeared in the offing, and it was plain that the time had arrived when Pensacola had to make a death struggle for preservation. Campbell was not one to despair, and in the time allowed him he had done his best to prepare for the situation he had now to meet. A vessel succeeded in stealing out of the harbour to proceed to Jamaica to ask for aid. It was a vain effort. The demand was made, when the fleet on the coast of America was unable to cope with the strength of the French, so that the beleaguering of Cornwallis was to follow.

Galvez' force amounted to 1,500 men, sustained by a well appointed fleet. The garrison of the place consisted of 1,000 men, assisted with devotion by the Crees, Choctaws and Chickasaws, Indian tribes who had established themselves in the neighbourhood. Pensacola furnished another example of the miserable mismanagement of those responsible for furnishing supplies, which was prevalent during the whole operations of the war. The place was left without food, the men had simply bread and water. There was neither meat, rum nor tobacco, and the most ordinary food could be obtained only at the highest price.* In this trying situation, some cruisers captured some merchant vessels containing rum, flour, coffee, sugar, and other "welcome supplies." Among the capture was a supply of powder. A ship was also taken containing 20,000 Spanish silver dollars, with the general's baggage and his provision for the campaign, his silver plate and some excellent wine, with a perfect battery of kitchen utensils. In other circumstances it would have been a welcome prize, but in the crisis in which Campbell was placed, it was not the aid he hoped for. Food to eat would have been of greater account than pans and kettles to cook it delicately.

It is not my duty to follow the incidents of the siege. I am simply desirous of

* The chaplain of the Waldeck troops thus describes the privations of the men. [Hülfsstruppen. Von Eelking, II., p. 146.] "Des Morgens trinken wir Wasser und essen ein Stück Brod dazu; zu Mittag haben wir ebenfalls nichts zu trinken als Wasser. Unsere Abendmahlzeit besteht in einer Pfeife Taback und einem Glas Wasser. Ein Schinken war um 7 Dollar verkauft worden. Das Pfund Taback kostete 4 Dollar, das Pfund Kaffee, so nahe an der Quelle, 1 Dollar, eine Maass Branntwein 8 Gulden schweres Geld. Der Mannschaft war schon längst der Rum entzogen worden. Bei dem schweren Dienst und solchem Mangel erzeugten sich mehr und mehr Krankheiten."

recording generally what took place in Pensacola to complete the narrative that I have striven to give of the leading events of the war, a knowledge of which is indispensable to every student of the history of this period.

What decided the fate of the garrison, for Campbell's defence was both able and determined, was the explosion of the powder magazine; that it was successfully accomplished was owing to the scoundrelism of a provincial colonel drummed out of the fort for infamous conduct. We are ignorant alike of the name and crime of the man. But he had his revenge; he went straight to the Spaniards, and gave full information of the condition of the garrison and of this weak spot. From this date it became the target of the Spanish gunners. For three days and nights, shot and shell were directed against it. On the morning of the 8th of May the whole exploded; fifty men were killed, fifty wounded, and a large break in the defences was effected. There was no hope for the garrison after this event. Campbell was forced to capitulate on the 9th of May, 1781. He obtained the most honourable terms, to march out with flying colours and drums beating, to leave for a British port on parole, and not to serve against Spain or her allies until exchanged. As Spain was then the ally of France and not of the United States, Campbell's force was free to take part in the operations against congress. The remonstrances, both from the French general and from Washington, to which this proceeding led are a part of United States history.

There is an absence of information both in Canadian and United States archives on the subject of Galvez's final operations in Florida. It may possibly be supplied to some extent by research in the British archives. During the last year, however, a work of research and usefulness on the subject has been published by Mr. Richard L. Campbell, of Pensacola, "*Historical Sketches of Colonial Florida*," a work of ability, indispensable to the student of American history. It is on his authority that I state, that no record of this period exists in the United States archives. It is not impossible some new facts may be brought to light from the archives of Spain. We learn from Mr. Campbell, that at present the only account we possess is that given by von Eelking in the *Hülfstruppen*, [Vol. II., pp. 143-152] a work alluded to in these columns. The report of the Waldeck regiment, present during the defence, furnished the material for von Eelking's narrative.

BOOK XXII.

CARLETON'S DEPARTURE.

[1778.]

HALDIMAND'S GOVERNMENT.

[1778-1779.]

CHAPTER I.

I return to the narrative of the events as they took place in Canada, with the conviction that they will be rendered more intelligible by a knowledge of the operations of the war in the southern provinces during the years 1777-1781. It is indeed to the influence which they exercised that we may trace the fact that Canada was permitted to remain unassailed, and to which we may assign the cause that no second invasion was undertaken. The possibility, however, of the renewal of the scenes of 1775 continued to be the constant source of anxiety in Canada, and what took place in the western country in 1778 did much to increase this feeling. Illinois, from its remote situation, being unsustained by any force, courted aggression, and it will be seen that when attacked, no defence was offered by its inhabitants. There was no want of desire to organize a second invasion of the province, both east and west; Canada, however, was better garrisoned, and the authorities had learned by experience the more defensible points, and the mode by which they could be safely held. The great reverses which had fallen upon the congress troops had conveyed the lesson, that the effort to gain possession of Canada would entail something more than a military promenade, and that a crowd of undisciplined marauders would experience certain defeat. During these years, it was never in the power of congress to organize an army of sufficient strength to make the attempt; nevertheless, the province remained in constant expectation of being again assailed, fortunately to escape a repetition of what it had endured.

Burgoyne's defeat and capitulation had the necessary effect of causing the abandonment of the outposts of his army on the south of lake Champlain. The movement was, however, made after full deliberation, without panic and with precision.

Ticonderoga was evacuated, as a position no longer required and as a place no longer tenable. The attack on the fort of the 18th of September and capture of the companies of the 53rd had established its defenceless condition, with its weak garrison against a large force. Owing to the surrender of Burgoyne, it was now threatened by the whole strength of Gates' army, fully supplied with heavy artillery and every appliance of attack, obtained by the defeat of the British.

In his position of doubt and difficulty the commandant, Powell, applied to Carleton for orders. The fort was in no way under Carleton's command, his authority having been, by Germain's orders, limited to the province of Canada. But the very necessities of the case called for, and induced him to take steps to reinforce the garrison. The fact is worthy of record, for it shews that in spite of the unpleasant relations which existed between Germain and himself, in the crisis he unhesitatingly departed from the strict orders he had received; moreover, it is a complete refutation of the charge made against him, that in petulance of spirit, when appealed to by Burgoyne, he had refused to garrison Ticonderoga from Canada.

St. Leger's force was despatched from Saint John's, its strength increased by the 31st regiment, the detachment being placed under the command of brigadier McLean, with instructions to return to Canada with the additional regiment when the fort was considered to be in safety.

Powell represented to Carleton that by Burgoyne's order he had included in his garrison the detachments of the 8th and 34th, but that after the action of the 19th of September Burgoyne had written requesting that St. Leger's force should be sent forward, consequently the presence of the 31st would do no more than place the fort in the position in which it was previous to the loss of the companies of the 53rd. Nevertheless, according to Carleton's instructions, he had given orders for the regiment to embark on lake Champlain. A few days later, Powell was directed by Burgoyne to keep St. Leger's force with him, so that he could maintain himself

during winter without troubling Carleton, and to apply to Canada for what the garrison might require. On hearing of this arrangement, Carleton ordered McLean to establish himself at Chimney point, near Crown point. McLean arrived at this place on the 27th of October, and he submitted the fact to Carleton, adding that Powell had asked him to come back to his assistance at Ticonderoga, the news having arrived of Burgoyne's disaster, but he had preferred to remain where he was. Powell must have felt his critical position. He had only 1,077 men fit for duty, with 177 sick in hospital and 201 sick in quarters. His force consisted of detachments of the 34th, 53rd, and the royal artillery, with the royal regiment of New York, the regiment of Prince Frederick, a detachment of Brunswick troops, and the Hesse Hanau chasseurs.

On the 11th of October the news reached Ticonderoga of Burgoyne's defeat of the 7th, and that he was retreating. It came with some authority, the names of the killed and the loss of the cannon being reported. It was followed by the intelligence that Burgoyne was surrounded; and, finally, by the supposition that, as no firing was heard, he was capitulating. Feeling his post endangered, in this emergency Powell on the 16th applied to Carleton for instructions. He expected the congress troops to appear in force, and suggested that he should receive orders to abandon the fort, otherwise that it would be difficult to bring off the garrison from Diamond island, on lake George. Carleton wrote with the good sense which never abandoned him. He stated that he could not give orders for Powell's guidance, as the post had been taken out of his command, and that he was unable to judge of Burgoyne's situation, owing to the distance between Burgoyne and himself. Were Powell under his command, he would allow him to take such steps as were suggested by prudence and reason; he concluded with recommending that the place should either be prepared for defence, or be abandoned while retreat was possible.*

* "I can only recommend to you, not to balance between two opposite measures,

It was the key-note for the line of conduct for Powell to follow. On the 31st, he wrote that he would have preferred to have received Carleton's instructions, but the season admitted of no delay. On his own judgment he had assembled the field officers, and with them had made a minute inquiry as to the condition of the garrison. They had come to the conclusion that "the post was not tenable, and that it would be more honourable and advantageous for his majesty's arms that it should be retired with all the stores, rather than subject the troops to every misery which could happen to human nature, the garrison in its uncovered situation being unable to maintain their ground against an enemy, coming in force by the many avenues which could be open to them, when the rigour of the winter was set in."

An event had also taken place which carried conviction to Powell's mind, that there could no longer be hesitation on his part. On the 20th of the month captain Fraser, of the 34th, arrived with a copy of the articles of the convention. As there was no doubt of the disaster experienced, the line of conduct to be observed, in relation to the movements of Burgoyne, had passed out of the calculation.

The decision of the council of war was immediately succeeded by steps being taken to carry it out. Indeed, the advanced state of the season suggested that no delay could, under any circumstances, be permitted. One additional embarrassment was entailed upon Powell, "the immense quantity of Burgoyne's baggage to be brought to Canada," which would "distress him greatly." * The fact establishes how little Burgoyne looked forward to the possibility of failure, and shews his self-indulgent habits in entering upon the

whereby you may be disabled from following the one or the other with advantage, but that either you prepare with vigour to put the place in such a situation as to be able to make the longest and most resolute defence, or that you prepare in time to abandon it with all the stores, while your retreat may be certain. Your own sense will tell you that this latter would be a most pernicious measure, if there be still hopes of general Burgoyne coming to your post." [Can. Arch., Q. 14, p. 302; 20th Oct., 1777.]

* [Can. Arch., Q. 14, p. 325. Powell to Carleton, 1st November, 1777.]

campaign cumbered with much that was purely unnecessary; a record that, in its way, furnishes its moral.

On the 11th of November, Powell wrote from Saint John's that the garrison, with its dependencies on lake George, with its baggage and stores, had safely retired and reached Canada. Previous to the abandonment of the place, the barracks and block-houses had been burned and razed to the ground, "not the least vestige of what it was, left." The boats on lake George required for the passage of the troops had been replaced on lake Champlain. Those not so needed had been burned. Thus the fort at Ticonderoga fell into the desolation from which it has never since emerged.

Such, in Canadian waters, was the disastrous close of Burgoyne's campaign, which four months earlier had been begun with the most sanguine expectations of success. It may safely be said, that there was not a man in his small army who did not look forward to its triumphant close. The showy qualities of Burgoyne had impressed every rank. The men started in the best health and spirits. One of the officers present describes the embarkation, on the 1st of July, from the camp north of Ticonderoga, to the attack of the fort. "The River," he says, "in general about a mile wide, was covered with Boats, or *Batteaux*: some of the Armed Vessels accompanied us, the Music and Drums of the different Regiments were continually playing, and contributed to make the scene and passage extremely pleasant."* What a contrast to the hurried, depressed, anxious departure from Ticonderoga, the garrison abandoning the fort from the avowed incapacity of holding it, the remnant of that fine, highly disciplined, well constituted force, which had appeared on the same waters with such pride, pomp and promise. Of the 6,570 men who crossed the Hudson, 1,200 had been killed or wounded, 4,700 had been marched to the sea coast as prisoners; the number wanting to complete the original strength of the army having reached their starting point as distressed fugitives.

The legislative council had assembled in the spring of 1777

* [Roger's Hadden, p. 82.]

for the first time since its abrupt adjournment in 1775. It was the first session of legislation; sixteen ordinances were passed. The most important was the establishment of the courts of justice; that of the king's bench for criminal causes only, presided over by the chief justice; the courts of common pleas, in the districts of Montreal and Quebec, in which three judges were usually present, but where two formed a quorum; a probate court for wills and matters of inheritance. Finally a court of appeal, consisting of the governor, lieutenant governor, the chief justice and the legislative council, five members of which should be present.

A militia act was also passed, by the provisions of which every able bodied man was liable to be called out; those who remained in the parishes were held to perform gratuitously the work upon the farms, of all absent on military duty. The period of war through which the province was passing had made such legislation imperative; its exigencies demanded the presence in the field of all capable of bearing arms. It is in this point of view the act must be considered, and not as being designed to be in operation during years of peace; but as called forth by the emergencies in which Canada was placed. With British troops in the field, it cannot justly be regarded as an exaction, that the militia should have been organized to act with them. Writers have described these provisions as a monstrous act of tyranny, leaving out of view the circumstances under which they became law. Nevertheless, it is an ordinance which requires no justification. There are many parallel enactments in the most modern times. War, unhappily, destroys all the nicer subtleties of law, private rights and individual freedom. From the earliest day of Roman jurisprudence, the safety of the commonwealth has been held to be the highest law, and such it must remain.* No merely political declamation can set the principle aside, and the demands,

* "Salus populi suprema est lex," which by tradition dates from the XII. tables of Rome, 450 B.C. Cicero in quoting the maxim: [Leg. 3, 3, 8] adds "Privatum incommodum publico bono pensatur," *i.e.*, "Personal inconvenience must be judged in its relation to the public benefit."

put forth to assure that safety must be held to be such as the government in power has the strength to prescribe.

A clause had been introduced in the Quebec act, with the design of removing an admitted abuse, but which by the evil genius of Germain was perverted to much mischief. After the conquest the appointments to office in Quebec had been given to men in England, sustained by powerful friends, or who themselves were the dependents of ministerial satellites. Qualification for office, competency, or the desire to perform the duties required, were little considered. The holders of the positions generally gave no thought to these points. Many remained in England, and sold their offices to the highest bidders, making all possible profit by the transaction. The consequence was that extortionate fees were demanded by the office holders. I have related Carleton's indignation at the abuses which had crept into the administration of the law, and his earnest efforts to remove them,* the opposition he experienced, and his determination to get rid of these exactions. The clause in question I consider may be safely attributed to Carleton's influence during the preparation of the act, and that it was introduced owing to the desire of putting an end to the injury inflicted both on the public mind generally, and on individuals by this "deputation." It was an effort to inculcate upon those in office the performance of their duty, and the recognition of their obligations, in place of irresponsible greed and dishonest exaction.

The clause† revoked and annulled all ordinances made by the governor and council under the king's proclamation of 1763, relating to the civil government and the administration of justice, together with all commissions to judges and other

* Ante, Vol. V., p. 211.

† "Clause IV., be it therefore further enacted, that the said proclamation so far as the same relates to the said province of Quebec, and the commission under the authority whereof the government of the said province is at present administered, and all . . . the ordinances made by the governor and council . . . relative to the civil government and administration of justice, and all commissions to judges and other offices thereof . . . are hereby revoked, annulled and made void from and after the 1st of May, 1775."

officials. Carleton, in carrying out this legislation, acted upon the principle, that he regarded no places to be vacant, except those newly created, or "where the former occupier did not think it worth his while to remain in the province to attend to his duty."* No changes were made by him in the bench, but in 1776 he received for his guidance a communication from lord Dartmouth giving a list of appointments made at home. Carleton had been notified the preceding year, that Livius had been appointed judge in Montreal, to be placed first on the commission. Livius, however, at that date, had not then reached Canada.† He was now promoted to be chief-justice. Southouse, hitherto attorney-general, was appointed judge. Southouse had been one of the absentees, his duty having been performed by Kneller, who had left the province. After his departure Grant had filled the position, and, owing to his great ability, Carleton had strongly recommended him for the appointment, but Monk, at the time solicitor-general in Nova Scotia, was nominated to the office. A judge Owen had been appointed to Detroit, the emolument of which was £100 a year; he, however, demanded £500 a year. Subsequently, Carleton was informed that Owen had been nominated by error to Detroit, and was to be appointed judge in Montreal.‡

The effect of these appointments made in London by lord George Germain, without regard to the requirements of the province, was to cancel those previously made by Carleton in Canada. Marteilhe and Fraser, who had sat on the bench since the establishment of the court, were displaced to make room for new comers. Marteilhe's health was not good, and an allowance was granted him, so that in his case no harm was done. It was different with Fraser, who had been removed

* [Can. Arch., Q. 14, p. 264. Carleton to Germain, 15th October, 1777.] Carleton adds, "I should even have reproached myself with an abuse of Power and Trust if, under the sanction of that clause, I had turned out any of the king's inferior servants who had executed the duties of his office with Integrity and Honor."

† [Can. Arch., Q. 11, p. 139; 23rd May, 1775.]

‡ [Can. Arch., Q. 12, p. 92; 22nd August, 1776.]

from his position after ten years of tenure. It was by no means the last time in Canada that this ministerial abuse of power has been committed.*

Fortunately for himself, Grant, on being superseded, felt that there was "a world without." He returned to England, entered parliament in 1790, and in 1801 became Sir William Grant, master of the rolls. His name will again appear in connection with this history, during the debate on the Canada Act in 1791.†

The appointments to the law courts made by Carleton in April, 1775, had been dictated by the necessity for providing for the administration of justice. By the Quebec act the courts had been annulled, and the measure was really indispensable to the preservation of civilization. Mabane, Dunn, and Panet, were appointed to Quebec,‡ and Fraser, Marteilhe, and de Rouville to Montreal. The chief justice, Hey, had been elected a member of parliament, and the question of his possible resignation presented itself. He, however, came out in the spring, and was present at the short session of the legislative council on the 17th of August, when, from the invasion of the congress troops, who had then reached ile-aux-Noix, the council adjourned on the 7th of September.§ Hey,

* Carleton thus represented Fraser's case to Germain—"Mr. Fraser's case is very different; more advanced in life with a family to support, having thrown himself out of a different profession, [he] has administered justice in this province from the conquest; and as a judge of the common pleas at Montreal from the first establishment of the civil court, without Reproach, I believe, from any honest man and good subject either as a gentleman or as a magistrate. Now turned out he must be reduced to no small Distress, and purposes going home on this account." [Can. Arch., Q. 14, p. 266.]

† From Grant's subsequent eminence, the mode in which Carleton communicated the fact to Germain is worthy of preservation. "Your Lordship's promise to take the first fit occasion to recommend Mr. Fraser and Mr. Grant, I believe Mr. Grant will not avail himself of. I understand he means in future to trust to his abilities in his profession at Home, and I think he will succeed very well without troubling your Lordship. I meant not to serve him, but government, by his appointment." [Can. Arch., Q. 14, p. 267.]

‡ Ante, Vol. V., p. 253.

§ Ante, Vol. V., p. 422.

however, remained in Canada till the autumn, when he returned to England. *

The mandamus of Livius, as chief justice, is dated the 31st May, 1777, and during the year he arrived in Canada. In a short time he shewed his dissatisfaction with his position. He wanted more money and more consideration. We can form an estimate of his qualifications for his office by the allusions made to him by Carleton in the autumn of 1777.†

Livius was neither a native of the mother country nor of the provinces, but appears to have been born at Lisbon, where his father, a German, had been employed in the English factory; and it is doubtful if he was ever naturalized as a British subject.‡ He first became known by his conduct in New Hampshire, previous to the revolution, when he was about forty-three years of age, for he is said to have been born in 1727. He had then for several years served as a justice of the common pleas.

* A letter of Hey to the lord chancellor dated 17th September, describing the situation in Canada, has been preserved. [Can. Arch., Q. 12, p. 203.]

† "'Tis unfortunate that your lordship should find it necessary for the king's service to send over a person to administer justice to the people, when he understands neither their laws, manners, customs nor their language, and that he must turn out of his place a gentleman, who had held it with reputation for many years, well allied in the province, and who had suffered considerably for his attachment to his duty, both as a magistrate and loyal subject." [Can. Arch., Q. 14, p. 264. Carleton to Germain, 15th Oct., 1777.]

‡ United States writers describe him as born in Bedfordshire in 1727. Passages in the diary of Haldimand furnish the authority for this statement, and Haldimand knew Livius perfectly. "Mr. Dunn called to ask me to show him the letter from lord George Germain, of 1777, respecting Livius, who had been suspended by sir Guy Carleton. He said that Mr. Chambers, solicitor of the treasury, had written him, that this letter was very essential for Carleton's justification. He said further that Mr. Livius, being born in Lisbon, and his father a German, who had never been employed (except ?) in the English factory of Portugal, had no right to fill an office under the crown, and that this reason alone rendered the action he had taken against Carleton invalid." [Haldimand's Diary, p. 199.] "Dunn told me that Livius, being a foreigner, could not occupy any office of trust in the king's domain; that there was a penalty attached (of £500 sterling) for each office which a foreigner occupied, and having occupied five, if any one prosecuted he could make him pay £2,500, of which half would be for the prosecutor." [p. 211.] Belknap, whose work was published in 1791, also describes Livius as "a gentleman of foreign extraction."

In 1767 Benning Wentworth, for some time governor of New Hampshire, had been permitted to resign, and his nephew, John Wentworth the second, as he is called, had been named as his successor. In 1770 Benning Wentworth died, leaving the bulk of his property to a young widow. Law-suits arose, and the question presented itself, whether the reservation of five hundred acres in several townships conveyed the title to Wentworth himself. The council was composed of eight persons, seven of whom were, in some form, family connections of the governor. They voted in the negative, and followed up their vote by advising the governor to grant the land to those who would settle upon it. Livius, then a member of the council, while supporting the view that the land was not the property of the late governor, dissented from the proposition that it should be again granted. At this date Livius had a grievance, and he appears to have been one of the not unfrequent class, who conceive they can carry their point by being obstructive, and aggressive.

Some time previously, the province of New Hampshire had been divided into counties. It had taken some time to settle all the provisions of the act, but finally, in 1771, the royal consent was obtained. The five counties were named according to the personal feelings of the Wentworths, in harmony with their family traditions and the public men they had known, namely, Hillsborough, Cheshire, Rockingham, Stratford and Grafton. Owing to the thin population of the two latter counties, they were for the time to be annexed to Rockingham, until held to possess the right of exercising the jurisdiction set forth in the act. It may be said that the legislation took effect in 1773. From these circumstances, the appointment of Livius, then a judge, lapsed, and he was left without office. Embittered by these proceedings, he proceeded to England, and brought charges before the lords of trade against the governor and his council.

Viewing this arraignment in connection with the course subsequently followed by Livius in Canada, his charges may with propriety be briefly specified.

That the governor and council had deprived grantees of land under the crown without any legal process, on the suggestions that the conditions of holding them had not been fulfilled: that the duty paid by foreign shipping, known as "powder money," had not been accounted for since 1741, and all inquiry had been refused; that, through a third party, the governor had moved, that the lands declared not to belong to the late governor should be granted to himself, in spite of the protest of Livius against the illegality of such grant; that in consequence of this opposition Livius had been ill-treated and abused by the governor; that in an action in common pleas brought by the governor, the judges had been changed, until the point of law had been decided in his favour; that the council records had not been sent to England as prescribed. There was a general charge of partiality against the governor and council, arising from their family relationship.

It suffices to say, with regard to this forgotten dispute, alluded to only to furnish some insight into Livius' character, and into his conduct during Carleton's government, that the conclusion expressed by the Privy Council in 1773 was, that there was no foundation for censure of the governor; none for any of the charges against him; and that Wentworth's administration was pronounced to have tended greatly to the peace and prosperity of the province.

There was a party in New Hampshire, opposed to the governor who desired to displace him. Those constituting it had strongly supported Livius in his aggressiveness, and they were enabled to obtain for him the appointment of chief justice of New Hampshire.* It was, however, considered that his appearance in that office would create discord in the province. As Livius had posed before the home administration as a loyalist, and it was held inexpedient to send him

* "The history of New Hampshire by Jeremy Belknap, A.M. 1791, II., pp. 354, 365." This work is deserving of a modern reprint. It is written with moderation, in excellent English, and was published at a period when historic truth was held to be pre-eminent.

back to New Hampshire, in order to provide for him, he was appointed in May, 1775, as a judge of the common pleas in Canada.* Livius' two-fold ground of complaint during the government of Carleton, that he was not held of sufficient importance, and that he did not enjoy the full emoluments of his office, is established by his own demands. He asked to be paid an additional sum of two hundred pounds a year as an allowance for travelling expenses; to be granted the occupation of a house belonging to the government in Montreal; and payment of his salary as chief justice from the date of his *mandamus* in August, 1776. He took exception to Carleton, as governor in chief, appointing the notaries, and granting licences to plead in any of the courts. The governor, he declared, was a man of the sword, and had nothing to say about such matters. They had always been managed by the intendants, and it was he as chief justice who performed the duties of that office. Unless he could settle all this with Mr. Carleton, he must be at war with Mr. Haldimand on his arrival.

When Carleton, in 1770, appalled at the abuses that disgraced the administration of justice, established a new tariff of fees, in many cases even abolishing them, his effort was to effect this reform without detriment to what was just to the office-holder. In many instances his intervention led to the *honorarium* being increased. Thus the previous chief justice, Hey, with a salary of £600, had been allowed £200 travelling expenses, while his fees of office amounted to £200 additional. On the readjustment of salaries, that of the chief justice was named at £1,200 a year, £200 additional being added to the amount hitherto received by him. Moreover, he was paid £100 as a member of the council. Livius

* Carleton well knew the history of Livius' attempt in New Hampshire. In his letter of the 25th June, 1778, Carleton described him "as greedy of Power, more greedy of Gain, Imperious and impetuous in his Temper, but learned in the ways and Eloquence of the New England Provinces, valuing himself on his knowledge how to manage Governors, well schooled it seems in Business of this sort." [Can. Arch., Q. 15, p. 153.] Owing to the character of this remarkable letter I give it entire at the end of this chapter.

possessed the same income, with the addition of £200 as judge of the vice-admiralty court, and thus his allowances amounted to £1,500 or \$6,000, certainly equal at the present day to double the amount.*

Mr. Livius could have little knowledge of character when he imagined that, by making himself troublesome to Carleton the latter would seek for quietness by according his request. Carleton had no object to gain in differing with Livius. His resignation had been long accepted, his successor named, and he was looking anxiously for the arrival of the new governor to be relieved from his duties. He knew the constant enmity he would experience from Germain, and that every occasion which might subject him to annoyance, or cause him injury, would be welcomed in London. His one object, therefore, was to act according to his theory of what was right. To Livius, on the other hand, it was highly important to obtain a favourable decision before Haldimand arrived; as a precedent would then have been established which, as a matter of course, the incoming governor would follow.

Livius commenced a system of annoyance, in the hope that his support would be purchased by compliance with his demands. He could confidently count on being sustained by the home government. Germain's dislike of Carleton, indeed the paralyzing influence it exercised upon Carleton, is the subject of more than one letter.† In this course, to some extent, he was sustained by Grant, the nominee of Sir Thomas Mills, who, having a patent as receiver-general, remained in England, employing Grant, at his own terms, to perform the duty; by Finlay, the postmaster-general, dissatisfied with Carleton on account of not having accepted his opinions; and by Allsopp, who had previously acted as provincial secretary. They aided Livius in his attempt to thwart Carleton in the council, and to make his government difficult. As early as August, Livius attacked the council in its function

* The present pay of the chief justices of Ontario and Quebec is \$6,000.

† On this point I can refer to letters 27th June [Can. Arch., Q. 13, p. 297], August 11th, Oct. 15th, Oct. 16th, Nov. 6th, 1777 [Q. 14, pp. 18, 264, 270, 315].

as the provincial court of appeal. Livius' ignorance of law is shewn by his contention. The council dealt only with the case, as it had been submitted from the court below, and declined to re-open it by receiving fresh evidence. The chief justice protested against the practice; he argued that no error could be rectified without the re-admission of evidence, and demanded that *viva voce* testimony should be heard; that as the judges in the lower court dealt with facts as well as law, the justice of the decision could be determined only by the weight of evidence, for it was possible the full merits of the case had not been entered into at the first trial. The court adhered to its first resolution, and Livius was so notified. The chief justice, however, was in no way discomposed, and he reiterated his opinions in a letter which extends over fifteen pages in the volume which records it.*

Livius' character can be correctly judged by his conduct with regard to one Giroux and his wife. In October, 1777, the condition of Canada had become critical. The failure of St. Leger's expedition, and his return to Canada without his tents and guns, had exercised a wide feeling of distrust, and created disbelief in the power of Great Britain to defend the country. At the same time, the doubt and uncertainty concerning the movements of Burgoyne had greatly affected opinion. The attack on Ticonderoga by the congress troops with the capture of the companies of the 53rd was known, and there was much to encourage those in the province who had sympathies with the revolted colonies; and many such remained in Canada. The most active were to be found among the number who had originally entered the province from New England and New York; at the same time there was by no means an insignificant party among the Canadians of French descent affected by these opinions, with whom, from their numbers, any such sentiment was the more dangerous, that it required to be unhesitatingly met.

Carleton, in a subsequent despatch to Germain, has described the condition of the country at this date. He

* [Can. Arch., Q. 14, pp. 413-427.]

dwelt upon the very unfavourable impression made in the parishes by the *habitants* who had returned from the expeditions of the year,* disseminating "those ill Humours, Discontents and Complaints which usually accompany Misfortunes." A rumour ran through Canada that the province was immediately to be invaded, and it was generally believed. Simultaneously, a feeling arose among the people that they had been abandoned by Great Britain, and left without hope of succour. Carleton pointed out the disadvantage of sustaining merely a defensive war, especially in the unprotected condition of every post, and in the temper of the people. The fleet on lake Champlain was of sufficient strength in summer. In winter it was of no account; and it was at that season the invasion was looked for. He had taken all possible precaution against such an attack. At Saint John's, île-aux-Noix, and point au Fer, the works, where necessary, had been strengthened by snow and ice; patrols were kept continually in motion. One act of presumption had taken place from point au Fer. The officer, hearing of some congress troops being in a house sixty miles distant, had made a forced march to attack it, and he had been repulsed with the loss of a Canadian officer and two or three men.

Rewards were given to all who had served in the militia, and had distinguished themselves in the campaign of 1777, the Indians being also included. The whole organization had been ordered to hold its members in readiness to march as occasion might demand, and the troops assembled in huts in the woods, ready for any emergency, so soon as the extreme cold had passed. While taking these precautions Carleton conscientiously observed the terms of Burgoyne's convention. None of the provincials included in its provisions who had been allowed to return to Canada were permitted to perform the least service. They were not allowed to caulk a boat, or to repair a house in which soldiers lodged. On the 2nd of June, 1778, however, having authentic

* [Can. Arch., Q. 15, p. 35, 10th June, 1778.]

accounts that the convention had been deliberately broken by congress, Carleton declared it to be null and void in Canada.*

In the autumn of 1777, in order to be prepared for the threatened invasion, the report of which was disquieting the public mind and by many regarded as certain, Carleton called out the militia of Three Rivers and Montreal to the extent of one-third of their number. The Three Rivers force, under the command of de Tonnancour, and that of Montreal under de Longueuil and de Lanaudière, were even on the point of marching, when the intelligence was received that the project of invasion had been laid aside. Consequent upon this news, the disaffection in the parishes to a great extent passed away. Mascouche had been among the most contumacious, but better sentiments were entertained, and a feeling of repentance was expressed that any disloyalty had been shewn.†

It was during the height of this restless feeling that one Giroux, with his wife, was arrested and sent to prison for disaffection. On learning this proceeding, Livius considered that it was an opportunity he should not let pass. Without delay he sought out the provost-marshal, Prentice, in order

* The provincials who returned to Canada after Burgoyne's convention are set forth in the return of those "who have been victualled and received monthly allowances" as 562 in number. [Can. Arch., Q. 15, p. 42, 10th June, 1778.]

† The strength of the Canadian militia was as follows [26th June, 1778. Can. Arch., Q. 15, p. 43.] :

	Officers of all Ranks.	Sergeants.	Rank and File.	Total.
City of Quebec	41	19	800	860
District of Quebec	113	177	6,768	7,058
City of Montreal	31	17	511	559
District of Montreal	253	294	6,189	6,736
“ of Three Rivers	61	59	1,865	1,985
Detroit	28	15	473	516
Total	527	581	16,606	17,714

At this date Canada was garrisoned by the 8th, 29th, 31st, 34th, 47th, 53rd, Royal Highland Emigrants, with detachments from the 9th, 20th, 21st, 24th, 33rd and 62nd, making a total of 223 officers, 217 sergeants, 128 drummers and fifers, and 3,282 rank and file, of which number 272 were sick in quarters, 67 sick in hospital, making a total of 3,850 of all ranks.

The Brunswick troops consisted of 83 officers, 26 staff, 164 sergeants and non-com. officers, 1,702 privates, 56 of whom were sick, making a total of 1,975.

to learn the facts of the case, with the names of the parties arrested. He at once addressed the lieutenant-governor on the subject. As this letter is read, carefully written as it is, it is difficult to refuse the conviction that Livius, in sending it, had his own interest in view more than that of the individuals whose cause he affected to advocate. It is one of those communications, as the saying goes, to be read between the lines, and forcibly suggests that it was a notification that he could be more troublesome, and was prepared to be so ; but that there was means of silencing him, and that he could be as useful as he might be required to be ; to use the expression of the modern police courts that he could be "squared."*

Livius complained that Giroux had been committed without examination, on suspicion of spreading false news and being disaffected ; that no cause of commitment was expressed in the warrant, moreover, without the informer being bound to appear, and without the authority on which the proceeding had been taken, being set forth. The two persons arrested, in no way military, had been sent to the military provost, for a civil bailable offence, out of the way of trial, and they had been confined for ten days.

It was to him as chief justice that the liberty of the subject was intrusted. While civil law prevailed, it was he alone who possessed lawful authority, without the expression of cause, to commit to prison, and it was his duty to see that the power was not usurped by others. He was therefore "under the necessity, very disagreeable to him," of stating what he felt called upon to do ; to issue a writ commanding the parties to be brought before him, and if the case appeared judicially as it had been described, he should discharge them ; but, he continues, "to occasion as little reflection as possible on your strain of proceeding, or if any good cause for their detention can be there shewn to me, I shall either bail them, if it be right to do so, and they be provided with Bail, or I

* I may be called to account for using this expression. I am therefore tempted to ask, is there any word to supply its place ? The dictionary gives us the meaning "to reduce to any given measure or standard."

will remand to the proper prison by my own warrant." Livius further advised, that if the lieutenant-governor intended to leave them in prison, to instruct the attorney-general to oppose their enlargement, and he would then bring the matter into the natural, legal, ordinary channel.

The letter closed with some remarks on his own zeal for the king's service, which he said could not be doubted. He had himself recommended to the general, that a stop should be put to the loose manner in which idle or disaffected persons used their tongues, but his lenity had been averse to harsh measures. The present proceedings had caused him surprise, and if they had been taken by an ordinary justice of the peace he would have directed an information to be laid against him, and it was only his respect for the lieutenant-governor that had prevented him so acting in his case.

Cramahé replied by sending a copy of the affidavit on which he had acted, adding he would submit to the governor his reasons for following the course he had taken. He advised Livius not to interfere in such matters ; the province was not in the state peaceable men would wish. The too numerous partisans of congress were spreading discord far and wide. He asked Livius to call upon him and he would then communicate some information which would shew that the times were ticklish, and required the united effort of all to prevent the flames of rebellion breaking out and extending through every part of the province. Livius declined to call on Cramahé ; he again denounced the acts of the lieutenant-governor as illegal, demanded recognition of his own position as chief justice, and an apology from the provost-marshal for having failed to submit to his authority.

Both Livius and Cramahé addressed Carleton on the subject. Cramahé stated that the day after information had been received of the attack on Ticonderoga, when the companies of the 53rd were taken prisoners, Giroux had spread the report that the fort had been taken, and that the congress troops were advancing to invade the province. He had been arrested as an example to others. Livius evidently supposed

that the *habeas corpus* act was in force in Canada; such a writ as he proposed had never been known in the province. But laws made for the time of peace, and here is his whole argument, are not adapted for a period of commotion and revolt.

The emissaries of the colonies were indefatigable. They were always furnished with the intelligence of any misfortune to the king's cause. Moreover, Livius, as chief justice, had claimed powers he in no way possessed, for no information can be fyled except on the facts being brought judicially before him. Otherwise the chief justice became both prosecutor and judge.*

Carleton's instructions authorized him to name a committee of five members of the legislative council for the despatch of business, but without authority to pass ordinances for legislation. In August, 1776, amid the agitation following on the defeat of the congress troops when driven out of Canada, in the midst of the operations for the defence of the province and to regain possession of lake Champlain, Carleton had nominated this committee, consisting of Cramahé, the lieutenant-governor, Mabane and Dunn, judges at Quebec, Finlay, the postmaster-general, and John Collins, a member of the council. It was the time of war; if the proceeding was not strictly in accordance with Carleton's instructions, and it was afterwards pronounced by the privy council to be at variance with their spirit, it had been dictated by the trying circum-

* There are writers who have represented, that Carleton's government was distinguished by arbitrary injustice in arresting numerous French Canadians, suspected of a treasonable correspondence with congress. We have the return of such prisoners confined on the 12th of October, 1777 [Can. Arch., Q. 14, p. 255]. They were six in number, two of whom only were Canadians of French descent, alluded to in the text; Giroux and his wife. The others were one L'Eglise, a Frenchman, suspected as a spy, Valentine Cole, sent a prisoner from Detroit, and Matthew Eliot, known to be a spy in 1775, sent down from Detroit in 1777, released in Montreal and admitted to take the oath of allegiance, and subsequently arrested.

There was a sixth prisoner, Augustin Bernice of Saint Ignace, arrested on complaint of a captain of militia, that he had refused to furnish carriages on the march of troops. Cramahé explained that the intention was to keep him confined for two or three days, and dismiss him with a reprimand.

stances in which the province was placed. This committee was regarded by Livius with particular disfavour. He was not a member of it, and hence, as one of the council, he felt that by his exclusion he was in an inferior position. It had gradually grown to be the executive branch of the government, and formed a state council. Livius attacked its legality. In April, 1778, he called upon the secretary, Jenkin Williams, and asked to see the order of the 8th of August, 1776, creating it. Williams gave him the reference, and temporarily left the room. On his return, he found that Livius had asked the clerk to make a copy of the entry. Williams interfered, and said that he did not know if any copy could be taken without the governor's authority. Livius, accordingly, wrote to know if it was meant that he could not obtain such a copy. Williams replied that he had referred the matter to Carleton, who had instructed him that the minutes of the legislative council and the public accounts were open to inspection, but not the proceedings of the privy council.*

The subject which especially aroused Livius' anger was the introduction of an ordinance into the legislative council regulating the fees to be asked, and awarding punishment to those who contravened the law. The measure was opposed by Livius. He took the ground of attacking the composition of the committee, proceeding by a series of resolutions which covertly assailed Carleton's government. I shall have to return to this matter at a subsequent period, when it became the subject of discussion before the privy council.

To Carleton it was plain, that Livius was prepared to use his official position to weaken the prestige of the government, at a time when it required to be strengthened in every possible form. The province was in the midst of danger, and every effort had to be given to its defence. Any want of resolution on the part of the central power would have been fraught with evil, for it would have directly encouraged the disloyal sentiments which could only be kept in control by firmness and concord. Carleton consequently prorogued

* [Can. Arch., B. 204, pp. 6, 8, 12th and 14th April, 1778.]

the council, and on the 8th of May superseded Livius from his place as chief justice. Livius, however, still retained his position in the court of vice-admiralty, and remained in Canada until the arrival of Haldimand, to whom he had determined to appeal.

Haldimand, Carleton's successor, reached Quebec on the night of the 26th of June. On the following day, the 27th, he was sworn in. The vessel which brought out Haldimand took back Carleton and his family, who immediately left. It was the close of sir Guy Carleton's first administration, a period of nearly twelve years, from September, 1766, to June, 1778. He had acted as lieutenant-governor until the 12th of April, 1768, the date of his appointment as governor in chief; he was not, however, sworn in at Quebec until the 20th of October. He was absent from the province from August, 1770, to September, 1774, when the duties were performed by Cramahé: the four years given to the consideration of the Quebec Act.

As it is said of Frontenac that he was the second founder of French Canada, so Carleton may be regarded as the second conqueror, in its establishment as a British province. It was his influence which moulded its form of government. The principle he followed was that of justice and right: his rule that of mercy and gentleness; administered with a firm hand. Those, who have followed the events which I have striven to describe, cannot fail to recognize that it was mainly owing to his determination, that in these trying times Canada continued under British rule. The few writers who advocate a new dismemberment of the empire, on the fanciful theories which have weight with themselves, may read in this fact the want of his political sagacity. The preponderating majority of the present population of the dominion can only regard it as affirmatory of his genius and wisdom. Carleton correctly estimated the painful features of the contest in which he was engaged. He regarded it, as it must to-day be considered by all good men, whether in the British empire or the United States, as the most painful episode in our common history;

that we should all do our utmost to heal the wounds received in that unhappy contest, and not by exacerbation, misrepresentation of fact, and perversion of truth keep in play the passions then called forth. When the congress troops were before Quebec, he withstood them with the spirit of the school of soldiers to which he belonged. When spring came, he drove them from Canadian soil. The prisoners taken by him he cared for, and sent to their homes on parole ; this humane conduct won the hearts even of those who were striving to rend the empire in twain. It was not mere sentimentality, for his preparations to defend Canada were unflinchingly continued, until he created the fleet which swept Arnold and the congress force from lake Champlain. No such effort had been thought possible at Philadelphia, and the defeat of the fleet was the more crushing that it was unlooked for. But Carleton saw little cause for gratulation in the event. When doing justice to the gallantry of his officers who had achieved it, the leading thought in Carleton's mind was that it was the defeat of his fellow-subjects in rebellion, and not a matter for the expression of triumph.

I have related that his conduct to the prisoners taken* had such influence upon them, that the congress commandant at Ticonderoga would not permit them to be brought in contact with the garrison, from fear of the impression they would make upon the troops composing it.

While engaged in the performance of this duty Carleton made every effort to establish law and order. He waged unceasing war against the exactions of the courts ; he restrained the extortions of office-holders, by bringing the fees payable to a standard within the conditions of the province. On the Quebec act becoming law, in the midst of the convulsions which followed, he inaugurated the legislative council, and established the law courts. Had Hey continued as chief justice, a man of moderation and character, his task would have been greatly simplified. It was the misfortune of the province to be afflicted with the presence of a clever,

* [Ante, p. 113.]

unscrupulous charlatan in the person of Livius. Bred in the atmosphere of New Hampshire, with some showy qualities, ignorant of the French language, of French law, his knowledge of English law being that of the mere sharp attorney, this person's main view was to add to his own importance and increase his emoluments. He thoroughly miscalculated his power in his attempt to coerce Carleton, for he was at once made powerless for further mischief.

Blame has been cast upon Carleton, because during the winter preceding Burgoyne's unhappy expedition he had not busied himself with obtaining horses. It is simply from ignorance of the facts that such opinions are expressed. I have related that his design was to have established himself at Ticonderoga, and to have operated against Connecticut, where horses in number were to be had. Burgoyne's expedition, equally with that of St. Leger's, was the work of Germain, who even detailed the precise strength of the force to be taken into the field.

In spite of the blight of the influence of Germain, his interference with military operations, and the feeling in the province, that it was a passport to the favour of the secretary of state to oppose the governor of Canada, Carleton held the province with a firm hand, for he was not one to be rendered impotent by untoward circumstances. Notwithstanding his protest against Germain's insulting injustice, he was kept at his post a year after his resignation had been given in, from the difficulty of finding one capable and willing to undertake his duties.

Writers have assailed many of Carleton's acts as arbitrary. They fail to remember that it was a period when the country had been invaded, and the dread of the recurrence of those days never passed away. The first meeting of the legislative council was interrupted by the siege of Saint John's. When the province was cleared of the invaders in 1776, Carleton returned to his attempt to establish the pre-eminence of law. Unfortunately, the days of peace were unknown, and the preparations for defence remained imperative. The militia

ordinance passed in 1777 has with singular misrepresentation been called in question for its severity. By its provisions all Canadians were called upon to defend their land under the threat of invasion, repeated year by year to the last day of the war. Those who are so ready with blame will do well to remember that these were the days when "the press-gang" to man the navy was a recognized institution in Great Britain, when men were seized by force and placed on ship-board. At this time the province was defended by British troops, and Canadians were not called upon, unaided, to protect their hearths and homes, but were sustained to the greatest extent possible by the mother country. A period of this exacting character cannot be judged by the standard of every-day ordinary life. Troops were necessary to safeguard the country. A great number, possibly the majority, of the Canadians may have been indifferent as to the issue of the contest, and desired to be left on their farms, and let matters run their course. There were great numbers who entertained different feelings. Undoubtedly, the higher classes of the Canadians and the clergy were, without exception, opposed to being engulfed within the new United States. Those belonging to the former class shewed their sympathy by taking the field in defence of the land. The sneer which has been expressed at the Canadian members of the council who supported the ordinance, that they were *seigneurs* and the creatures of the government, can only be regarded as an unworthy attempt to influence modern political opinion in times of excitement, and is simply perversion of history.*

I have disposed of the charge against Carleton's arbitrary imprisonment of Canadians, and have shewn it to be groundless. I am unable even to find ground for the accusation.

* The French Canadian members of the first legislative council were François Levêque, Pécaudy de Contrecoeur, Roch St. Ours Lechaillons, Charles François Lanaudière, St. Luc de Lacorne, Joseph G. Chaussegros de Léry, Picotté de Belestre, des Bergères de Rigauville. Nevertheless, there are writers who assert that the French Canadians were excluded from the government, and certainly the characters of these men court comparison with those of the parties who have assailed them.

Carleton will ever retain one of the first places in Canadian history. The work he performed remained after him. His government was carried on with integrity, and with wisdom. It is he who in a great measure laid the foundation for the Quebec act, on the broad ground of rendering justice to the new subjects. The great mistake of this legislation was extending its provisions beyond the territory of Canada proper, to the country of the lakes to the west of Pennsylvania and Virginia, which furnished ground for discontent to the southern provinces. Otherwise, the act was the only one possible in the circumstances, so far as it related to Canada. It was administered by Carleton with judgment and moderation, and he was enabled to set at defiance the clamour of discontent with which the English-speaking minority had assailed Murray. Not the least striking feature in his character is the dignity with which he met the insolent persecution of lord George Germain. Carleton's government remains to us to shew what can be achieved in difficult circumstances by a man sustained by high principle and a sense of duty. He offers us an example for imitation in every respect by his patriotism, his untiring zeal in the fulfilment of his duty, by his private integrity and worth, unaffected by narrowness of spirit, and what is often the bane of great powers, fanciful, unpractical theories.

[Can. Arch., Q. 15, p. 152.]

Quebec, 25th June, 1778.

My Lord, I formerly observed that under the Disadvantages your Lordship's Displeasure and Censures had placed me, Prudence required I should afford as little opportunity as possible to all who might desire and find the times favourable for exciting Disorders to the great Detriment of the King's Service; for these and other Reasons I did not call together the legislative Council before the 23rd of March when the Ice of the Lakes was no longer passable and all apprehensions of Invasion vanished for the present; I then only recommended that they should examine and regulate the different Tables of Fees which had been prepared for their Inspection adding that as the King had been pleased bountifully to augment the Salaries of most of His Servants in this Province that they might live comfortably in their respective stations without oppressing His People, so it came more particularly my duty to see his paternal Intentions carried into Execution, as these alterations had taken Place under my Command.

I have had the Pleasure to perceive there are [some] who require no Law but their own integrity to keep them within the limits of Justice and Moderation, unfortunately it is far otherwise with many, and in this Province, there is now no Rule or Regulation for Fees of Office, but each man for himself is guided by his own desire of Gain, which of late has broke out with greater keenness than heretofore.

Many of the Gentlemen of the Council saw the necessity of an Ordinance which at the same time that it authorized what was reasonable, awarded proper Punishments to deter those whose Avarice might induce them to disregard or elude it, this Business so reasonable and necessary was continually intercepted by Motions and Speeches quite new in this Province, and more suited to a popular assembly of the Massachusetts than to the King's Council for Canada.

Mr. Livius Chief Justice took the lead, greedy of Power, and more greedy of Gain, Imperious and impetuous in his Temper, but learned in the ways and Eloquence of the New England Provinces, valuing himself in his knowledge how to manage Governors well schooled, it seems, in Business of this sort. This Gentleman appeared eager to seize in time every opportunity of recommending himself after the manner of Christie to your lordship's Protection and Favour when all such Characters were not a little encouraged that after similar services, He had received promises of preferment, these indeed were amply notified and echoed round the Province, so that no doubt remained how most effectually to pay their Court to your lordship.

The personal Grievances this Patriot complained of were, that He was not of Importance enough in the Province, that I had cut him off two hundred a Year for his travelling Expences, that I had refused him the House hired for Government at Montreal, advantages which he said his Predecessor enjoyed, that I would not pay him his Salary as Chief Justice from the date of his Mandamus in August 1776. The truth of the case is, that Mr. Hey was allowed two hundred Pounds travelling Expences and two hundred more in lieu of Fees of office when his salary was six hundred in all, amounting to one thousand Pounds a Year; upon the late arrangements taking Place, these were united in the Salary and two hundred added besides one Hundred as a Member of the Council, so that the whole from

this Period amounted to thirteen hundred Pounds a year with which Mr. Hey was perfectly satisfied, and thought no more of travelling Expences or Fees of Office. Mr. Livius enjoyed this same allowance of Thirteen hundred a year, besides two hundred as judge of the Vice Admiralty Court when he made these complaints.

Mr. Hey had no warrant for Pay for the first notice of Mr. Livius' appointment, on the contrary tho' the order was issued to pay him half a year's salary to the 30th of April, 1777, it was recalled on receiving the first accounts of a new appointment, but I did not Judge it right to pay this Gentleman what his Predecessor had already received nor rashly decide in his Favor what might be disputed. After all, tho' I thought his Demands unreasonable, I did not refuse, I only desired Patience till the case might be laid before the Lords of his Majesty's Treasury for a final answer. He was also dissatisfied I hear, that I should take upon me to appoint notaries, grant Licenses to plead in the different Courts of Justice, appoint the Officers belonging to any of those Courts ; the General, he said, was a man of Sword, and had nothing to say to such matters, they had always been managed by the Intendant, that He, as Head of the law was in the Intendant's place, and unless he could settle all this with Mr. Carleton He must immediately and on his account be at War with general Haldimand. The Intendant 'tis true regulated all such Business, and much more, but did not force himself into this Importance by Opposition and disturbing the Tranquility of the Province. He exercised his authority by Commission from the King his master, who judged it expedient to lodge in his hands almost all the Powers of Civil Government ; the proceedings of the Legislative Council will shew your Lordship how small the Hopes, that this unfortunate Province should enjoy the least Tranquility, was my successor to find him Chief Justice. I therefore superseded him, and appointed Mr. Mabane, Mr. Dunn and Mr. Williams to officiate in that office as formerly. I saw no other method of averting from general Haldimand great embarrassment and difficulties on his first entrance into his command.

Last year it was Sir Thomas Mills' Pleasure to appoint Mr. Grant of St. Roc to do the Duty of Receiver-General here, it was therefore Judged necessary He should be a member of the council, this gentleman was well chosen to second Mr. Livius on all occasions, nor did he fail in this.

Mr. Finlay our Postmaster and Postmaster-General joined in hopes of having the Powers and Independence of his Office greatly extended ; in such views he is far from being singular : Mr. Allsopp too, who many years acted as Provincial Secretary, &c., perhaps piqued at his Dismission, perhaps from some more secret cause, united with them : indeed I thought his case hard, and it should have been represented, had not a conspicuous coldness for the King's Service, in all these Disturbances which immediately followed raised some doubts concerning him.

These four gentlemen were joined sometimes by one member, sometimes by another without much meaning. Even Caldwell by his strange motions had no settled Plan of Disturbance in view. He neither saw their evil Tendency nor would he listen to advice.

Having no Hope left that the proposed Business should take place, and seeing their fractious Measures daily increase, I prorogued the Council and dismissed Mr. Livius, when his associates at once seemed to sink into a proper sense of their duty.

Thus on my Departure, as at my arrival, I found it necessary to exert some acts of severity, the last I hope will be attended with consequences as favourable to the Tranquility of the Province as the former, for from that Event, not the least appearance of a Cabal of this sort, till your Lordship's arrangements and new system of Politicks brought them forth. With my Removal I trust those measures will change, and tho' the distinguished character may be of no consideration with your Lordship, the Tranquility of this People, the Security of this important Province, the Dignity and Dominion of the Crown will I hope appear worthy of some attention. But should all those still give place to private Resentment or private Favour, if the Power of the Crown within the Province must be trampled down to exalt the sway of the inferior servants and Scribblers, and while callous to the merit of old and faithful servants, all Places disposed of like Private Property to Friends and Followers, no matter how unqualified or whom they thrust out, or to such who are loud in their own Praise and abuse of better men, tho' in both equally unjust. If unconcerned for the Interests of the King our Master His Authority must be here destroyed, that the Rapine and Dirt of office may find no Restraint, I will venture to prognosticate, that instead of Subordination, Tranquility and Obedience, your Lordship will soon perceive Faction and sedition among both Troops and People, and this great Province run Headlong into the same Disorders our neighbours have experienced, with no less Detriment to the interests of Great Britain.

To prevent these Evils, I early wished to retire from before your Lordship's high Displeasure, least the King's Service and public Tranquility intrusted in my hands should be destroyed thereby; I have long and impatiently looked out for the arrival of a Successor, Happy at last to learn his near approach, that into Hands less Obnoxious to your Lordship's I may resign the important commands with which I have been honoured. Thus for the King's Service, as willingly I lay them down as for His service I took them up, the most essential and in Truth, the only service in my Power to render your Lordship's administration.

I am, &c., &c.,

GUY CARLETON.

LORD GEORGE GERMAIN,

One of his Majesty's

Principal Secretaries of State.

CHAPTER II.

Carleton's arrival in England was the indirect means of threatening important political changes, but the storm passed over. George III., sensible of Carleton's service in the siege of Quebec, rewarded him with knighthood and gave him the sinecure appointment of the government of Charlemount. Germain affected to consider the act as a personal slight. Had George III. been content to govern constitutionally, the resignation would have been accepted, and there would have been an end to Germain's political career. But complications followed, which, fortunately for Germain, made his presence in the ministry a necessity.* I allude to lord North's resignation of the 14th of March, and his recommendation to the king to send for lord Chatham to form an administration. Although the proposed retirement of Germain may have had weight with North, the main cause may be assigned to the communication of the French ambassador in London, the marquis de Noailles, that France had entered into a treaty of commerce with the United States, having recognized their independence. To North's mind the act was equivalent to a declaration of war, and he felt that the country demanded a strong and vigorous administration to meet the emergency. The king's answer might have been looked for; he would have nothing to do with "lord Chatham and his crew," he could not accept "that perfidious man" as prime minister,

* The fact is established by the king's letter to lord North, 3rd March, 1778. "I own, I think lord G. Germain's defection a most favourable event. He has so many enemies, that would have made him a heavy load whenever the failure of the expedition under Lt.-G. Burgoyne came to be canvassed in parliament. Yet I never would have recommended his removal, unless with his own good will; now he will save us all trouble. The laying it on my bequeathing the government of Charlemount on Carleton is quite absurd, and shews the malevolence of his mind."

but he and some of his friends could be taken into the ministry as subordinates to lord North. No further explanation is necessary to add that the king's wishes enforced the continuance in office of lord North, although he sincerely desired to resign.

The note of the French ambassador led to his immediate departure from London. Lord Stormont, the ambassador at Paris, was recalled. The king sent a message to both houses, declaring the determination to assert the honour of his crown. It was followed by the loyal addresses which the majority of lord North rendered possible, aided to a great extent by the strong feeling of national indignation called forth by the attitude of France.

Public opinion, in the emergency, instinctively turned to Chatham. The successful direction of the former war came prominently to the mind of every one, and the feeling was general that the exercise of some commanding intellect was indispensable in the impending crisis. War with France was inevitable; the dangers into which the country was drifting awakened the feeling that extraordinary measures were demanded to meet them, and the common sentiment pointed to Chatham as the one man, whose genius and firmness would successfully direct the national strength. Chatham, however, would only consent to form an administration on the condition that he should be free to control the policy of the country and to choose his own instruments to carry it out.* The king, on his part, would abandon no item of his pretensions to be the sole presiding power in the direction of the public policy. Sustained by this determination, he personally appealed to North to resume the direction of affairs. The king proposed as an addition to the strength of the government, that Thurlow should be appointed chancellor; an

* What a comment on aristocratic government is the fact that the army was not considered to contain among its officers one general of commanding ability, and that prince Frederick of Brunswick was designated as the soldier to whom alone the defence of the country could be entrusted. That we are not to-day in this deplorable condition is owing to the liberal institutions under which the empire is governed. It is their influence which has opened the path to merit and worth.

assurance that the royal influence would remain undiminished and that the inner working of the cabinet would be adjusted in every respect by the king's desire. Had Chatham lived, it is questionable if North would have withstood the influence which demanded the presence of Chatham at the head of the government, but on the 7th of April, 1778, he sank down in the house of lords in a fit, to die at Hayes on the 11th of May. Thus lord North's administration was continued for the mischievous influence of Germain still to be exercised.

There has been much discussion in modern times as to the probable effect of lord Chatham's success as first minister in this crisis, had his life been prolonged, and had he obtained the hold of government on the terms he desired. I do not feel myself absolved from the investigation of this problem. It appears to me that the consideration turns upon the fact, was lord Chatham of that date the same William Pitt, who in the last reign achieved the triumphs and successes of the former war? If so, and acting on the principles which made his administration so renowned, I believe that he would have saved the country from the disasters which were experienced. Chatham's genius had been eminently shewn by his wisdom in the choice of men to perform the duty assigned them. When he had declared the main purpose to be attained, he left to the judgment of the officer he appointed the means of working out the duty to be performed. He was the last man to write verbose instructions. He would not have sought in the records of the peerage, or on the benches of the houses of lords and commons, for the generals, or admirals and diplomatists he selected for his country's service. The tone given to the service would not have been that of frivolity and self-indulgence; its self-respect and dignity would have been strictly maintained. Both army and navy would have been held in discipline and decorum, the officers would have been made to feel that they must be gentlemen in fact, as by title; there would have been no repetition of the riot, revelry and gambling, which, to our discredit, can be recorded as having taken place at Philadelphia, to impair the strength and vigour

of the troops. The power of the country would have been wisely and firmly directed, and the recognition of merit would not have been limited by pliant subserviency to the monarch's wishes. The heart of the nation would have responded to the call for service. All the best national instincts would have been brought into activity, and the true force of the empire, its patriotism, its earnestness, its devotion, would have vibrated with that uncontrollable national emotion which has been the secret of the great achievements emblazoned in the history of the British race.

One important consequence would have followed. The loyalists would have been sustained and encouraged in the belief that their efforts on the part of the mother country were not to result in their persecution and ruin. Hope would have arisen among those who still desired a preservation of the unity of the empire. The great obstacle to reconciliation would have remained in the hostility of the active leaders of the revolt, who, in their desire from the earliest period to be independent and freed from colonial control, had entered into the agitation on the plea of political wrong, in many respects more apparent than real.

Undoubtedly, there was much which demanded rectification and change. The old theories of colonial rule could no longer have been maintained. It is not too sweeping an assertion to declare that there must have been a new order of things. The first step towards peace was to have given power to a British minister, who, with greater moderation of view, would have united firmness of purpose in establishing confidence in the wisdom and justice of the mother country, with reliance on her power. With some knowledge of the facts of which I am writing, I assert such to be the almost universal feeling of Canada. The fact, however, still remains, and I do not feel warranted in concealing it, that from time to time, among many public men in the mother country, we meet much misconception with regard to the dominion and its condition of feeling. There are, fortunately, English writers who can be named whose knowledge of Canadian history is

not exceeded by that of any Canadian student, whose wise comments we willingly accept. It is our hope that such as these will cease to prove the exception.

Had Great Britain succeeded in the contest, a strong intervening power would have been necessary to withstand the unforgiving temper of the king towards those who had in any way opposed him. Chatham would never have lent himself to persecution, but George III. always found pliant men to obey his wishes. The supposition presents a possibility which even the modern writer dreads to contemplate. It was only one possessed of the genius of Chatham in his early days who could have withstood this feeling. It was from this temper of the king that the cause of America became identified with the cause of liberal institutions, and that it, to some extent, continues so to be considered. Even at the present day, it has been regarded as a struggle which affected the political life of the mother country, and as having injuriously interfered with the endeavour to obtain constitutional government and a truly national representation in the house of Commons. While narrating this epoch of history, I have been unable to withstand the impression that many writers in their allusions to it are unwilling to advance any statement injurious to the reputation of Fox. Such as these seem to be sustained by the conviction that any disputable point is definitely settled by adducing the authority of Burke, Chatham or Fox, when the truth is alone obtainable by a faithful narrative of the facts. Writers of this class invariably place the mother country in the wrong. They set out of view that the invasion of Canada under Montgomery in 1775 took place before the declaration of independence, and that even at this date men of advanced opinions as to the future of the provinces were looking toward France for aid, while at the time they were earnestly representing in London that it was their most fervent desire to remain in allegiance to the empire.

One of the first matters which demanded Carleton's attention on his arrival in London was the proceedings taken before the privy council on the petition of Livius, who had

appealed against his suspension. There can be little doubt that in the course taken by him, Livius had the support of Germain, which was continued until Germain's own retirement from office. We learn from the report of the committee of the privy council, which adjudicated on the case, the detail of the circumstances which led to the extreme measure being taken by Carleton; Carleton declined to attend personally. When called upon to explain his conduct, he replied that he had given his reasons at length to lord George Germain, and that he justified the course he had pursued by the necessity of the measure, as it was established by the minutes of the legislative council. Both Carleton and Livius were summoned to attend, the former that he might make good the reasons assigned for Livius' removal. Carleton, however, in writing, submitted, whether his attendance was necessary, as his charge was confined to the papers laid before the privy council, and he declined to consider the proceedings in any other form than as an official act established by its public record. Livius appeared, and addressed the council in advocacy of his pretensions.

In giving its decision, the council pointed out that there was no arraignment of Livius in his judicial capacity; on the other hand, the governor's instructions were to the effect that he should displace no judge, or other official, without good and sufficient cause being signified in the fullest and most distinct manner.

The legislative council had been called together on the 23rd of March, 1778, and prorogued on the 25th of April, the first and only council which Livius had attended. One of the earliest proceedings was the regulation of fees, Livius being appointed chairman of the committee on law fees. He moved that the judges of Quebec and Montreal should first furnish a report on the proceedings of their courts. The motion was rejected. He was followed by Finlay, the postmaster general, and Grant, the deputy receiver general, both of whom moved for the adoption of regulations submitted by them which affected their duties. Livius supported the motion that they

should be referred to a committee. Neither of the motions was accepted.

There was a further motion by Livius, on the subject of Carleton's having nominated five members of the legislative council, to act as a special committee on important questions submitted to it. Livius' motion on this point can only be regarded as a direct attack on the power of the governor-in-chief. He asked that Carleton should produce the royal instructions, in order that the council might dutifully conform to them. The privy council justified this motion. The instructions to the governor by the home government, it is true, directed that this communication should be made, but with the saving clause, as the governor should find it convenient for the king's service to impart his instructions. As Carleton had not submitted his instructions, it was plain he held it to be inexpedient to do so. The legislative council of Canada sustained this view by voting down Livius' motion. The feeling in Livius' favour is further shewn by the privy council making the recommendation, that for the future the instructions should be shewn to the council, with certain limitations on the responsibility of the governor, which made the whole paragraph without meaning.

Livius' motion on the day previous to the prorogation really amounted to a series of resolutions antagonistic to the governor, much as in the house of commons they would in modern practice be directed against a minister. They related the establishment of the council of 23, out of which the governor, on the 8th of August, 1776, had appointed a privy council of five; that the five members had acted as a council for the province to the exclusion of the rest of the members; that the united number had examined the expenditure of moneys, and their report, afterwards approved in the "legal council" without their interference, approbation or consent, had been made to appear as that of the whole body; that these proceedings were irregular and illegal; consequently, Livius moved that the governor will be pleased to order immediate remedy. Carleton's reply to this challenge to his

authority was the prorogation of the council and the suspension of Livius as chief justice.

Carleton, who had acted in the discharge of his duty during the trying time in which he had to defend the province, declined to raise any personal issue before the privy council. He might have shewn Livius' incapacity, his want of knowledge of French, his ignorance of French law as shewn in his letters to Cramahé, and his want of knowledge of English law as shewn by him in the points which he raised regarding the court of appeal. He disdained to consider the act as one in which he had the least personal interest. He contented himself by referring to the explanations he had given to Germain, and left the privy council to act as they might judge fit.

The committee of the privy council, nevertheless, placed on record, that it was much to be wished that the text of the above recited motions had been propounded in terms more studiously guarded, and to appearance not so offensive to the governor, "yet, upon a full review of these proceedings, without entering into any discussion on the authority assumed by the governor in the mode of removal, there does not appear to us good and sufficient cause for displacing Mr. Livius, especially when we consider that no complaint or imputation has been preferred against him in his judicial capacity." They accordingly concurred in the opinion of the lords of trade, that there was not good and sufficient cause for displacing Mr. Livius, and therefore that he should be restored.

The privy council also recommended that all members of the council should be considered equal members of the council of state, and that all the business of the council should be executed by the whole body.

At the same time the powers of the chief justice were extended. Hitherto his duty had been confined to criminal cases only, except in cases of appeal; he was now made a member of the court of common pleas, over which he should preside, and, even though he had given his opinion in the

court below, he should also sit and give his opinion in the court of appeal. It was in itself a victory for Livius. He was ordered to be restored to his office, and lord George Germain had the satisfaction of inflicting a slight on Carleton. But the qualified mode in which the decision was made must have told Livius how imperfectly he had obtained the sympathy of those who had adjudicated on his case. He had obtained the technical right which he could claim. That Livius had given great provocation was so manifest to every one cognizant of the facts, that even Germain, when notifying Haldimand that he was reinstated, informed the governor-in-chief that "Mr. Livius has given the most solemn assurance, that he will give every assistance in his power, and conduct himself in such a manner as a member of council as will give you entire satisfaction."

Livius never returned to Canada, but remained in London enjoying his £1,200 a year as a sinecure; an example of wrong committed on the colony by the favour of the minister. From 1779 to November, 1785, the date of the appointment of chief justice Smith, he continued to enjoy a lucrative office as a sinecure, receiving the *honorarium* of a modern chief justice, at a time when money was without doubt double its present value. The fact is undeniable; we are in possession of a list of the commissioners for executing the office of chief justice from the date of Livius' suspension to August, 1784; Adam Mabane, Thomas Dunn and Jenkin Williams performing this duty.* In October, 1783, we have the application of the commissioners for the salary due them for having acted in that capacity. It is doubtful if ever they received any such payment.† There is something even comical in the intrigues by which Livius contrived to remain in London. At the end of March, 1779, Germain notified him that he was restored to office, and instructed him to repair to Quebec by the first conveyance to reassume its duties. In July, Germain again notified Livius that his presence could no longer be

* [Can. Arch., B. 225.2, p. 376.]

† [Can. Arch., B. 204, p. 114.]

dispensed with, and he was requested to return by one of the "ships now going out." In August Livius addressed de Grey; he hoped that the necessity of his departure could be obviated and asked for the opportunity of "laying himself at his majesty's feet."

Livius must have succeeded in his application; for in March, 1780, we find him applying to Germain for leave to remain to meet his brother who was returning from India, whom he had not seen for years. In July he explains his non-departure, by the difficulty of obtaining a passage. In April, 1782, we find him addressing lord Shelburne, then secretary of state in the administration of lord Rockingham. He narrates his attempt, the previous autumn, to reach Canada, but that he had been driven back by a storm. His letter continues in a strain which it may be safely said was never previously taken by an official. He took the extraordinary ground of declaring that, in the event of his returning to Canada, it would be his duty to oppose the governor in the arrest of suspected persons, and as chief justice to assert himself in a manner which would only cause trouble in the province, in the critical situation in which it was placed, and therefore his presence was undesirable.* Although the negotiations for peace had been commenced, they were not concluded, and it would have been in no way conducive

* To shew that I do not exaggerate in my account of Livius' letter to lord Shelburne, I give his precise words. [Can. Arch., Q. 19, p. 190. 7th April, 1782.] "I did intend to have returned this spring, but some obstacles have arisen at Quebec, and as no steady resolutions were taken here relative to my future conduct in that province as chief justice, nothing as yet has been settled on that head. The powers general Haldimand exercises in that province, in imprisoning many people, which he extends to civil persons and causes in a very extraordinary manner, would render my presence in the Province at this time rather hurtful than useful, as my duty would oblige me to interfere in a manner, that in the present state of things your lordship would wish to prevent." *Vide* likewise [Can. Arch., 31st March; 22nd July; 4th August, 1779, Q. 16.1, pp. 18, 67, 311; 11th March; July, 1780; Q. 17, pp. 64, 106].

Mr. Fiset, the proto-notary of Quebec, was good enough to make a search among the archives of that city to see if there was any trace of Livius' presence in the province after his departure in 1778, but failed to find any.

to their advancement, for Canada to have been the scene of turmoil and agitation.

The audacity of this proceeding passed unnoticed. The ministry was weak and divided, in ill-favour with the king, embarrassed by the sickness of the premier, from which in a few weeks he was to die. At the same time the ministers were engaged in peace negotiations, on which Shelburne and Fox were not working in accord. These facts may explain that Livius' letter passed without rebuke. It is a wonder, from the threat it contained, that he was not immediately superseded. In his letter to Shelburne, he added some papers to sustain a personal charge against Carleton: viz., that owing to the part he had taken in an appeal before the legislative council, he had been suspended by Carleton from private pique, Carleton having been interested in a lawsuit; the assignees of Carrignan against one Dobie of Montreal, through his relationship with one of the assignees, a Mr. Brook Watson. The facts, as they are recorded, prove the outrageous nature of the charge. It is the last we hear of Livius; he managed to remain in London enjoying his income, and performing no duty. Events which followed were those of unrest, and it appears as if Livius passed out of notice. Lord Rockingham died on the 1st of July, 1782. Lord Shelburne was named prime minister a few days afterwards. The following April, 1783, the coalition ministry of North and Fox came into power. In December of the same year Pitt's ministry was formed. Haldimand remained in Canada until November, 1784, and he arrived in London in January, 1785. One of his last acts was to reappoint the commission to execute the office of chief justice.

Carleton, now lord Dorchester, was reappointed governor-general of Canada, where he arrived on the 23rd of October, 1786. His nomination had been made the previous April. To judge by events, it was at that time that the continual absence of the chief justice of the province obtained attention, for his successor, chief justice Smith, was appointed on the

1st of November, 1786, when the sinecure of Livius, enjoyed for so many years, ceased.

Frederick Haldimand, the new governor general, has been previously mentioned in this history. He had been upwards of twenty years in America, having arrived in 1757. His advancement had proceeded independently of court favour, for he was unknown except as a captain of the Swiss guards at the Hague, formed in 1748 by the prince of Orange, having the rank of lieutenant-colonel. With that rank he had joined the newly-formed regiment of Royal Americans, now the 60th regiment of the line, "The King's Royal Rifle Corps," then formed for service in America. If the project of raising this regiment did not originate with the duke of Cumberland, it received his strong support. Its formation took place at the time of Braddock's expedition. In the search for competent officers who could aid in recruiting Swiss and German protestants, of which the corps was principally to be composed, Haldimand, with his life-long comrade Bouquet, was brought to the duke's notice, and both received commissions in the regiment.

The precise date of Haldimand's birth is unknown. He died in 1791, at the recorded age of seventy. Nothing is known of his family; but it must have been of high respectability, as is established by his appointment to a commission then given only to men of position. He was born probably between 1719 and 1721 at Yverdun, in the canton of Berne, at the south-eastern corner of the lake of Neuchatel, directly north of Lausanne. His manners and attainments were such as were found among the higher classes. He must have entered the service in his eighteenth or nineteenth year.* There is a passage in his private diary which suggests that he was present at the battle of Molwitz, for the only explanation of this particular battle being recalled to memory in

* [Can. Arch. Report, 1889, Sup. p. 229.] "13th of June, 1787. Day of the battle of Mohitz [Molwitz] in the year 1741." We learn from Carlyle that the margrave Friedrich, a volunteer from Holland, was killed in the action. Haldimand may have accompanied him as an aide-de-camp.

this form is, that it is a personal recollection. If present, he was at the time between his twentieth and twenty-second year.

His services in America have already been related.* In February, 1762, he had been promoted to the rank of colonel by brevet,† and in May, 1772, he was appointed colonel and given the command of the 60th regiment with the rank of major general in the army. On Gage leaving for England in June, 1773, Haldimand was appointed general commanding-in-chief in America.

As the difficulties in the provinces increased, and fears were entertained that the conflict was inevitable, it was not considered advisable, owing to his foreign birth, to entrust to Haldimand duties so delicate. In April, 1775, he was notified by lord Dartmouth that the position could be held only by a natural born subject, and leave of absence‡ was granted to him to return to England. He arrived in June, and in September was appointed inspector general of the forces in the West Indies.

On September the 19th, 1777, Haldimand was informed by lord George Germain that he had been appointed governor general of Canada. There is no record of what passed during this intermediate period, and, as Haldimand preserved§ his official correspondence, the inference may therefore be drawn, that he remained during the two years from 1775-1776 enjoying the pay of a major general, and that his appointment to the West Indies did not exact his presence in that country. During this period he obtained his promotion, in 1776 being appointed a general in America, and in 1777 a lieutenant general in the army.

Although, on the appointment being communicated to him he was informed that he was expected to leave immediately to take possession of his government, he remained in England

* Ante, IV., p. 318.

† [Can. Arch., B. 53, p. 1.]

‡ [Can. Arch., B. 53, p. 10.]

§ [Can. Arch., B. 50, p. 300.]

until the following spring, and arrived at Quebec on June the 30th, 1778.*

By a perversion of the truth, Haldimand's name has been mentioned by many modern writers as representative of all that is tyrannical. While his abilities and attainments are admitted, he is described as a stern, unbending soldier, recognizing no principle but military force; as one who was regardless of law, and set at naught the right of political liberty. He has been accused of imprisoning citizens by the hundred on mere suspicion, and the charge has been made that innocence was no protection against the reports of his spies; that he depended more on this offensive exercise of authority to repress discontent than on good and sound government, and that imprisonment invariably followed the least indication that any person might prove troublesome to his administration. There is likewise a class of writers who can see nothing of importance during the whole time of Haldimand's official life at Quebec. Passing by the dogmatism with which this view has been expressed, it may be attributed to the circumstance that the facts connected with his administration remained unknown until the establishment of the archive office at Ottawa.

Haldimand succeeded to the government in the hour of difficulty and trial, when a second invasion was anticipated, with but imperfect means of resisting it. This occurrence was looked upon as certain by the active sympathisers with the cause of congress, who gave constant information of what was happening in the province. Canada had but limited communication with New York. The operations of the royal

* Horace Walpole in his last journal [Oct., 1777, II., p. 135.] has some disparaging remarks concerning Haldimand, describing him as Swiss "not very legally . . . and not very wisely named, as he was better for a partizan than for the civil and military government. But he had been a witness for Lord George Germain on his trial after the battle of Minden as Carleton had been a witness against." Walpole was grossly misinformed; Minden was fought on the 1st of April, 1759. At that date Haldimand was at Oswego and Niagara; in 1760 he accompanied Amherst in his descent of the Saint Lawrence, and was present at the surrender of Montreal. [Ante, IV., pp. 318-405.]

army could be known only through the scouts who travelled by the by-routes, in constant danger of being intercepted. The summer communication with the mother country was uncertain and irregular. In order to remedy this defect, Haldimand proposed the establishment of swift sailing monthly packets, at intervals of departure of not less than six weeks. As matters stood, Haldimand was entirely cut off from the outer world. He could obtain information of the proceedings of congress only with great difficulty ; and even the information he received, except when sent from an accredited source, was unreliable. He could not be certain who were or who were not really dangerous in the province ; hence, there was a constant demand on his watchfulness. Nevertheless, but few men were subjected to detention for any length of time, and no one prisoner suffered capital punishment. That record of mercy speaks powerfully in Haldimand's praise, and establishes clearly that his measures were not taken out of revenge or from personal hostility to individuals. It furnishes a strong proof that he acted only from the desire of warding off public danger, of restraining treason, and paralyzing the strength of the opponents of the government desirous of subverting it.

There was undoubtedly a number of persons confined in Quebec, but the majority were not political prisoners. They were prisoners of war, many taken in the privateers. From time to time arrests followed of the men whose conduct created suspicion. Such as these were examined, and, when the evidence warranted it, were released upon bail or upon their own recognizances, with the warning to avoid suspicion for the future. The names of the few who suffered long confinement have been preserved ; no attempt has ever been made to place on record the other prisoners who, we are told, were unjustly persecuted for their political opinions. The charge is in all respects unspecified and 'unsustained. The case of the individuals admittedly held as political prisoners will at the right time be considered.

Another ground of complaint against Haldimand was the

conduct of the public functionaries, who were harsh and exacting. The responsibility for this condition of things, if it existed, did not lie with the governor. The system had grown up during the old colonial rule of appointing men to office from London. Carleton's continued effort had been to keep within their proper limits the demands of the officials. It was on this account that Livius determined to be troublesome; nevertheless, he succeeded in London in obtaining his restoration to office. Haldimand endeavoured to exercise the same control, and did not escape his annoyances. The expenditure was carefully considered by him, and every demand upon the government was subjected to careful scrutiny. His own example was that of simplicity of life; and it can be affirmed of his administration, that the name of no man among the public functionaries has come down to us who is held in reprobation for abusing his position.

There are many facts to establish Haldimand's liberal views with regard to personal liberty. The correspondence between himself and Tryon in September, 1773, is an example. Tryon, as governor of New York, had called upon Haldimand when in command in the city of New York, to furnish military aid against the parties from New Hampshire, who, on the eastern side of lake Champlain, the present state of Vermont, had taken possession of the land to the detriment of settlers, under titles from the legislature of New York. Haldimand replied by recommending that the militia laws should be enforced, and added that it was of a dangerous tendency to employ regular troops on such duty. This opinion not being acceptable to Tryon, the matter was referred to London, when an answer was received from lord Dartmouth "that the king does not think fit that his majesty's troops should be drawn out in aid of the civil power in the colonies, unless in cases of absolute and unavoidable necessity." *

There is another case in point which took place in November, 1781. He wrote to colonel von Speth, in command at

* [N.Y. doc., VIII., pp. 395-399.]

Montreal, that the accusations against a prisoner should be substantiated before acted upon, adding that "otherwise we shall have our prisons filled upon private suspicion and private pique. The liberty of the subject being by our laws very sacred, it is necessary that suspicion should be well founded to justify imprisonment." Consequently he ordered that no arrest for political crime should take place until reported to the civic governor.*

Another definite accusation against Haldimand has to be met, that he enforced the *corvées* [pressed labour] as had been the custom during French rule, without compensation. Before the conquest, no payment was ever made for such service. Men were called out by the French government to perform this duty as a legal obligation, unremunerated. Under English rule, the necessity of war frequently called for the presence of non-combatants, and in such emergencies they were demanded from the parishes and furnished by them. In all such cases men were well paid for their labour from the military chest, the current rate of wage. To hold Haldimand responsible for the necessity of exacting this labour, is to hold him responsible for the condition of war in which the continent was involved. Moreover, it was not Haldimand who instituted the *corvées*; he had found them in full operation on his arrival. Recourse to them had been a matter of necessity with Carleton, to provide for Burgoyne's expedition, and by the exigencies of his own situation to meet the threatened invasion. Haldimand inherited the difficulties of Carleton's rule. His first duty was to assure the province against danger, and he could successfully do so only by the aid of the inhabitants. When not given voluntarily, necessarily it had to be obtained by the operation of law, but never without remuneration for the labour bestowed.

It is proper to investigate the particular assertions which led to this misrepresentation of Haldimand's character, with the view of considering the claim they have upon our belief.

His principal assailant was one Pierre Du Calvet, repre-

* [Can. Arch., B. 131, p. 136. 23rd November, 1781.]

sented by Maseres* to have been a French protestant of unspotted reputation. He had made a large fortune and had been appointed a justice of the peace. He is stated by the same authority to have acted with integrity and disinterestedness, which, Maseres tells us in another place, were not always characteristic, at that time, of men in that position. Du Calvet, during Haldimand's government, was imprisoned as an avowed and active sympathiser with congress, an abettor of the invasion of Canada, who had supplied information to encourage and promote it. We have from his own hand the statement of his case, which, without examination, has been accepted as truth by one writer following another. He was arrested on the 13th of September, 1780, and remained a prisoner two years and eight months, until the 2nd of May, 1783. On a future occasion, I will relate the circumstances of his arrest. On the conclusion of the peace he was released. In the first instance, he was placed on board a ship at Quebec; afterwards, he was confined in a military prison. On his release he proceeded to England. Representing himself as one devoted to British rule in Canada, and as having been unjustly imprisoned, he attacked Haldimand with the grossest calumnies as the author of his sufferings. He obtained support in London in certain circles, from those opposed to the war; especially from Maseres, who had known him in Canada, and partook of his opinions so far as they applied to recognition of French institutions. Du Calvet entered proceedings against Haldimand in a court of law, and obtained damages for his imprisonment. The suit was defended, and the costs paid by the imperial government.

In 1784 his two volumes were published in London in French and English. †

* [Maseres, Vol. 1776, p. 8.]

† The title of the work in English is, "The case of Peter du Calvet, Esq., of Montreal, in the province of Quebec, containing (amongst other things worth notice) an account of the long and severe imprisonment he suffered in the said province by order of general Haldimand, the present governour of the same, without the least offence or lawful cause whatever. To which is prefixed a dedication of it in the French language [Mr. Du Calvet not understanding English] to the

It is owing to this published statement that the assertions of Du Calvet have obtained currency, and to some extent have been believed. The consequence has been the portrait of Haldimand as an old imperious general who had seen service in the field, ill-adapted by his character and habits to administer a government, and as having performed its duties in the spirit of a petty, unrelenting tyrant. It is a matter of wonder that French Canadian writers have accepted this view. Du Calvet had nothing in common with them. He was a huguenot, and his political feelings and sympathies were with the small English-speaking population, they cannot be called British, that had reached Canada from the southern provinces. He strongly advocated the union of Canada with the revolted colonies, so that the country should be independent of all imperial control. It must also be borne in mind that Du Calvet had been a prominent member of that blatant party that demanded the establishment of a house of assembly from which Roman Catholics should be excluded, and whose members were to be chosen from the 300 English-speaking protestants, while the eighty thousand French Canadians were to be entirely ignored: an opinion advanced on the pretence that the house of assembly had been promised by the king's proclamation of the 7th of October, 1763.

It is necessary to examine Du Calvet's assertions with regard to himself, to test their worth as evidence, and to establish whether as a writer he is or is not trustworthy.

Of Du Calvet's two works, the one in French, written for the longitude of Canada, so far as can be judged, was the first published, and, I believe, liberally distributed. Both appeared in 1784; although Du Calvet had been in Canada from 1758, twenty-six years, he professed to be ignorant of English. His dedication to the king set forth the fact, in language sufficiently fulsome; possibly in accordance with the manners of

king's most Excellent Majesty, Humbly imploring the protection and countenance of his Majesty's royal justice in his endeavours to procure some compensation for the injury he received. London, printed in the year MDCCLXXXIV; 284 pp."

the time. He describes himself as a French protestant of a good family originally domiciled near Toulouse, heir to a rich estate, which he obtained in 1762, on his father's death.

He represents that he arrived in Quebec before the conquest in 1758, and that at the end of some weeks he was sent to Miramichi, where he was appointed "*Garde Magasin en chef*," principal commissary of the king's stores. He there found from 3,000 to 4,000 expatriated Acadians, with 100 English prisoners, chiefly officers and soldiers, to whom he was careful to extend the best of treatment. Mr. Du Calvet did not marry until thirteen years afterwards, so it may be surmised that on his arrival in the country he was under twenty. With our knowledge of the French government of that time, it is inconceivable that a young man, a stranger, being what was a horror to the hierarchy, a huguenot, should receive an appointment of any character, or indeed be tolerated in any way.

Mr. Du Calvet's statement is totally at variance with history. On the expatriation of the Acadians in 1756, the total number was about 6,000. At the close of the year 1757, the few who had established themselves on the river Saint John were displaced by the operations of Monckton, and, in consequence of having been driven from settlement on that river, found their way to Miramichi. Several reached Quebec, where they suffered great hardships. Those who remained at Miramichi came under the control of father le Corne. He was succeeded by the *père* Ménac, who was eventually the principal means of their ultimate submission to the British crown. Du Calvet tells us that at the end of August, 1759, Bourdon, in command at the Restigouche, believing that Quebec must fall by Wolfe's attack, resolved to release his prisoners and send them to fort Cumberland; and that it was he who saved them from being massacred by the Indians, to whom the proceeding was distasteful. The truth is that in 1760, after the capitulation of Montreal, major Elliott, in command of a detachment of the 43rd, was sent to take possession of that place. It was under the orders of a regular officer, Dangac, and a force of 193 men, to whom de Vaudreuil sent imperative orders to sur-

render his post. There were at this time 1,000 inhabitants, independent of the garrison, 700 of whom are described as capable of bearing arms.

In the same year, the French ships that had sought refuge in the bay of Chaleurs were destroyed by commodore Byron, when sixty prisoners were released. Every fact is against the truth of Du Calvet's statement.

In his English edition, Du Calvet principally dwells on the narrative of his wrongs. His effort is to prove that his arrest was unlawful and dictated by private spite; that justices Fraser and de Rouville were his personal enemies; hence, he could obtain no justice in the courts. That these parties induced the judge at Quebec, Mabane, also to act against him, and that the latter drew Haldimand into the persecution. He demanded compensation for his losses, and indemnity for his unjust confinement.

No speculation is required as to Mr. Du Calvet's sympathy with the troops of congress, on their appearance in Canada in 1775. He furnished them with supplies, and was their active supporter. The fact is established by Franklin's treatment of Du Calvet's application for payment for his service. When in England in 1783, Du Calvet proceeded to Paris, and submitted his claim to Franklin, with the papers necessary to establish it. Franklin, in the first instance, declined to interfere, but finally acknowledged the appeal, and recognized the "services rendered" by Du Calvet. The letter* reads

* To the President of congress.

1 November, 1783.

There has been with me lately M. Pierre du Calvet, a merchant of Montreal, who, when our army was in Canada, furnished our general and officers with many things they wanted, taking their receipts and promissory notes for payment: and when the English repossessed the country he was imprisoned and his estate seized on account of the services he had rendered us. He has shewn me the originals of his papers, which I think are genuine. He produced also a quantity of congress paper, which he says he received in payment for some of the supplies, and which appeared to me of our first emissions, and yet all fresh and clean as having passed through no other hands. When he was discharged from prison he could not obtain permission to go into the United States to claim the debt, but was allowed to go to England, and from thence he came hither to solicit payment from me. Having no authority to meddle with such debts, and the sum being considerable, I

strangely in connection with the dedication to the king of his volume published in 1784.

It can be easily understood that in Canada during 1776 and 1777 the sympathisers with the revolution felt it politic to be quiescent. The congress troops had been driven from the province early in 1776, and there was a general belief, in the first months of 1777, that Burgoyne would carry all before him and triumphantly reach Albany. The royal cause was then in the ascendant, but the failure of St. Leger on the Mohawk and the greater disaster of Burgoyne's more crushing defeat rekindled much of the old revolutionary feeling, and the hope was revived that the province would again be invaded, and be permanently held. The doubt whether Great Britain possessed the power to defend Canada was strongly entertained by many. Burgoyne's defeat profoundly impressed the whole population and did much to destroy faith in the imperial prestige.

In a small community like that of Canada at that date, the opinions of men were more than surmised.* Many facts tended to make them known. Suspicion fell upon several, among the number upon Du Calvet. His narrative tells us of his restless disposition, and it is easily conceivable that his conduct attracted attention. His description of his mode of arrest and his treatment in prison at the time has received unqualified contradiction. His protest of being unjustly

refused and advised him to take passage for America, and make his application to congress. He said he was grown old, much broken and weakened by near three years imprisonment, and that the voyage from Canada to London had like to have been too much for him, he being sick all the way; so that he could not think of another, though distressed for want of his money. He appears an honest man, and his case a hard one. I have therefore undertaken to forward his papers, and I beg leave to recommend them to the speedy consideration of congress, to whom I request you would be pleased to present my dutiful respects and assure them of my most faithful services.

With great esteem and regard, &c.,
[The Works of Benjamin Franklin, by Jared Sparks, X., p. 30.]

B. FRANKLIN.

* We may remember the remark of Madame Sevigné. "C'est un sorte de vie étrange que celle des provinces; on fait des affaires du tout." Letter xxviii., Paris, 12th March, 1721.

accused has not a shadow of foundation. In the days of revolution and war many technical legal modes of procedure cease to be stringent. The question really to be answered is, whether substantial justice was meted out in the proceedings called forth by the necessities of the hour.

While the work in English is principally directed to vindicating his character, to the statement of his losses, and complaint of the enmities by which he suffered, the French edition is aggressive and vituperative. The English book is rare ; it is possible but few copies were published. The French volume is often seen, leaving the inference that it was generally distributed in Canada. He asserts in this volume that there was a deliberate attempt to ruin him. The administrators of the law are described as being in a conspiracy against him, setting at defiance the rule of procedure, common honesty and decency. His abuse is directed against all who failed to meet his views. As we read all this, we wonder what should have made Mr. Du Calvet such a special mark of persecution, and why everybody brought into contact with him and his affairs should set at naught the duties, the proprieties, the obligations of life. That Du Calvet was imprisoned for his treasonable designs is the one fact to be accepted as truth in his memoir ; on every other point his statements are contradicted by established facts and are unworthy belief, while his charges against Haldimand may be dismissed as unfounded and unsubstantiated.

CHAPTER III.

On Haldimand's appointment, previous to leaving England for Canada he addressed a letter to Germain, in which he dwelt upon some of the points affecting his government. He asked that the army should be reinforced, and that as commanding-in-chief his power should be unrestrained to act as his judgment suggested, equally in the matter of the defence of the province as in any aggressive expedition he would undertake. He submitted the necessity of receiving definite instructions for his guidance in the event of a province being desirous of returning to its allegiance, so he could know the terms on which he could treat with its representatives. He pointed out that the late siege of Quebec had shewn the necessity of extending the fortifications, and that the construction of a citadel, as furnishing greater security of defence, was indispensable.

He directed, also, the attention of the minister to the western posts. He recommended that Niagara should be permanently referred to the government of Canada, and that all commandants of such posts should obtain their orders direct from the commanding general at Quebec, and not receive instructions from London independently of him; likewise, that these posts should be fortified and placed in a condition of defence. He dwelt on the necessity of the governor in chief being supreme in the matter of the policy observed towards the Indians, and that his views should not be subordinated to those of the chief Indian agent, the position claimed by sir Guy Johnson.

As civil governor, Haldimand pointed out the difficulty of carrying on the government in the crisis in which the province was placed, unless he possessed the disposal of the public

offices ; and he conceived it essential that the recommendations for appointment to the council should be made by him.

He drew attention to the necessity of establishing whether the *habeas corpus* act was or was not in force in Canada. The chief justice had taken upon himself to oppose the commitment of persons on suspicion of being spies and agents of congress : a power which in present circumstances should be given to the governor only. He brought to notice, that Livius had asserted that the criminal law of England carried with it the *habeas corpus* act : an opinion not universally entertained, as the attorney-general held different views. Unless the point were determined, the governor might be greatly impeded in his duty, and his authority checked by an inferior officer of the crown. The answer Haldimand received on this matter has not been preserved. As he never hesitated to act with decision in cases where he conceived the condition of the province called for the interference of the executive, it may be inferred that discretionary power was placed in his hand to act as he deemed expedient. In the lawsuits which subsequently were carried on against him by Du Calvet in England, the defence was undertaken and the costs paid by the government, so it may be considered that his action in the matter was in accordance with his instructions.

The first months of Haldimand's tenure of office were devoted to the consideration of the best means of securing the safety of the province. At the end of July he pointed out its weak condition to resist any attack in force, and on the 15th of October, 1778, he wrote at length on the subject. The total number of regular troops of all ranks, not taking into account the sick and absentees, amounted to 6,102 ; deducting the number absent at the garrisons of the western posts, 871, there remained 5,231 effective men. Excluding the garrisons, at the lowest calculation, to be left to defend Quebec, Montreal, Chambly and Saint John's, viz., 1,089, there remained but 4,142 to take the field to act on any sudden emergency. *

* [Can. Arch., Q. 15, p. 177.]

Haldimand was greatly impressed by the opinion entertained that a second invasion of the province was imminent ; to be undertaken by a force commensurate to insure success. His belief was that the reduction of Canada was looked upon by the leading members of congress as indispensable to their own safety, as they could only consider themselves secure when the province came into their possession. The narrative given in the preceding book of the events of the war is explanatory of the influence which prevented the attempt being made. That no invasion took place arose primarily from the want of power to undertake it, and, secondly, the consummation of the French alliance rendered such a policy undesirable. The suspicion of d'Estaing's designs in Canada led to the rejection of every plan of invasion in which the French would take a leading part, and the cause of the revolution was frequently so desperate as to make the enterprise inexpedient, if not impossible, by the congress troops alone. Haldimand had no means of knowing the state of feeling at Philadelphia, and he was equally unable to judge the strength of the adversaries, by whom he believed he was unceasingly threatened. The agitation, however, on the part of the sympathizers with congress was maintained in the province. Hazen, with Tavernier, a strong French Canadian partisan of congress, appeared at Saint Francis and held a meeting with those adhering to them. Both gave the assurance, that in no long period the congress troops would appear with a strength sufficient to drive the British from the province.

The prisoners who returned to Canada after being exchanged gave similar information. It is not possible to refuse credence to the weight of evidence that the invasion of Canada was left dormant only until it could be efficiently undertaken. There were many agents scattered throughout the province constantly sending information to encourage this feeling. Haldimand endeavoured to penetrate these secret designs, and at the same time he took the precautions he considered necessary to guard against them.

He established a post on the Saint Francis ; it was by that river many of the emissaries entered Canada, arriving by way of the settlements of Vermont. In order to prevent a second surprise by the river Chaudière, he constructed in a commanding position a picketed fort with a block-house. It was held by a force consisting of a party of the 24th and some companies of provincials.

He resolved likewise to make Sorel a place of strength and the depot of his stores, so that in the event of any attack by the lake Champlain, it would be the point from which active operations could be directed. Chambly he looked upon as without protection against cannon ; Saint John's he regarded as incapable of being made defensible. He, however, added some outworks, and did the best he was able for the protection of that place. He proposed to execute what works were possible to make île-aux-Noix tenable ; he had, however, in carrying out his plans, to be governed by circumstances.

He resolved to destroy the settlements which had been formed on lake Champlain at the river Ouinouski, Otter creek, Crown point and Ticonderoga, as they furnished facilities for the approach of a hostile force, and would prove a great source of supply during its advance.

In the west, while maintaining a detachment of thirty men at Oswegatchie, he despatched three companies of the 47th, with a portion of sir John Johnson's regiment, to take possession of Carleton island, at the entrance of lake Ontario, so that it would serve for the trans-shipment of goods to be placed on the king's vessels on the lakes, the only large craft at that time allowed to navigate them. Consequently, the canoes which ascended the Saint Lawrence would find at this place an established and protected haven for their resort.

A claim had been early made upon Haldimand's sense of duty and on his benevolence, by the arrival of the many loyalist families who had sought refuge in Canada. He ordered houses to be built for the women and children at Machiche, and he there established them with what comfort he could create for them.

He strove to remedy the system which had grown up since the arrival of the troops in 1776, that of billeting them in the houses of the inhabitants. In some cases it caused much inconvenience to the parties who received the men, and was generally subversive of discipline. To remedy this evil he hired vacant houses where possible, in which the troops were quartered, and established them as temporary barracks. When such places were not obtainable, he constructed barracks with the squared timber procured in the neighbourhood, paying for the work of erection by *corvée* labour; the parish being called upon to furnish the additional men necessary, who received the established rate of wage. In making the report, Haldimand mentions that caution was observed in obtaining *corvées*, so as to avoid making demands which would lead to murmuring, and so awaken a declaration of the sentiment which the French alliance with congress "had raised in numbers of those . . . who were unquestionably attached to government." In the position in which the province was placed, in case of its being attacked, Haldimand strongly expressed the opinion that it could not be preserved without a force superior to that then present. He considered that after leaving the garrisons required in the several stations he would be in a position to take the field with 8,000 men.

Haldimand met the legislative council in Quebec in November. The proceedings were opened by an address on his part on his assuming the government. It was the mere courteous announcement of the fact and was so accepted. One serious subject attracted the attention of the council; it was reported that there was a scarcity of wheat, the crops having fallen short, and the supply received from home having been limited. An ordinance was accordingly passed forbidding its exportation till the first of December.

Arrangements were also made in regard to the seigneurial titles. It was ordered that the system followed before 1760, regarding the *Aveux** *et Dénombrements*, and the declaration

* The *Aveux* constituted the acknowledgment by the tenants of the seigneur [*censitaires*] of the terms on which their lots in each case had been conceded to

for *Rotures*, should be still observed. Both ordinances were made in English and French.

In the months of October and November, a party was despatched under major Carleton to carry out the policy indicated by Haldimand in his earlier letters, of rendering the country around lake Champlain incapable of furnishing supplies to an army of invasion. After Burgoyne's defeat and the abandonment of Ticonderoga, the authorities of congress had driven from the shores of the lake all known to have feelings of friendliness to the mother country, and such as these had sought refuge in Canada. The supporters of congress were permitted to remain, and an additional population had established itself in several localities. Encouragement was given to this movement, with the view of creating a source of supply for the future operations against Canada; and in order not to awaken the vigilance of the Canadian government, it was customary to describe this population as entirely British in feeling, or at least neutral and inoffensive. It was hoped that this stratagem would lull the watchfulness of the British authorities, and that these settlers would be permitted peacefully to create the supplies, which at the proper time would be required.

This deceit was too transparent; the men dispossessed of their lands, who entered Canada, represented the true condition of the country around lake Champlain. In the policy of self-defence, Haldimand determined to remove this source of continual threat, which only awaited the opportunity to inflict ruin and devastation on the province he had to safeguard. It was with this purpose Carleton's expedition was organized. It proved in every way successful. Carleton laid

them, setting forth the emuneration of the obligations the tenant was bound to perform.

The *Dénombrement* was the list of lots, described according to the seigneurial maps, shewing the number of *arpents* possessed by each *censitaire*.

The *Roture* was the legal expression of the tenure by which the land was held by the *roturier*; the title to the land in contra-distinction to the word seigneur, the first possessor, who himself rendered to the crown the *acte de foye et d'hommage*, as incident to his own proprietorship.

waste everything in the shape of a settlement on both sides of lake Champlain as far as Ticonderoga, penetrating to Otter creek, and entirely uprooted all before him. He found at the latter place stands of arms and ammunition, with a large store of provisions. The whole was entirely destroyed. Carleton reported that the amount of the damage inflicted by him might be estimated as four months' provisions for a corps of 12,000 men.

Several prisoners, between thirty and forty, were brought in, among them an interpreter who had been active in obtaining information in Canada, and had been constantly busied in carrying messages to the Indians to induce them to accept the cause of congress ; he had been long looked for, but was taken on this occasion only.

The constant appearance of privateers in the Saint Lawrence, seizing vessels incapable of resistance, led Haldimand to take steps to prevent, as far as possible, these attacks. Moreover, he felt that Quebec itself was endangered by the presence of the French fleet in Boston, unless a naval force was retained in port to withstand the attack of a squadron sent to the Saint Lawrence. Accordingly, in September, he addressed captain Pearson, in command of the navy, asking that the ships should winter in Quebec, as they were required for the defence of the province. He expressed the hope that no consideration whatever would divert or prevent Pearson from so acting. Pearson replied by enclosing his positive orders from the admiralty to sail on the 25th of October in convoy of ships from Quebec, notwithstanding any orders to the contrary.

Haldimand nevertheless persisted in his demand. As the king's service rendered necessary the non-departure of the vessels, he asked that Pearson would himself remain, or leave the "Triton" behind, the "Canceaux" being unfit for service ; for it was not impossible that both the guns and the men wintering at Quebec might be required. Pearson answered that he could not depart from his instructions. Haldimand adhered to the view he expressed, and pointed out that the

ships wintering at Quebec could sail for the gulf on the 22nd of April, and by the 27th or 28th would be in the waters frequented by the privateers. The city would thus be safe from any attack by them. He could only leave the matter in Pearson's hands, as he might consider it his duty to carry out his orders. All that remained to Haldimand was to write to Germain setting forth the impolicy of withdrawing the ships of war, especially in leaving unchecked the attacks of the privateers present in the gulf in large numbers, which were causing great damage.

At the commencement of the revolutionary movement there was great activity in the fur trade. The headquarters were at Niagara, at which place colonel Bolton was in command: a man of ability and indefatigable in the discharge of his duties. The situation of Niagara, at the west of lake Ontario, gave the fort importance, for the post was the head of the navigation from Montreal, where the portage was taken to arrive at lake Erie. Consequently, the entire communication with the western lakes depended upon its possession. The fort was in bad condition, incapable of resisting an attack from heavy artillery. Its situation, however, secured it from any assault of that character, owing to the difficulty of moving guns through the leagues of wilderness which intervened between the Saint Lawrence and the Mohawk. In 1778 it was garrisoned by 361 men of all ranks of the 8th regiment, with 18 artillery men, independently of Butler's Rangers, who had likewise their headquarters at the fort.

The most western post which contained a garrison was Michillimackinac, under the command of colonel de Peyster, an officer of ability and enterprise, who shewed much activity in controlling, and in obtaining information regarding the Indians. His garrison consisted of 77 men of the 8th, of all ranks, with two gunners. Sinclair was the civil governor.

To the west, the small settlements of Illinois, in the neighbourhood of the Mississippi, were without any garrison. Kaskaskia, near old fort Chartres, and Cahokia, opposite the present Saint Louis, were French Canadian settlements,

so far apart from the rest of Canada as to be visited by the fur traders only.

The most important settlement on the lakes was Detroit, which at this date contained 1,500 of a population, entirely French Canadian. Captain Lernoult was in command of the regular troops, viz., 180 of the 8th, King's, of all ranks. In November, 1777, Hamilton had arrived as the civil governor. He early undertook the enrolment of a militia regiment of seven companies of 60 men, officered by persons selected from the inhabitants; the force numbered 490 of all ranks.

Vincennes, on the Wabash, had lately assumed some importance, having, from its increase in population, become a spot frequented by the Indians. The place, from being accessible from Detroit, had to some extent become connected with that garrison, as subordinate to it. The communication was effected by lake Erie to the river Maumee, which was ascended to the portage, by which the source of the tributaries of the Wabash were reached, and the main stream was followed to fort Sackville, the name by which Vincennes was likewise known. In 1777 Abbott had been sent there as governor, with instructions to maintain the Indians in the interest of the British. He had arrived on the 9th of May. He reported that there was generally a loyal feeling apparent, although they had been visited by hostile agents who, to some extent, had influenced them. The event which had somewhat tended to alienate the inhabitants was, that at this date fort Pitt [Pittsburg] had been taken possession of by the supporters of congress, and they had commenced the construction of *bateaux*, with the intention of assailing the upper posts.* Matters had become unsettled in the territory, owing to no person having been present to represent authority. The Indians had consequently made exorbitant demands, and Abbott, not being sustained by a detachment of troops, did not think it expedient to dispute them. His presence in one respect was not particularly agreeable to the inhabitants, as

* [Can. Arch., Q. 13., p. 310.]

he began to inquire into the tenure of the land held by them ; especially as he reported that no proper titles had been obtained for that which had been taken in possession. The inhabitants, however, had given him a respectful reception.

His immediate duty was to consider the mode in which the Indians should be controlled. He conceived that the best mode would be to appoint an officer specially deputed to conduct business with them. He felt himself unable to cope with the situation as he was placed, and, anticipating difficulty, he left Vincennes with his family on the 3rd of February. His journey was one of suffering and hardship ; he, however, safely arrived at Detroit on the 7th of March. In his report to Carleton he explained that his reason for taking this course was to avoid any expression of dissatisfaction from the Indians, on their arrival from the hunting expedition, when they found they had nothing to receive. He considered it, accordingly, the more politic to leave in their absence than to have altercation with them when present. He hoped his conduct would be approved. He reported that many Indians had been forced into the service of congress, and were practising great cruelties on the settlers unfavourable to their opinions. He advocated that the neutrality of the Indians should be obtained, rather than that they should be employed in any operation.*

During 1777 great attempts had been made to induce the tribes to join the expedition of St. Leger. There had been a general feeling of confidence in its success ; nothing but benefit had been expected from it. Unfortunately, in the action with the congress troops, the loss had mostly fallen upon the Indians who were with the force, and St. Leger's subsequent retreat, in which he abandoned his guns, exercised an unfortunate influence throughout the west ; similar to that experienced in Canada, which had equally depressed Burgoyne's expedition.

De Peyster, from Michillimackinac, reported that the Indians as a rule remained friendly, although they had been

* [Can. Arch., B. 122, p. 50.]

visited by some Spanish agents, who, from New Orleans, had reached them by the Mississippi. They had shewn no intention of abandoning the British cause, but they had become more difficult to influence. There was, however, no reason to doubt that they remained well inclined, and there was no present fear of their defection.

The attack upon Wyoming from Niagara, that took place in 1778, is one of those historical events which, similar to the expulsion of the Acadians, has obtained from poetic fiction a totally different character from that which must be its record in history. The place was undoubtedly destroyed, as it furnished a basis of operations from which the western posts were threatened and whence supplies were obtainable; but the highly-coloured narrative of the general slaughter of the inhabitants is at entire variance with fact.

I have in a previous volume* alluded to Campbell's injustice in his poem of "Gertrude of Wyoming" to Brandt, the Mohawk chief Thayendanege, who is mentioned with every epithet of reproach. Brandt was not even present at the expedition. His name, however, is still retained in the poem, with a note declaring it "to be a pure and declared character of fiction." The statement may be extended to the poem, in the sense of the assertion that cruelty was inflicted upon the settlers in scenes of bloodshed and destruction.

Campbell's poem of "Gertrude of Wyoming" appeared in 1809, dedicated to lord Holland. Campbell had never visited the spot himself, but introduces his poem by the remark that "the testimonies of historians and travellers concur in describing the infant colony as one of the happiest spots of human existence, for the hospitable and innocent manners of the inhabitants, the beauty of the country, and the luxuriant fertility of the soil." The two last excellencies are undoubted. Few countries in the world exceed in picturesque beauty this region, extending from lake Ontario through New York to Pennsylvania; but the poet certainly did not found his eulogy of innocence and hospitality upon the narrative of the Scotch

* Ante II., p. 167.

and Dutch settlers who had found their way to Wyoming, and who for no crime, but being supposed to be attached to the mother country, had been seized and taken prisoners to Connecticut. The truth is that the inhabitants of Wyoming were aggressive and persecuting in the advocacy of their opinions; the pastoral simplicity of their existence is a mere myth. The majority, actively engaged in the cause of congress, were guided by no qualm of conscience with regard to those who opposed it. The small settlement, indeed, had furnished more than its proportion to the troops in the field.

It was this spirit of persecution displayed towards the loyalists that led to the retribution which fell upon Wyoming. Those who returned from Connecticut, after their arrest, felt the indignation which proceeds from injustice and cruelty personally experienced. Moreover, Wyoming was a spot where an organization was being formed to act against the Six Nations, and to starve out, or storm Niagara. One of the means of defending Niagara was the destruction of the place where the attack was being organized, where the provisions were procurable and were being gathered to sustain the expedition.

War unhappily leads to acts which on calm examination it is difficult to justify or even for which apology can be made. In modern times the devastation which it will most certainly cause is well known, and the *væ victis!** is as sure to recur as in the times recorded by Livy. The cost of war is immense, and the destruction of the bonds of society for the time often without limit, while the woe it occasions is incalculable. Nevertheless, war can be judged only by its laws and customs, and we cannot examine its incidents by the feeling with which we sit round the Christmas fire. Although Wyoming was not the peaceful abode of virtue as has been represented, its destruction was an act of violence, the explanation of which is, that it was considered, by those who executed it, to be necessary for their own safety. The story of personal injury to the inhabitants is not sus-

* "*auditaque intoleranda Romanis vox Væ victis esse.*" Livy V., 49.

tained ; the contrary is declared to have been the case. We have the official report of major Butler, of the rangers, who conducted the expedition, that expressly states the fact.*

The enterprise was avowedly undertaken to anticipate the threatened attack of Niagara. The design was to destroy the crops and supplies obtainable from the settlement, and thus increase the difficulty of the advance to lake Ontario. The expedition consisted of 500 rangers and Indians. Concealing their movements, the column reached the neighbourhood on the 30th of June. Butler encamped on an eminence, and sent out a party of scouts to discover the situation of the place he was to attack and the strength of those holding it. There were several forts so called, which were simply enclosures, where the defenders of the place were assembled. The scouts meeting an adverse party attacked it, and returned with eight prisoners and some scalps; shortly afterwards, two loyalists came into the camp, from whom Butler learned that 800 men were assembled in the several forts.

On the following day, July 1st, Butler marched to within half a mile of Wintermont's fort, and sent a messenger to demand immediate possession; the place was surrendered. Jenkins' fort was next summoned, and also surrendered. Butler now advanced against Forty-fort, but the commandant refused the terms offered.

Parties were sent out to collect cattle, and Butler established himself in his position, preparatory to taking further measures of hostility. About two, he was informed that the congress troops, some 400 and 500 in number, were preparing to attack him. Between four and five o'clock the column had advanced to within a mile of his position. He ordered the forts he held to be set on fire, and posted his men in an open wood, telling them to lie flat on the ground. There must have been some indication of his presence, for his adversaries advanced and commenced firing. They had discharged three

* [Can. Arch., Q. 15, p. 220.] Major John Butler to colonel Bolton, Larawanak, 8th July, 1778.

volleys, when Sumgerachta, the chief in command of the Indians, ordered them to rise, and to commence the attack on the congress right. The rangers, who were on the right of Butler's force, fell simultaneously on the left. The Indians fired one round, and rushed upon the surprised party with their tomahawks. They were in a high state of exasperation, for they belonged to the tribe that had suffered the great loss near fort Stanwix the preceding year, during St. Leger's operations. The congress troops made little or no defence; the Indians gave no quarter, and 227 were killed and scalped. Five prisoners only were taken, and Butler relates the difficulty he had in saving them.

The next day colonel Denniston came in with a minister and some others, to treat for the surrender of the rest of the settlement of Westmoreland. They declared they had lost 1 colonel, 2 majors, 7 captains, 13 lieutenants, 11 ensigns, and 268 privates. Butler's own loss was 1 Indian killed, 2 rangers and 8 Indians wounded.

Butler now proceeded to carry out the purpose of his expedition, the destruction of the settlement. It consisted of 8 palisaded forts, 1,000 dwelling houses, and several mills; they were all burned. One thousand head of horned cattle, with sheep and swine, were driven away. "I can with truth assure you," adds Butler, writing to Bolton, "that in the destruction of this settlement not a single person has been hurt of the inhabitants, but such as were armed: to those, indeed, the Indians gave no quarter."

It is not a pleasant chapter of history to record, and I give it as I find it. It must, however, be borne in mind that the expedition was regarded as a defensive measure for the protection of Niagara, and that the loss of this fort would have constituted the loss of the west to the British. Its defenders lived in continual anticipation of attack, and it was held that one mode of defence was to prevent the creation of settlements from which it could be assailed. The destruction of Wyoming gave rise to great indignation. A narrative in the most exaggerated form of the cruelties practised was disseminated

to arouse a feeling of hate against its perpetrators. Those who record the event in this spirit fail to relate that it was not the first act in the drama of persecution ; that it followed the cruel treatment of the loyalists, the Scotch and Dutch who were living inoffensively in the settlement on their farms. They were seized and sent away prisoners, for the crime, in the eyes of their oppressors, that they remained loyal to the mother country. It is only too true that from the policy followed on both sides this war brought great misery on private individuals, by the devastation of settlements from which supplies could be obtained and the possession of which favoured any plan of military operations. It has always been so in war, and it will always be so. Any impediment to the advance of an army, or which threatens dangerous opposition to it, is unfailingly removed, generally by fire as the more ready means of destruction. In the same way the defenders of a position only recognize the urgency which calls for the destruction of any obstacles to their security. The suffering and misery which follow are the painful incidents of the contest, and can only be regarded as phases of individual suffering unhappily unavoidable.

The operations of Sullivan in 1779 were dictated to some extent by the desire of chastising the Indians ; but this feeling was a secondary object. The systematic uprooting of the homes and villages of the Six Nations was primarily less an act of vengeance than of policy, to render those tribes incapable of aiding the British cause. The campaign had principally in view the subjection of the Six Nations, so they would be forced to become the allies of congress, or at least be passive spectators of their efforts in the field. It was hoped that by their subjection Niagara would be unable to withstand a siege. Congress was in possession of the Ohio and the Wabash, and a considerable number of the Indians of the West, if not willing to join in any expedition undertaken by congress, had shewn they would not take the field against any attempt from the Ohio ; thus the possession of Niagara would have conferred the command of the whole of the Indian tribes of the west.

The French Canadian settlers of Illinois and of Vincennes had given plain indication that they would fight for neither side. As circumstances had dictated, they changed their allegiance and were prepared to act passively with the force which for the time was strongest.

De Peyster at Michillimackinac shewed ability and resolution in keeping the Indians faithful to their old alliance; but he was sustained by a mere handful of men and knew that reinforcements were not to be looked for. Consequently, if attacked by a force of any strength well appointed, he would have found it impossible to maintain his position.

At Detroit, Lernoult was better provided with supplies and had a larger force under his command; but the French Canadians established in the neighbourhood were in no way to be relied upon. He had only to bear in mind the treatment which Hamilton received from the Vincennes settlers, who had sworn fidelity to him, to form an opinion of what he might expect. Consequently, in place of giving them his confidence, he looked upon them as led by their interest alone and entirely unreliable. So long as Niagara remained to the British, there was hope that Detroit would not be abandoned, but Niagara in the possession of congress, and his command vigorously attacked, he would have been made to feel the desperation of his position, so that he could only count the period of his defence by the hours which would elapse before his surrender.

The devastation of the Indian territory of the Six Nations by the congress troops can be explained by every principle of war. The design in view was the nullification of the support given by those tribes to the British, and the consequent occupation of Niagara, for with that fort the possession of the whole territory of the western lakes would have followed.

It was in accordance with this plan that Wyoming was immediately re-occupied after its destruction. A regiment of congress marched in, and placed itself in position against insult. A Pennsylvania militia regiment likewise was stationed at Schoharie, on the Mohawk. It did not remain

here inactive. A small force advanced to the waters of the upper Susquehanna. In October it reached the settlement of Unadilla. The place was principally held by a royalist population, with several Indian families. The scenes of Wyoming were enacted here, the settlement was destroyed, its homesteads were burned, and its inhabitants scattered. The following month, on the 10th of November, Cherry Vale, which may be described as being in the valley of the Mohawk, to the south of the river, was attacked by Butler's rangers and a force under Brandt. The fort, which had some strength, was able to withstand the assault, but its inmates, without the means of resisting the general attack, could only look upon the destruction of the settlement, and the seizure of many of the inhabitants, carried away by the assailants. The colonel who lived in the village was killed, the lieutenant-colonel and some of his men were included among the prisoners, and the settlement was entirely destroyed.

Hamilton's unfortunate expedition to Vincennes on the Wabash took place in 1778; it has long been forgotten. The event, however, deserves more than a passing mention. It is difficult to imagine anything more unwisely conceived, or less justified by the circumstances under which it was undertaken. As such it was foredoomed to failure. It is one of the many disastrous consequences of Germain's direct interference in the operations of the war, and of his giving orders from London to a subordinate placed in a responsible and difficult position, without reference to the general in command, and without inquiry as to the expediency of the movement. Hamilton possessed personal courage and shewed much nobility of nature during his trials, but his judgment was defective. He was entirely without experience of Indian life of the west, and had scanty knowledge of the character of the population with which he was brought in contact. His nature was credulous, and he trusted men who were faithful to him only so long as it was their interest to be so.

He arrived at Detroit early in November, 1777, on his appointment as lieutenant-governor of the place. Lernoult,

with some companies of the 8th regiment, was the officer in command. Shortly after Hamilton's arrival the Indians proposed to him to make inroads into Pennsylvania and Virginia to obtain information. Hamilton must have submitted the proposition directly to lord George Germain, for in June, 1777, he received through Cramahé, the deputy governor, the copy of Germain's orders, instructing him to appoint officers to accompany the Indians, with strict orders to prevent all barbarism and cruelty. Carleton, in deputing Cramahé to forward these instructions, shewed, by his silence, his entire disapproval of any such enterprise, but Germain's orders exacted his obedience as that of all others. Haldimand, who was governor-general when the expedition took place, would never have countenanced it, and the fact is capable of proof.

Early in 1778, before Haldimand's arrival, Hamilton wrote to Carleton that fort Pitt, which had been lately taken in possession by the congress troops, was incapable of resisting the attack of a properly constituted force. It was held by a garrison of 120 men who were without discipline and not particularly well affected to congress. The commandant was one Hand, who had been a surgeon's mate in the Royal Irish regiment. Carleton declined to give any instructions, and replied that he would lay the plan before Haldimand on his arrival.

Haldimand's decision was soon made. He wrote to Hamilton that he considered that there was little advantage to be reaped in regaining fort Pitt, owing to its distance and situation. On the other hand, if it contained a large amount of stores and provisions it would be a useful service to destroy the place, and likewise the houses and crops of the advanced settlers, as it would increase the difficulty of carrying on any operations against the posts on the western lakes. This policy of driving back settlements would be more harassing than any other. Haldimand also expressed his disapproval of inviting men of doubtful sympathies to pass over to the British posts, where they would have to be maintained at great expense, except on the condition that they were willing

to take up arms. Otherwise, many would present themselves whose sole intention would be to act as spies.

Hamilton's report of what he effected shews the justice of Haldimand's view. While sending the Indians on their expedition, he earnestly impressed upon them the avoidance of all bloodshed, offering a reward for every prisoner brought in alive. The inducement worked its effect, for on the departure of the Vincennes' expedition, there were at Detroit 129 prisoners of different ages and sexes, clothed and fed by the crown. For what purpose they were brought there, and what benefit could result from their presence, is inconceivable; one fact must be plain, that they were all willing to impart information to those prepared to attack the place.

On the 1st of August news was brought by one François Maisonneville that the congress troops were in possession of the Illinois. Rocheblave, the chief Indian agent there, had been seized and treated with great cruelty. He had been put in irons, confined in a place where hogs had been kept, while at the same time great indignities were offered to his wife, and his property was destroyed.

Early in June, 1778, a backwoodsman of Kentucky came into great prominence, George Rogers Clark. He obtained authority from the state of Virginia to enlist some men, and was furnished to some extent with money and supplies. After gathering some 300 volunteers at Pittsburg, with this force he descended the Ohio until the canoes reached the mouth of the Wabash. The force at this place abandoned the river and marched across the country to Kaskaskia. On their arrival the troops remained in concealment until night, when the place was surprised by them. Kaskaskia was entirely without any means of defence, and the inhabitants were indifferent to whom the territory would be assigned. It was here that Rocheblave, the principal person present, was made a prisoner and placed in irons. An oath of allegiance to congress was demanded; it was unhesitatingly taken. So soon as Clark felt himself secure in possession, he sent a detachment to Cahokia to receive the submission of the inhabitants; as at Kas-

kaskia, it was immediately made. Thus Illinois passed without a blow from the possession of the British to that of congress.

Clark's next proceeding was to take possession of Vincennes on the Wabash ; fort Sackville. The instrument in this attempt was a priest named Gibault. When called upon, he immediately left for Vincennes. On his arrival, he summoned the people to the church, and, as an ecclesiastic, absolved them from the oath they had taken to the king and administered another of fidelity to congress. In consequence of these preliminaries, of which Clark was notified by Gibault, he sent one of his captains to fort Sackville, and no opposition was offered to his taking possession of the place.

Hamilton, in his correspondence, shews that he was much affected by these proceedings, and Haldimand, when informed of the loss of the Illinois, wrote both to Hamilton and de Peyster, and pressed the consideration of the possibility of regaining possession of them.

In consequence, an attempt was made to call out the Ouiatanon Indians, and de Céleron was despatched to them with belts and friendly messages, to ask their services in the field.

Hamilton formed the opinion that the first step towards regaining possession of the territory was by taking Vincennes, and making it the base of his future operations. Geographically† it offered many advantages in this respect ; the chief difficulty lay in the transport of provisions there. Moreover, Vincennes could be so easily assailed from the Ohio that a large force would be necessary to hold the place ; especially during the period that an expedition was absent with the view of regaining the Illinois. The defect of Hamilton's mind was that he failed to conceive the magnitude of the task he was undertaking. When the crisis came, he had thirty-seven men only who were prepared to join in the defence, and

* [Can. Arch., Q. 15, p. 230.]

† I beg leave to refer my readers to the map in Vol. V., p. 1, on which the places named in the text are shewn.

six of them were wounded. The only chance of success was with a picked force of strength, fully provided, every man of which could be relied upon.

Hamilton, however, commenced his organization. He received every assistance from Lernoult, the commanding officer at Detroit, who permitted some of the men of the 8th to volunteer; he was also aided by de Peyster, at Michillimackinac, who encouraged the Indians to join the expedition. Hamilton's chief duty was to collect provisions, and he was occupied during August and September in obtaining a sufficient quantity. His force consisted of an officer and two men of the royal artillery, two sergeants and thirty men of the 8th regiment, with seventy volunteers from the Detroit militia, under captain Lamothe. One of Hamilton's earliest attempts upon arriving at Detroit had been the organization of the militia, and he had been enabled to report that there were seven companies, duly officered, the whole amounting to 530 men. It was from this body that the volunteers were obtained.

Owing to the delay attendant on these proceedings, Hamilton was unable to move before October. A solemn mass was held for the Canadian militia, which constituted the greater part of his force, by the missionary present, the jesuit father Potier, who, in giving them his blessing, called upon them to remember their oath of allegiance and to shew their gratitude to the king who had granted them his favour beyond their expectation.

The expedition started down the Detroit river on the 7th of October. Owing to being impeded by a snowstorm, and to the navigation becoming difficult, they landed and encamped. On the 9th they recommenced their journey, with the design of making the traverse direct from lake Erie to the river Maumee. The waters of the lake were without movement; the storm had passed away, and it was considered that this attempt, which involved the distance of only 36 miles, could be safely made. The days close early in October, and the boats were rowed forward in darkness, guided by the light

of the leading craft. Towards eleven, the wind arose and the rain began to pour in torrents. The swell increased, so as to endanger the safety of the detachment. The rowers turned the bows to the waves, as the best means of encountering the swell. The boats became separated. They were again assembled, and it was judged prudent to make for the land; they reached the shore safely. The night, however, remained one of privation; the men could not pitch their tents and were forced to remain in the rain without food. When morning came, they found they were fortunately within a mile of their destination, the mouth of the Maumee.

The boats ascended the stream to the foot of the rapids, the limit of navigation. They here found the schooner which had preceded them, with fourteen tons of provisions. Placing the provisions in their boats, they continued their journey to the Miami village, as it was called. The river was low and the labour of ascent very great, for in the spots of shallow water the boats had to be lightened, and the loads carried to the stream where it was navigable. Fourteen days elapsed before the village was reached. It was here that the portage, nine miles in length, was taken to *la Petite Rivière*, one of the sources of the Wabash. As they proceeded on their journey the weather had become colder. There was a more frequent recurrence of the shallow spots, and an attempt to float the boats was made by breaking down the beaver dams, but the relief was of short duration. The river, likewise, became full of floating ice; the men suffered in forcing their way, and the boats were injured. The latter were repaired, so they could be dragged over the shoals and rocks, but there were places where the provisions had to be unloaded from the canoes and carried on the shoulders of the men. The journey was made only with trying labour and amid great difficulties. All present were subjected to a succession of hardships, which were patiently borne and overcome with much endurance. Finally, they approached the spot where their labours were to cease, to reach which they had passed through so much suffering.

Within a short distance of Vincennes a few men were taken prisoners ; a scouting party sent out by Helm, the congress officer then in command at Vincennes. The officer in charge was in possession of two commissions : one signed by Abbot, the British governor ; the second by Clark, on the part of congress. He afterwards related that, seeing the Indians, he had looked forward to be tortured and killed ; but he met no violence, and soon felt at his ease. Hamilton himself relates the leniency with which he treated the prisoners, in the hope of conciliating the inhabitants of Vincennes. He simply held them in confinement, while he was advancing towards fort Sackville.

Hamilton went onward to Vincennes, and summoned the officer in command, Helm. Only a few men remained to support him, the greater number had deserted, and they were the men belonging to Vincennes. Resistance was not possible : he surrendered on the 17th of December, under promise of fair treatment for himself and his small force : a condition fully observed. The fort was plundered by the Indians, but no personal cruelty or wrong was perpetrated. Indeed, the whole body had shewed not simply fortitude and endurance during those trying 71 days which the journey occupied, but discipline had been fully maintained. There had not been a single case of drunkenness, and the men were in excellent health and condition.

It was only as a base for some ulterior operation, to regain possession of the Illinois, that the expedition could be justified. The fort was only so by name, being simply surrounded by a stockade fence without any *banquette* for musketry discharge, and it was at the mercy of a gun of ordinary calibre. There was no barrack for the troops ; not even a well. No place could be more indefensible. A small population surrounded the fort, the commencement of settlement. On being numbered by Hamilton, the inhabitants were found to amount to 621 of both sexes and all ages, 217 of whom were capable of bearing arms, and at this time several were absent on hunting expeditions.

They had been induced by the priest Gibault to swear fidelity to congress, and had been furnished with arms for defence of the post. Upon hearing of the advance of Hamilton, they had to a man abandoned the place. They now again pledged their fidelity to Great Britain, and, repudiating with some ceremony in the church the obligation taken to congress, renewed their oath of loyalty. Several of them had received arms and had been incorporated into companies. The officers who had received commissions from Clark, as the representative of the province of Virginia, resigned them to Hamilton and accepted new commissions to serve the crown. The arms were restored to the men, and they were enrolled among Hamilton's force.

Hamilton hesitated as to the course he should pursue ; whether to proceed to Kaskaskia and drive out Clark's force in possession, or to remain at Vincennes until the spring, when he would be sufficiently reinforced. With increased strength, he would be able to advance into the Illinois country and leave behind a garrison sufficient to hold Vincennes. He determined on the latter course. He shewed energy in his preparations for the defence of the place ; he built barracks for four companies, with a guard-house, and sank a well ; he erected two block-houses of oak, with embrasures for five cannon ; he altered and lined the stockade, and laid the parade ground with gravel. By the end of February he had made the fort tenable. But he was in a position where everything was against him. The whole population was disaffected ; he could not rely on even the men who had accompanied him from Detroit. Observing a strong feeling of discontent among them, he permitted a certain number to return to Detroit. On the 30th of January his small garrison was reduced to ninety-five men of all ranks, fifty of whom were volunteers from the Detroit militia. With this small force he was removed from all hope of assistance, and there was no place whence he could obtain supplies ; he was entirely dependent on Detroit. His Indian scouts were active in preventing the transmission of the news of his arrival, but Hamilton

knew that the place abounded with men ready to give full information of his strength and his situation.

To add to his anxieties, a corporal and six men deserted, taking with them a canoe and some of the officers' baggage. The impression was formed that they had gone to Kaskaskia. One of the party was a brother of the priest Gibault, described by Hamilton as being in a vicious community the most eminently vicious and scandalous. By these means Hamilton's occupation of Vincennes became known to Clark, then at Kaskaskia, on the Illinois. Clark acted with the courage and determination of his character. He subsequently told Hamilton he knew precisely the opposition he would meet, and the number of the men on whom Hamilton could depend. They were simply the detachment of the 8th, while he himself could count upon the non-resistance of the Detroit volunteers. He had received information that they were prepared to join the inhabitants of Vincennes, all of whom were ready to abandon the British. Clark gathered some 170 men, and, with slight preparation, marched forward to attack Hamilton at his post.

Clark shewed energy and resolution in undertaking the expedition. He had but slender means of sustenance and only a poor supply of powder. He had, however, been confidently assured that all he required would be furnished to him by the people of Vincennes. His march had its privations and was attended with that demand on strength and endurance called for at that season; but it in no way differed from a winter march in that territory, and the exaggerated accounts concerning it are inadmissible. It was, however, boldly and successfully accomplished.

On the 22nd, Maisonville, who had been sent out on the scout and had brought in two Virginian prisoners, returned with the report that, four leagues below the fort, he had seen evidences of the presence of a party and had counted fourteen fires. It was not welcome intelligence. Hamilton despatched a party of 20 men under captain Lamothe on a reconnaissance, to learn whether or not they were Indians.

Maisonville, although just returned, agreed to act as their guide. The men lost their way, and when night came on they were apprized by the firing of a cannon from fort Sackville that the place was attacked. They concealed themselves in a barn. From time to time, a member of the party was sent out to obtain information ; the men who belonged to the Detroit militia never returned, and Maisonville was betrayed by his own cousin into the power of Clark.

Hamilton called together the militia present in the fort under arms ; the major, one of the captains, and seven men were absent. During the day no movement was made, but as evening came on, about five minutes after the candles were lit, as Hamilton expresses it, the report of musketry was heard. There was no certainty whence it arose, but doubts were soon dispelled, for one of the sergeants was wounded. McBeath, the surgeon, was in the village when he heard the shots. He was told by the woman of the house that Clark was present with 500 men, and, to avoid being made prisoner, he started to reach the fort gate. He gained the fort, narrowly escaping being shot.

The night was dark, Clark's men lay concealed amid the houses and near the church ; they were, however, driven out from this spot by the small gun served from the block-house, not before a gunner and five men had been wounded : one-sixth of Hamilton's reliable force. An hour before daylight Lamothe's party returned, having climbed over the stockade eleven feet in height. Two of them had deserted and Maisonville was a prisoner.

At 8 o'clock on the following morning, a captain of the Vincennes militia brought a letter from Clark requiring a surrender at discretion, and also notifying Hamilton that if he destroyed either the provisions or his papers he would be treated as a murderer. Hamilton called out the men on parade and addressed them. The 8th, as British soldiers, declared they were ready to perform their duty, and gave three cheers ; the Detroit volunteers hung their heads in silence. Hamilton replied to the demand that threats would

not prevent him doing his duty. He was, however, soon made to understand that defence was impossible. Lamothe's volunteers began to murmur, and to say that it was hard to fight against their relations and countrymen; and they had all joined Clark. The small detachment of the 8th was his only reliance. In this position Hamilton had no alternative but to surrender. The terms granted were, that the few men were to march out with fixed bayonets and to become prisoners of war; the arms, accoutrements and knapsacks to be delivered up; the officers to be allowed their necessary baggage; the fort to be given over on the 25th. Three days were allowed to settle the accounts in the village.

Hamilton, hearing that Clark had ordered neck-irons and handcuffs, with the avowed purpose of using them with the officers "who had acted as partisans of the Indians," sought the opportunity of telling Clark that they were prisoners of war, included in the capitulation. Clark replied that his resolution was formed; that he had made a vow never to spare man, woman or child of the Indians or those employed with them. Hamilton justified the conduct of the officers of the detachment who had acted under his orders, and declared that they had never permitted or justified cruelty. If any one were to blame, it was he. Clark gave no reply. Shortly afterwards a young man named Raimbaut, who had been absent with a scouting party, was brought in with a halter round his neck, the intention being to hang him. He was saved only by the expostulation of the Illinois volunteers, some of whom were his relations.

An event took place during the truce, when the conditions of surrender were being discussed, which shewed that Clark's expressed sentiments were not a mere matter of speech; in itself an act of perfidy and cruelty.

Fifteen Indians returning to the post from a scouting expedition, seeing the British flag on the staff, and being ignorant of the state of the siege, as was their custom on approaching the fort, discharged their muskets as a salute. They were proceeding without suspicion, when suddenly a fire

was opened upon them. Two fell dead; one was wounded, and, strange to add, he was the only one who afterwards escaped; the remainder were surrounded and shot down. Some United States writers endeavour to justify this slaughter by describing these Indians as having returned from some scalping expedition. The fact is disproved by Hamilton's statement. Those who had not been killed were bound, taken into the village, placed in a circle, and tomahawked one after the other; their scalps were subsequently affixed near the British tents. This act took place during the truce.

The cruelty practised on Maisenville was a more disgraceful act of atrocity, and was, moreover, perpetrated under the personal direction of Clark. One of his Illinois force was ordered to scalp Maisenville, and the operation was commenced. Maisenville sat unmoved; the man faltered and hesitated in the execution of his bloody duty. He was urged forward by Clark with oaths and reproaches. Fortunately for Maisenville, a near relation had joined Clark's force, and his expostulations, aided by those of his friends, prevented the continuance of this ruthless proceeding. It may be said of Maisenville, that the cruelty and persecution he suffered, and the months of hardship and tribulation he endured, finally affected his reason; and some months afterwards he committed suicide in prison.

The spirit of Clark extended to his force. During the few days Hamilton remained at the fort, he was warned that several of them had declared that they would have his life, with that of the Indian agent, colonel Hay. On one occasion a drunken knot of men threatened to shoot them in their tent, and they were driven to take refuge in Clark's quarters.

On the 5th of March Dejean of Detroit was brought in a prisoner with Adhémar. The latter had been sent in charge of some boats with provisions. Dejean had volunteered to accompany the party to bring the letters, and to visit the country. When they reached Ouatanon, they were seized and brought to Vincennes.

On the 8th of March the prisoners were sent to their desti-

nation ; the officer's baggage had been placed in the possession of Clark ; it was not permitted to be taken away by its owners and was permanently retained by him. The surgeon's medicines and instruments were likewise appropriated. The prisoners, 27 in number, were placed in a heavy oaken boat, accompanied by a guard of 23 men. They had before them 300 miles of water and 840 of land, to reach Williamsburg in Virginia. The waters of the Ohio were 18 feet above the summer level, running with an exceedingly swift current. The labour of working the heavy boat up stream was very great ; all had to take a turn at the oar. The guard which attended the prisoners was distributed in light boats. At night, it not being possible to land, the prisoners' boat was fastened to a tree. The unhappy men, without any protection, used some of their blankets with the aid of their oars to extemporize shelter against the rain ; and in order to sleep they had to lie their length in the cramped space at the bottom of the boat. There was not room sufficient, and they had "to pack themselves like swine." The guard did not behave unkindly ; they aided the prisoners with food, who would otherwise have been nearly starved. There was little discipline observed, and it appeared feasible to Hamilton, that his party could, with no great effort, master the escort and descend the Ohio to the Mississippi, and thence make their way to Natchez, then held by British troops. The attempt itself was desperate in every sense ; and it was considered that it would cost the lives of the six wounded men left behind at Vincennes.

A landing was finally made on the 30th of March. The horses promised by Clark were not present, so the march was commenced without them. It was continued until the 15th of June to Chesterfield, when an officer appeared with an order, signed by Jefferson, to take Hamilton handcuffed to Williamsburg. He was placed on a horse, no servant being allowed to attend him, his valise strapped behind him. Lamothe experienced the same treatment. The handcuffs brought were too tight, causing Hamilton pain ; they were,

however, enlarged at a blacksmith's shop. On the 2nd of July, after the sixty days' journey had been performed, sometimes on foot, sometimes mounted, they reached Williamsburg. Hamilton was kept standing in the sleet outside Jefferson's door, his clothes drenched with rain, hungry and thirsty, not even a cup of water being offered to him. From this place he was transferred to a cell not ten feet square. On entering he found Dejean, also handcuffed, and five criminals. The floor was the prisoners' bed.

The succeeding day the five prisoners were placed in an adjoining cell; the handcuffs were exchanged for fetters: Hamilton has recorded that the weight of those allotted to him was 18 lbs. 8 oz. Several of the inhabitants attended to witness the ceremony of the transfer, among them some of the delegates to the legislature. Hamilton addressed them; he told those present that they were prisoners of war under the sanction of a capitulation, charged with no crime, and the ignominious manner in which they were treated was only a reproach to those who permitted it. He was prepared for any extremity, but he called upon them to witness that this punishment had been ordered before any inquiry had been made. He was heard in silence, but Hamilton believed that several who listened to him did not refuse their sympathy.

The prison itself was a place of torture. Light was admitted only through a grating looking upon a court twenty feet square with walls thirty feet high. The door was never opened but to bring in water. The conveniences of the place emitted a vapour which was suffocating. The consequence was, that all the prisoners became covered with vermin, and their health was sinking under the accumulated poison of the fetid air, want of exercise, insufficient food and mental depression.*

* There is a paper on record issued by the council at Williamsburg justifying this conduct. The original in the imperial archives, in the copy which we possess, is stated to be in print [Can. Arch., B. 122, p. 356.]. It is without date, but from a letter appended it may be assigned to July, 1779. In its way it is a curiosity. It sets forth "that governor Hamilton had incited the Indians to perpetuate their accustomed cruelties to the citizens of these states without distinction

The jailer, one Pelham, performed his duty as considerably as circumstances permitted. Obtaining paper and ink, Hamilton in a letter asked the jailer to send a communication to the lieutenant-governor, for Jefferson had gone from Williamsburg, leaving the prisoners to their fate. The jailer refused to be the intermediary. Hamilton therefore forwarded his letter himself: he asked for an examination into his own conduct, and stated that he was responsible for what had been done by Dejean and Hay. The only notice taken of the communication was, that the use of paper and ink was denied him and no one was to be permitted to converse with him.

On the 31st of August Hay arrived with the other prisoners. The soldiers were confined in the old debtors' room. The officers, five in number, were added to the dungeon, so the heat was almost unbearable. The surgeon became so ill that the jailer removed him to his own quarters.

Even the criminals in the adjoining cells took pity on these

of age, sex or condition, with an eagerness and activity which evince that the general nature of the charge harmonized with his particular disposition."

The document proceeds to state "that the conduct of the British officers, civil and military, has in its general tenor through the whole course of this war been savage and unprecedented among civilized nations, that our officers and soldiers taken by them have been loaded with irons, consigned to loathsome and crowded jails and dungeons and prison ships, supplied often with no food, generally with too little for the sustenance of nature, and, that little sometimes unsound and unwholesome, whereby so many of them have perished, that captivity and miserable death have with them been almost synonymous; that they have been transported beyond seas where their fate is out of the reach of our enquiry; have been compelled to take arms against their country and by a new refinement in cruelty to become the murderers of their own brethren."

"Their prisoners with us have, on the other hand, been treated with moderation and humanity, they have been fed on all occasions with wholesome and plentiful food, lodged comfortably, suffered to go at large within extensive tracts of country, treated with liberal hospitality, permitted to live in the families of our citizens, to labour for themselves, to acquire and to enjoy property and finally to participate of the principal benefits of society, while privileged from all burthens." With some additional matter of this character the Council draws the conclusion that the prisoners of war named should be put in irons, confined in the dungeon of the public jail, debarred the use of pen, ink and paper and excluded all converse except with their keeper.

"Approved by the Governor" [Mr. Jefferson !]

unhappy men. They volunteered to be locked up and debarred the use of the yard, when Hamilton and the others were admitted there for exercise and such air as it afforded. Finally, this indulgence was conceded. They shewed their sympathy by performing many kind offices; they aided the British prisoners to clean out their cells, shewed them how to manage their fetters, and taught them to wrap them in rags. They behaved even with great delicacy: when Hamilton and the others sat down in the court to eat, the men withdrew.

Hamilton finally, attacked by a fit of the gout, obtained the services of a surgeon of the place. The latter shewed much kindness, and caused the removal of the fetters, and the substitution of handcuffs. Fortunately the handcuffs selected were so large that Hamilton could slip his hand through them, and the imposition was but nominal.

General Philipps, then in command of the convention troops of Burgoyne's surrender, sent a letter of credit for Hamilton's use, the communication passing through the Virginia council. Hamilton was thus enabled to obtain proper food, and to aid the prisoners whose good offices he had experienced. But on his refusal to sign the parole offered him, the permission to purchase this food was withdrawn, and it was again reduced to rations of Indian meal, salt beef and water.

Hamilton contrived to make his situation known to Haldimand in Quebec. Haldimand in consequence directly addressed Washington.* He enclosed the letter to Clinton, and left it to his judgment whether it should be forwarded or not. The letter being placed on record is proof that it was sent.

Haldimand, after protesting against the treatment meted out to Hamilton, said that he would be justified if he were to proceed immediately to inflict the same cruel confinement on American officers, without distinction, who were in his power. He had, however, forbore from imitating the example until he gave general Washington an opportunity of employing his

* [Can. Arch., Q. 16.2, p. 371. 29th August, 1779. Haldimand to Washington.]

influence to stop proceedings which "are so disgraceful to humanity." He proposed an exchange of the prisoners. Haldimand counted upon Washington's endeavour to prevent such distress from being the unavoidable lot of all prisoners of war, and he would be glad if the answer he received would justify the continued exercise of humanity he had "hitherto shewn," "notwithstanding," adds Haldimand, "the unreasonable delay in performing the sacred promises made in releasing the prisoners taken at the Cedars in 1776." Haldimand concluded by stating in temperate language, but firmly, how repugnant to his feeling as a man retaliation in cruelty would be, but his duty to the king's service and his sense of public justice would oblige him to follow the example given him, unless he perceived that the Americans were disposed to act upon the same generous principles which had hitherto guided his own conduct.

This letter had to pass from Quebec to Halifax and thence to New York, and be placed in Clinton's hands, before it could be forwarded to Washington. Even when it reached that stage, it was only preliminary to Washington's address to the legislature of Virginia. There cannot be a doubt that the letter worked its influence. Washington's mind was differently constituted from that of Jefferson. Although no one could be firmer in the stern discharge of his duty, he abhorred petty persecution. Some months, however, elapsed before Hamilton was exchanged.

Hamilton refused the parole first offered to him, on the ground that its wording placed him at the mercy of any miserable informer, whose false testimony might again cause his imprisonment, with the reproach that he had broken his parole.

Christmas of 1779 was exceedingly cold in Virginia. The prisoners were without fuel, and the only recourse left them was to lie all day wrapped in their blankets. The consequence of all this ill treatment was that scurvy appeared among them. Owing to the severity of the weather, the soldiers of the 8th who were prisoners were sent to the congress barracks to cut

wood, a portion of which found its way to the jail. The guard at the jail even gave for the prisoners' use some of the wood allowed them. The jailer removed Hamilton and the others to an upper room during the day. There were no windows, but there was an open grate where a fire could be lit ; at night, they were removed to their dungeon.

In April, 1780, Rocheblave, who had been brought here a prisoner from the Illinois with lieutenant Schieffelin, managed to escape and reached New York. In June Maisenville, whose mind had been shattered by the sufferings he had undergone, committed suicide. Months passed, and the confinement continued. A change was then made ; Dejean and Lamothe accepted the parole offered them. The surgeon and Bellefeuille were sent to King William court-house. Hamilton and Hay were transferred to Chesterfield ; at this place they were treated courteously and kindly. We may ask, was it owing to Washington's intervention? The parole was a second time offered to Hamilton, but he again rejected it. Circumstances were, however, taking place to lead to Hamilton's release. Colonel Fowler, who had been for some time a prisoner at Long island, arrived on parole to effect an exchange. Hamilton's friends assured him that unless he accepted the parole, no exchange affecting him could be made. Accordingly he and Hay signed a parole, with leave to proceed to New York.

In October he left in a small schooner, paying \$400 for the passage, in hard money. He experienced a series of storms, and narrowly escaped shipwreck. He arrived, however, safely, in ragged clothes and worn-out shoes, so squalid in look, and altered in face and figure, as scarcely to be recognizable. His exchange was finally effected on the 4th of March. Leaving Sandy Hook on the 27th of May he arrived at Falmouth on the 21st of June, 1781. Hamilton had remained in confinement eighteen months, experiencing the severe treatment described.

I have bestowed some attention on this forgotten event, for it proved to be more historically important than it was con-

sidered at the time. It really determined which power should hereafter possess the country of the Illinois and the territory north of the Ohio to lake Erie. Hamilton's failure made it plain to Haldimand that any attempt to regain Vincennes was impracticable. A paper of his is extant, in which he criticises Hamilton's report of his position in Vincennes in anything but a friendly tone.* It has the appearance of notes thrown together for future reference. From these remarks it is evident that he considered the expedition had been undertaken with no definite view ; that Hamilton had trusted to be sustained by reinforcements and powerful support, and further to be countenanced by definite orders as to his future, rather than follow his own well considered determination. As there were not troops in Canada to make good the occupation, as often happens in war, Hamilton only created for himself a position of difficulty, in which he succumbed.

Modern warfare demands the exercise of higher qualities than personal courage and chivalrous devotion to duty. Necessary as these qualities are to the character of a great soldier, intellect and judgment are also indispensable to conceive the operations of a campaign. They must be accompanied by the foresight to anticipate the issues involved, and be attended by the readiness of resource which can find means of deriving advantage even in the hour of defeat. Applying this higher standard to Hamilton's attempt, we can discover no argument to sustain it. The place was difficult of access from Detroit, while it could be approached without much effort from the Illinois to the north-west, and from the south by the Ohio and the Wabash.

The frontiers of Pennsylvania and Virginia contained a bold, active population, ready for adventure, who had accepted the cause of the revolution with zeal and devotion. They had no clear conception of any abstract theories of right or of political liberty. They suffered under what they held to be a personal grievance. The proclamation of 1763 regulat-

* [Can. Arch. B. 122, p. 247. Remarks on Lt.-Gov. Hamilton's letter of 18th December, 1778 ; undated.]

ing the acquisition of Indian lands was regarded by them as a positive wrong. The prevention of the spoliation of the Indian was the great cause of dissatisfaction in the western country. It formed one of the specified grievances of the declaration of independence, and the opportunity of being relieved from what the western backwoodsman held to be an intolerable injustice awoke his passions and sharpened his hatred against the mother country. He became personally interested in taking his place in the field, when the circumstances presented themselves for the acquisition of the coveted territory. In any system of irregular warfare the backwoodsman was formidable. He had strength, courage, was inured to fatigue, was used to firearms, and an undaunted bush fighter.

This spirit had now been fully aroused. Even if the Illinois had been re-taken and Vincennes for a time held, it would only have been possible to keep them in possession by a strong force, and the troops were not in the province to send there. The expense of sustaining such a body of men would have been immense, and there would have always been the danger of convoys being assailed and cut off.

There cannot be a doubt that these considerations prevailed at the peace when the frontier was adjusted, four years later, and to my mind the operations by Hamilton had much to do in suggesting them. Some modern writers in Canada, as they look on the map, have described the boundary line passing by the lakes as an abandonment of British territory. They have conceived that the states of Ohio, Indiana, Michigan and Illinois should not have been given up, and that they should never have been recognized as a part of the United States. Had this view prevailed, and the frontier been drawn at the western boundaries of Pennsylvania and Virginia, and to the south by the Ohio, it would have been impossible to have held the country without strongly garrisoned military posts, the maintenance of which would have exacted a large annual expenditure. Great Britain was tired of war and of the burdens it had exacted, and no such vote could have been carried in the house of commons.

Conceding the desire to hold the territory, and the willingness to meet the demands attendant on its possession, its occupation would have soon furnished the cause of another dispute. In a few years the aggressive spirit of the frontier backwoodsmen would have made itself felt. These men would never have consented to be restrained from further settlement west by any arbitrary power, and there was no population to oppose their constant inroads. The one defence would have been the British garrisons. The French Canadian inhabitants of Detroit and of the Illinois furnished no strength. We should simply have had a repetition of the scenes I have described at the Illinois and at Vincennes. Western Canada was a wilderness. Except the garrison at the Cedars, some stray settlers at Vaudreuil, and the Indian settlements of Saint Regis, there was not even a shanty constructed on the whole extent of country between the island of Montreal and the Detroit river. Thus there were no means of sending a population to the territory to occupy it, except the French Canadians of the west, and they had shewn they would not have fired a shot in its defence.

One of the wisest provisions in the treaty of Versailles was the establishment of the boundary where it is at present traced, and that this decision was formed I consider is in no small degree attributable to the unfortunate expedition of Hamilton, which I have felt it a duty to describe.

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
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